Introduction to Ethics - PHIL 212 at Wesleyan University • • • • • Show contents «

!!!Nietzsche distinguishes two archetypes of moral attitudes, “master-morality” and “slave-morality,” commenting about them in ways that suggest…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) “Master-morality” is admirable in prioritizing the will to power over the mere will to self-preservation.]>
{{green{Yes. Gay Science 349
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Law and political constraint are held in contempt by those who embrace master morality, because they do not allow a strong person to realize his or her will to power.]>
{{red{No... 204
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Utilitarians and Marxists aspire to treat everyone equally, while an Aristocratic attitude does not involve anything like respect or reciprocity.]>
{{red{No... Note, in Gay Science, that the Aristocratic attitude (”master morality”) does involve “respect among equals” — but only among equals within a social order, nothing like a universal grounds for respect across all humanity.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) A wise person would call for the return to the old aristocratic values exemplified in the “master-morality.”.]>
{{red{No... 1007-1109, 1014
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the emergence of “slave-morality” results from a lack of creativity among inferior people.]>
{{red{No... In fact, there’s an ironic respect Nietzsche shows for the creativity of those who “invented” such a distinctive approach to values.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Aristotle, virtue requires not just correct action, but correct perception and emotion. For example,…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The virtuous person always finds the correct action to be pleasurable.]>
{{red{No... The virtuous disposition involves the right pleasures and pains. Furthermore, the virtuous person is never pained by the thought of virtue. Still, virtuous choices may be painful in the ordinary sense; for example, a brave person risks injury and faces challenges even while in pain.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The virtuous person does not feel anger, although she has a keen sense of justice.]>
{{red{No... The virtue translated as “gentleness” is not freedom from anger; note “inirascibility” (failure to be roused to anger) is a vice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The “great-souled” person has various positive and negative attitudes that revolve around their interactions with others of high and low status.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle certainly makes room for such perception (1124b), though he also suggests that the magnanimous person does not enjoy “impressing” those who are inferior, and that is vulgar (1124b).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) The right sense of humor is part of Aristotle’s ethical ideal.]>
{{green{Yes. Clearly, Aristotle’s “wit” is not just an external performance, but a kind of attunement to the appropriate level of humor.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Courageous people are doing more than acting unafraid; they no longer experience the emotion of fear.]>
{{red{No... Courage is not lack of fear; indeed, fearing the right things is part of the wisdom of the brave person.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Virtue and vice, on Aristotle’s view, are found only in voluntary action. Hence…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Even when a person acts deliberately and for a reason, some aspects of their action may be non-voluntary, and hence not subject to blame.]>
{{green{Yes. in Book 3, Aristotle begins by carefully distinguishing the “nonvoluntary” from the “involuntary”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Someone who voluntarily acts in accord with the rules of justice is showing the virtue of justice.]>
{{red{No... Virtue requires more that acting in accord with rules; it requires that action flow from the right feelings, perceptions, and habits.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) As Socrates argued, no person willingly chooses to act badly; so strictly speaking, vice is not voluntary, but virtue is.]>
{{red{No... Book 3 Ch 5 (right before this section) is all about this claim, but Aristotle is arguing against it.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Emotions such as pleasure and spiritedness do not have any role in virtue; their influence prevents us from acting deliberately and rationally.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle certainly values deliberate rationality, but not entirely to the exclusion of emotion, which (if it is well-trained) helps orient us to worthy action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) A poor person usually cannot be blamed for being poor, so money is irrelevant to the virtues of character.]>
{{red{No... This is a common view now, but it is not Aristotle’s view. Note, however, that he’s not claiming that money is sufficient for any virtue, nor that one can’t have the virtue while happening to be poor *now* — just that one cannot develop the virtues of handling resources unless one sometime has had the opportunity to practice using them.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Marx’s philosophical stance has been called “materialism” —&nbsp;specifically a dialectical and historical materialism. According to this form of materialism…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we can make no a priori claims about human consciousness.]>
{{green{Yes. 224-225
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) philosophical ideas are true only insofar as they satisfy market demands at a specific moment in history.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) patterns of economic interaction, and historical changes in these, explain trends in philosophy, which in turn influence material life.]>
{{green{Yes. 226
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) The value of a philosophical text is determined by the amount of labor that goes into it.]>
{{red{No... This would be a catchy parody of Marx’s views, but no form of “labor” counts as labor unless it helps meet human needs, and not all philosophy does so.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Human life, like other forms of animal life, revolve around needs and interests, and these interests motivate the production of both ordinary physical goods and ideas.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

|>|>|!IMPERATIVES articulate commands...|
|!+++[CATEGORICALLY...]when they promote what is good in itself<br>for no further purpose<br>===|>|!+++[HYPOTHETICALLY...]when they promote something good as means<br>for either a ''possible'' or an ''actual'' purpose===|
|Commands of ''morality'' (moral imperative)|Imperatives of ''skill'' (technical)|Counsels of ''prudence'' (pragmatic)|
|>|>|Q:  how is each kind of imperative (necessitation) possible?|
|+++[...]But for moral imperative, it cannot be shown by means of an example that moral law ever does determine the will without incentives. So it must be investigated a priori<br>===|Anyone who wills //anything// must recognize imperatives of skill: <br>to will an end is to will the means (this is an analytic claim).|For happiness, we lack a determinate concept (418)... We cannot know for certain what will bring us happiness. So "imperatives" of prudence do not really command; they are "counsels" only. But there is no difficulty in understanding the possibility, since (virtually) everyone //does// seek happiness.|

!!!In reading Marx, we find hints of his view of human nature. On that view…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) human nature itself is constantly evolving with historical circumstances.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) human nature has been corrupted by capitalism, and needs to be returned to a more organic pre-industrial economy.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) human motivation is naturally governed by the desire to maximize material gain.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) humans are distinguished from other animals by a capacity to transcend the world of material needs.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) praxis, or the “self-activity” of transforming the material world, is essential to human well-being.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Based on clues in the Euthyphro, a definition of piety that would be acceptable to Socrates…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) is impossible.]>
{{red{No... There’s //room// to think a definition is impossible, and many atheist thinkers are inspired by the Euthyphro. However, it’s not at all //established by// the text; Socrates himself never distances himself from piety, and leaves room for a good definition.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) might essentially involve some kind of service to the gods, but it would involve more than “taking care of” them or their needs.]>
{{green{Yes. Note this is the only suggestion that is abandoned (by Euthyphro, who cannot say anything about the //kind// of service it would be) rather than jointly refuted by dialogue. Also, this is one suggestion that has been fueled by Socrates’ own suggestions after Euthyphro falls short with his initial line of attempts.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) would take Socrates’ search for wisdom as a defining example.]>
{{red{No... Clearly a definition cannot revolve around examples, on Socrates’ view.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) would respect the divine will as establishing the standard of piety.]>
{{red{No... We have clues that Socrates would resist any account of the gods that makes them unreasonable, and hence makes piety a matter of blind obedience. However, this definition would at least have the virtue of a certain consistency.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) would recognize different individual definitions of piety, just as different gods love different things.]>
{{red{No... Any definition that simply embraces relativistic disagreement is no definition at all, for Socrates, as is illustrated by his complaint about Euthyphro’s first definition.
}}}
===
}}}

There are at least three formulations of the ''categorical imperative'', plus some variants:
+++!!!![UNIVERSAL LAW formulation:]
"Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law [of nature]." (421 )
===
+++!!!![END IN ITSELF formulation:]
"Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as and end and never simply as a means." (429)
===
+++!!!![KINGDOM OF ENDS formulation:]
"never to act on any maxim except such as can also be a universal law hence such as the will can thereby regard itself as at the same time the legislator of universal law." (434)
===

+++!!!![Kant enumerates some particular duties, 422:]
|bgcolor:#ffd; |!derivation of ''perfect duties''|!derivation of ''imperfect duties''|
|!to<br>self|1. A man reduced to despair ... feels sick of life. His ''maxim'' is this: //from self-love I make as my principle to shorten my life when its continued duration threatens more evil than it promises satisfaction.// (422)|3. A third finds in himself a talent whose cultivation could make him a man useful in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to bother himself about broadening and improving his fortunate natural aptitudes. ... ''maxim'' of //neglecting his natural gifts.//|
|~|maxim fails, revealing...<br>{{{[duty against suicide]}}}|maxim fails,revealing...<br>{{{[duty of self-cultivation]}}}|
|!to<br>others|2. Another man in need finds himself forced to borrow money. He knows well that he won’t  be able to repay it, but he sees also that he will not get any loan unless he firmly promises to repay it within a fixed time. ... The ''maxim'' of  his action would then be expressed as follows: //When I believe myself to be in need of money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back, although I know that I can never do so.//|4. A fourth man finds  things going well for himself but sees others (whom he could help) struggling with great hardships; and he thinks: what does it matter to me? //Let everybody be as happy as Heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take nothing from him nor even envy him; but I [will not] contribute anything to his well-being or to his assistance when in need.//|
|~|maxim fails, revealing...<br>{{{[duty against lying promises]}}}|maxim fails, revealing...<br> {{{[duty to give charitably]}}}|
|bgcolor:#ffd;  |+++[Such maxims fail because...]<br>when we try to conceive them as universal law, <br>the projected world turns out to be internally inconsistent.<br>Result of reflection: derivation of "perfect duties".<br>===|+++[Such maxims fail because...]<br>When they are conceived as universal laws, <br>they conflict with what we can intelligibly will.<br>Result of reflection: derivation of "imperfect duties".<br>===|
===
+++!!!![Three outcomes for a maxim tested by the categorical imperative in its universal law formulation...]
|>|!consistency|such action does not conflict with moral duty|
|~|~| ... //but note that we still cannot know whether duty is our actual motive.//|
|!inconsistency| ... in conception|''perfect duties'' prohibit committing such violations.|
|~| ... in willing|''imperfect duties'' require rejecting such maxims and acting positively against them.|

[img(100%,auto)[Kant's four examples|https://www.dropbox.com/s/qje8l2ltv9j0fr6/Kant%27s%204%20examples%20handout%20landscape.png?raw=1]]

!!!Kant claims that a rational being…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) does not really know how to make itself happy, but it knows that it is subject to moral laws.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is not necessarily a human being; thus moral requirements cannot depend on details of human nature.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) should avoid acting on any hypothetical imperatives.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) must never regard other rational beings as useful to us in reaching our own objectives.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) must ultimately obey only the laws she or he makes.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

[[Unit A]] (Authority and Conscience): Euthyphro, Crito, Epictetus, King
[[Unit B]] (Aristotelian Virtue & Flourishing): Aristotle1, Aristotle2, Aristotle3, (Nussbaum, for some semesters)
[[Unit C]] (Principles and Kantian Duties): Kant1, Kant2, Kant3, Korsgaard
+++!![Unit A question set (as discussed in class):]
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+++!![Unit B question set (as discussed in class):]
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+++!![Unit C question set (from in class):]
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The irony in this Socratic dialogue emerges in response to Euthyphro's confidence that he is an expert who can easily answer Socrates' question; his arrogance prevents him from recognizing that Socrates' questions represent deep problems. In taking notes on the dialogue, it is useful to recognize the sequence of proposals made by Euthyphro, and why each one fails. What exactly are the various @@hypotheses@@ Euthyphro offers in his attempt to define piety (hosion). What is the fate of each of those ideas when subjected to @@elenchus@@? For example, which idea does Socrates subject to a @@reductio ad absurdum@@ strategy?

The high point of the dialogue, 10a-11b, shows Euthyphro confronted with a @@dilemma@@ about the grounds for his moral confidence. What is the point of Socrates' questions about whether something is loved by the gods because it is god-beloved? How might this “Euthyphro dilemma” present analogies to difficult questions in other contexts, concerning things other than piety? 

Finally, note that this dialogue is @@[[aporetic|aporia]]@@. Have we found any clues as to what kind of account Socrates himself might accept about piety (or, perhaps, what [[Plato]] wished us to consider, using Socrates' voice)? Do you suppose that one of Euthyphro's suggestions could have been developed in some better way? Is there some //other// hypothesis that would have helped Euthyphro avoid the difficulties of the dialogue?
 
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Next reading: Crito

!!!In light of his discussion with Crito (taken as a whole), we can conclude that Socrates endorses the following ideas about acting rightly…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) One must conform to any just agreements one has made.]>
{{green{Yes. 49e: when one has come to an agreement that is just with someone, ... one should fulfill it.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) A person benefits more from acting rightly than from acting wrongly.]>
{{green{Yes. 48b: the most important thing is not life, but the good life... [which is the same ] the beautiful life, and the just life... 49b: wrongdoing is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) It is not right for people to cause harm in retaliation for the harms inflicted on them.]>
{{green{Yes. 49c: One should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man, whatever injury one has suffered at his hands.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) He must ultimately accept the beliefs that have been officially endorsed by the democratic majority.]>
{{red{No... 44c: Why should we care so much for what the majority think?  and 47a: one must not value all the opinions of men, but some and not others... [only] the good opinions ... of the wise.  50c does speak of “respecting the judgments” of the city, but that need not mean agreeing with the beliefs of the majority.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) It is always right for a person to follow the laws of the state, regardless of whether one has any say in those laws.]>
{{red{No... 52a: “Yet we only propose things, we do not issue savage commands to do whatever we order; we give two alternatives, either to persuade us or to do what we say. ...” This matter does seem pivotal to Socrates’ sense that his agreement with the city was a *just* one...
}}}
===
}}}

Socrates and Crito debate whether Socrates should elude an unfair death sentence. Socrates first addresses the question of whether one should attend to the opinion of the majority. What are the key steps in his argument against being swayed by majority opinion? Is there a tension between Socrates' lack of interest in the majority's opinion and his obedience to the laws of the Athenian democracy? 

In the course of the dialogue, many different kinds of basic grounds for moral conclusions are invoked by one or the other character. How many distinct kinds of concern do you find? When Socrates rests his case against escape, how much has his reasoning relied on particular premises about himself as an individual, and to what extent does he aim to reach general conclusions about anyone’s obligation to obey authority?

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back to [[Euthyphro]] ... forward to [[Epictetus]]

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!!!The character Euthyphro is portrayed (by Plato) as making various kinds of mistakes about how to offer a definition (or account of the concept) of piety. These mistakes include…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Giving a mere attribute of the concept rather than its definition.]>
{{green{Yes. At 11b, this is the complaint about the hypothesis from 9e
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Attempting to give an objective definition of something that is essentially subjective in nature.]>
{{red{No... This is a frequent complaint about definitions, and one of the early discussions (about divine disagreement) may *look* like this is Socrates' complaint. But Socrates is not making this point (and he actually hints that he himself is skeptical about all these accounts of divine disagreement). Even if the gods //disagree// about what things are X (what's pious, what's lovable, what's just, etc.), they (and we) must have some notion of what "X" means in the first place in order to begin to make sense of that claim that //there is something// about which they disagree! (And giving an account of that notion is exactly what the Greeks are trying to do when they seek the thing’s //logos//, which we translate as meaning/definition/account.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Giving a definition that leads, according to Euthyphro’s own beliefs, to contradictory claims.]>
{{green{Yes. At 8a, this is the end of the cross-examination of the hypothesis from 7a
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Giving a definition that is different from Socrates’ definition.]>
{{red{No... No; as frustrated as Euthyphro (and readers)  may be, Socrates does not allow his elenchus to focus on whether he disagrees, and Plato does not portray “disagreeing with Socrates” as the problem with any of what Euthyphro claims. The problem is, in each case, that Euthyphro’s own claims are not coherent with each other, and that Euthyphro himself recognizes the incoherencies. We do see a hint, late in the dialogue, about how Socrates might define piety, however.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Offering an example rather than an account of the concept itself.]>
{{green{Yes. At 6d, this is the complaint about what Euthyphro said at 5e (that piety means “doing what I am doing now”)
}}}
===
}}}

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!!!Wisdom, according to Epictetus, involves…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) willingness to devote effort and energy into one’s tasks and duties, but without concern for promotion or recognition.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. Although beginners may be advised to avoid competitive tasks (for risk of becoming preoccupied with winning or recognition), a stoic might embrace any task as worthwhile, but remain focused on aspects of the task that are entirely within one’s own control.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) acting in conformity with nature, which means behaving in all the ways that are typical of the human species.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus does urge us to act “in conformity with nature,” and yet he clearly doesn’t mean that we ought to embrace everything that’s typical of human behavior. So, the challenge is to read closely for a better understanding of what “conformity to nature” might mean, in Epictetus’ sense.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) scorning all emotions, and avoiding intimacy and family ties.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus counsels against living by one’s own emotions, but  neither intimacy nor family ties are ruled out. Indeed, family bonds and responsibilities are explicitly part of the lives Epictetus depicts as admirable.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) a tranquil state of mind, based on accepting that whatever one does will not matter in the end.]>
{{red{No... Though the wise stoic achieves tranquility, there is no suggestion that “whatever one does, it will not matter;” in a sense, the *only* thing that matters is how one chooses to act. Our choices matter, since they are “up to us.” 

(It’s true that in the future, we will not be anxious about whether we made the right choice today, but this fact does not make our current choice meaningless. It is also unwise to *judge* others’ actions once they have occurred, and unwise to blame. Again, neither of these entails that there is no difference between better and worse actions.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) being able to gain perspective on sensations and feelings, which tend be distorted by our particular point of view]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, recognizing that “appearances” may be misleading, and gaining an improved perspective on one’s experience, is a crucial aspect of stoic practice.
}}}
===
}}}

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!!!King’s discussion of justice…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) acknowledges that conscience differs and that some reasonable people believe segregation laws to be just.]>
{{red{No... Not only is this claim not directly made, but the notion that conscience is inscrutable and "subjective" plays no role in this text. Conscience, for King, is not the same as merely individual conviction; it is in fact //con-science// or the coming-together of knowledge, which involves a process rather than an obvious-sounding "voice in the head".
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) if applied to Socrates’ case, would imply that Socrates had a duty to defy his death sentence and escape.]>
{{red{No... King’s civil disobedience process requires submitting to legal penalties; clearly, King and Socrates do not differ substantially on this point.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) requires rejecting the Stoic idea that each person’s psychological well-being depends only on her or his own choice of perspective.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes! King says “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” implying that one can’t just be content to have one’s own “house in order” — one’s ability to thrive is bound up with events beyond one’s own control.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) implies that the world inevitably becomes less unjust over time.]>
{{red{No... Clearly, King argues against the “inevitability” of justice; progress is not “unavoidable,” but it comes only through efforts.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) requires support from Judeo-Christian premises in order to justify civil disobedience.]>
{{red{No (with some room for appeal)... Although King draws on Judeo-Christian premises for this particular audience, he also provides parallel arguments that appeal to secular public ideals. [Arguably, the discussion in this particular text does make an essential appeal to religious premises in order to persuade its audience -- though not in such a way as to imply that civil disobedience *needs* religious premises in order to be justified.]
}}}
===
}}}

!!!(Option A) Can moral conscience and self-interest conflict?
For each thinker you discuss, give an account of what "self-interest" (or happiness or well-being) would involve. Then describe the role for something we might call "conscience" or moral reflection. Given these accounts, should we expect these ideals to come into conflict? When, why, and how so? 
Make sure to offer reflections on whether the conflict is genuine and direct, or whether the conflict is only apparent and/or solvable.)

!!!According to Aristotle, virtue…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) depends upon having a good upbringing as well as various opportunities and resources with which to practice acting well.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is not up to us, because it is a matter of character, which is shaped by factors beyond our control.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle does not draw this conclusion; he argues that we must hold one another responsible for character.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is cultivated through wisely-chosen actions, which become habitual over time.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) requires acting according to the mean, always choosing the mean between the extremes that are possible for a given choice.]>
{{red{No... not exactly... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) is the capacity in one’s character for living well — for being happy, in Aristotle’s sense.]>
{{green{Yes. happiness depends on more things (such as how you die, the fortune of your kin etc) than just virtue, but virtue corresponds exactly to OUR contribution!
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Nussbaum’s view, Aristotle’s list of virtues…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) … was surely shaped by his cultural perspective, yet Aristotle himself acknowledged that cultural values can evolve and improve, and laws should be open to revision.]>
{{green{Yes. See Nussbaum’s §3, p. 205
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) … reflects his social status in Athenian society, and similar virtues are appreciated in other privileged social circles, regardless of cultural difference.]>
{{red{No... No, this simply isn’t claimed by Nussbaum. Of course, there’s some insight in seeing Aristotle’s list of virtues as especially informed by his social and economic privilege.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) … implies that there are challenging spheres of human choice that are generally shared, and that each sphere demands practice and educated judgment.]>
{{green{Yes. The shared problem is how to handle a challenging “sphere”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) … can each be understood “thinly” (in terms of their basic role and structure) or “thickly” (in terms of the detailed description of the virtuous state). ]>
{{green{Yes. This is the crucial distinction that drives Nussbaum’s argument for Aristotle’s value beyond his own culture — the theory of virtues, including a “thin” theory of their nature.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) … was valid and relevant for ancient Greek society, although people in other societies should be judged by their own list of virtues...]>
{{red{No... Nussbaum never endorses the kind of relativism that treats a person’s own evaluative perspective as the final reference-point for evaluating that person.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Acting out of good will, according to Kant,…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) is the only path to true human happiness.]>
{{red{No... No. It is the condition of being //worthy// of happiness -- which is quite different!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) does not require much specific experience in worldly affairs.]>
{{green{Yes. Correct. See AK 403: “Inexperienced in the course of the world and incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself whether I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) requires knowledge not of the specific effects of one’s particular action, but  of the general effects that would result if one’s maxim, or pattern of action, always guided everyone’s actions.]>
{{red{No... Kant will insist, here, that it is not the //effects// of the maxims being universally adopted that determine its moral worth; it is the logical consistency of that maxim.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) requires that we have been brought up to respect the moral law.]>
{{red{No... Respect for the moral law is crucial, but such respect is not “instilled” by education. It is “not received through any outside influence” but is “self-produced” (fn 14)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) means acting in opposition to our inclinations, which are by nature not morally worthy.]>
{{red{No... Careful! It’s true that inclination as such has no moral worth. However, acting on duty does not //require// acting in opposition to inclinations; sometimes inclinations may lean in a decent direction, though in such cases it is especially hard to be confident that good will would have sufficed to motivate us in the absence of the contingent inclination.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Dewey warns us against various habitual ways of drawing distinctions in moral philosophy and educational theory. For example, he is critical of how theorists tend to oppose…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) the “inner” and “outer” aspects of moral activity, which tend to be emphasized by different moral theories, taking turns as if a historical pendulum swings between them.]>
{{green{Yes. 346
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) selflessness (taken as a moral quality) and selfish or useful traits and abilities (taken to lack moral value).]>
{{green{Yes. 350, 357-8
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) between the educational phase of life and the world of real practical activity for which education prepares us.]>
{{green{Yes. 358
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) reductive economic conceptions of happiness and eudaimonistic ideals of well-being.]>
{{red{No... No. Dewey is clearly dissatisfied with reductively economic notions of wellbeing, but he does not attempt to discourage us from distinguishing these two concepts. Something like eudaimonia is closer to Dewey’s ideal than the various polar opposites discussed throughout this essay.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) intellect (knowledge and abstract reasoning) and individual personality (or character)]>
{{green{Yes. 354
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!![Crito discussion question]
<<tiddler [[Crito discussion question]]>>
===
+++!!![Philosophical Reasoning: argument]
While the Euthyphro ended with aporia, the Crito clearly builds toward a conclusion. What is the main conclusion?
//Method tip:// nominate potential conclusions, and check to see which one is most dependent on the other claims of the text.

===
+++!!![Mapping the Crito]
See handout. 
Two main premises:
# that life is worth living only if the soul is healthy -- i.e., if it is just
# that escaping his death sentence would constitute a significant injustice
===
+++!!![Reading for Tuesday: Epictetus]
# Attend to argument, metaphor, and distinctions.
# Write a passage commentary if it's your turn. Post it //by midnight//
# Take a look at other students' commentaries, if it's not your turn.
===
+++!!![Groups]
Add/Drop is nearly completed for this course. There will be a couple further shifts, and then we should be settled.
Make sure to coordinate scheduling of commentaries within your groups!
===

!Please find your name on one of the GROUP posters, and sit together as a group. 

!!!Sorting out enrollment +++
|CLASS IS FULL -- Four students on wait list have been invited to sit in just in case...|
===

!!!Name Cards+++
Please write out:
##   full name and nickname (preferred name for discussion purposes)
##   campus/cell phone (indicate if you prefer it to be confidential)
##   a potentially-philosophical question that you (or someone you know) have reflected on. 
##   one moral priority that matters to you
=== 
!!!Groups: +++
# Meet 
# Discuss the [[Introductory Group Question|01/24 Discussion Question]]
# Negotiate commentary schedule: one student per class session
===

!!!Course Overview+++
# Syllabus
# Assignments
# moodle
# Philosophical Reasoning
===

!!!Reading for Tuesday: Euthyphro +++
# Scan [[argument vocabulary|Definitions list]]; attend especially to:
## dialogue
## hypothesis
## elenchus
## premise
## reductio ad absurdum
## dilemma
## aporia
# Write a passage commentary if it's your turn. Post it at moodle //by midnight//
# Take a look at other students' commentaries, if it's not your turn.
===

[>img(20%,auto)[Ahmed|https://socialpolicyandthedorisdayfan.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/sara.jpg]]Sara Ahmed (1969–) is an interdisciplinary scholar who has contributed to [[phenomenology]], post-colonial and critical race theory, and feminist and queer theory.
----
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Key concepts:
;Existentialism (Marx, Beauvoir)
:There are subjects who existence runs ahead of their values; values //come into being//.
;Phenomenology
:study of the features of phenomena as they are experienced (often drawing on detailed, paradoxical description).
;Transvaluation
:Recasting of concepts so that their evaluative charge is shifted (from positive to negative, or from negative to positive).
;Affect
:"What creates the impression that objects have affective value" (p. 32)
;Affect aliens
:a gap, or lack of alignment, between social expectations for affect and actual experience of affect.
;False consciousness (from Marx)
:Inherited patterns of perception that cover over or obscure, even while pretending to illuminate reality.

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Shippensburg University adopted a campus policy limiting certain controversial speech, described by //The New York Times// (Apr 24, 2003) as follows:
|[The] code gives each student 'primary' right to be free from harassment, intimidation, physical harm or emotional abuse, and 'secondary' right to express personal belief system in manner that does not 'provoke, harass, demean, intimidate or harm' another; prohibits conduct that 'annoys, threatens, or alarms a person or group'; limits demonstrations and rallies to two specific 'speech zones' on campus.|
!!!!Altman’s arguments about campus speech policies would likely lead him to comment as follows:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that the above-described code is in fact a violation of the Constitutional right to free speech.]>
{{red{No... The Constitution is not mentioned by Altman, and it’s not obvious that college speech codes are governed by the Constitution’s First Amendment “freedom of speech” provision, since that directly prohibits only Congress from making laws that abridge speech. One might make the argument, however, that Shippensburg, being a state-supported school, is bound more tightly than entirely private institutions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that its demand not to demean others is unfairly biased against those whose belief systems necessarily involve degrading others.]>
{{red{No... Altman clearly does not think that it is “unfair” to prohibit acts of degradation, since these are ways of wronging people, not just the expression of viewpoints.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that “Millian” reasons (those advanced by John Stuart Mill) would support this code.]>
{{red{No... Mill argues for strong protections of liberty in speech, and Altman appeals to Mill in arguing against the prohibition of “merely harmful” speech.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that this code shares certain flaws with the University of Connecticut’s code, one of the most restrictive.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes -- in virtue of its focus on perlocutionary effects, it resembles the UConn code that Altman found problematically sweeping in its restrictiveness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that it targets speech based on harmful perlocutionary effects.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, annoying and alarming, for example, are clearly perlocutionary rather than illocutionary concepts.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!!*[302: Liberals can be found on both sides of this]
|Liberals can be found on both sides of this debate. Many see campus hate-speech regulation as a form of illegitimate control by the community over individual liberty of expression. They argue that hate-speech rules violate the important liberal principle that any regulation of speech be viewpoint-neutral. But other liberals see hate-speech regulation as a justifiable part of the effort to help rid society of discrimination and subordination based on such characteristics as race, religion, ethnicity, gender, and sexual preference.|
===
+++!!!!!*[304: UConn rules]
|the rules of the University of Connecticut, in their original form, were relatively sweeping in scope... “Every member of the University is obligated to refrain from actions that intimidate ,humiliate or demean persons or groups or that undermine their security or self-esteem.” Explicitly mentioned as examples of proscribed speech were “making inconsiderate jokes. . . stereotyping the experiences, background, and skills of individuals, . . . imitating stereotypes in speech or mannerisms and [attributing objections to any of the above actions to ‘hypersensitivity’ of the targeted individual or group.”|
===
+++!!!!!*[306: Even academic/political speech can harm]
|The liberal will not accept the regulation of racist, sexist, or homophobic speech couched in a scientific, religious, philosophical, or political mode of discourse. The regulation of such speech would not merely carve out a minor exception to the principle of viewpoint-neutrality but would, rather, eviscerate it in a way unacceptable to any liberal. Yet, those forms of hate speech can surely cause in minorities the harms that are invoked to justify regulation: insecurity, anxiety, isolation, loss of self-confidence, and so on. Thus, the liberal must invoke something beyond these kinds of harm in order to justify any hate-speech regulation.|
===
+++!!!!!*[307: Appeals to value of the speech fail]
|There is a ... basic problem with any effort to draw the line between regulable and nonregulable hate speech by appealing to the value of speech. Such appeals invariably involve substantial departures from the principle of viewpoint-neutrality. There is no way to make differential judgments about the value of different types of hate speech without taking one or another oral and political viewpoint.|
===
+++!!!!!*[309: Perlocutionary effects vs. illocutionary force]
|The position of Lawrence and Matsuda can be clarified and elaborated using J. L. Austin’s distinction between perlocutionary effects and illocutionary force. The perlocutionary effects of an utterance consist of its causal effects on the hearer: infuriariting her, persuading her, frightening her, and so on. The illocutionary force of an utterance consists of the kind of speech act one is performing in making the utterance: advising, warning, stating, claiming, arguing, and so on. Lawrence and Matsuda are ... are suggesting that hate speech can inflict a wrong in virtue of its illocutionary acts, the very speech acts performed in the utterances of such speech.|
===
+++!!!!!*[309: speech act wrong: treating as moral subordinate]
|What exactly does this speech-act wrong amount to? My suggestion is that it is the wrong of treating a person as having inferior moral standing. In other words, hate speech involves the performance of a certain kind of illocutionary act, namely, the act of treating someone as a moral subordinate. ... Terms such as ‘kike’, ‘faggot’, ‘spic’, and ‘nigger’ are verbal instruments of subordination. They are used not only to express hatred or contempt for people but also to “put them in their place,” that is, to treat them as having inferior moral standing.|
===
+++!!!!!*[311: Difficulties of drawing line]
|I do not believe that a clean and neat line can be drawn around those forms of hate speech that treat their targets as moral subordinates. Slurs and epithets are certainly used that way often, but not always, as is evidenced by the fact taht sometimes victimized groups seize on the slurs that historically have subordinated them and seek to “transvalue” the terms. For example, homosexuals have done this with the term ‘queer’, seeking to turn it into a term of pride rather than one of subordination.|
===
+++!!!!!*[312: Three deeper liberal concerns]
|[The] principle of viewpoint-neutrality must be understood as resting on deeper liberal concerns... First is the Millian idea that speech can promote individual development and contribute to the public political dialogue, even when it is wrong, misguided, or otherwise deficient. Second is the Madisonian reason that the authorities cannot be trusted with formulating and enforcing rules that silence certain views: they will be too tempted to abuse such rules... Third is the idea that any departures from viewpoint-neutrality might serve as precedents that could be seized upon by would-be censors... to further their broad efforts to silence speech and expression.|
===

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!!!In making recommendations for campus hate speech regulation, Altman appeals to various liberal principles, such as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) the claim, defended by Mill, that even false and prejudiced claims should  have a place in public debate.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the core of Altman’s reason for preferring the narrower kind of regulation, which does not preclude the expression of any given *viewpoint*.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) a deep concern for equality, which requires that we protect members of disadvantaged groups from psychological harm.]>
{{red{No... Psychological harm, a perlocutionary effect, is not Altman’s concern; to attempt to regulate speech in this way is too restrictive and unclear as a guideline.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) a viewpoint-neutrality principle, which requires laws be equally acceptable to everyone, regardless of the viewpoints they hold.]>
{{red{No... Altman makes clear that this is not a reasonable guideline; any law may be unacceptable to people who hold a viewpoint that opposes that law.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) preventing moral subordination, which is achieved through the expression of degrading and insulting claims.]>
{{red{No... This Kantian ideal is not one that Altman thinks our regulations can enforce. (Kant also does not believe that law can tell us what intentions to have.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the Madisonian worry that some regulations would lend themselves to abuse by authorities, who may interpret them in partisan ways.]>
{{green{Yes. Altman does take this worry seriously, though he argues that his suggested regulations don’t show signs of being subject to such abuse.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Altman argues that some (and only some) campus hate-speech regulations are justifiable. Along the way he rejects…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) rules against speech that insults people for their supposed unattractiveness or defects of intelligence.]>
{{red{No... Words *can* inflict psychological harm, but that’s not enough of a reason to regulate them. (306)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) any restriction of speech based on whether it causes “psychological harm”.]>
{{green{Yes. 315
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) an extreme form of the viewpoint-neutrality ideal.]>
{{green{Yes. 308
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) regulations and laws — such as those in the European Union that forbid explicit Holocaust-denial — that mark certain claims as off-limits.]>
{{green{Yes. Altman insists on the value of allowing any claims to face public debate.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Mill’s argument that even the most provocatively offensive points of view may make vital contributions to public discourse.]>
{{red{No... No; that’s why Altman preserves the right to express any *claims*, so long as they are advanced without subordination. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Based on clues in the Euthyphro, a definition of piety that would be acceptable to Socrates…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) is impossible.]>
{{red{No... There’s //room// to think a definition is impossible, and many atheist thinkers are inspired by the Euthyphro. However, it’s not at all //established by// the text; Socrates himself never distances himself from piety, and leaves room for a good definition.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) might essentially involve some kind of service to the gods, but it would involve more than “taking care of” them or their needs.]>
{{green{Yes. The only suggestion that is abandoned by Euthyphro is this one: that piety is a part of justice, specifically the part concerned with service to the gods. Euthyphro seems interested, but cannot say anything about the //kind// of service it would be. Note that it was Socrates himself who expressed interest in exploring whether piety should be defined as a part of justice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) would take Socrates’ search for wisdom as a defining example.]>
{{red{No... Clearly a definition cannot revolve around examples, on Socrates’ view.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) would respect the divine will as establishing the standard of piety.]>
{{red{No... We have clues that Socrates would resist any account of the gods that makes them unreasonable, and hence makes piety a matter of blind obedience. However, this definition would at least have the virtue of a certain consistency.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) would recognize different individual definitions of piety, just as different gods love different things.]>
{{red{No... Any definition that simply embraces relativistic disagreement is no definition at all, for Socrates, as is illustrated by his complaint about Euthyphro’s first definition.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Val Plumwood develops an “animist” perspective, according to which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we should celebrate imagination and metaphor rather than science and reason, since science and reason objectify nature.]>
{{red{No... On p 40 Plumwood explicitly claims that a better kind of science and reason is possible. See 40 and 46 for some distance from idealizing the “imaginary” and “[just] metaphorical.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The opposition between “deep” vs “shallow” kinds of environmentalism is misleading.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 35: a pernicious false choice...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) human beings, just like everything else in nature, are nothing more than material substances that react in lawlike ways to the forces around them.]>
{{red{No... no; this would be reductive materialism, which she rejects just as much as dualism (or, presumably, mentialistic idealism).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) When people complain about “anthropomorphic” portrayals of non-human phenomena, they tend to treat valuable qualities as human by definition.]>
{{green{Yes. 46-47, near end.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we should resist  creationist thinking, as it depicts nature as devoid of agency and incapable of developing anything by itself.]>
{{green{Yes. 41
}}}
===
}}}

Curious about some question from the exam, and can't wait until classes resume? Here are the tentative answers... though as always I'll have my eye out for any corrections or concerns:

!!!Plato’s dialogue, Euthyphro, revolves around what has been called the “Euthyphro dilemma”, about which we can say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that it presses us to choose between making divine values or commands seem arbitrary and beyond reason and making god(s) or religion marginal and undefinitive in revealing the values of piety.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that Euthyphro himself prefers to say (on reflection) that the Gods love doesn’t really make something pious; rather, their love is a response to something’s pious qualities.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that this dilemma has analogues for many important values, such as friendship and democracy.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that it reveals a logical difficulty unique to polytheism, including the classical Greek pantheon of divine beings.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that many philosophers have taken sides on the question that is central to the Euthyphro dilemma, including Kant.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!The Crito is sometimes seen as an argument in favor of political obedience, yet this interpretation is made weaker by noticing…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that Socrates refuses to conform with majority opinion, and clearly would not have accepted any “penalty” that required him to express regrets or change his philosophical mission.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that Socrates emphasizes the role of his own decisions in confirming his tacit consent to Athenian law.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that Socrates obeys the verdicts only because he thinks the jury was acting justly and correctly in reaching it.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that Socrates’ approval is not for any straightforward kind of obedience; it is for the Athenian expectation that one must either obey or persuade the city that it is wrong.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the Athenian system was a democracy that included respect for civil rights including disobedience.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!What is “up to us”, according to Epictetus, includes…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) our emotional reaction to our situation.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) our reputation.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) what to care about.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) what we have done in the past.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) what our goals are.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!King’s religious perspective might be characterized as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) hoping for redemption not in this earthly existence, but in the afterlife.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) a “rationalist” response to the Euthyphro dilemma: religion is interpreted by conscience, revelation (such as the Bible) cannot arbitrarily establish what is right and wrong.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) highly critical of many established churches and clergy, which fail to take clear stands on matters of social justice.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) a challenge to the separation of church and state, since he appeals to religious concepts in explaining what is just.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) including an optimistic confidence that conscience will bring people together once they are confronted with certain experiences of tension.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Aristotle explicitly presents human beings as a kind of animal, and some of the consequences of this include…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that our moral perspective is shaped by experience and training as much as abstract reason.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that achieving happiness is seen as central to our purpose.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that our deliberate choices do not always perfectly dominate the force of habit and impulse.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that he thinks biological differences between people can influence their moral qualities.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) if given a choice between being virtuous and surviving, human beings should choose survival.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Aristotle’s claims about justice include that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) in a specific sense, justice is the right kind of approach to questions of who gets what.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) in one general sense, justice just is complete virtue, the rightness of one’s character.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) what people deserve, in most cases, is proportional to the relative worth of their characters.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) it is not a virtue, but rather a good state analogous to continence.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) in one sense, friends have no need of justice.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Aristotle’s ethics go hand in hand with his political philosophy, according to which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) citizens and rulers should recognize that they have a kind of friendship together.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the best kind of government is aristocracy, in the sense of rule by the best people.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) bad governments reflect and perpetuate bad appetites and priorities, such as overemphasis on money or honor.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the happiness of the whole state is more valuable than the happiness of particular individuals.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) a person can fully develop virtue only in the presence of good role models and the guidance of good policies.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant claims that various methods of teaching and illustrating morality are dangerous or misleading, such as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) offering stories and real-life examples of admirable behavior as role models for the moral life.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) separating out some kind of “rational core” of moral principle that can be understood independently of any experience.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) present virtuous dispositions (such as courage) as the key to morality.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) promising there is a reward for good action in Heaven.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) encouraging people to do to others exactly what they want to have done to themselves.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant claims that there are many things we cannot really know with certainty, including…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) whether we are happy.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) what our moral duties are.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) whether any of our actions actually spring from duty.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) whether other persons deserve our respect.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the purpose rational beings should aim to achieve.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative requires…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) distinguishing two levels of moral policy: one for ideal situations, and another for non-ideal situations.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) melding together the “formal” features of the first formulation with the “material” features of the second.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) admitting that one is only meaningfully “free” when one chooses lawlike rules for oneself.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) accepting his proof that human beings live outside of the causal laws that govern what we can observe in nature.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) reflecting on what kinds of laws would hold in a Kingdom of Ends (a world of rational beings who recognize and respect each other).]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Korsgaard claims it may be justifiable to set aside the most rigorous formulation of the categorical imperative and to rely upon the Law of Universality criterion -- but we may do so only when…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we are sure that we ourselves are “free from sin”.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the “victim” of our lie or coercion is already participating in lying or coercive actions.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we are in the presence of evil.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) doing so is necessary to preserve self-respect.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we know for sure what the consequences of our actions will be.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

Is it less shameful to have incontinence about spirit than about appetites?
>“Let us observe that incontinence about spirit is less shameful than incontinence about appetites…Now spirit and irritability are more natural than the excessive and unnecessary appetites.” 1149a
|Aristotle claims that it is less shameful to have less restraint with spirits than with appetites. In justifying this, he claims that spirit is more natural than excessive appetite. However, if a person is left to his own in a feast-filled room, would not his instincts tell him to eat more than in a normal sitting, lest there be worse times ahead? How can something be more natural than an instinct? Instincts are the uncontrollable core of the natural. Aristotle may responds to this issue by saying that while appetite is natural and necessary, excessive appetite means that a person has exceeded the limit for which the body has called and a person is simply acting with incontinence.(119 words)|@@This distinction (appetite vs spirit) goes back to Plato...@@|

>[1] Now each man judges well the things he knows, and [only] of these he is a good judge. And so [2A] the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and [2B] the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence [3A] a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for [3B] he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but [3C] its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since [3D] he tends to follow his passions, [3E] his study will be vain and unprofitable, because [3F] the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. [1094e-1095a]
+++!!![BLANK DIAGRAM:]
Reconstruct the inference structure of Aristotle's argument by placing the claims within this blank diagram:
[<img[http://d.pr/i/YPca+]]
===
+++!!![For answer, click here...]
Filling in the blanks on this argument analysis exercise, we get this result...
[<img[draft|http://d.pr/i/p69G+]]
Once we fill in implicit steps and implicit premises, the resulting diagram might look like this...
[<img[diagram|http://d.pr/f/gDHn+]]
===

!!!!!//Note: wording on these passages is from T Irwin's translation//
+++!!!!!*[1094: End of political science]
|Suppose, then, that (a) there is some end of the things we pursue in our actions which we wish for because of itself, and because of which we wish for the other things; and (b) we do not choose everything because of something else, since (c) if we do, it will go on without limit... then clearly (d) this end  will be the good, i.e., the best good.<br>Then surely knowledge of this good is also of great importance. ... <br> [The end of political science] will include the ends of the other sciences, and so will be the human good. For though admittedly the good is the same for a city as for an individual, still the good of the city is apparently a greater and more complete good to acquire and preserve. |
===
+++!!!!!*[1095: youth and political science]
|Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general . Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1095: need for fine habits]
|This is why we need to have been brought up in fine habits if  we are to be adequate students of what is fine and just, and of political questions generally. For the origin we begin from is the belief that something is true, and if this is apparent enough to us, we will not, at this stage, need to reason why it is true in addition; and if we have this good upbringing, we have the origins to begin from, or can easily acquire them.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1095: Three lives]
|... there are roughly three most favoured lives — the lives of gratification, of political activity, and third, of study.
The many, and the most vulgar, would seem to conceive the good and happiness as pleasure; and hence they also like the life of gratification. Here they appear completely slavish, since the life they decide on is a life for grazing animals; and yet they have some argument in their defence, since many in positions of power fell the same way...|
===
+++!!!!!*[1095: Honor, or goodness?]
|The cultivated people, those active [in politics], conceive the good as honour, since this is more or less the end [normally pursued] in the political life. This, however, appears to be too superficial to be what we are seeking, since it seems to depend more on those who honour than on the one honoured, whereas we intuitively believe that the good is something of our own and hard to take from us. <br>Further, it would seem, they pursue honor to convince themselves that they are good; at any rate, they seek to be honoured by intelligent people, among people who know them, and for virtue. It is clear, then, that in the view of active people at least, virtue is superior [to honour]. <br>Perhaps, indeed, one might conceive virtue more than honour to be the end of the political life. However, this also is apparently too incomplete [to be the good]. For, it seems, someone might possess virtue but be asleep or inactive throughout his life; or, further, he might suffer the worst evils and misfortunes; and if this is the sort of life he leads, no one would count him happy, except to defend a philosopher’s paradox. ...|
===
+++!!!!!*[1096: Money only as means]
|The money-maker’s life is in a way forced on him [not chosen for itself]; and clearly wealth is not the good we are seeking, since it is [merely] useful, for some other end. Hence one would be more inclined to suppose that [any of] the goods mentioned earlier is the end, since they are liked for themselves.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1097: ends for their own sake]
|An end pursued in itself, we say, is more complete than an end pursued because of something else; and an end that is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than ends that are choiceworthy both in themselves and because of this end; and hence an end that is always [choiceworth, and also] choiceworthy in itself, never because of  something else, is unconditionally complete.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1097: happiness as chief good]
|Now happiness more than anything else seems unconditionally complete, since we always [choose it, and also] choose it because of itself, never because of something else. <br>Honour, pleasure, understanding and every virtue we certainly choose because of themselves,  since we would choose each of them even if it had no further result, but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, by contrast, no one ever choose for their sake, or for the sake of anything else at all.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1098: the human function]
|may we likewise ascribe to a human being some function...?<br>
What, then, could this be? For living is apparently shared with plants, but what we are looking for is the special function of a human being; hence we should set aside the life of nutrition and growth. The life next in order is some sort of life of sense-perception; but this too is apparently shared, with horse, ox and every animal. The remaining possibility, then is some sort of life of action of the [part of the soul] that has reason.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1098: a) We have found, then, that the human function]
|(a) We have found, then, that the human function is the soul’s activity that expresses reason or requires reason. (b) Now the function of F, e.g. of a harpist, is the same in kind, so we say, as the function of an excellent F, e.g. an excellent harpist. (c) The same is true unconditionally in every case, when we add to the function the superior achievement that expresses the virtue... (d) Now we take the human function to be a certain kind of life, and take this life to be the soul’s activity and actions that express reason. (e) [Hence by (c) and (d)] the excellent  man’s function is to do this finely and well. (f) Each function is completed well when its completion expresses the proper virtue. (g) Therefore [by (d), (e) and (f) the human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1099: we took the goal of political science to be]
|... we took the goal of political science to be the best good; and most of its attention is devoted to the character of the citizens, to make them good people who do fine actions,  [which is reasonable if happiness depends on virtue, not on fortune].|
===
+++!!!!!*[1100: virtuous activities control happiness.]
|[We hesitate] out of reluctance to call him happy during his lifetime, because of the variations, and because we suppose happiness is enduring and definitely not prone to fluctuate, whereas the same person’s fortunes often turn to and fro. ... <br>...surely it is quite wrong to be guided by someone’s fortunes. For his doing well or badly does not rest on them; though a human life, as we said, needs these added, it is the activities expressing virtue that control happiness, and the contrary activities that control its contrary. <br>... since it is activities that control life, as we said, no blessed person could ever become miserable, since he will never do hateful and base actions. For  truly good and intelligent person, we suppose, will bear strokes of fortune suitably, and from his resources at any time will do the finest actions, just as a good general will mke the best use of his forces in war, and a good shoemaker will produce the finest shoe from the hides given him, and similarly for all other craftsmen. <br>If this is so, then the happy person could never become miserable. Still, he will not be blessed either, if he falls into misfortunes as bad as Priam’s.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1100: fortunes, even after death]
|... life includes many reversals of fortune, good and bad, and the most prosperous person may fall into a terrible disaster in old age, as the Trojan stories tell us about Priam; but if someone has suffered these sort of misfortunes and comes to a miserable end, no one counts him happy. <br>... if a living person has good or evil of which he is not aware, then a dead person also, it seems, has good or evil when, e.g., he receives honours or dishonours, and his children, and descendants in general, do well or suffer misfortune. [Hence, apparently, what happens after his death can affect whether or not he was happy before his death.]|
===
+++!!!!!*[1106: many ways of being bad]
|Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar is it aims at what is intermediate. <br>Moreover, there are many ways to be in error, — for badness is proper to the indeterminate, as the Pythagoreans pictured it, and good to the determinate. But there is only one way to be correct. That is why error is easy and correctness is difficult, since it is easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it. And so for his reason also excess and deficiency are proper to vice, the mean to virtue; ‘for we are noble in only one way, but bad in all sorts of ways.”|
===
+++!!!!!*[1107: Virtue defined]
|Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1109: avoid the more contrary extreme]
|[I]n each case it is hard work to find the intermediate; for instance, not everyone, but only one who knows, finds the midpoint in a circle. So also getting angry, or giving and spending  money, is easy and everyone can do it; but doing it to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way is no longer easy, nor can everyone do it. ... <br>That is why anyone who aims at the intermediate condition must first of al steer clear of the more contrary extreme, following the advice that Calypso also gives: ‘Hold the ship outside the spray and surge.’ For one extreme is more in error, the other less. Since, therefore, it is hard to hit the intermediate extremely accurately, the second-best tack, as they say, is to take the lesser of the evils... different people have different natural tendencies toward different goals, and we all come to know our own tendencies from the pleasure or pain that arises in us. We must drag ourselves off in the contrary direction; for we pull far away from error, as they do in straightening bent wood, we shall reach the intermediate condition.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1109: voluntary vs. involuntary]
|Virtue, then, is about feelings and actions. These receive praise and blame if they are voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, if they are involuntary. Hence, presumably, in examining virtue we must define the voluntary and the involuntary. <br>Now it seems that things coming about by force or because of ignorance are involuntary. <br>What is forced has an external principle, the sort of principle in which the agent, or [rather] the victim, contributes nothing — if, for instance, a wind or people who have him in their control were to carry him off. <br>But what about actions done because of fear of greater evils, or because of something fine? Suppose, for instance, a tyrant tells you to do something shameful, when he has control over the parents and children and if you do it, they will live, but if not, they will die. These cases raise a dispute about whether they are voluntary or involuntary. <br>... These sorts of actions, then, are mixed, but they are more like voluntary actions... if the prinicple of the actions is in him, it is also up to him to do them or not to do them.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1109: hard to find mean]
|§2 hard work to be excellent... For in each case it is hard work to find the intermediate; for instance, not everyone, but only one who knows, finds the midpoint in a circle. So also getting angry, or giving and spending money, is easy and everyone can do it; but doing it to the right person, in the right amount, at the right time, for the right end, and in the right way is no longer easy, nor can everyone do it. Hence doing these things well is rare, praiseworthy, and fine. <br>§3... anyone who aims at the intermediate condition must first of all steer clear of the more contrary extreme...  to take the lesser of the evils.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1109: One extreme more opposed to mean]
|§6 In some cases the deficiency, in others the excess, is more opposed to the intermediate condition. For instance, cowardice, the deficiency, not rashness, the excess, is more opposed to bravery, whereas intemperance, the excess, not insensibility, the deficiency, is more opposed to temperance.|
===

[<img(100%,100%)[Schoolofathens|http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/98/Sanzio_01_Plato_Aristotle.jpg/458px-Sanzio_01_Plato_Aristotle.jpg]]
Here's a detail from Raphael Sanzio's symbolist painting [[The School of Athens|http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c3/Raphael_School_of_Athens.jpg]] (1509), showing Plato (as an elder) and Aristotle (as a young man, Plato's student). 

The Symbolist Contrast:
* Plato points //upward//, toward the ideal of transcendent Forms and "Nous" (soul/mind).
* Aristotle pulls back //down// to nature, culture, ordinary experience.
//Yet// Aristotle does retain much interest in abstract ideals).

Tempting FALSE Contrast:
* Plato's dialogues are lively
* Aristotle's reasoning is dull
//But// this contrast is an artifact of which texts were preserved through history.

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Arist3">>

//Note: this list of excerpts draws on a different translation, so key terms differ.//
+++!!!!!*[1145: vice, incontincence, and bestiality.]
|Let us now make  new start, and say that there are three conditions of character to be avoided—vice, incontincence, and bestiality.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1145: common beliefs about continence & temperance]
|People think the temperate person is continent and resistant. Some think that every continent and resistant person is temperate, while others do not. Some people say the incontinent persons is intemperate and the intemperate incontinent, with no distinction; others say they are different.<br>Sometimes it is said that a prudent person cannot be incontinent; but sometimes it is said that some people are prudent and clever, but still incontinent.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1145: beasts and gods]
|The contrary to bestiality is most suitably called virtue superior to us, a heroic, indeed divine, sort of virtue... For indeed, just as a beast has neither virtue nor vice, no neither does a god, but the god’s state is more honorable than virtue, and the beast’s belongs to some kind different from vice.<br>...the bestial person is also rare among human beings. He is most often found in foreigners; but some bestial features also result from diseases and deformities.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1145: Puzzles about incontinence]
|... no one, in Socrates’ view, supposes while he acts that his action conflicts with what is best; our action conflicts with what is best only because we are ignorant [of the conflict].|
===
+++!!!!!*[1146: Continence requires base appetites, sometimes goes wrong]
|... if the continent person must have strong and  base appetites, the temperate person will not be continent nor the continent person temperate. For the temperate person is not the sort to have either excessive or base appetites; but [the continent person] must have both. <br>.... if continence makes someone prone to abide by every belief, it is bad, if, for instance, it makes him abide by a false... belief.<br>...A certain argument, then, concludes that foolishness combined with incontinence is virtue.<br>[note puzzle here about the goodness of not sticking to one’s “conscience” -- compare to Huck Finn]|
===
+++!!!!!*[1146: Incontinence less curable?]
|Further, someone who acts to pursue what is pleasant because this is what he is persuaded and decides to do seems to be better than someone who acts not because of rational calculation, but because of incontinence. For the first person is easier  to cure... [the incontinent one], though already persuaded to act otherwise,... still acts [wrongly].|
===
+++!!!!!*[1149: incontinence about spirit, about appetites]
|Moreover, let us observe that incontinence about spirit is less shameful than incontinence about appetites. For spirit would seem to hear a reason a bit, but to mishear it. It is like overhasty servants who run out before they have heard all their instructions, and then carry them out wrongly, or dogs who bark at any noise at all, before looking to see if it is a friend. ... reason or appearance has shown that we are  being slighted or wantonly insulted; and spirit, as though it had inferred that it is right to fight this sort of thing, is irritated at once. Appetite, however, only needs reason or perception to say that this is pleasant, and it rushes off for gratification.<br>[spirit = ‘thumos’, honor-drive]<br>
Note: preserving reputation seems more like duty than gratification!|
===
+++!!!!!*[1150: Incontinence more curable]
|The intemperate person, as we said, is not prone to regret,  since he abides by his decision [when he acts]. But every incontinent is prone to regret. That is why the truth is not what we said in raising the puzzles, but in fact the intemperate person is incurable, and the incontinent curable. For vice resembles diseases such as dropsy or consumption, while incontinence is more like epilepsy; vice is a continuous bad condition, but incontinence is not. For the incontinent is similar to those who get drunk quickly from a little wine, and from less than it takes fro most people. And in general incontinence and vice are of different kinds. For the vicious person does not recognize that he is vicious, whereas the incontinent person recognizes that he is incontinent.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1151: stubbornness distinguished from continence]
|Now there are some others people who tend to abide by their belief. These are the people called stubborn, who are hard to persuade into something and not easy to persuade out of it. These have some similarity to continent people, just as the wasteful person has to the generous, and the rash to the confident. But they are different on many points. For the continent person is not swayed  because of feeling and appetite;... But stubborn people are not  swayed by reason; for they acquire appetites, and many of  them are led on by pleasures..<br>The stubborn include the opinionated, the ignorant, and the boorish. The opinionated are as they are because of pleasure and pain. For they find enjoyment in winning... and they feel paint if their opinions are voided... Hence they are more like incontinent than like continent people.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1152: imagine an incontinent city]
|In fact the incontinent person is like a city that votes for all the right decrees and has excellent laws, but does not apply them, as in Anaxandrides’ taunt... The base person, by contrast, is like a city that applies its laws, but applies bad ones.<br>|
===
+++!!!!!*[1152: Incontinence & intemperance summary]
|The incontinent and the intemperate person... both pursue bodily sources of pleasure. But the intemperate person ... also thinks it is right, while the incontinent person does not think so.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1152: cleverness & prudence]
|Nor can the same person be at once both prudent and incontinent. For we have shown that a prudent person must also at the same time be excellent in character... However, a clever person may well be incontinent. Indeed, the reason people sometimes seem to be prudent but incontinent is that [really they are only clever and] cleverness differs from prudence in the way we described in our first discussion; though they are closely related in definition, they differ in so far as prudence requires the correct] decision.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1152: no pleasure is a good?]
|The reasons for thinking [pleasure] is not a good at all are these: Every pleasure is a perceived becoming toward [the fulfillment of something’s] nature; but no becoming is of the same kind as its end—for instance, no [process of] building is of the same kind as a house. Further, the temperate person avoids pleasures. Further, the prudent person pursues what is painless, not what is pleasant. Further, pleasures impede prudent thinking, and impede it more the more we enjoy them; no one, for instance, can think about anything during sexual intercourse. Further, every good is the product of a craft, but there is no craft of pleasure. Further, children and animals pursue pleasure. <br>... <br>These arguments, however, do not show that pleasure is not a good, or even that it is not the best good.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1152: habit as ‘second nature’]
|The [impetuous] type of incontinence found in volatile people is more easily cured than the [weak] type of incontinence found in those who deliberate but do not abide by it. And incontinents through habituation are more easily cured than the natural incontinents; for habit is easier than nature to change. Indeed the reason why habit is also difficult to change is that it is like nature; as Eunenus says, ‘Habit, I say, is longtime training, my friend, and in the end training is nature for human beings.’|
===
+++!!!!!*[1154: Some enjoy only bodily pleasures.]
|...bodily pleasures are pursued because they are intense, by people who are incapable of enjoying other pleasures. ... What they do is not a matter for reproach, whenever [the pleasures] are harmless, but it is base whenever they are harmful. These people do this because they enjoy nothing else, and many people’s natural constitution makes the neutral condition painful to them.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1154: Things pleasant by nature, variation, constancy]
|Pleasures without pains, however, have no excess. These are pleasant by nature and not coincidentally. ...<br>‘Variation in everything is sweet’ (as the poet says] because of some inferiority; for just as it is the inferior human being who is prone to variation, so also the nature that needs variation is inferior, since it is not simple or decent.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1154: explain the false view]
|We must, however, not only state the true view, but also explain the false view; for an explanation of that promotes confidence. For when we have an apparently reasonable explanation of why a false view appears true, that makes us more confident of the true view. Hence we should say why bodily pleasures appear more choiceworthy.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1155: Friendship as necessary]
|friendship ... is a virtue, or involves virtue.<br>Further, it is most necessary for our life. For no one  would choose to live without friends...<br>But in poverty also, and in the other misfortunes, people think friends are the only refuge. Moreover, the young need friends to keep them from error. The old need friends to care for them and support the actions that fail because of weakness. And those in their prime need friends to do fine actions; ...<br>Further, a parent would seem to have a natural friendship for a child...<br>Moreover, friendship would seem to hold cities together... if people are friends, they have no need of justice, but if they are just they need friendship in addition...|
===
+++!!!!!*[1156: Three kinds of friendship]
|friendship has three species, corresponding to the three objects of love...<br>Those who  love each other for utility love tho other not in his own right, but insofar as they gain some good for themselves from him. The same is true for those who love for pleasure; for they like a witty person not because of his character, but because he is pleasant to them... these friendships... are coincidental, since the beloved is loved  not insofar as he is who he is, but insofar as he provides some good or pleasure.<br>As so these sorts of friendships are easily dissolved...|
===
+++!!!!!*[1156: Complete friendship]
|But complete friendship is the friendship of good people similar in virtue; for they wish goods in the same way to each other insofar as they are good... Now those who wish goods to their friend for the friend’s own sake are friends most of all; ... these people’s friendship lasts as long as they are good; and virtue is enduring.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1165: some friendships dissolve easily]
|With friends for utility or pleasure perhaps there is nothing absurd in dissolving the friendship whenever they are no longer pleasant or useful. For they were friends of pleasure for utility; and if these give out, it is reasonable not to love. We might, however, accuse a friend if he really liked us for utility or pleasure, and pretended to like us for our character. For, as we said at the beginning, friends are most at odds when they are not friends in the way they think they are.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1179: moderate resources are enough]
|Moreover, we can do fine actions even if we do not rule earth and sea; for even from moderate resources we can do the actions that accord with virtue. This is evident to see, since many private citizens seem to do decent actions no less than people in power do— even more, in fact.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1179: Arguments are not sufficient...]
|Now if arguments were sufficient by themselves to make people decent, the rewards they would command would justifiably have been many and large... If fact, however, arguments seem to have enough influence to stimulate and encourage the civilized ones among the young people, and perhaps to make virtue take possession of a well-born character that truly loves what is fine; but they seem unable to turn the many toward being fine and good.<br>For the many naturally obey fear, not shame; they avoid what is base because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful.  ... <br>What argument, then, could reform people like these? For it is impossible, or not easy, to alter by argument what has long been absorbed as a result of one’s habits. But, presumably, we should be satisfied to achieve some share in virtue if we already have what we seem to need to become decent.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1180: Upbringing to be supplemented by laws]
|Presumably, however, it is not enough if they get the correct upbringing and attention when they are young; rather, they must continue the same practices and be habituated to them when they become men. Hence we need laws concerned with these things also, and in general with all of life. For the many yield to compulsion more than to argument, and to sanctions more than to the fine.|
===
+++!!!!!*[1180: Further, education adapted to an individual is actually better]
|Further, education adapted to an individual is actually better than a common education for everyone, just as individualized medical treatment is better. For though generally a feverish patient benefits from rest and starvation, presumably some patient does not; nor does the boxing instructor impose the same way of fighting on everyone. Hence it seems that treatment in particular cases is more exactly right when each person gets special attention, since he then more often gets the suitable treatment.|
===

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "arist3">>

+++!!!![Crucial philosophical connection: ETHICS <—> Account of HUMAN NATURE]
{{indent{
Dualism: human ''souls/minds'' are a kind of being //different from// ''physical stuff''
Idealism: The stuff of soul/mind is primary (There's nothing more to matter than the idea of it)
Naturalism: humans are animals; our minds/souls are material developments
}}}
===
+++!!!![ARISTOTLE is a NATURALIST: human life is a (special) kind of animal life]
[img[Aristlevels|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/wescourses/2008s/phil212/01/aristlevels.png]]
{{indent{life of ''nutrition/growth'', plus life of ''sense perception'', plus life of reason [and politics].}}}
===
+++!!!![EUDAIMONIA ("happiness" or "flourishing") is having one's (human) life go well.]
Arete ("virtue" or "excellence"): what one contributes to life's going well.
+Fortune (what Stoics call externals): outside events that affect one's well-being.
=Being EU-DAIMON (good in one's spirit/"demon", well-ensouled)
===
+++!!!![''VIRTUE ETHICS''...]
* is not unique to Aristotle
* Aristotle's virtues require "the mean between extremes" 
Dualists and idealists, like Plato and later Christian thinkers, tend to present dichotomous pictures:
{{indent{
virtue as one extreme, vice or sin as its opposite.
Think of King's embrace of "extremism" in the name of love, and Socrates' and Epictetus' attempt to rise above all ordinary appetites.
Aristotle, by contrast, emphasizes the art of finding the mean between the relevant extremes (for each important area of human engagement).
}}}
===

[>img(20%,auto)[Aristotle bust|https://media1.britannica.com/eb-media/84/87984-004-5ADE9ACA.jpg]]Aristotle (384–322BCE) was a prolific Greek philosopher and proto-scientist. He was the most famous student of [[Plato]] and the first to develop a thorough [[empiricist]] philosophy (albeit one within which reason played a central role). 
----
Many of his theoretical manuscripts (sometimes in multiple versions drawing on different students' lecture notes) were well-preserved and copied by ancient and medieval scholars. Some argue that Aristotle also wrote eloquent [[dialogues]], but if so, these apparently do not survive in any form today.
See Aristotle1, Aristotle2, Aristotle3 for more specific discussion of //Nicomachean Ethics// readings.

!!!Aristotle’s claims about continence and temperance would support these conclusions:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that Aristotle disagreed with Socrates’ theory that knowing what’s right always motivates us to do it.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that incontinent people are more frustrating than intemperate people, because reasoning with them can’t do any good.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that continence is not a virtue; it is required only insofar as a person is not fully virtuous.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that the intemperate person is “bestial” (like a beast) and not fully human.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that Aristotle believes only Athenians can be fully virtuous.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[Aristotle's argument|https://www.dropbox.com/s/p3gcpt4gczoj9qn/AristPlusDiagramBartlett_clouds_rev.png?raw=1]]

!!!Aristotle categorizes friendships based on their focus on utility, pleasure, or the good. In order to have the third kind of friendship (a friendship focused on the good), friends must…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) spend a considerable amount of time doing things together.]>
{{green{Yes. No amount of mutual admiration is enough; a true friendship must also include some kind of shared activities.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) be similar in the level of moral cultivation.]>
{{red{No... 1162a: “3 types of friendship.... and within each type some ... rest on equality, while others correspond to superiority.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) also be pleasant and useful to each other, because continuing to function as useful and pleasant companions is a prerequisite for developing a more profound bond.]>
{{red{No... This may sound plausible, but Aristotle clearly recognizes friendships of the good — including parenting relationships —&nbsp;as not focused on pleasure or usefulness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) aim for the benefit of the other as if aiming for one's own benefit.]>
{{green{Yes. treat the other as another self, being as concerned for their benefit as much as for one’s own; hence there is no need for justice...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) be especially vigilant in making sure that they follow the requirements of justice with each other.]>
{{red{No... In one sense, wherever there is genuine friendship there is also justice. But Aristotle also remarks that friends “have no need of justice.” So, although they are not unjust toward each other, the justice they achieve does not require heightened vigilance.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Aristotle, friendship in its highest form…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) becomes virtually impossible under very bad political regimes.]>
{{green{Yes. 1161a: “Friendship appears in each of the political systems, to the extent that justice appears also. ... there are friendships and justice to only a slight degree in tyrannies also, but to a much larger degree in democracies.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is desired by everyone, though a life of virtue and happiness may be achieved without it.]>
{{red{No... Virtue cannot be realized in the absence of friendship -- think especially about its role in education and young adulthood. Happiness, also, is hard to achieve without friends -- although the contemplative philosopher may eventually become self-sufficient.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is what any two people who are fully virtuous feel for each other.]>
{{red{No... Friendship is not just a feeling, and it requires “living together” or “tasting much salt together” to grow.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) requires a person to desire, for her friend, exactly what that friend desires for himself or herself.]>
{{red{No... Two problems: the highest form of friendship may involve some mutual guidance or correction. Also, friends may be anxious about great gains in the status of the other.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) should be distinguished from friendship between unequals, which can only revolve around pleasure and usefulness for both participants.]>
{{red{No... 1162a: “3 types of friendship.... and within each type some ... rest on equality, while others correspond to superiority.” Note, this Greek word "philia" is translated as "friend," but it includes any kind of important bond of affinity, including parental bonds and bonds of mentorship.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Aristotle, the point of reflecting and inquiring into politics (and ethics, understood as an aspect of political science)…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) helps us to accomplish the work of being human.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is not achieved by young students.]>
{{green{Yes.  
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is achieved only among people who have already been brought up well with good habits.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) is to understand how to live morally, and living morally means living well.]>
{{red{No... The idea that living morally is the same as living well is Socrates’ -- not Aristotle’s...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) serves the development of happiness (eudaimonia).]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

Homosexuality and incontinence
>“Other [states] result from diseased conditions of from habit- for instance…sexual intercourse between males” Nicomachean Ethics, 1148b28-31
|In his section on bestiality and disease, Aristotle describes homosexuality as a result of either diseased conditions or from habit. In this case, how would Aristotle respond to the modern view held by some people that homosexuality is a sin, or is immoral? In his explanation, Aristotle explains that homosexuality lies outside the realm of vice and virtue. In that case, it seems that he would believe that a person could not be both virtuous and a homosexual. However, he would also say that homosexuality is not inherently wrong, but can be practiced with continence or incontinence within the context of a diseased incontinence (1149a19). Furthermore, it cannot be considered incontinent if its cause is natural.(116 words)|@@@@|

!!!Consider this argument early in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1095a):

>(1) Each person judges nobly the things he knows,  and  of these he is a good judge.  (2) He is a good judge of a particular thing, therefore, if he has been educated with a view to it, but is a good judge simply [that is, overall] if he has been educated about everything.  (3) Hence of the political art, a young person is not an appropriate student, for he is inexperienced in the actions pertaining to life, and the arguments are based on these actions and concern them. (4) Further, because he is disposed to follow the passions, he will listen pointlessly and unprofitably, since the end involved is not [simply] knowledge but action…
…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) This passage aims to establish the conclusion that what is ultimately worthwhile, in practical life, is the subject-matter of politics.]>
{{red{No... That argument is elsewhere in the text. This passage focus on a smaller point — that young people aren’t good students of the political art.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) It’s not a valid argument, because its central terms remain vague and undefined.]>
{{red{No... The concept of validity, in logic, is strictly formal: a valid argument can include vague terms as long as it uses them consistently; it can also include outright false claims. The only thing a valid argument can’t do is lead readers from true premises into a false conclusion.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) It makes use of multiple inference indicators (e.g., since, because, for, given that; therefore, so, hence, thus).]>
{{green{Yes. Lots of them. Five!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) This argument an an enthymeme because it relies on at least one suppressed premise.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle’s reasoning does rely on at least one suppressed premise: that following passion means NOT acting on knowledge.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Given the larger argument of the first three books, this passage offers a glimpse of why Aristotle would say young people are not yet fully virtuous, nor fully happy.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes; on Aristotle’s view, happiness requires virtue, and virtue requires considerable wisdom and experience. (Furthermore, happiness, for Aristotle, pertains only to a whole well-lived life, not just to a moment in that life.)
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In giving an account of what the virtues have in common, Aristotle appeals to the idea of the “mean” (mesotes = intermediate) between extremes. In particular, Aristotle claims.…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Virtue is about balance; a moral flaw in one area can be counterbalanced by strength in another area.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle doesn’t speak of any such counterbalancing. Other virtue theorists, however, do.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The mean is relative to our point of view; if someone feels naturally timid, they achieve courage simply by doing what is easy and ordinary for others.]>
{{red{No... Not quite -- there is relativity, but it's not about "point of view," but instead to things like our actual abilities and circumstances. Aristotle would not count a temperamentally cowardly person as courageous just for doing an ordinary thing; one has virtue only once the right deeds are done out of the right attitudes and feelings.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) We achieve the mean only through practice; so people who are inexperienced with money, for example, cannot achieve generosity.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes; this is the logic behind his claim that someone who has no money (and has never had it) cannot be generous.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) To be magnificent, a very rich person would have to make a great and expensive lasting contribution to the public good, but a poor person illustrates magnificence with a much smaller expenditure.]>
{{red{No... Alas, Aristotle claims a poor person “could not be magnificent” (1122b25), although the logic of his argument should press him in that direction. He does talk about “fix[ing] [what is] the right amount according to what resources [the agent] has,” but he seems to invoke a cut-off below which magnificence is not possible at all.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) The virtue of justice requires a kind of balancing act; when people have unequal shares of something, justice requires correcting for the difference so that equality is restored.]>
{{red{No... The first part is true -- but the “balancing” or “proportional” ideal does not mean equality, but something more like proportion to worth or merit.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Aristotle, a person who is fully virtuous…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) does not feel fear in response to danger.]>
{{red{No... On the contrary -- one who lacks fear cannot be courageous, for Aristtole; courage is the appropriate response to situations that rightly inspire fear.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) shows humility, especially around those with higher status.]>
{{red{No... Humility is a positive “pole” in the Judeo-Christian tradition, contrasted only against ”pride” as a negative opposite. Humility, for Aristotle, connotes lack of appropriate self-regard. (One might consider whether there is a commentary, here, on Socrates’ ironic self-deprecation, which seemed to lack honesty.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is generally undisturbed by changes of fortune.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. Aristotle does allow that there may be tragically extreme forms of suffering or torture, but these are rare exceptions; any level of ordinary sickness or material deprivation do not matter to the virtuous person -- provided the person’s character is already fully-developed (Severe misfortune in formative years, however, can prevent a person from developing the full range of virtuous habits.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) feels no shame.]>
{{green{Yes. This point surprises modern readers, especially since “shameless” names a vice... But Aristotle simply means that the virtuous person has no actual cause for shame.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) must be experienced in spending money.]>
{{green{Yes. Only through practice and experience can a person become skilled in handling resources. Compare to the difficulty of becoming a virtuoso musician without access to any instrument or to time to practice...
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Kant, a person’s autonomy…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) is violated when we treat them simply as a means to our own ends.]>
{{grey{Not exactly. Autonomy, in Kant’s sense, is not exactly open to *violation* in the way that, say, a political right can be violated. My actions toward you cannot prevent you  from being an autonomous person. As with the Stoics, Kant presents our faculty of choice as "up to us" even when externals influence which choices are open to us. We can say, however, that another's autonomy may be //disrespected//; we act as though our ability to choose action is more important than theirs. The problem with our immoral actions, for Kant, always revolves around how //our reasons// are bad, not around how our act affects others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) entails acting only on laws she gives to herself.]>
{{green{Yes. “Freedom and self-legislation of the will are both autonomy.” (450)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is the same as freedom, which requires seeing one’s actions as not bound by any kind of cause.]>
{{red{No... “free” actions are still caused -- rational will is just a different kind of cause from sensible forces.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) makes human beings, unlike nature, unpredictable from the vantage-point of scientific explanation.]>
{{red{No... This is a tempting view, but it is not Kant’s. On the contrary, nothing about human behavior makes scientific explanation and prediction grind to a halt. It is just that these explanations concern appearances (including regularities and patterns), and autonomy corresponds to an order deeper than appearances.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) appears to be in contradiction with recognizing that person as a part of nature.]>
{{green{Yes. It certainly does //appear// so (right before 456)
}}}
===
}}}

Nicomachean Ethics 1 - 3 (1094a - 1115a)	
Study questions:
The most important inquiry, Aristotle claims, is what he calls politics. Yet we can tell that "politics" doesn't mean, for Aristotle, what it might mean to us today... Why does Aristotle's focus on political understanding lead to an investigation of happiness, and then to virtue?  What are the crucial ingredients of Arisotle's definition of virtue?  Can Aristotle claim both that good character depends on good education, and that our characters are our own responsibility?

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Aristotle1">> 
[[<< back to King|A4 King]] ... [[forward to Aristotle 2>>|B2 Aristotle 1115-1132b]]

!!!Aristotle’s represents human life as part of nature, stating or implying that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) because individuals are naturally different, what is virtuous for one may not be virtuous for another.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle acknowledges that our way of *representing* the mean may need to differ based on what our temptations (natural inclinations) are. There’s no suggestion of a subjective standard for where the mean lies.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) virtue is mean to which we naturally gravitate in avoiding two opposite vices.]>
{{red{No... Nothing about virtue involves “naturally gravitating” towards it. 1109b
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) people are either virtuous or vicious because of their innate nature.]>
{{red{No... While virtue is the perfection of a natural function, we are not simply virtuous by “innate” nature, but must be educated in it and must continue to cultivate it deliberately in ourselves as well.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that he thinks biological differences between people can influence their moral character.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle speaks of the moral tendencies of men and of women, for example -- a distinction that would not make sense to Plato or the Stoics, for whom the soul, quite distinct from the body, is not shaped by biology.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) virtue means optimally carrying out the natural functions of human beings.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes; even our rational capacities are portrayed as functions that are natural to us in virtue of being animals of the human species.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!English translations of Aristotle often use “happiness” to render the Greek word εὐδαιμονία or “eudaimonia”. The ‘eu’ prefix means ‘good’ or ‘well,’ and ‘daimon’ (which survives as the English word “demon”) means ‘life-spirit’ or ‘soul’; so the word “eudaimonia” means something like “having one’s life go well.” 

After reading the first sections of Aristotle’s text, we can say the following about Aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia (“happiness”):…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) It is the only thing that is good in itself, and is the real point of being virtuous.]>
{{red{No... It’s not the only thing. Virtue & health are choiceworthy for their own sake (as well as being means to happiness).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) It is the highest good, and hence the good toward which all policy-making and practical deliberation is ultimately directed.]>
{{green{Yes. This is Aristotle’s claim: “political science” is the over-arching art of setting the conditions that best promote well-being (or “happiness”)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is best assessed by that individual, since each person knows his or her own feelings best.]>
{{red{No... There’s no affirmation of subjective authority about one’s own happiness in Aristotle.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) This ideal cannot yet be directly or fully realized by children; it requires a complete life, and can even be affected by events after a person’s death.]>
{{green{Yes. Exactly. This is one way in which the English concept of happiness is a poor fit for Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Achieving this ideal state depends on one’s attitude and perspective; it is a state of character that is “up to us” in the sense that we can control whether we achieve it.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle does say that our //virtue// is “up to us” (in at least in important respects), but he denies that our //eudaimonia// (happiness) is fully up to us, for it is somewhat vulnerable to matters of fortune (what Epictetus would call “externals”).
}}}
===
}}}

Nicomachean Ethics 3 - 5 (-1132b): For most virtues of character, Aristotle lists two contrasting vices. What are the most important complications in assessing matters such as bravery, or temperance, or generosity? What should be the relation, on his account, between a virtuous person and the emotion of shame? In the case of justice, Aristotle does not simply describe two extreme vices and one mean between them. How, then, is it similar in form to other virtues?
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Aristotle2">>

[[<< back to Aristotle 1|B1 Aristotle (up to 1115a)]] ... [[forward to Aristotle 3>>|B3 Aristotle (books 7, 8, 10)]]

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!!!Aristotle de-emphasizes values that are central to the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as humility and equality. For example, Aristotle claims or implies:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that a good person is entirely free from the feeling of appropriate shame.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle’s claim may surprise us. Note it doesn’t imply virtuous people lack understanding of when shame *would* be appropriate. See Book IV Chapter 9.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that we should generally be ready to pay more attention to the opinions of those who are considered fortunate and worthy.]>
{{green{Yes. Fortune & status don’t guarantee good judgment, but Aristotle’s starting-point is what people actually say, and what they actually admire. Thus people's social status does factor into how seriously Aristotle takes their perspective. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that it is easier to develop a full set of virtues when a person is free from economic hardship and material need.]>
{{green{Yes. Virtues require practice and resources, and hardship can interfere. (Of course, wealth is no guarantee of virtue, and an already-virtuous person who suffers financial misfortune does not thereby lose their virtue!)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that once virtue is attained, the virtuous person is not dependent on anyone else.]>
{{green{Yes. We can’t *become* virtuous without friends, & good people enjoy friends. Yet virtue brings independence & self-sufficiency of a kind. (Of course, Aristotle's virtuous person still values friendships and cares about family and community; still, he clearly thinks there is a kind of independence that is proper to the person with a fully developed character.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we cannot be magnificent unless we have experienced opportunities to practice and refine our habits in managing money and resources.]>
{{green{Yes. Perhaps we could practice good habits with *little* resources - but not in the absence of resources altogether.
}}}
===
}}}

Nicomachean Ethics 7 - 8, recap (1145a15 - 1163a; 1175a30 - end).

People can fail to be virtuous in three ways: by being intemperate in their perception of what is appropriate, by being incontinent (failing to act on what they believe is best), or by suffering a “bestial” condition whereby sickness or trauma result in unchosen activity. What puzzles does Aristotle raise about these differencess? What is Aristotle's account of the relationship between friendship and virtue, and how should we understand his distinctions among varieties of friendship?

//NOTE: Most prior semesters' study notes on Aristotle were generated with the Oxford (Ross) translation; Bartlett & Collins' translation differs substantially. Feel free to raise questions about differences in translation!//

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Aristotle3">>
[[<< back to Aristotle 2|B2 Aristotle 1115-1132b]]...[[forward to Nussbaum>>|Nussbaum]]

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!!!Even a person who is not fully virtuous tends to have a variety of friendships. About these, Aristotle would say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Friendships, for a person who lacks virtue, are all merely for the sake of pleasure and/or practical benefits.]>
{{red{No... no; friendships for pleasure and utility are less than ideal, but there may be friendships of the right kind (for the sake of the good) between people who are not themselves perfectly good.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) A person who lacks virtue cannot have a friendship with a fully virtuous person.]>
{{red{No... there can be friendships across different levels of virtue
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) In the development and improvement of character, friends play a vital role.]>
{{green{Yes. It is friends who can help us reflect on our habits, improve them, and become more continent -- and, if we are still young, can help us achieve full virtue.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Friendships between people who lack virtue tend not to endure as well as friendships between fully virtuous people.]>
{{green{Yes. Both because more of their friendships are for pleasure and utility AND because less-than-virtuous friendships are more vulnerable to changes of status and fortune...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) For a young person, who is not yet fully virtuous, the most important kind of friendships is friendship with parents.]>
{{green{Yes. though “friendship” (the word in English) applies only awkwardly to parents (and spouses, etc), Aristotle’s “philia” is a broader concept.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!(Option B) Impact of social arrangements on morality
Can social conditions make it difficult for a person to develop and exercise their moral capacities well? Do human beings have any ability to engage in radical criticism of the cultures and traditions with which they are raised? (If so, how? If not, why?) 

In what ways can bad social influences be overcome, and in what ways can they not be overcome?

+++!!!![Starting point: the challenge is to bridge:]
|!(1) a Kantian account of what //ideal moral reasoning// involves |with|!(2) a social-scientific empirical //explanation of differences// in moral outlook|
|>|>|So we require an account of how it’s possible for individuals to arrive at AUTONOMY despite beginning life as socially situated learners (HETERONOMY).|
===
+++
Note the importance of the Kantian premise: that people, as they experience the world, actively construct reality: thus, on Kohlberg’s view, there is not a “blank slate,” but a pattern-seeking and reasoning-building engine of ideas in any learning mind.

Piaget, a developmental psychologist, developed the suggestion that patterns of understanding are universal, but unfold only through meeting the challenges of our environment.
===
+++!!![STAGES]
Kohlberg’s account suggests that there are three major levels of thinking about what is good:
|1. Pre-conventional|2. Conventional&nbsp;|3. Post-conventional|
1.  children are clearly heteronomous, and they do not yet evaluate their inclinations according to social norms. (~PRE-CONVENTIONAL)
2. Concern for external rules emerges in all children... originally socially-determined (CONVENTIONAL)
3. Can the child’s interest in moral reasons ever become ~POST-CONVENTIONAL? 

Certainly, some children and adults learn to ''reflect on the fact that customs differ'' -- and thus attempt to gain some moral perspective on familiar conventions.
===

[>img(20%,auto)[https://encrypted-tbn0.gstatic.com/images?q=tbn:ANd9GcQD_NkHrUAC6h33AY2oPmSWCzeoEBQaTBnLeTUQc2EMVqonda6X]]Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1986) wrote philosophy (as well as novels and political essays) within the French [[existentialist|existentialism]] tradition, working closely with ~Jean-Paul Sartre and developing a feminist and socialist critique of human beings' failure to recognize and respect one another's freedom.

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[[<< back to Nietzsche|Nietzsche]] ... [[forward to Plumwood>>|Plumwood]]

!!!Beauvoir distinguishes her existentialist "ethics of ambiguity" from various other writings in moral philosophy, arguing…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) materialists — among whom we must count Marx — simplify the human condition by denying the subjective and internal dimension of human experience.]>
{{green{Yes. That’s the gist of her early mention of those who “reduce mind to matter”:
|[The goal of their ethics] has been a matter of eliminating the ambiguity by making oneself pure inwardness or pure externality, by escaping from the sensible world or by being engulfed in it (262)|
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that Kant’s concept of freedom is a mere illusion because he values the intelligible over the sensible.]>
{{red{No... Beauvoir does fault Kant (all dualists) for setting up a hierarchy that makes the sensible realm negligible. Yet Kant’s conception of freedom is not thereby made into mere illusion. It is central to Beauvoir:
|we believe in freedom... by turning toward this freedom we are going to discover a principle of action whose range will be universal...The man who seeks to justify his life must want freedom itself absolutely and above everything else. (265)|
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) stoics (such as Epictetus) mistakenly content themselves with a merely internal and subjective kind of freedom.]>
{{green{Yes. The Stoic fails to recognize the importance of the material and conditioned body...
|This [existentialist] conversion is sharply distinguished from the Stoic conversion... does not claim to oppose to the sensible universe a formal freedom which is without content. To exist genuinely is not to deny this spontaneous movement of my transcendence, but only to refuse to lose myself in it. (264 top)|
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Nietzsche’s celebration of the “will to power” seems to invite a sort of despotic lack of concern for others.]>
{{green{Yes. Beauvoir leaves //some// room for appreciating Nietzsche, but...
|Nietzsche would exalt the bare will to power... would seek to impose [his own created values] on others... to the extent that passion, pride, and the spirit of adventure lead to this tyranny and its conflicts, existentialist ethics condemns them... (269)|
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that belief in God (such as King demonstrates) necessarily demonstrates an immature “seriousness” about values.]>
{{red{No... Beauvoir clearly acknowledges the possibility of a theology compatible with existentialism:
|if we are to believe the Christian myth of creation, God himself was in agreement on this point with the existentialist doctrine since, in the words of an anti-fascist priest, “He had such respect for man that He created him free.” (269)|
}}}
===
}}}

263: accept the task of realizing it. He rejoins himself only to the extent that he
264: world is useful, whether life is worth the trouble of being lived. These
265: feel the joy of existing. They then manifest existence as a  happiness and
266: mystified. The less economic and social circumstances allow an individual
267: [detached from himself, but as…] a thing disclosed by his subjectivity.
268: against itself. If I were really everything there would be nothing beside me;
269: does not concern me? I concern others and they concern me. There we

!!!In The Ethics of Ambiguity Simone de Beauvoir offers an account of freedom according to which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) nihilism is irresponsible because it involves denying the freedom to create meaning in the world.]>
{{green{Yes. Nihilists start from noticing that values “aren’t out there” and conclude too quickly that values cannot be realized.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) freedom is a universal that transcends experience, so it can be developed, using reason, into a code of moral values.]>
{{red{No... this is the Kantian (or Stoic) version of (serious) freedom: invulnerability to worldy circumstance and consequences.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) religion necessarily involves a denial of freedom, since it insists on positing a superhuman moral authority that eclipses our own radical responsibility.]>
{{red{No... Religion may be interpreted in ways that remain compatible with responsibility and freedom: see her positive endorsement of the anti-fascist’s priest’s view of the Christian myth of creation. (269)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) each person’s freedom is bound up with the freedom of others, so that our freedom is not enhanced by the ability to dominate others.]>
{{green{Yes. Beauvoir is in this way refusing Nietzsche’s vision of freedom as embodying an indifferent or exploitative will to power.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) authentic people are unconcerned with social norms; they are moved by their own passions and inspirations rather than by the pressures of the world around them.]>
{{red{No... this is a mildly disguised articulation of the passionate ideal: “moved by inspiration” rather than taking responsibility for choice.
}}}
===
}}}

;EXISTENTIALISM
:the thesis that human subjectivity exists antecedent to essence (that which gives direction and prescribes values)
;AMBIGUITY
: tension between our physical determined natures (“facticity’) and our transcendent subjective point of view. 
;AUTHENTICITY
: acknowledgement of one’s own responsibility to live without pretending to be fully determined from outside
;BAD FAITH
:self-deception: an attempt to avoid difficult truths by masking their implications... The temptation to relinquish one’s subjective indeterminacy, thereby failing to affirm one’s responsibility for making values, constitutes the principle vice of human beings.
;FACTICITY (“thrownness”)
: the encounter with unchosen circumstances: the situation of coming to terms with the given world.

!!!Beauvoir contrasts existentialist authenticity against various forms of “bad faith”. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we should not think that our freedom is enhanced by the ability to dominate others; on the contrary, our freedom is meaningless without theirs.]>
{{green{Yes. 270: “To will oneself free is also to will others free” —this is close to [[Kant]]’s notion of will, though it does not place the same confidence in the uniformity of reasoned judgment.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) we should not think of our feelings, emotions, and passions as things that simply happen to us; on the contrary, we should take responsibility for them.]>
{{green{Yes. 267: “what characterizes the passionat man is that he sets up the object as an absolute, not, like the serious man, as a thing detached from himself, but as a thing disclosed by his subjectivity.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we should move beyond the “seriousness” of most religious views, recognizing instead that human life is and must remain fundamentally devoid of meaning.]>
{{red{No... The first clause does reflect Beauvoir’s argument, but the second illustrates nihilism.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) we should admit that the world does not give everyone the same essential purpose, but it still happens to people that they are moved and inspired by personally meaningful endeavors.]>
{{red{No... The first clause is accurate, but the second leans too far toward the “passionate” form of bad faith
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we should give up the belief in a divine being, and accept that humanity’s purpose is nothing other than the animal purposes of intelligent survival and reproduction.]>
{{red{No... This kind of naturalism is still essentialism: nature determines our purpose.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Beauvoir contrasts existentialist authenticity against various forms of “bad faith”. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we should admit that the world does not give everyone the same essential purpose, but we can and should allow ourselves to feel moved and inspired by personally meaningful endeavors.]>
{{red{No... no, this is “passionate” bad faith
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) we should move beyond the “seriousness” of most religious views, recognizing instead that human life is and must remain fundamentally devoid of meaning.]>
{{red{No... no, this is nihilism
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we should not think that our freedom is enhanced by the ability to dominate others; on the contrary, our freedom is meaningless without theirs.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) we should give up the belief in a divine being, and accept that humanity’s purpose is nothing other than the animal purposes of intelligent survival and reproduction.]>
{{red{No... This kind of naturalism is still essentialism: nature determines our purpose.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we should not think of our feelings, emotions, and passions as things that simply occur to us; on the contrary, we should take responsibility for them.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Beauvoir bases her discussion on a distinction between existence and being, encouraging us to live authentically and genuinely by…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) abiding in the despair and nausea that arise from knowing that our lives are fundamentally nothing.]>
{{red{No... 267  As stated, this is much closer to the nihilist attitude, which asserts that there can be no meaning because meaning is not given to us.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) treating one’s freedom as intertwined with the freedom of other human beings.]>
{{green{Yes. 270 —The flipside of living in a way that demonstrates or represents what humanity can be is that one’s attitude toward others also demonstrate what one thinks humanity can be...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) embracing the “tragic ambiguity” of the human condition.]>
{{green{Yes. 262
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) not identifying oneself so completely and “passionately” with some object as to be “carried away” by it.]>
{{green{Yes. 267-8 — Beauvoir’s stance toward “passionate” is reminiscent of the stoics. She is not denouncing feeling, but rather the attitude that “I can’t help it!” when it comes to certain strong feelings.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) avoiding the “seriousness” associated with most religious authorities.]>
{{green{Yes. 264 — “Seriousness” is a somewhat specialized term here, suggesting that the pressure to live according to a certain norm comes entirely from outside oneself, that the guidelines for our life are given in advance of our existence.
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Bentham|https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c8/Jeremy_Bentham_by_Henry_William_Pickersgill_detail.jpg]]Jeremy Bentham  (1748-1832) was a British legal reformer who offered a quantitative and systematized account of utilitarian ideals, and who advocated influentially for legal changes aimed at minimizing cruelty and social stratification, and maximizing access to resources, education, and political voice.

On the basis of utility calculations, Jeremy Bentham advocated: 
* annual elections
* equal districts
* universal suffrage
* secret ballot
* improvement of the status of women
* abolition of trade restrictions
* international law
* establishment of a world court
* humane and effective penal system

[>img(40%,40%)[bentham|https://chrisgoesbrit.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/february-spamalot-002.jpg]]
Mill writes, of Bentham:
>Bentham... was not a great philosopher, but he was a ''great reformer'' in philosophy. ... He introduced into morals and politics those ''[methods] which are essential to the idea of science''; and the absence of which made those departments of inquiry, as physics had been before Bacon, a field of interminable discussion, leading to no result...

>Bentham's method may be shortly described as the method of detail... Hence his interminable classifications. Hence his elaborate demonstrations of the most acknowledged truths. That murder, incendiarism, robbery, are mischievous actions, he will not take for granted without proof; ... he will distinguish all the different mischiefs of a crime, whether of the first, the second or the third order, namely, 1. the evil to the sufferer, and to his personal connexions; 2. the danger from example, and the alarm or painful feeling of insecurity; and 3. the discouragement to industry and useful pursuits arising from the alarm, and the trouble and resources which must be expended in warding off the danger. <br> After this enumeration, he will prove from the laws of human feeling, that even the first of these evils, the sufferings of the immediate victim, will on the average greatly outweigh the pleasure reaped by the offender; much more when all the other evils are taken into account. Unless this could be proved, he would account the infliction of punishment unwarrantable; and for taking the trouble to prove it formally, his defence is, 'there are truths which it is necessary to prove, not for their own sakes, because they are acknowledged, but that an opening may be made for the reception of other truths which depend upon them. It is in this manner we provide for the reception of first principles, which, once received, prepare the way for admission of all other truths.' To which may be added, that in this manner also we discipline the mind for practising the same sort of dissection upon questions more complicated and of more doubtful issue.

[img(100%,auto)[fallacy list|https://www.dropbox.com/s/razz9ouqfu1j5to/bentham_calculus.png?raw=1]]

!!!In the first section of Kant’s Groundwork, Kant disagrees with Aristotle by claiming…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Reason can grasp morality’s principles a priori, without any essential need for examples or role models.]>
{{green{Yes. See especially 389 ... “a pure moral philosophy that is wholly cleared of everything ... empirical... ¶&nbsp;Not only are moral laws ... essentially different from ... anythin empirical, but it does not in the least borrow from acquaintance with [man] (anthropology) but gives a priori laws to him as a rational being.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The ultimate human purpose is not the achievement of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. See especially Ak 396: “Existence has another and much  more worthy purpose, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly intended, and which  must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private purpose of men must, for the most part, defer.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) A morally admirable person does not experience powerful appetites, inclinations, or emotions.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s moral agent does not really have any power over her or his own inclinations (including appetites and passions); morality simply demands subordinating those appetites/inclinations to duty.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) The clearest example of moral worth is someone who performs a dutiful action without enjoying it.]>
{{green{Yes. This is of course one of Kant’s most surprising claims. See esp Ak398: “Suppose ... even though no inclination moves [a depressed person] any longer, he nevertheless ... performs the [beneficial] action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty — then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth.” (also, end of ¶12)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Reason by itself can determine whether the actions we observe are right or wrong, and morality doesn’t require nuanced judgment and practice.]>
{{brown{Not really, though I will accept either answer for the in-class discussion challenge, since the answer is tricky to determine based simply on the first section of the text. The role for judgment in Kant *is* more limited than in Aristotle, since there is a "pure core" of moral principle that is supposed to be clear to anyone, //a priori//. But judgment, which can be difficult, is essential to the process of recognizing how moral rules //apply// in practice. See 389 (in the preface): “To be sure these laws require, furthermore, a power of judgment, sharpened by experience...”
}}}
===
}}}

!!!On the subject of moral duties, Kant would claim…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) in observing others’ action, we will reach agreement about whether their choices are in accord with duty, provided we reason properly]>
{{red{No... Notice the question is about actions we actually observe (in experience). Kant does insist that the universalizability test is a logical test independent of individual preferences and interpretations, so reason should give everyone the same answer about whether a maxim is acceptable. So he expects us to agree about what the duties are (such as not to lie). Still, this does not entail agreement about whether particular cases illustrate that duty, and whether particular cases violate it. (Furthermore, it’s not just that we “disagree”; we should all be skeptical about forming opinions on such matters.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) they are easily summarized by the “golden rule” (do not unto others as you would not have them do unto you).]>
{{red{No... Clearly the “golden rule” has a similar spirit to the Categorical imperatave. Yet Kant explicitly warns against the sufficiency of this adage at footnote 23, AK 430 (p. 37). It makes it too easy to justify treating others in a way that you in fact (here and now) happen to be okay with being treated. The universalizability test is more strict.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that duties can never conflict in such a way that a person has no choice but to violate one duty or another.]>
{{green{Yes. Outright catch-22 moral dilemmas are not possible. perfect duties are absolute prohibitions (to avoid a kind of action), while imperfect duties are positive responsibilities to be exercised according to discretion and good judgment. Perfect duties trump imperfect duties, and perfect duties cannot conflict with one another since they call for refraining from corrupt actions (rather than doing positive things like helping people live longer lives).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that there is a duty never to kill.]>
{{red{No... No, for two reasons: killing is not always intentional (one can accidentally kill); also, not all cases of intentional killing are cases of treating someone as a means -- though most surely are. Retributive capital punishment is acceptable to Kant; it is treating someone in accord with desert.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that there is a perfect duty to tell the truth.]>
{{red{No... Granted, in a loose and popular sense people treat “tell the truth” and “don’t lie” as equivalent. But telling truth cannot be a *perfect* duty for two reasons: (1) one is not in control of whether one tells the truth -- one can only control whether what is *sincere* (saying what one *takes* to be true). (2) One cannot possibly disclose all truths, all the time, to everyone (nor would that be necessarily a good thing). So although we have a perfect duty not to lie, discretion is required in fulfilling the imperfect duty to communicate truths (to the best of our understanding).
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant claims that everything and everyone always behave according to laws. He further argues…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) laws can be either those of nature (regulating the sensible world) or those of reason (regulating the intelligible world).]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that human beings need not see themselves as bound by the moral law, because they understand themselves as acting on the laws of nature.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s argument for believing in our freedom is a “transcendental” argument: presupposing our freedom is the only way to make sense of our lives and experiences.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) speculative philosophy proves that we have freedom of the will, even if we never experience it directly.]>
{{red{No... Alas, “proof” is too strong a word; we may be satisfied that the belief is essential to us, and that it is reasonable, but not that it is certainly true.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) we can aspire to be free from natural law only insofar as we subject ourselves to moral law.]>
{{green{Yes. ¶3
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that when human beings act on the moral law, their actions cannot be explained by psychological laws.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s view illustrates compatibilism about causal necessity and moral responsibility.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant describes his moral principle as “the principle of the autonomy of the will” (Ak 433). In elaborating the distinction between autonomy (being governed by oneself) and heteronomy (being governed by something different from the self), Kant asserts or implies the following claims:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) It is not possible to prove that a particular being is autonomous, but it is also not possible to disprove autonomy.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the gist of the whole argument that concludes the third section.... See Ak 456 “impossible ... to argue away freedom... though one might never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible...” 
Also: “the idea of a pure intelligible world ... remains always a useful and permissible idea for the purpose of rational belief, although all knowledge ends at its boundary.” (Ak 462)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Only rational beings are capable of autonomy, which simultaneously means freedom and self-legislation.]>
{{green{Yes. “Freedom and self-legislation of the will are both autonomy... different concetpions of the same object” (Ak 450) Meanwhile, non-rational beings are heteronomous: determined by natural law (which is outside of themselves).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we are heteronomous whenever our actions conform to legal codes, because they are external.]>
{{red{No... We can -- and often do -- conform to legal codes precisely because reason persuades us that we have a duty to do so. (We also might conform coincidentally, when acting on a good moral reason happens to go well with following the law of the state.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) human action can be understood in both ways: as heteronomous and as autonomous.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, this is true insofar as we take ourselves to belong to both worlds. We can’t take both perspectives at the same time, but we can alternate between them.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) emotional responses -- even emotions about moral duty -- are to be counted as heteronomous influences.]>
{{green{Yes; even emotions that generally point "the right way" (such as sympathy) are unreliable guides to moral action, and hence are distinct from the good will. What’s difficult here is that Kant does recognize one crucial “feeling” connected to morality, namely RESPECT. Even though respect can be felt, it is NOT an emotion, according to Kant (not an inclination, not a passion, but a response to something one takes to be worthy of deference)... See last f.n. to §1.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In a Kantian nonideal theory of morality, Korsgaard argues that telling a lie…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) may still satisfy Kant’s Formula of Humanity when the lie responds to someone else’s attempt to deceive us.]>
{{red{No... No; it may still satisfy the universalizability criterion, but Korsgaard does not expect maxims of deception to count as respecting each human being as ends in themselves.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is actually a duty when it is necessary in order to resist evil.]>
{{red{No... On this point Korsgaard seems equivocal. There is an argument to the effect that refusing to allow oneself to be used for evil is a perfect duty, and that lying in such a case is required by that duty. However, Korsgaard also argues, clearly, that a person is never to blame for a failure to engage in such deception.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is justified whenever the underlying maxim passes the universalizability test of the Categorical Imperative.]>
{{red{No... Unless it is a case of “evil circumstances”, retreating to the universalizability criterion is not acceptable.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) is sometimes permissible in our dealings with those who have forfeited their right to be treated with respect.]>
{{green{Yes. Korsgaard does seem to say so; some people put themselves in a “morally unprotected position” and this fact serves as a premise for her claim that lies toward them are permissible. p. 145.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) can be an act of good will, and that whenever we act on good intentions, we are not responsible for the actual results.]>
{{red{No... We are indeed responsible for the results.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!(Option C) Humanity
For most of our authors so far, morality has been tied (explicitly or implicitly) to some account of how to understanding what a human being (or person, or self) really //is//; what matters in ethics is then explained by reference to that account of what it is about a person that most matters. 
Discuss how different accounts (of the core or essential aspects of a person or human) make a difference to the ethical theories associated with them. Along the way, consider whether (or how much) these accounts depend on understanding human beings as dramatically different from the rest of the natural world.

!!!Callicott (author of “How Environmental Ethical Theory May Be Put into Practice) characterizes individual human beings as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) capable of acting on convictions and values, even when those convictions  and values are in tension with their individual interests.]>
{{green{Yes. Acting on conviction, even at considerable expense, is a phenomenon Callicott describes in several passages.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) driven by appetites that will continue to generate environmental problems until those appetites are curbed by collective and coercive constraints.]>
{{red{No... Hardin’s position
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) profoundly influenced, at the level of their consciousness, by the technologies that surround them.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) able to resolve environmental problems only because we possess reason, which clearly sets us off from other animals.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) misguided if they approach environmental problems by seeking to minimize their individual impact.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed.
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Mills|https://aalbc.com/author-photos/Charles-W-Mills.jpg]]Charles Mills (contemporary) is a philosopher, born in Jamaica and appointed to graduate faculty at CUNY, who focuses on non-ideal theory in politics and ethics, and critical philosophy of race and gender.

How radically must we revise moral theory, if its priority shifts to critique of actual non-ideal situations? Must all criticism of the non-ideal proceed by means of contrast against an idealized state? 

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Degree of participation in worlds
>“And thus are categorical imperatives possible because the idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world” (Kant, 55)
|Is it not possible to choose to follow our natural feelings over reason? If so, is it possible to control the degree at which I am a member of the intelligible world? Kant argues that humans occupy both the natural and intelligible world, but do humans vary in the degree to which they live in one over the other? Kant may argue that the degree at which one is a member of the intelligible world does not matter, but instead it is the capacity to be a member that grants one freedom. If this is so, does it not affect the amount to which one is free?(107 words)|@@@@|

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!!!In the first section of Kant’s Groundwork, Kant disagrees with Aristotle by claiming…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) the clearest example of moral worth is someone who performs a dutiful action without enjoying it.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the ultimate human purpose is not the achievement of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) reason can grasp morality’s principles a priori, without examples.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) people need not have been raised with good habits in order to understand right and wrong.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) our actions are immoral unless they conflict with our inclinations.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Aristotle de-emphasizes values that are central to the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as humility and equality. For example, Aristotle claims or implies:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that a good person is entirely free from the feeling of appropriate shame.]>
{{green{Yes. That’s Aristotle’s claim, much as it might surprise us!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) we cannot be magnificent unless we have experienced opportunities to practice and refine our habits in managing money and resources.]>
{{green{Yes. Perhaps we could develop good habits with *little* resources - but not in the absence of resources altogether.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that we should pay more attention to the opinions of those who are considered fortunate and worthy.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that it is easier to develop a full set of virtues when a person is free from economic hardship and material need.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the virtuous person is self-sufficient, not dependent on others.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

[Question for this session (for anyone who participated on that day) will draw in the in-class quotes on courage, and their similarities/differences in comparison with Aristotle's account of courage. Actual question is still under formulation, since class discussion groups took non-standard form.]

{{outline{
Socrates’ extended arguments against the escape plan claim or imply that...
{{indent{
(a) he has, by living as a citizen in Athens, implicitly agreed that if he cannot persuade the jury, he must abide by its penalty.+++^*Yes
===

(b) he believes that the verdict upon him was just. +++^*No.
===

(c) if he were sentenced to sitting in the public square and denouncing his prior actions, he would have done so.+++^*Socrates' refusal to do unjust things, including misrepresenting himself, would surely win out. The law can exact a penalty upon the body, but cannot legitimately command false speech.
===

(d) one should sooner die than commit an injustice.+++^*Yes; that is the point of his initial discussion with Crito. (Note, it does not follow that one's life is ruined by inadvertent wrongdoing.)
===

(e) because Athens is a democracy, the preferences of the majority outweigh his own preferences.+++^*No, it's not because the majority //prefers// his death that Socrates accepts it; it is only because the process of law resulted in a death sentence. The fact that the majority prefers something would not generally hold any significance for Socrates.
===

}}}
}}}

|>|"But he who has the experience of the manner in which we order justice and administer the state, and still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him.  And he who disobeys us is, as we maintain, thrice wrong: first, because in disobeying us he is disobeying his parents; secondly, because we are the authors of his education; thirdly, because he has made an agreement with us that he will duly obey our commands; and he neither obeys them nor convinces us that our commands are unjust." ({{es{//[[Crito 51e|CITE]]//}}}  pg. 4 {{es{col B}}} line 28)|
|It doesn’t seem that living in a state, thriving off that which it offers, is a reason [[to consistently follow|VSI]] its laws.  If that were to be the case would we not frown upon the civil rights movement?  Or even the American Revolution?  I believe that [[stage five of Kholberg’s [sp] stages of development finds|SVX]] that, in order to act in a manner we would consider [[‘just,’|SQ]] at least ethically so, we must at times [[view the laws as being flexible and|LIT]] be willing to break them should they stand in the way of that which we perceive as being truly [[‘right.’|SQ]]  It seems that if all laws were followed all the time there would be no room for moral improvement.  (120)|{{es{//This commentary persuasively registers a ''objection'' to the text. The next step would be to frame the objection very compactly, leaving room to consider and evaluate a likely reply from a Socratic perspective.//}}}|

>"My good Crito, why should we care what the majority think... but [rather[ what he will say who understands justice and injustice... and the truth itself." [citation location needed]
|Here's Socrates challenges the  negative normative value Crito assigns to incurring unfavorable public opinion and advances a counter-argument. Their arguments share a common premise but diverge on whose opinions matter. Following are objections to Socrates' argument, also available to Crito as follows:<br>1) The laws reflected the will of the majority <br> 2) "Reasonable people" would not have supported laws that restricted personal liberties and , ultimately sanctioned Socrates' execution; <br>3) Nor would they have assigned greater value to man-made law over moral law, rather, they would have opposed the imposition of government realizing that wisdom is often a proxy for power.<br>Socrates might have concluded this but because representative government was in its infancy, he might have lacked the experience to understand the distinction.|@@Might Socrates already agree that reasonable people would not have prosecuted him? We still need to confront his argument that evading the law cannot be the correct response to errors on the part of the state... @@|

[img(100%,auto)[Kant's four examples|https://www.dropbox.com/s/oq3mrxkkfhxhm5p/crito%20outline%20handout.png?raw=1]]

S: And is life worth living for us with the part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits? Or do we think that part of us … is inferior to the body?
C: Not at all.
S: Is it more valuable?
C: Much more.
(Crito 48a)

S: Above all, is the truth such … wrongdoing is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer? Do we say so or not?
C: We do.
(Crito 49b)

Socrates establishes that the moral person should never do wrong, even if wronged. But what if wrongdoing allows for previously inaccessible good deeds in the future? What if Crito had attempted to argue that Socrates may do more good with the rest of his life if he escaped to some other city?

Socrates may respond that Crito forgets the original assertion that never should one do wrong, lest ze harm hirself and render hir life meaningless. Socrates may even say that if Crito's proposition of goodness after exile was a certainty and not possibility, he would be forever harmed by having done wrong, even in response to wrongdoing. The ends, as we might say today, would never justify the means.Type the text for 'New Tiddler'

“And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits?... the most important thing is not life, but the good life.” (Crito, 48 a, 48b)         
“Be persuaded by us who have brought you up, Socrates. Do not value either your children or your life or anything else more than goodness, in order that when you arrive in Hades you may have all this as your defense before the rulers there. If you do this deed, you will not think it better or more just or more pious here, nor will any one of your friends… we shall be angry with you while you are still alive, and our brothers, the laws of the underworld, will not receive you kindly, knowing that you tried to destroy us as far as you could.” (Crito, 54 c)  

Socrates’ definition of goodness appears to deny him the pleasures of day-to-day living, while placing the utmost importance on how he will be judged by the gods in the afterlife.    Can his perspective be defended from an atheistic point of view, or is it entirely contingent upon the notion of an afterlife?    While it is true that Socrates argues against making an escape because it will discredit his ‘good’ reputation, both among his fellow men and among the gods, the larger issue is not Socrates’ reputation, but that he does not wish to upset the relationship dynamics which allow the Athenian legal system to function properly. Socrates’ sacrifices contextual justice in order to preserve the justice system itself.

+++!!!![Hypotheses for explaining cultural disparity in Kohlberg's results:]
(a) Subordination retards moral development
(b) Researchers do not (or cannot) score subordinated populations fairly.
(c) Subordinated groups face greater danger when they violate conventions.
(d) Transcending convention happens at similar rates everywhere, but takes different forms in different places.
(e) There might be multiple paradigms of post-conventional reasoning
(f) There isn’t really any post-conventional reasoning
===
+++!!!![Caution:]
It certainly seems that *if* moral development is influenced by culture at all, then it has to be at least possible for there to be cultures that do better at cultivating it, and cultures that do worse. 
===

!!Post-midterm units:
[[Unit D]] (Utilitarian Aims): [[Mill Ch 1-2]], [[Mill Ch 3-4]], [[Mill Ch 5]], Rawles
[[Unit E]] (Freedom and Ideology): Marx, Beauvoir, Nietzsche, Plumwood
[[Unit F]] (Development and Relationships): Kohlberg, Noddings, Dewey & TA Choice readings ([[McMahan|Just war case study…]], [[Kimmerer|Kimmerer's ethics of reciprocity…]])
+++!![Unit D question set (from in class):]
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        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged for inclusion//"'
>> ===
+++!![Unit E question set (from in class):]
<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("sp19e") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
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        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged for inclusion//"'
>>===
+++!![Unit F question set (from in class):]
<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("sp19f") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
    sortBy
       'tiddler.title'
    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged for inclusion//"'
>>===
!!!(see also [[final exam]] and [[final essays]])

!!!Virtues, according to Mill…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) becomes valuable to a person in just the way that money or fame may be — through association with achieving happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed, though they have moral value, unlike those things.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) include all the traits of character that have been praised by religious and philosophical traditions.]>
{{red{No... Something is not a virtue, by Mill’s standard, unless it actually promotes general happiness. Some traits cherished within *some* traditions may not meet this standard, though they might well have seemed beneficial in the past.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) are habits that a utilitarian necessarily endorses because of their positive effect on general happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. yes; if they did not promote happiness, they would not count as virtues.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) could lead you, on a particular occasion, to act in a way that causes considerable suffering to yourself.]>
{{green{Yes. Virtues are among the habitual patterns of will that may persist even when acting on them -- in a particular case -- does not promise dividual happiness overall (though acting on the virtue, as such, may still be part of a person’s conception of happiness).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) are not originally or naturally a part of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. They can become a part of happiness only through association.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Mill distinguishes so-called “perfect” and “imperfect” duties, about which he claims (or implies) …
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Perfect duties are matters of justice, and there is no injustice except where individual rights are at stake.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Perfect duties are those around which we experience clear social consensus; imperfect duties, however, are more controversial.]>
{{red{No... Mill simply makes no such claim.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Punishment is appropriate only for violations of perfect duties; for imperfect duties, enforcement has costs that outweigh the benefits.]>
{{red{No... For all punishment, Mill weighs costs against benefits to determine the appropriate means (legal, social, or private conscience), but there’s no correspondence between perfect duties and what’s appropriate to punish overtly.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) When perfect duties are violated, legal enforcement is necessary to preserve the basic preconditions of society; imperfect duties, however, are those that should be punished only through social attitudes of disapproval.]>
{{red{No... Some perfect duties are not enforceable by law; some imperfect duties are. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) The pursuit of one’s own happiness is only an imperfect duty (as Kant claimed); considering one’s impact on the general happiness, however, is a perfect duty.]>
{{red{No... no duties to self for Mill. Meanwhile, considering impact on general utility is not a “duty” -- as such -- at all.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Hardin would argue that because of limited resources, rational persons face a dilemma. In explaining the nature and implications of this dilemma, Hardin’s view suggests…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) population growth cannot be made sustainable through technology.]>
{{green{Yes. This is among the “No technical solution” problems, on his account.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) it is always a mistake to approach a resource that human beings need as a common and freely available resource.]>
{{red{No... Some resources are relatively inexaustible (relative to the practical horizons of a society), and others are clearly finite. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) when we understand the problem of limited resources on earth, we will come to reject the notion of human rights.]>
{{red{No... Hardin does argue against the right to reproductive freedom, but not against all human rights. He also claims all morality is relative to context, but again that does not preclude an embrace of some human rights, such as the right not to be tortured or the right to due process under law...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) people who refuse to take advantage of common resources, simply out of a strong individual sense of guilt, are irrational.]>
{{green{Yes. Paul Goodman’s argument against guilt is embraced by Hardin.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) hoping that education will spur individuals to act more conscientiously is an naive and insufficient solution.]>
{{green{Yes. Conscience, and guilt, are individual solutions that do not prevent selfish freeloaders, who will eventually overcome those who act on conscience.
}}}
===
}}}

[tag[welcome]]
[[HomeItems]]

!!!Virtue, on Aristotle's account, requires not just that we act well, but that we have the right kinds of desires (1106b20). On Aristotle's account of desire…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) sometimes a person is so carried away by desire that their action is not voluntary.]>
{{red{No... 1111a27
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) young children have innate desires, and every time we engage in desire, we further increase that habit of desiring.]>
{{green{Yes. 1103b18, 1119b 9-10
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) with respect to natural appetites, we find some people pursuing them to excess, but nobody is deficient in pursuing them.]>
{{green{Yes. 1118b16
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the maximally virtuous person desires the honor and esteem of fellow citizens.]>
{{red{No... the great-souled person (who is maximally virtuous) is not interested in the admiration or esteem of ordinary people.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that in order to make the right decision, we must use reason to conquer our desire.]>
{{red{No... 1119b/15
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!![Most relativists focus on HORIZONTAL diversity]>At any one time, different people have different ideas about the same problem.===
+++!!!![Developmental psychologists notice “VERTICAL” diversity]>Given any one person, at different stages of life, that person has different conceptual approaches to the same problem.
## There’s an asymmetry of stages: higher stages “comprehend” all lower stages, but not vice-versa.
## Those at a higher stage offer explanations about why their approach makes more sense, but explanations do not affect lower-stage thinkers until they are ready for the transition.
===
+++[Challenges:]
• on “progression” vs. “succession”
• whether the notion of a “postconventional” level is ever fully illustrated
	Consider Anthony Cortese’s Ethnic Ethics arguments
• on various potential biases in Kohlberg’s methods & interpretation
	Next week, we’ll read a piece on CARE, which has emerged as a contrasting paradigm of development and complexity in moral thought.
===

{{floatleft{KOHLBERG'S SCALE of STAGES
*preconventional level (4-10)
** 1: Punishment & Obedience Orientation
** 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation
*conventional level
** 3: Interpersonal Concordance<br>^^(or “Good Boy - Nice Girl” approach)^^
**  4: Society Maintaining Orientation
*postconventional or autonomous
** 5: Social Contract Orientation
** 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation
}}}{{floatright{
+++!!!![GILLIGAN'S ALTERNATIVE SCALE:]
*preconventional level 
** 1: Individual Survival
** 2: transition: selfishness to responsibility
*conventional level
** 3: Goodness as self-sacrifice, responsibilities
** 4: transition from goodness to truth 
*postconventional or autonomous
** 5: morality of non-violence 
===
}}}
{{floatright{
+++!!!![Gilligan's worry:]
|Kohlberg (1971) identifies a strong interpersonal bias in the moral judgments of women, which leads them to be considered as typically at the third of his six-stage developmental sequence. ... the very traits that have have traditionally defined the “goodness” of women, their care for and sensitivity to the needs of others, are those that mark them as deficient in  moral development. |
|Turiel... reported that while girls reached Stage Three sooner than did boys, their judgments tended to remain at that stage while the boys’ development continued further along... |
|Carol Gilligan, from “In a Different Voice: Women’s Conceptions of Self and Morality”|c
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Dewey|https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/John_Dewey_cph.3a51565.jpg/330px-John_Dewey_cph.3a51565.jpg]]John Dewey (1859-1952) was an American philosopher and public intellectual. His orientation toward intellectual problems required recognizing thought as a phase of practical activity -- an approach often called [[pragmatism]], though Dewey himself did not emphasize the term. Beyond academic philosophy, he was especially well known for progressive and democratic models of education, and for advocating a deliberative model of democracy. 

<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("Dewey") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
    sortBy
       'tiddler.modified'
       descending
    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
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			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>[[<< back to Noddings|Noddings]] ... [[forward to final essays>>|final essays]] or [[TAchoice]]

!!!Dewey, like Kohlberg, examines morality in the context of education and psychological development. Yet  some contrasts between Dewey and Kohlberg include…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Kohlberg places great weight on abstract principles, while Dewey argues that principles mean little apart from habits of application.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Kohlberg presents morality as a cognitive achievement (expressed through verbal reasoning), while Dewey presents morality as integrated with practical skills and experience.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Kohlberg thinks mature post-conventional reasoners will largely converge in their patterns of reasoning, while Dewey expects that each person’s ideals will be differently shaped by their practical roles.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Kohlberg describes an invariant path of moral development, while Dewey leaves open the possibility of very different cultural and historical patterns.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Kohlberg suggests that the role of the educator is to illustrate moral reasoning one level above that of the students, while Dewey thinks educators should illustrate the ideal moral virtues of their culture.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!![What perspective does Dewey offer us on the following thinkers and/or movements:]
Stoicism - Kantianism - dualism
Marxism 
Utilitarianism
Dialectic (thesis - antithesis - synthesis)
evolution 
Existentialism
moral education
===

!!!Dewey warns us against buying into various dualisms and dichotomies in moral philosophy and educational theory, including between…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) between education (school) and the real life for which it prepares us.]>
{{green{Yes. 358
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) selflessness (a moral quality) and selfish or useful traits and abilities.]>
{{green{Yes. 350, 357-8
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) economic conceptions of well-being and eudaimonistic ideals of happiness.]>
{{red{No... No. Dewey is clearly dissatisfied with reductively economic notions of wellbeing, but he does not attempt to discourage us from distinguishing these two concepts. Something like eudaimonia is closer to Dewey’s ideal than the various polar opposites discussed throughout this essay.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) intellect (knowledge and abstract reasoning) and individual personality (or character)]>
{{green{Yes. 354
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the “inner” and “outer” aspects of moral activity, where a focus on inward goodness is one characteristic of what Nietzsche would have called “slave morality.”]>
{{green{Yes. 346
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In response to various moral thinkers we have read, Dewey argues -- or would argue -- that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Utilitarianism constitutes an overreaction to the Stoic/Kantian approach to moral agency.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Beauvoir is right to complain about how many moral theories have recommended “making oneself a pure inwardness or pure externality, by escaping from the sensible world or by being engulfed in it”.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Noddings is right to reject “the ethics of principle”, but wrong to think that we can take a special interest in the development of the ethical self.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) materialists (such as Marx) fail to recognize that philosophical reflection enables us to transcend our historical context.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Stoic morality overemphasizes inner purity, partly because this kind of philosophy developed under harsh circumstances, where it was difficult to change the material conditions of their experience.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Which of the following claims might Dewey make about the experiences of students in an ethics class?…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) A well-rounded moral education must orient students to their potential role, as unique individuals, in solving social problems.]>
{{green{Yes. In other words, an ethics class, as such, is not sufficient for a moral education; moral education is inseparable from the skills and perceptiveness that enable people to respond to the problems around them.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Students should come to see how different ethical ideas address the challenges and assumptions of different circumstances.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The central task of an ethics class should be to give students knowledge of the major traditions and claims of moral philosophers.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) A good ethics class should provide students with a feeling of duty to act in ways that transcend selfish concerns.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Prioritizing discussion and dialogue rather than indoctrination is not intrinsically important, but it is important at an institution like Wesleyan because of our role in a democracy.]>
{{red{Not really... This is a more difficult call, however; Dewey certainly suggests that reflective education carries a special burden in democracy, and this essay is especially concerned with democracy. Nonetheless, his acknowledgement of the possibility that indoctrination may "work" in certain authoritarian cultures is not a claim that it serves well as moral education; he's simply highlighting the difference between a context where students tend to resist absorbing such lessons (ours) and a context where they might accept them. An ability to raise questions and articulate new problems is vital for a sound moral education, even beyond democracy.
}}}
===
}}}

Dewey's philosophical approach belongs to the pragmatist tradition.
;Pragmatism
:<<tiddler [[Pragmatism]]>>
Taking a pragmatist approach to ethics means thinking of moral cognition as emerging out of human activity (in all its organic, historical and social specificity), rather than being a set of ideals apprehended //a priori//.

Note subtle differences from Marxist [[materialism]] (though Marx has a closely related concept of praxis) and [[existentialism]] (which also warns of false extremes of internal and external ways of looking at action).

+++!!!!!*[347: inner vs outer]
|The first obstruction which meets us is the currency of moral ideas which split the course of activity into two opposed factors, ... the inner and outer, or the spiritual and the physical. This division is a culmination of the dualism of mind and the world, soul and body, end and means,  which we have so frequently noted. In morals it takes the form of a sharp demarcation of the motive of action from its consequences, and of character from conduct. ... Different schools identify morality with either the inner state of mind or the outer act and results, each in separation from the other.|
>Compare to Beauvoir’s complaint in “Ethics of Ambiguity”.
===
+++!!!!!*[347: doubt and hesitation (thought and consciousness) as practical]
|A person who does not have his mind made up, does not know what to do. Consequently he postpones definite action so far as possible. His position may be compared to that of a man considering jumping across a ditch... he is in doubt he hesitates. During the time in which a single overt line of action is in suspense, his activities are confined to such redistributions of energy within the organism as will prepare a determinate course of action. He measures the ditch with his eyes; he brings himself taut to get a feel of the energy at his disposal he looks about for other ways across, he reflects upon the importance of getting across. All this means an accentuation of consciousness it means a turning in upon the individual’s own attitudes, powers, wishes, etc. ¶ Obviously, however, this surging up of personal factors into conscious recognition is part of the whole activity in its temporal development. There is not first a purely psychical process, followed abruptly by a radically different physical one...|
===
+++!!!!!*[348: problematic situation [pragmatism]]
|We may distinguish, of course, the more explicitly conscious phase of the continuous activity as mental or phychical. But that only identifies the mental of psychical to mean the indeterminate, formative state of an activity which in its  fullness involves putting forth of overt energy to modify the environment. ¶ Our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, aversions are important, because they represent inchoate, nascent activities. They fulfill their destiny in issuing, later on, into specific and perceptible acts. And these inchoate, budding organic readjustments are important because they are our sole escape  from the dominion of routine habits and blind impulse. They are activities having a new meaning in process of development. Hence, normally, there is an accentuation of personal consciousness whenever our instincts and ready formed habits find themselves blocked by novel conditions.|
>Note EVOLUTION, and also denial of Marxist materialism (and behaviorism) on which the mental phase does NOT have a real importance.
===
+++!!!!!*[348: castles in the air]
|This role of mind in continuous activity is not always maintained, however... When we find the successful display of our energies checked by uncongenial surroundings, natural and social, the easiest way out is to build castles in the air and let them  be a substitute for an actual achievement which involves the pains of thought.|
===
+++!!!!!*[349: social situation and refuge]
|the split may be more than an incident of a particular # individual’s experience. The social situation may be such as to throw the class given to articulate reflection back into their own thoughts and desires without providing  the means by which these ideas and aspirations can be used to reorganize the environment. Under such conditions, men take revenge, as it were, upon the alien and hostile environment by cultivating contempt for it... In the early centuries of the Christian era, the influential moral systems of Stoicism, of monastic and popular Christianity and other religious movements of the day, took shape under the influence of such conditions.... The external world...  was thought of as morally indifferent. Everything lay in  having the right motive... Much the same sort of situation recurred in Germany [in late 18th, early 19th C]; it led to the Kantian insistence upon the good will as the sole moral good, the will being regarded... apart from ... consequences...|
>Compare against Marxist explanation for “false consciousness”.
===
+++!!!!!*[349: reaction]
|The purely internal morality... naturally led to a reaction... utilitarianism... that the important thing morally is not what a man is... but what he does... Inner morality was attacked as sentimental... dogmatic, subjective... Results... are what counts...|
>Note the rhetoric of pendulum-swing hints that Dewey will not endorse this view either.
===
+++!!!!!*[349: The social situation may be such as to throw]
|The social situation may be such as to throw th class given to articulate reflection back into their own thoughts and desires without providing the means by which these ideas and aspirations can be used to reorganize the environment. Under such conditions, men take revenge, as it were, ... by cultivating contempt for [the environment].|
===
+++!!!!!*[350: 2. Opposition of Duty and Interest]
|... to act according to interest is, so the allegation runs, to act selfishly, with one’s own personal profit in view... <br>the supporters of the “interest” side of the controversy habitually use the term “self-interest”. Starting  from the premisses that unless there is interest in an object or idea, there is no motive force, they end with the conclusion that even when a person claims to be acting from principle or from a sense of duty, he really acts as he does because there “is something in it” for himself. The premiss is sound; the conclusion false. In reply the other school argues that since man in capable of generous self-forgetting and even self-sacrificing action, he is capable of acting without interest. Again the premiss is sound, and the conclusion false....<br>Both sides assume that the self is a fixed and  hence isolated quantity.|
===
+++!!!!!*[355: remote information vs. first-hand knowledge]
|a  devitalized remote information ... does not guarantee conduct, ... But if knowledge means something of the same sort as our conviction gained by trying and testing that sugar is sweet and quinine bitter, the case stands otherwise. ... it is knowledge gained at first hand through the exigencies of experience which affects conduct in significant ways.|
===
+++!!!!!*[358: virtue: to be fully what one is capable of becoming]
|To possess virtue does not signify to have cultivated a few nameable and exclusive traits; it means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming  through association with others in all the offices of life.|
===
+++!!!!!*[358: recommendations]
|(i) In the first place, the school must itself be a community life in all which that implies.<br>(ii) The learning in school should  be continuous with that out of school.|
===

!!!In response to various moral thinkers we have read, Dewey argues -- or would argue -- that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Noddings is right to reject “the ethics of principle”, but wrong to think that we can take a special interest in the development of the ethical self.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Beauvoir is right to complain about how many moral theories have recommended “making oneself a pure inwardness or pure externality, by escaping from the sensible world or by being engulfed in it”.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Stoic morality overemphasizes inner purity, partly because this kind of philosophy developed under harsh circumstances, where it was difficult to change the material conditions of their experience.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Utilitarianism constitutes an overreaction to the Stoic/Kantian approach to moral agency.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) materialists (such as Marx) fail to recognize that philosophical reflection enables us to transcend our historical context.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

/***
|Name|DisableWikiLinksPlugin|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#DisableWikiLinksPlugin|
|Version|1.5.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|plugin|
|Requires||
|Overrides|Tiddler.prototype.autoLinkWikiWords, 'wikiLink' formatter|
|Description|selectively disable TiddlyWiki's automatic ~WikiWord linking behavior|
This plugin allows you to disable TiddlyWiki's automatic ~WikiWord linking behavior, so that WikiWords embedded in tiddler content will be rendered as regular text, instead of being automatically converted to tiddler links.  To create a tiddler link when automatic linking is disabled, you must enclose the link text within {{{[[...]]}}}.
!!!!!Usage
<<<
You can block automatic WikiWord linking behavior for any specific tiddler by ''tagging it with<<tag excludeWikiWords>>'' (see configuration below) or, check a plugin option to disable automatic WikiWord links to non-existing tiddler titles, while still linking WikiWords that correspond to existing tiddlers titles or shadow tiddler titles.  You can also block specific selected WikiWords from being automatically linked by listing them in [[DisableWikiLinksList]] (see configuration below), separated by whitespace.  This tiddler is optional and, when present, causes the listed words to always be excluded, even if automatic linking of other WikiWords is being permitted.  

Note: WikiWords contained in default ''shadow'' tiddlers will be automatically linked unless you select an additional checkbox option lets you disable these automatic links as well, though this is not recommended, since it can make it more difficult to access some TiddlyWiki standard default content (such as AdvancedOptions or SideBarTabs)
<<<
!!!!!Configuration
<<<
Self-contained control panel:
<<option chkDisableWikiLinks>> Disable ALL automatic WikiWord tiddler links
<<option chkAllowLinksFromShadowTiddlers>> ... except for WikiWords //contained in// shadow tiddlers
<<option chkDisableNonExistingWikiLinks>> Disable automatic WikiWord links for non-existing tiddlers
Disable automatic WikiWord links for words listed in: <<option txtDisableWikiLinksList>>
Disable automatic WikiWord links for tiddlers tagged with: <<option txtDisableWikiLinksTag>>
<<<
!!!!!Installation
<<<
import (or copy/paste) the following tiddlers into your document:
''DisableWikiLinksPlugin'' (tagged with <<tag systemConfig>>)
<<<
!!!!!Revision History
<<<
''2006.06.09 [1.5.0]'' added configurable txtDisableWikiLinksTag (default value: "excludeWikiWords") to allows selective disabling of automatic WikiWord links for any tiddler tagged with that value.
''2006.12.31 [1.4.0]'' in formatter, test for chkDisableNonExistingWikiLinks
''2006.12.09 [1.3.0]'' in formatter, test for excluded wiki words specified in DisableWikiLinksList
''2006.12.09 [1.2.2]'' fix logic in autoLinkWikiWords() (was allowing links TO shadow tiddlers, even when chkDisableWikiLinks is TRUE).  
''2006.12.09 [1.2.1]'' revised logic for handling links in shadow content
''2006.12.08 [1.2.0]'' added hijack of Tiddler.prototype.autoLinkWikiWords so regular (non-bracketed) WikiWords won't be added to the missing list
''2006.05.24 [1.1.0]'' added option to NOT bypass automatic wikiword links when displaying default shadow content (default is to auto-link shadow content)
''2006.02.05 [1.0.1]'' wrapped wikifier hijack in init function to eliminate globals and avoid FireFox 1.5.0.1 crash bug when referencing globals
''2005.12.09 [1.0.0]'' initial release
<<<
!!!!!Credits
<<<
This feature was developed by EricShulman from [[ELS Design Studios|http:/www.elsdesign.com]]
<<<
!!!!!Code
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.disableWikiLinks= {major: 1, minor: 5, revision: 0, date: new Date(2007,6,9)};

if (config.options.chkDisableNonExistingWikiLinks==undefined) config.options.chkDisableNonExistingWikiLinks= false;
if (config.options.chkDisableWikiLinks==undefined) config.options.chkDisableWikiLinks=false;
if (config.options.txtDisableWikiLinksList==undefined) config.options.txtDisableWikiLinksList="DisableWikiLinksList";
if (config.options.chkAllowLinksFromShadowTiddlers==undefined) config.options.chkAllowLinksFromShadowTiddlers=true;
if (config.options.txtDisableWikiLinksTag==undefined) config.options.txtDisableWikiLinksTag="excludeWikiWords";

// find the formatter for wikiLink and replace handler with 'pass-thru' rendering
initDisableWikiLinksFormatter();
function initDisableWikiLinksFormatter() {
	for (var i=0; i<config.formatters.length && config.formatters[i].name!="wikiLink"; i++);
	config.formatters[i].coreHandler=config.formatters[i].handler;
	config.formatters[i].handler=function(w) {
		// supress any leading "~" (if present)
		var skip=(w.matchText.substr(0,1)==config.textPrimitives.unWikiLink)?1:0;
		var title=w.matchText.substr(skip);
		var exists=store.tiddlerExists(title);
		var inShadow=w.tiddler && store.isShadowTiddler(w.tiddler.title);

		// check for excluded Tiddler
		if (w.tiddler && w.tiddler.isTagged(config.options.txtDisableWikiLinksTag))
			{ w.outputText(w.output,w.matchStart+skip,w.nextMatch); return; }
		
		// check for specific excluded wiki words
		var t=store.getTiddlerText(config.options.txtDisableWikiLinksList)
		if (t && t.length && t.indexOf(w.matchText)!=-1)
			{ w.outputText(w.output,w.matchStart+skip,w.nextMatch); return; }

		// if not disabling links from shadows (default setting)
		if (config.options.chkAllowLinksFromShadowTiddlers && inShadow)
			return this.coreHandler(w);

		// check for non-existing non-shadow tiddler
		if (config.options.chkDisableNonExistingWikiLinks && !exists)
			{ w.outputText(w.output,w.matchStart+skip,w.nextMatch); return; }

		// if not enabled, just do standard WikiWord link formatting
		if (!config.options.chkDisableWikiLinks)
			return this.coreHandler(w);

		// just return text without linking
		w.outputText(w.output,w.matchStart+skip,w.nextMatch)
	}
}

Tiddler.prototype.coreAutoLinkWikiWords = Tiddler.prototype.autoLinkWikiWords;
Tiddler.prototype.autoLinkWikiWords = function()
{
	// DEBUG alert("processing: "+this.title);
	// if all automatic links are not disabled, just return results from core function
	if (!config.options.chkDisableWikiLinks)
		return this.coreAutoLinkWikiWords.apply(this,arguments);
	return false;
}
//}}}

/***
|''Name:''|DropDownMenuPlugin|
|''Description:''|Create dropdown menus from unordered lists|
|''Author:''|Saq Imtiaz ( lewcid@gmail.com )|
|''Source:''|http://tw.lewcid.org/#DropDownMenuPlugin|
|''Code Repository:''|http://tw.lewcid.org/svn/plugins|
|''Version:''|2.1|
|''Date:''|11/04/2007|
|''License:''|[[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.2.5|

!!Usage:
* create a two-level unordered list using wiki syntax, and place {{{<<dropMenu>>}}} on the line after it.
* to create a vertical menu use {{{<<dropMenu vertical>>}}} instead.
* to assign custom classes to the list, just pass them as parameters to the macro {{{<<dropMenu className1 className2 className3>>}}}

!!Features:
*Supports just a single level of drop-downs, as anything more usually provides a poor experience for the user.
* Very light weight, about 1.5kb of JavaScript and 4kb of CSS.
* Comes with two built in css 'themes', the default horizontal and vertical. 

!!Customizing:
* to customize the appearance of the menu's, you can either add a custom class as described above or, you can edit the CSS via the StyleSheetDropDownMenu shadow tiddler.

!!Examples:
* [[DropDownMenuDemo]]

***/
// /%
//!BEGIN-PLUGIN-CODE
config.macros.dropMenu={

	dropdownchar: "\u25bc",

	handler : function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler){
		list = findRelated(place.lastChild,"UL","tagName","previousSibling");
		if (!list)
			return;
		addClass(list,"suckerfish");
		if (params.length){
			addClass(list,paramString);
		}
		this.fixLinks(list);
	},
	
	fixLinks : function(el){
		var els = el.getElementsByTagName("li");
		for(var i = 0; i < els.length; i++) {
			if(els[i].getElementsByTagName("ul").length>0){
				var link = findRelated(els[i].firstChild,"A","tagName","nextSibling");
				if(!link){
					var ih = els[i].firstChild.data;
					els[i].removeChild(els[i].firstChild);
					var d = createTiddlyElement(null,"a",null,null,ih+this.dropdownchar,{href:"javascript:;"});
					els[i].insertBefore(d,els[i].firstChild);
				}
				else{
					link.firstChild.data = link.firstChild.data + this.dropdownchar;
					removeClass(link,"tiddlyLinkNonExisting");
				}
			}
			els[i].onmouseover = function() {
				addClass(this, "sfhover");
			};
			els[i].onmouseout = function() {
				removeClass(this, "sfhover");
			};
		}
	}	
};

config.shadowTiddlers["StyleSheetDropDownMenuPlugin"] = 
	 "/*{{{*/\n"+
	 "/***** LAYOUT STYLES -  DO NOT EDIT! *****/\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish, ul.suckerfish ul {\n"+
	 "	margin: 0;\n"+
	 "	padding: 0;\n"+
	 "	list-style: none;\n"+
	 "	line-height:1.4em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish  li {\n"+
	 "	display: inline-block; \n"+
	 "	display: block;\n"+
	 "	float: left; \n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li ul {\n"+
	 "	position: absolute;\n"+
	 "	left: -999em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li:hover ul, ul.suckerfish li.sfhover ul {\n"+
	 "	left: auto;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish ul li {\n"+
	 "	float: none;\n"+
	 "	border-right: 0;\n"+
	 "	border-left:0;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish a, ul.suckerfish a:hover {\n"+
	 "	display: block;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li a.tiddlyLink, ul.suckerfish li a, #mainMenu ul.suckerfish li a {font-weight:bold;}\n"+
	 "/**** END LAYOUT STYLES *****/\n"+
	 "\n\n"+
	 "/**** COLORS AND APPEARANCE - DEFAULT *****/\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li a {\n"+
	 "	padding: 0.5em 1.5em;\n"+
	 "	color: #FFF;\n"+
	 "	background: #0066aa;\n"+
	 "	border-bottom: 0;\n"+
	 "	font-weight:bold;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li:hover a, ul.suckerfish li.sfhover a{\n"+
	 "	background: #00558F;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li:hover ul a, ul.suckerfish li.sfhover ul a{\n"+
	 "	color: #000;\n"+
	 "	background: #eff3fa;\n"+
	 "	border-top:1px solid #FFF;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish ul li a:hover {\n"+
	 "	background: #e0e8f5;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li a{\n"+
	 "	width:9em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish ul li a, ul.suckerfish ul li a:hover{\n"+
	 "	display:inline-block;\n"+
	 "	width:9em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish li {\n"+
	 "	border-left: 1px solid #00558F;\n"+
	 "}\n"+
	 "/***** END COLORS AND APPEARANCE - DEFAULT *****/\n"+
	 "\n\n"+
	 "/***** LAYOUT AND APPEARANCE: VERTICAL *****/\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li{\n"+
	 "	width:10em;\n"+
	 "	border-left: 0px solid #00558f;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical ul li, ul.suckerfish.vertical li a, ul.suckerfish.vertical li:hover a, ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover a {\n"+
	 "	border-left: 0.8em solid #00558f;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li a, ul.suckerfish.vertical li:hover a, ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover a,  ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover a:hover{\n"+
	 "	width:8em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical {\n"+
	 "	width:10em; text-align:left;\n"+
	 "	float:left;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li a {\n"+
	 "	padding: 0.5em 1em 0.5em 1em;\n"+
	 "	border-top:1px solid  #fff;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical, ul.suckerfish.vertical ul {\n"+
	 "	line-height:1.4em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li:hover ul, ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover ul { \n"+
	 "	margin: -2.4em 0 0 10.9em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li:hover ul li a, ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover ul li a {\n"+
	 "	border: 0px solid #FFF;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li:hover a, ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover a{\n"+
	 "	padding-right:1.1em;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "ul.suckerfish.vertical li:hover ul li, ul.suckerfish.vertical li.sfhover ul li {\n"+
	 "	border-bottom:1px solid  #fff;\n"+
	 "}\n\n"+
	 "/***** END LAYOUT AND APPEARANCE: VERTICAL *****/\n"+
	 "/*}}}*/";
store.addNotification("StyleSheetDropDownMenuPlugin",refreshStyles);
//!END-PLUGIN-CODE
// %/

Plumwood's "Easter Island" story is loosely based on Jared Diamond's speculative account. [[Research has taken a radically different direction recently|https://theconversation.com/the-truth-about-easter-island-a-sustainable-society-has-been-falsely-blamed-for-its-own-demise-85563]], based on [[rethinking the technology and clues about social relations|https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/easter-island-statues-might-have-been-walked-out-of-quarry/]].

<!--{{{-->
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<!--}}}-->

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Wesleyan University

Emerson's work illustrates transcendentalism in philosophy, and "Self-Reliance" shows its implications for ethics. 

Some concepts to learn and evaluate as we read include:
antinomianism
transcendentalism
idealism
perspectivalism
relativism

As always, we should be on guard against hasty readings. Emersonian self-reliance and relativism may not be as self-confident or anti-social as they seem.

!!!Epictetus advises us against being misled by certain impressions or appearances. On gaining a better perspective, we will no longer be tempted to insist on …
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) gaining recognition for our merits.]>
{{green{Yes. This is an “external”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the importance of correcting those who act wrongly or accuse falsely.]>
{{green{Yes. Right; their actions are not up to us.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) the importance of activities such as politics, physical exercise, and art.]>
{{red{No... The activities may be important, but the results (“winning” them) are not to be focused upon.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the value of human life.]>
{{red{No... Notice in XXVI (and XVI) how Epictetus wants us as much to EXTEND sympathetic reactions outward to others, not just to reduce our strong sensitivity to lives around us.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) taking friendships and family relations seriously.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus clearly takes such commitments seriously; he simply does not endorse many of the emotions and value-judgments associated with favoring loved ones.
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[http://www.phillwebb.net/History/Ancient/Epictetus/Epictetus2.jpg]]Epictetus (c 55-135 CE) was a [[Stoic]] philosopher who taught that tranquility and self-control are the most important goals. 
----
How is tranquility different from passivity? Does Epictetus’ emotional coolness suggest lack of concern for others? In the Enchiridion ([[Epictetus]]' best-known work), unlike the Platonic dialogues, we find that reasoned argument is not sustained for long. Instead Epictetus employs [[aphorisms]] and [[metaphors]] to stimulate reflection. Critical examination on the text can focus either on [[argument]] or on the effects of its important distinctions, metaphors, and stylistic approaches. Which aspects of the Enchiridion probably account for its popularity among those enduring adversity, such as prisoners of war?
<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagging")||hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Epictetus">> 
back to [[Crito]] ... forward to [[King]]

!!!According to Epictetus, a woman sentenced to life in jail for a crime she did not commit should…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) not attempt any appeal or protest until and unless she can anticipate all possible outcomes.]>
{{red{No... It’s true that Epictetus encourages you as reader to think through possible outcomes before making a choice. However, the point is not that you must always delay action until you actually know all outcomes; rather, you should maintain perspective on uncertainty, not setting yourself up to feel distressed and indignant when events unfold in some non-ideal way.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) follow the orders of the prison staff because that is what is right for the role of a prisoner.]>
{{red{No... It’s true that she is in some kind of prisoner role, but it is not yet settled whether she is an *obedient* prisoner. It is up to her whether or not she is obedient. She might choose a stance of calm non-compliance or conscious dissent, for example.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) embrace that her role is divinely scripted; hence her fate is to remain a prisoner.]>
{{red{No... The fact that she’s *currently* in prisoner role (yes) does not determine that her fate is to *remain* a prisoner. Her larger fate may take lots of directions; only her choices are up to her.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) do nothing because her sentence is an “external event,” over which she has no control.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus never recommends “doing nothing” -- no situation would lead to such advice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) not be determined to escape, for such an intention invites disappointment if it is not successful.]>
{{green{Yes. Being “determined” to escape means being attached to the result, which is not “up to us”. She can follow a plan, but she cannot intend anything beyond her own choices. Digging is a viable choice, for example, but escaping is not.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!![Groups]
We'll rearrange after this first unit, when we have resolution about add/drop activity.
===
+++!!!^*[Error in text file]
31. has typo (OCR error): "existing in"
===
+++!!![Philosophical Reasoning: premises]
//Method tip:// Distinguish objections to someone's premises and objections to the inferences drawn on the basis of those premises.
===
+++!!![Epictetus session notes]
<<tiddler [[Epictetus session notes]]>>
===
+++!!![moodle details]
# You can ''subscribe'' to threads, or to a whole unit forum
# You can see ''study questions'' to orient your reading
# You can find [[definitions|Definitions list]] for philosophical terms, notes from prior classes, etc.
===
+++!!![Reading for next time: M.L. King, Jr, "Letter from a Birmingham Jail"]
# Write a passage commentary if it's your turn. Post it //by midnight//
# Take a look at other students' commentaries, if it's not your turn.
===

For this reason goodness has priority over every relationship. Even my father is of no concern to me but only goodness.
//Are you so hard?//
Yes; that is my nature. This is the currency God has given me. Accordingly, if goodness is different from honourableness and justice, that is goodbye to father, brother, country, and all such things. Am I to pass up my own good, in order for you to get yours, and give way to you? In exchange for what?
//I am your father!//
But you are not my good.
//I am your brother!//
But you are not my good. Yet, if we locate goodness in correct volition, the actual maintenance of such relationships becomes a good, and also, one who gives way over certain externals acquires the good.
//My father is seizing my property. //
But he is not injuring you.
//My brother will get the main part of the land.//
As much as he wants. He won't be getting any of your integrity or your fraternal attitude. Who can rob you of this property? Not even Zeus. For he did not wish to, but he made it up to me, and gave it as he has it himself, unhindered, unconstrained, unimpeded. (3.3.5-10)

AA Long comments:
>To take the measure of this startling passage, we need to combine it with Epictetus' earlier comments on the role of being a [end p.237] son. There he claimed that there should be no limits to filial respect. Here, contrary to first appearances, he is actually making the same point. We do not choose our parents (1.12.28), and some parents do not deserve that title (3.18.5), but what matters about parents, so far as their children are concerned, should be not how they treat us but how we treat them. We are not accountable for how our parents and other relatives behave (1.12.33). In that respect they are of no concern to us and to our own integrity. If, however, we allow their treatment of us to become a matter of concern, we are liable to jeopardize the integrity that is one of our most valuable possessions.

[[15crito]]

Philosophy = philo - sophia
For ancients, the ''sophia'' (wisdom) embodied ''knowledge'' and ''//eudaimonia//'' (living well, happiness), inseparably.

The Stoics, including Epictetus, conclude that both ''knowledge'' and ''happiness'' are enhanced by a practice of:
* getting //perspective//
* correcting for bias of appearances.
Stoic terms: 
{{indent{
prohairesis (choice is both physical and mental)... ataraxia
apathy (freedom from passion, but not from motivation)
}}}
See [[Biography of Epictetus|http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epictetu.htm]]

Epictetus' central ''distinction'': 
|!in your control<br>|!not in your control<br>|
|prohairesis|"externals"|
Central ''claim'': we should not become concerned over matters that are beyond our control.

{{outline{
Consider the traditional prayer:
"God grant me the serenity... +++to accept the things I cannot change,<br>the courage to change the things I can, <br>and the wisdom to tell the difference."
===}}}

!!!In The Enchiridion, Epictetus dwells on the actions befitting a person who is serious about pursuing true happiness and freedom. According to him, it is proper for such a person to…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) speak clearly and openly about errors in others’ conduct, without arrogance and without worrying about their feelings.]>
{{red{No... Although Epictetus would not have us be especially worried about others’ feelings as such, he still does not advise open judgment of others’ conduct. Instead, we are to presume that people have acted as best as they could based on their perspective. If it is possible to improve their perspective, there is no further need to call attention to errors.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) operate on the assumption that the natural course of events, even when it brings about material or social losses, is fundamentally good.]>
{{green{Yes. Acceptance of fate, including deaths and other kinds of suffering, are central to Epictetus’ advice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) adhere to proper principles of action, rather than basing one’s decisions on the expected consequences of action.]>
{{green{Yes. Exactly; to act in anticipation of consequences is to become attached to results and pulled away from choosing wisely.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) satisfy social expectations, since each person must conform to their social roles and to local customs.]>
{{red{No... This is a bit too far. A general respect for customs and conventions does mark Epictetus’ advice, yet the satisfaction of social expectations suggests something further: an unwillingness to disappoint specific others. Epictetus admires some instances of non-conformity (such as Diogenes); yet one must not simply act aloof and superior to local standards.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) minimize involvement with familial bonds and deep friendships, since the fate of such relationships is not in a person’s control.]>
{{red{No... One may attend to such relationships, and be involved in them on a day-to-day level, yet without being *emotionally* attached to outcomes. Responsibility to family and friends (and community) is not rejected by Epictetus; he rejects the attempt to find happiness or satisfaction through others. Discourses 52: “I ought not to be unmoved [apathês] like a statue, but I should maintain my natural and acquired relationships, as a dutiful man and as a son, brother, father, and citizen.”
}}}
===
}}}

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!!!Epictetus is likely to face objections because of bits of advice that may seem to be in tension. His advice includes…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Treat ridicule as something external. If you wish to turn ridicule into admiration, keep steady in your commitments.]>
{{green{Yes. 20 & 22 offer some apparently paradoxical admonishments about the right stance toward ridicule or being ridiculous. Epictetus ultimately encourages us not to be preoccupied with social attitudes like ridicule; yet Epictetus is writing for students who might still be affected by imagery of ridicule, and he seems to harness that interest along the way.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) You must “play your role” — as if in a drama written by another. Yet your actions and attitudes are up to you at all times.]>
{{green{Yes. The drama metaphor does seem to imply lack of control even over one’s own actions and speech (if there’s a script). Yet the rest of the text makes clear that only your role (your past, your identity, body, circumstances, etc.) is fixed by the author of the drama (or by the gods). How to live it out, how to animate and give it meaning, depends on the actor.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) You should act in conformity to nature. Yet, you should resist human nature.]>
{{red{No... The advice be “conformable to nature” is central. Although our modern conception of “human nature” may link it to emotional vulnerability, Epictetus never associates “human nature” with the things advises us to resist.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) You should avoid emotional attachments. Yet you have duties because of your relationships.]>
{{green{Yes. Bonds/attachments in the sense of commitments and responsibilities can matter; bonds as in emotional attachments to “having” a person (and the motivation to treat one’s attachments as more valuable than others’) are discouraged.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Only you are to blame for any bad decisions you have made. You are not to blame for any bad decisions you have made.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus never actually encourages self-blame; at most we “attribute” our disappointment or disturbance to the attitude we had.
}}}
===
}}}

In order to challenge Epictetus' view, consider ... +++
|objecting to the ''central claim''<br> (that we should not worry about things beyond our control):<br>{{red{OBJ: We //should// be concerned over things beyond our control}}}|objecting to the ''details'' of the distinction as Epictetus applies it.<br>(that such-and-such is beyond our control, so...):<br>{{red{OBJ: Some things are within our control more than Epictetus acknowledges}}}|
===

!!!Critical questions: 
# Is Epictetus right that ''reputation'' is out of our control?
# Can Epictetus make ''commitments'' to other people? (See Commentaries...)
# What about our ''beliefs'' and ''attitudes''? Aren't some tendencies simply “human nature”? 
## “That makes me mad”
## “I can’t help but believe that...” Stoicism introduces VOLUNTARISM about belief
# Does Epictetus encourage a hermit-like ''isolation'' from social bonds and public roles?
# Does Epictetus encourage a stance of ''denial'' toward important human emotions?

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!!!In his stoic teachings, Epictetus employs imagery and analogies to illustrate the wisdom of keeping things in perspective and not overreaching. For example, at §15 he writes,
>Remember that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought around to you? Put out your hand and take your share with moderation. Does it pass by you? Don't stop it. Is it not yet come? Don't stretch your desire towards it, but wait till it reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to public posts, to riches, and you will eventually be a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods.
In light of the larger text, this passage should be taken to imply…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) A wise athlete would be one who appreciates the challenges of training and exertion, but remains unconcerned with who actually wins the race or other event.]>
{{green{Yes. It is possible to pursue politics or athletics wisely in this way (focusing not on results), though Epictetus certainly warns his students about getting involved in such pursuits because of the temptations toward taking a competitive attitude.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) After being nominated or appointed by others, a stoic might accept a political responsibility, but she should not participate in a public campaign or advocate particular policies.]>
{{red{No... Though most stoics will not be attached to the idea of taking office, it’s not so clear that public campaigning or policy-advocacy is ruled out. As with athletic activity, political activity must be governed by the discipline of worrying only about the exercise of one’s own agency, and not about results.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Because a stoic does not indulge in passionate pursuits, he will not enjoy intimate pleasures and will not develop intimate bonds.]>
{{red{No... The advice to avoid chasing desire does not imply having no pleasures. More importantly, Epictetus clearly expects his students to have intimate bonds and commitments, even while they accept that the fate of a relationship is not entirely up to them.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Death and other losses will not make any emotional impression on a person who has committed to the stoic path.]>
{{red{No... A stoic does not fail to experience “impressions” or “appearances” (emotional or otherwise); Epictetus’ recommendations concern how one responds to those appearances. Equally importantly: there is a big difference between committing to the stoic path and achieving the kind of self-direction attributed to a sage.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) A stoic will be fatalistic about physical pain, passively enduring physical difficulties and trusting that they will pass.]>
{{red{No... Nothing about stoicism recommends passivity rather than action; nor does Epictetus suggest that things will get better through non-action.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia (usually translated to English as “happiness”) differs from familiar and modern notions of happiness, as becomes evident in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Happiness is an “activity” rather than a feeling.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed, this is Aristotle’s way of speaking. Another translation is “flourishing”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Happiness is good partly because of how it motivates us to act virtuously.]>
{{red{No... Happiness is not good for anything else; it’s the only good that is self-sufficient.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) A person’s happiness might be somewhat affected by events after their death.]>
{{green{Yes. Book I, §10-11 take this claim seriously.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Happiness cannot really occur in children.]>
{{green{Yes. We can appreciate only the “promise” of happiness for children.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Happiness cannot occur without education and practice.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; happiness requires virtue, which in turn requires education and practice.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Our sources (article, podcast) respond to various concerns about euthanasia. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) In response to those who claim that palliative care is a more appropriate response to suffering, Wilkinson argues both that certain forms of suffering do not respond fully to palliative care, and that patients may rightly resist being sedated to a degree that deprives them of conscious participation in their lives.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) In response to worries that euthanasia involves disrespect for life, Wilkinson suggests that control over the timing and manner of death offers a measure of dignity to patients suffering from terminal illnesses, and that this may be an appropriate way to respect their lives and their autonomy.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) It is hard to argue that physician-assisted suicide will be sought out because of financial strain, since PAS is associated with relatively high educational background and with access to health insurance.]>
{{brown{Not really. It’s true that Battin claims that people in one specific “vulnerable group” (the uninsured) have not been especially likely to participate in PAS, but this fact is not enough to support the broader claim that financial strain will not function as a significant factor; the correlation with being insured (so far) may reflect only that those without insurance have not yet been able to hire a doctor to perform PAS, especially during the early years of PAS being legal.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) To avoid moral concerns around actively causing death, life-support technologies may be altered so as to require frequent positive interventions (such as re-starting a breathing machine each day).]>
{{green{Yes... Such technology is discussed in the podcast, specifically in Israel.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Battin reports that requests for physician-assisted death are met with close scrutiny in the Netherlands, with two thirds of requests being rejected by physicians.]>
{{green{Yes. This is Battin’s claim, although one may still have reservations about whether the scrutiny is being carried out by the right people and in the right way.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Euthyphro's various hypotheses about piety do not withstand Socrates' elenchus because, for example,…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Euthyphro can never decide whether something counts as pious because the gods love it, or whether they love it because of its pious quality.]>
{{red{No... Euthyphro’s initial definition implied that something counts as pious because of divine love, but he does then agree with Socrates that the gods have reasons for their love.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Late in the dialogue, Euthyphro embraces the idea that pious actions help the gods achieve “many fine things”, but Euthyphro cannot say what the gods are achieving with our help.]>
{{green{Yes. Look at the “flowchart.” Euthyphro claims the gods do “many fine things.” Socrates wants to hear more; Euthyphro falls silent.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Socrates refutes Euthyphro's claim that there are many gods and that they disagree with each other.]>
{{red{No... Socrates is skeptical that gods fight amongst themselves, but his elenchus focuses on internal inconsistenciess among Euthyphro’s ideas.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Euthyphro suggests piety involves caring for or benefiting the gods, but he also affirms that humans can’t improve gods or fill divine needs.]>
{{green{Yes. Look at the “flowchart.” Euthyphro is stumped about how to offer details about how pious acts “benefit” the gods.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Socrates believes it is impious to prosecute one's own father.]>
{{red{No... Socrates does seem to disapprove of prosecuting one’s own father. But his elenchus focuses on internal inconsistencies within Euthyphro’s ideas.
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[euthyphro_map|https://www.dropbox.com/s/ns5qorosa44aify/euth_footnotes%2000001.png?raw=1]]

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    where
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    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged with \"Euthyphro\"//"'
>>

{{menubox{
Euth: These people themselves believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods,yet they agree that he bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn castrated his father... But they are angry with tme because I am prosecuting my father...

Soc: ... I find it hard to accept things like that being said about the gods... Now, however, if you, who have full knowledge... share their opinions, then we must agree with them too, it would seem... do you believe that there really is war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other such things...?

Euth: Not only these, Socrates, but... many other things... I know will amaze you.
...

Soc: But you say that the same things are considered just by some gods and unjust by others, and as they dispute about these things they are at odds and at war with each other. Is that not so?

Euth: It is.

Soc: The same things are loved by the gods and hated by the gods... the same things would be both pious and impious, according to this argument?

Euth: I’m afraid so.
...

Soc: ...let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate it. However, is this the correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that wht some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety and impiety?
...
Euth: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.
}}}

!!!Based on the text of the //Euthyphro//, there is room to think that a definition of piety that would be acceptable to Socrates…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) might be an option Euthyphro rejects — namely, that the pious is whatever actions all the gods love, though their love itself has no reason behind it and simply causes actions to count as pious.]>
{{red{No... We have clues that Socrates would resist any account of the gods that makes them unreasonable, and hence makes piety a matter of blind obedience. However, this definition would at least have the virtue of a certain consistency.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) begins with examples such as Socrates’ own activities in pursuit of wisdom.]>
{{red{No... Clearly a definition cannot revolve around examples, on Socrates’ view.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) might specify how pious actions perform some kind of service to the gods.]>
{{green{Yes. Note this is the only suggestion that is abandoned (by Euthyphro, who cannot say anything about the //kind// of service it would be) rather than jointly refuted by dialogue. Also, this is one suggestion that has been fueled by Socrates’ own suggestions after Euthyphro falls short with his initial line of attempts.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) is impossible.]>
{{green{Yes. There’s //room// to think so. However, it’s not at all //established by// the text!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) would be one that leaves it up to individuals to settle on a definition that satisfies their own conscience.]>
{{red{No... Any definition that simply embraces relativistic disagreement is no definition at all, for Socrates, as is illustrated by his complaint about Euthyphro’s first definition.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant claims that all actions and events must be understood as following some kind of law. He further argues…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we can aspire to be free (in a practical sense) from natural law only by formulating moral laws for ourselves, and acting autonomously on such principles.]>
{{green{Yes. ¶3: freedom of action can’t mean random lawlessness. And no act “breaks” natural law... So affirming a law for oneself is only way to rise above nature.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that when an agent is motivated by the moral law, observers find that those actions cannot be explained by reference to any natural (psychological) law.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s view illustrates compatibilism about causal necessity and moral responsibility; all actions will continue to make sense from a naturalistic (psychological or causal) perspective.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) laws can be either those of nature (regulating the sensible world) or those of reason (regulating the intelligible world).]>
{{green{Yes. Heteronomy and autonomy are distinguished in just this way.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that human beings need not see themselves as bound by the moral law, because sometimes their actions are fully explained by the laws of nature.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s argument for believing in our freedom is a “transcendental” argument: presupposing our freedom is the only way to make sense of our lives and experiences.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) speculative philosophy offers an analytic proof that we have freedom of the will, even if we never experience it directly.]>
{{red{No... Alas, “proof” is too strong a word (and the argument is not analytic but synthetic); we may be satisfied that the belief is essential to us, and that it is reasonable, but not that it is certainly true: “only a necessary presupposition...”
}}}
===
}}}

|! in-class prompts|!alternate prompts|
|01C	Many of Euthyphro’s suggestions about piety end up being rejected because of implications that even Euthyphro would not embrace, including…|01D	Plato’s dialogue, Euthyphro, revolves around what has been called the “Euthyphro dilemma”, about which we can say…|
|02C	Over the course of the dialogue, Crito retracts his commitment to the following initial claims:…|02D	The Crito is sometimes seen as an argument in favor of political obedience, yet this interpretation is made weaker by noticing…|
|03C	Epictetus expects that advanced students of Stoic self-discipline would abstain from…|03D	What is “up to us”, according to Epictetus, includes…|
|04C	King’s program of non-violent direct action is justified, on his account, because…|04D	King’s religious perspective might be characterized as…|
|05C	Deliberate voluntary choices, on Aristotle’s account…|05D	Aristotle explicitly presents human beings as a kind of animal, and some of the consequences of this include…|
|06C	On Aristotle’s view, we should not expect to find a fully virtuous person who…|06D	Aristotle’s claims about justice include…|
|07C	Aristotle considers many paradoxical or puzzling claims, but embraces only some of them, including…|07D	Aristotle’s ethics go hand in hand with his political philosophy, according to which…|
|08C	Persons with good will, according to Kant…|08D	Kant claims that various methods of teaching and illustrating morality are dangerous or misleading, such as…|
|09C	On the subject of moral duties, Kant would claim…|09D	Kant claims that there are many things we cannot really know, including…|
|10C	Kant emphasizes that we think of ourselves as belonging to the realm of intelligibility, and this means…|10D	Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative requires…|
|11C	Christine Korsgaard argues for a modified Kantian ethics, basing it partly on the following claims, which (she says) are really advanced by Kant:…|11D	Korsgaard claims it may be justifiable to set aside the most rigorous formulation of the categorical imperative and to rely upon the Law of Universality criterion -- but we may do so only when…|

Virtuous Feelings
>“If continence makes someone prone to abide by every belief, it is bad, if, for instance, it makes him abide a false as well [as true] belief. If incontinence makes someone prone to abandon every belief there will be an excellent type of incontinence. ” (1146a, 17) 
|Aristotle puts forth that incontinence can have value because “false” beliefs sometimes prevent us from seeing the greater truth. However, if incontinence represents the abandonment of “correct reason” in favor of one's "feelings" (1151a, 21), is Aristotle suggesting that sometimes truth lies outside of the bounds of rational thinking? Is there virtue in trusting one’s emotions rather than one’s reason? Aristotle condemns persons unmoved by reason as “boorish and ignorant” (1151b, 13), but praises Neoptolemus whose feeling of pain when lying triumphs his rational duty to tell the lies. Aristotle resolves this contradiction by saying that it is only incontinent to abide by “shameful pleasures” (1151b, 24), so perhaps virtuous feelings, like wanting to tell the truth, can serve as justifiable reason.(122 words)|@@Note that this is in the section "Puzzles about Continence" and that Aristotle is following up on implications of Socrates' view... which he ends up rejecting!@@|

|>|>|!First, how well do EXISTING moral theories address our interaction with non-human beings and our environment? |
|>|!Moral theory <br>(click to show its standard position on animals):|!Can it be adapted? |
|>|+++[deontology (Kant's theory):]>Only deliberate reasoners have moral status.===|+++[...]Moral status COULD extend to wider range of "agents"<br>if moral dignity and respect were not <br>restricted to rationally deliberate beings. (Regan)===|
|>|+++[utilitarianism (Mill's theory):]>All sentient beings matter (though some animals are "higher" than others). <br> Note, Mill has no account of how their interests get associated with our own.===|+++[...]We would need to engage actively in revealing the plight of animals, <br> especially those exploited for human consumption and industry. (Singer)===|
|>|+++[virtue ethics (Aristotle's theory):]>Other animals each have proper "telos" (function / end), but <br> they have no "virtue" because they cannot reason, and <br>we have no particular moral dealings with them.<br> (Furthermore, Aristotle is not concerned with systemic conditions<br> that prevent even marginalized human beings from thriving.)===|+++[...]A virtue-oriented theory COULD emphasize conditions <br>that promote or inhibit ecological flourishing<br> and theorize about the human "virtues" <br> related to proper interaction with non-humans...<br>(Leopold, Sandler, Carson)===|

the origin of freedom
>“He acquires the concept of himself not a priori but empirically”. (Kant, 451)  
|The final part of Kant’s writing transitions to the concepts of freedom, will and autonomy. The idea of freedom is presented as a priori, not resulting from experience. However, it also seems that those with free will are those who understand morality and acknowledge that they have this freedom. Rational beings think of themselves as free. How do we reconcile these two ideas? Doesn’t it take experience to recognize our own free will, making it empirical rather than a priori? I think that Kant might argue that freedom as a concept is always in existence, regardless of experience, but that a rational person must recognize the free will in order for it to be utilized.  (115 words)|@@@@|

/***
|Name|ExternalTiddlersPlugin|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#ExternalTiddlersPlugin|
|Documentation|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#ExternalTiddlersPluginInfo|
|Version|1.3.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|plugin|
|Requires|TemporaryTiddlersPlugin (optional, recommended)|
|Overrides|config.macros.tiddler.handler|
|Description|retrieve and wikify content from external files or remote URLs|
This plugin extends the {{{<<tiddler>>}}} macro syntax so you can retrieve and wikify content directly from external files or remote URLs.  You can also define alternative "fallback" sources to provide basic "import on demand" handling by automatically creating/importing tiddler content from external sources when the specified ~TiddlerName does not already exist in your document.
!!!!!Documentation
>see [[ExternalTiddlersPluginInfo]]
!!!!!Configuration
<<<
<<option chkExternalTiddlersImport>> automatically create/import tiddlers when using external fallback references
{{{usage: <<option chkExternalTiddlersImport>>}}}
<<option chkExternalTiddlersQuiet>> don't display messages when adding tiddlers ("quiet mode")
{{{usage: <<option chkExternalTiddlersQuiet>>}}}
<<option chkExternalTiddlersTemporary>> tag retrieved tiddlers as 'temporary'(requires [[TemporaryTiddlersPlugin]])
{{{usage: <<option chkExternalTiddlersTemporary>>}}}
tag retrieved tiddlers with: <<option txtExternalTiddlersTags>>
{{{usage: <<option txtExternalTiddlersTags>>}}}

__password-protected server settings //(optional, if needed)//:__
>username: <<option txtRemoteUsername>> password: <<option txtRemotePassword>>
>{{{usage: <<option txtRemoteUsername>> <<option txtRemotePassword>>}}}
>''note: these settings are also used by [[LoadTiddlersPlugin]] and [[ImportTiddlersPlugin]]''
<<<
!!!!!Revision History
<<<
2008.01.08 [*.*.*] plugin size reduction: documentation moved to ExternalTiddlersPluginInfo
2008.01.03 [1.3.0] use lower-level doHttp() instead loadRemoteFile() so that optional username/password values can be used in XMLHttpRequest
2007.12.22 [1.2.2] in handler(), when reading from local file with relative path fixup, use decodeURIComponent() instead of decodeURI 
2007.11.30 [1.2.1] lots of code/docmentation cleanup.  renamed option cookies.  changed auto tag value to "external".
2007.11.27 [1.2.0] added support for automatically importing external tiddlers
2007.11.26 [1.1.1] improved XMLHttpRequest() error reporting for cross-domain security issues
2007.11.26 [1.1.0] added support for multiple alternative fallback references
2007.11.25 [1.0.0] initial release - moved from CoreTweaks
<<<
!!!!!Code
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.ExternalTiddlers= {major: 1, minor: 3, revision: 0, date: new Date(2008,1,3)};

// optional automatic import/create for missing tiddlers
if (config.options.chkExternalTiddlersImport==undefined) config.options.chkExternalTiddlersImport=true;
if (config.options.chkExternalTiddlersTemporary==undefined) config.options.chkExternalTiddlersTemporary=true;
if (config.options.chkExternalTiddlersQuiet==undefined) config.options.chkExternalTiddlersQuiet=false;
if (config.options.txtExternalTiddlersTags==undefined) config.options.txtExternalTiddlersTags="external";
if (config.options.txtRemoteUsername==undefined) config.options.txtRemoteUsername="";
if (config.options.txtRemotePassword==undefined) config.options.txtRemotePassword="";

config.macros.tiddler.externalTiddlers_handler = config.macros.tiddler.handler;
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{
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		return text;
	}
	function addTiddler(src,text,tids) { // extract tiddler(s) from text and create local copy
		if (!config.options.chkExternalTiddlersImport) return; // not enabled... do nothing
		if (!text || !tids || !tids.length) return; // no text or no tiddler list... do nothing
		var remoteStore=new TiddlyWiki();
		if (!remoteStore.importTiddlyWiki(text)) // not a TW document... create a single tiddler from text
			makeTiddler(src,text,tids[0]);
		else // TW document with "permaview-like" suffix... copy tiddler(s) from remote store
			for (var t=0;t<tids.length;t++)
				insertTiddler(src,remoteStore.getTiddler(tids[t]));
		return;
	}
	function makeTiddler(src,text,title) { // create a new tiddler object from text
		var who=config.options.txtUserName; var when=new Date();
		var msg="/%\n\nThis tiddler was automatically created using ExternalTiddlersPlugin\n";
		msg+="by %0 on %1\nsource: %2\n\n%/";
		var tags=config.options.txtExternalTiddlersTags.readBracketedList();
		if (config.options.chkExternalTiddlersTemporary) tags.pushUnique(config.options.txtTemporaryTag); 
		store.saveTiddler(null,title,msg.format([who,when,src])+text,who,when,tags,{});
		if (!config.options.chkExternalTiddlersQuiet) displayMessage("Created new tiddler '"+title+"' from text file "+src);
	}
	function insertTiddler(src,t) { // import a single tiddler object into the current document store
		if (!t) return;
		var who=config.options.txtUserName; var when=new Date();
		var msg="/%\n\nThis tiddler was automatically imported using ExternalTiddlersPlugin\n";
		msg+="by %0 on %1\nsource: %2\n\n%/";
		var newtags=Array.concat(t.tags,config.options.txtExternalTiddlersTags.readBracketedList());
		if (config.options.chkExternalTiddlersTemporary) newtags.push(config.options.txtTemporaryTag);
		store.saveTiddler(null,t.title,msg.format([who,when,src])+t.text,t.modifier,t.modified,newtags,t.fields);
		if (!config.options.chkExternalTiddlersQuiet) displayMessage("Imported tiddler '"+t.title+"' from "+src);
	}
	function getGUID()  // create a Globally Unique ID (for async reference to DOM elements)
		 { return new Date().getTime()+Math.random().toString(); }

	// loop through "|"-separated list of alternative tiddler/file/URL references until successful
	var fallback="";
	for (var i=0; i<items.length; i++) { var src=items[i];
		// if tiddler (or shadow) exists, replace reference list with current source name and apply core handler
		if (store.getTiddlerText(src)) {
			arguments[2][0]=src; // params[] array
			var p=arguments[4].split(list); arguments[4]=p[0]+src+p[1]; // paramString
			this.externalTiddlers_handler.apply(this,arguments);
			break; // stop processing alternatives
		}
		// tiddler doesn't exist, and not an external file/URL reference... skip it
		if (!config.formatterHelpers.isExternalLink(src)) {
			if (!fallback.length) fallback=src; // title to use when importing external tiddler
			continue;
		}
		// separate 'permaview' list of tiddlers (if any) from file/URL (i.e., '#name name name..." suffix)
		var p=src.split("#"); src=p[0]; var tids=p[1]?p[1].readBracketedList(false):[];
		// if reference is to a remotely hosted document or the current document is remotely hosted...
		if (src.substr(0,4)=="http" || document.location.protocol.substr(0,4)=="http") {
			if (src.substr(0,4)!="http") // fixup URL for relative remote references
				{ var h=document.location.href; src=h.substr(0,h.lastIndexOf("/")+1)+src; }
			var wrapper = createTiddlyElement(place,"span",getGUID(),className); // create placeholder for async rendering
			var callback=function(success,params,text,src,xhr) { // ASYNC CALLBACK
				if (!success) { displayMessage(xhr.status); return; } // couldn't read remote file... report the error 
				if (params.fallback.length)
					addTiddler(params.url,text,params.tids.length?params.tids:[params.fallback]); // import tiddler
				var wrapper=document.getElementById(params.id); if (!wrapper) return; 
				wikify(substitute(extract(text,params.tids),params.args),wrapper); // ASYNC RENDER
			};
			var callbackparams={ url:src, id:wrapper.id, args:args, tids:tids, fallback:fallback }  // ASYNC PARAMS
			var name=config.options.txtRemoteUsername; // optional value
			var pass=config.options.txtRemotePassword; // optional value
			var x=doHttp("GET",src,null,null,name,pass,callback,callbackparams,null)
			if (typeof(x)=="string") // couldn't start XMLHttpRequest... report error
				{ displayMessage("error: cannot access "+src); displayMessage(x); }
			break; // can't tell if async read will succeed.... stop processing alternatives anyway.
		}
		else { // read file from local filesystem
			var text=loadFile(getLocalPath(src));
			if (!text) { // couldn't load file... fixup path for relative reference and retry...
				var h=document.location.href;
				var text=loadFile(getLocalPath(decodeURIComponent(h.substr(0,h.lastIndexOf("/")+1)))+src);
			}
			if (text) { // test it again... if file was loaded OK, render it in a class wrapper
				if (fallback.length) // create new tiddler using primary source name (if any)
					addTiddler(src,text,tids.length?tids:[fallback]);
				var wrapper=createTiddlyElement(place,"span",null,className);
				wikify(substitute(extract(text,tids),args),wrapper); // render
				break; // stop processing alternatives
			}
		}
	}
};
//}}}

!Exam essay questions:
//Two questions will be offered; choose just one for your essay. Please write concisely and legibly! //

!!!Self-knowledge:
Several authors raise issues about how well people understand the motivations, ideologies, or cultural factors that affect their own choices. Compare and contrast at least four authors on this point, including at least one from prior to the midterm.

!!!The Distinctively Human:
Many of our authors discussed whether and how human beings should be sharply distinguished from other beings, ''and what kind of moral significance this difference does (and does not) have''. Compare and contrast at least four authors' arguments and assumptions, including at least one text from prior to the midterm.

!!!Ought vs Is:
Several authors discuss the tension between ideals of empirical knowledge (of "facts" or what "is") and ideals of normative knowledge (of "values" or what "ought" to be). Compare and contrast at least four approaches to this tension, including at least one from prior to the midterm.

! recent material for review
<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("postmid") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged with \"postmid\"//"'
>>

Please choose among the following options. Any of these may be completed as take-home prompts (see details below) or as in-class written essays (in which case there is no word limit).

|''A. Non-human concerns:''<br>Illustrate how two influential moral theories center on human concerns. To what degree might those theories be extended or interpreted so as to apply significantly to our treatment of certain non-human beings? If there are limits to their ability to illuminate non-human concerns, do these limits also reflect limitations in how the theory handles certain human concerns? Which author(s) come closest to an adequate moral stance toward non-human beings, and why? Discuss at least four authors, including at least one from prior to the midterm. Integrate evaluative remarks along the way.|
|''B. Development:''<br>Several of our authors are interested in how moral ideas develop over time — either over the lifetime of an individual and/or over historical time. Discuss several accounts of moral change, including critical discussion of when and how to portray change with positive terms such as "progress," "growth," "learning," or "creativity". Under what conditions should these authors see change as not progress? Along the way comment on what is most valuable about these accounts, and which aspects we ought to challenge. Discuss at least four authors, including at least one from prior to the midterm. |
|''C. Re-interpretations:''<br>What looks admirable from one perspective may look dangerous or foolish from another. Several of our authors encourage us to look differently at a familiar moral claim or ideal, suspecting that it came about for dubious reasons or serves questionable functions in practice. (Alternately, there may be negatively-charged notions that we ought to reconsider in a more positive light.) Consider several such accounts — why they matter, what we can learn from them, and their limitations. Discuss at least four authors, referencing at least one from prior to the midterm. |

~TAKE-HOME OPTION: You may use a word-processor to type your essay, and then print and bring to our midterm session. Time available to complete the non-essay portion of the exam will be reduced to 90 minutes if you choose this option. More details:

# Set aside up to ''90 minutes''. Note your start time and end time.
# ''Clear your desktop''. Ensure that texts, notes, conversation and online resources (etc.) are not available to you while you write. Your writing should be entirely based on what you have learned through study, and should be comparable to what someone might write out by hand in a classroom exam session. (You may use spell-check functions and cut/paste editing features, but no further electronic functions such as dictionary or thesaurus.)
# Stick to a limit of ''800 words'', trimming your essay, if needed, before the end of your 90-minute time interval. (Make sure to structure your essay and include some big-picture perspective, rather than hurrying to fill the page.)
# ''Print'' your document (on a single sheet if at all possible, using back/front printing if needed), including your start-time and end-time, date of work completed, and ''~WesID'' at the top, but NOT your name. (I grade these anonymously.) Bring your printed essay to the final exam session.
# During the exam, on a separate ''Honor Pledge'' sheet, I'll ask you to sign ("No Aid, No Violation") with your name and ~WesID. (I'll have index cards at the exam for this purpose, so you won't need to worry about bringing this.)

//''Disclaimer'': These prompts (and their response options) are subject to revision. These are offered as a study aid.// 
|!in-class prompt|!alternate prompt|
|[[13*]] Mill seeks to ground his moral theory (utilitarianism) in a clear understanding of happiness, about which he suggests…|13-alt In response to those who raise objections to utilitarianism, Mill argues that…|
|[[14*]] Virtues, according to Mill…|14-alt In chapters 3 and 4 of Utilitarianism, Mill paints a picture of human progress according to which…|
|[[15*]] In discussing the Trolley Problem and related dilemmas, Radiolab podcasters seem to approve of decisions that follow “the moral math,” accepting Greene’s suggestion that other ways of handling the dilemma represent more primitive responses. Mill would comment, in response to their discussion…|15-alt Regarding the distinction between “perfect” and “imperfect” moral duties, Mill claims (or implies) …|
|[[16*]] Rawles distinguishes conservationist and animal-welfare perspectives on our moral stance toward the non-human world, arguing or implying along the way…|16-alt In discussing our ethical relation to non-human individuals and species, Kate Rawles is critical of various trends in moral philosophy, including…|
|[[17*]] As we have seen in other texts, Marx’s normative views (about what matters, what deserves criticism, etc.) go hand-in-hand with a particular account of human nature. On Marx’s account of human nature…|17-alt Marx’s philosophical stance has been called “materialism” —&nbsp;specifically a dialectical and historical materialism. According to this form of materialism…|
|[[18*]] Nietzsche clearly takes aim at Kantian ethics when he claims… “[W]e no longer want to brood over the moral value of our actions!” Further Nietzschean connections we ought to notice, in connection with Kant, include…|18-alt In opposing Christian, Utilitarian, and Socialist ideologies, Nietzsche suggests…|
|[[19*]] Beauvoir contrasts existentialist authenticity against various forms of “bad faith”. For example…|19-alt Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics is critical of many religious claims, but not all. She would argue…|
|[[20*]] In “Nature in the Active Voice,” Plumwood criticizes “reductionist materialism,” about which she claims or implies…|20-alt Val Plumwood develops an “animist” perspective, according to which…|
|[[21*]] Kohlberg’s theory of moral development is structured around pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional levels. Post-conventional reasoning, on this view…|21-alt In challenging moral relativism, Kohlberg argues or implies:…|
|[[22*]] Noddings criticizes the exclusive focus on reason and justification found in much mainstream ethics, and insists on the importance of lived interactions and feeling. Yet, she does not simply reject reason, claiming that…|22-alt Noddings distinguishes “natural caring” and “ethical caring”, noting that…|
|[[23*]] Our sources (Battin et al article; Practical Ethics Bites podcast) respond to various concerns about euthanasia. For example…|23-alt In the Netherlands and/or in Oregon, laws around euthanasia have been structured around various key distinctions, such as…|
|[[24*]] In response to various moral thinkers we have read, Dewey argues -- or would argue -- that…| 24-alt In his "Theories of Morals", Dewey presents human beings’ moral motivation as…|

/***
|''Name:''|ForEachTiddlerPlugin|
|''Version:''|1.0.6 (2006-09-16)|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#ForEachTiddlerPlugin|
|''Author:''|UdoBorkowski (ub [at] abego-software [dot] de)|
|''Licence:''|[[BSD open source license (abego Software)|http://www.abego-software.de/legal/apl-v10.html]]|
|''Copyright:''|&copy; 2005-2006 [[abego Software|http://www.abego-software.de]]|
|''TiddlyWiki:''|1.2.38+, 2.0|
|''Browser:''|Firefox 1.0.4+; Firefox 1.5; InternetExplorer 6.0|
!Description

Create customizable lists, tables etc. for your selections of tiddlers. Specify the tiddlers to include and their order through a powerful language.

''Syntax:'' 
|>|{{{<<}}}''forEachTiddler'' [''in'' //tiddlyWikiPath//] [''where'' //whereCondition//] [''sortBy'' //sortExpression// [''ascending'' //or// ''descending'']] [''script'' //scriptText//] [//action// [//actionParameters//]]{{{>>}}}|
|//tiddlyWikiPath//|The filepath to the TiddlyWiki the macro should work on. When missing the current TiddlyWiki is used.|
|//whereCondition//|(quoted) JavaScript boolean expression. May refer to the build-in variables {{{tiddler}}} and  {{{context}}}.|
|//sortExpression//|(quoted) JavaScript expression returning "comparable" objects (using '{{{<}}}','{{{>}}}','{{{==}}}'. May refer to the build-in variables {{{tiddler}}} and  {{{context}}}.|
|//scriptText//|(quoted) JavaScript text. Typically defines JavaScript functions that are called by the various JavaScript expressions (whereClause, sortClause, action arguments,...)|
|//action//|The action that should be performed on every selected tiddler, in the given order. By default the actions [[addToList|AddToListAction]] and [[write|WriteAction]] are supported. When no action is specified [[addToList|AddToListAction]]  is used.|
|//actionParameters//|(action specific) parameters the action may refer while processing the tiddlers (see action descriptions for details). <<tiddler [[JavaScript in actionParameters]]>>|
|>|~~Syntax formatting: Keywords in ''bold'', optional parts in [...]. 'or' means that exactly one of the two alternatives must exist.~~|

See details see [[ForEachTiddlerMacro]] and [[ForEachTiddlerExamples]].

!Revision history
* v1.0.6 (2006-09-16)
** Context provides "viewerTiddler", i.e. the tiddler used to view the macro. Most times this is equal to the "inTiddler", but when using the "tiddler" macro both may be different.
** Support "begin", "end" and "none" expressions in "write" action
* v1.0.5 (2006-02-05)
** Pass tiddler containing the macro with wikify, context object also holds reference to tiddler containing the macro ("inTiddler"). Thanks to SimonBaird.
** Support Firefox 1.5.0.1
** Internal
*** Make "JSLint" conform
*** "Only install once"
* v1.0.4 (2006-01-06)
** Support TiddlyWiki 2.0
* v1.0.3 (2005-12-22)
** Features: 
*** Write output to a file supports multi-byte environments (Thanks to Bram Chen) 
*** Provide API to access the forEachTiddler functionality directly through JavaScript (see getTiddlers and performMacro)
** Enhancements:
*** Improved error messages on InternetExplorer.
* v1.0.2 (2005-12-10)
** Features: 
*** context object also holds reference to store (TiddlyWiki)
** Fixed Bugs: 
*** ForEachTiddler 1.0.1 has broken support on win32 Opera 8.51 (Thanks to BrunoSabin for reporting)
* v1.0.1 (2005-12-08)
** Features: 
*** Access tiddlers stored in separated TiddlyWikis through the "in" option. I.e. you are no longer limited to only work on the "current TiddlyWiki".
*** Write output to an external file using the "toFile" option of the "write" action. With this option you may write your customized tiddler exports.
*** Use the "script" section to define "helper" JavaScript functions etc. to be used in the various JavaScript expressions (whereClause, sortClause, action arguments,...).
*** Access and store context information for the current forEachTiddler invocation (through the build-in "context" object) .
*** Improved script evaluation (for where/sort clause and write scripts).
* v1.0.0 (2005-11-20)
** initial version

!Code
***/
//{{{

	
//============================================================================
//============================================================================
//		   ForEachTiddlerPlugin
//============================================================================
//============================================================================

// Only install once
if (!version.extensions.ForEachTiddlerPlugin) {

if (!window.abego) window.abego = {};

version.extensions.ForEachTiddlerPlugin = {
	major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 6, 
	date: new Date(2006,8,16), 
	source: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#ForEachTiddlerPlugin",
	licence: "[[BSD open source license (abego Software)|http://www.abego-software.de/legal/apl-v10.html]]",
	copyright: "Copyright (c) abego Software GmbH, 2005-2006 (www.abego-software.de)"
};

// For backward compatibility with TW 1.2.x
//
if (!TiddlyWiki.prototype.forEachTiddler) {
	TiddlyWiki.prototype.forEachTiddler = function(callback) {
		for(var t in this.tiddlers) {
			callback.call(this,t,this.tiddlers[t]);
		}
	};
}

//============================================================================
// forEachTiddler Macro
//============================================================================

version.extensions.forEachTiddler = {
	major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 5, date: new Date(2006,2,5), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Configurations and constants 
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

config.macros.forEachTiddler = {
	 // Standard Properties
	 label: "forEachTiddler",
	 prompt: "Perform actions on a (sorted) selection of tiddlers",

	 // actions
	 actions: {
		 addToList: {},
		 write: {}
	 }
};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//  The forEachTiddler Macro Handler 
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

config.macros.forEachTiddler.getContainingTiddler = function(e) {
	while(e && !hasClass(e,"tiddler"))
		e = e.parentNode;
	var title = e ? e.getAttribute("tiddler") : null; 
	return title ? store.getTiddler(title) : null;
};

config.macros.forEachTiddler.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
	// config.macros.forEachTiddler.traceMacroCall(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler);

	if (!tiddler) tiddler = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getContainingTiddler(place);
	// --- Parsing ------------------------------------------

	var i = 0; // index running over the params
	// Parse the "in" clause
	var tiddlyWikiPath = undefined;
	if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "in") {
		i++;
		if (i >= params.length) {
			this.handleError(place, "TiddlyWiki path expected behind 'in'.");
			return;
		}
		tiddlyWikiPath = this.paramEncode((i < params.length) ? params[i] : "");
		i++;
	}

	// Parse the where clause
	var whereClause ="true";
	if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "where") {
		i++;
		whereClause = this.paramEncode((i < params.length) ? params[i] : "");
		i++;
	}

	// Parse the sort stuff
	var sortClause = null;
	var sortAscending = true; 
	if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "sortBy") {
		i++;
		if (i >= params.length) {
			this.handleError(place, "sortClause missing behind 'sortBy'.");
			return;
		}
		sortClause = this.paramEncode(params[i]);
		i++;

		if ((i < params.length) && (params[i] == "ascending" || params[i] == "descending")) {
			 sortAscending = params[i] == "ascending";
			 i++;
		}
	}

	// Parse the script
	var scriptText = null;
	if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "script") {
		i++;
		scriptText = this.paramEncode((i < params.length) ? params[i] : "");
		i++;
	}

	// Parse the action. 
	// When we are already at the end use the default action
	var actionName = "addToList";
	if (i < params.length) {
	   if (!config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions[params[i]]) {
			this.handleError(place, "Unknown action '"+params[i]+"'.");
			return;
		} else {
			actionName = params[i]; 
			i++;
		}
	} 
	
	// Get the action parameter
	// (the parsing is done inside the individual action implementation.)
	var actionParameter = params.slice(i);


	// --- Processing ------------------------------------------
	try {
		this.performMacro({
				place: place, 
				inTiddler: tiddler,
				whereClause: whereClause, 
				sortClause: sortClause, 
				sortAscending: sortAscending, 
				actionName: actionName, 
				actionParameter: actionParameter, 
				scriptText: scriptText, 
				tiddlyWikiPath: tiddlyWikiPath});

	} catch (e) {
		this.handleError(place, e);
	}
};

// Returns an object with properties "tiddlers" and "context".
// tiddlers holds the (sorted) tiddlers selected by the parameter,
// context the context of the execution of the macro.
//
// The action is not yet performed.
//
// @parameter see performMacro
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.getTiddlersAndContext = function(parameter) {

	var context = config.macros.forEachTiddler.createContext(parameter.place, parameter.whereClause, parameter.sortClause, parameter.sortAscending, parameter.actionName, parameter.actionParameter, parameter.scriptText, parameter.tiddlyWikiPath, parameter.inTiddler);

	var tiddlyWiki = parameter.tiddlyWikiPath ? this.loadTiddlyWiki(parameter.tiddlyWikiPath) : store;
	context["tiddlyWiki"] = tiddlyWiki;
	
	// Get the tiddlers, as defined by the whereClause
	var tiddlers = this.findTiddlers(parameter.whereClause, context, tiddlyWiki);
	context["tiddlers"] = tiddlers;

	// Sort the tiddlers, when sorting is required.
	if (parameter.sortClause) {
		this.sortTiddlers(tiddlers, parameter.sortClause, parameter.sortAscending, context);
	}

	return {tiddlers: tiddlers, context: context};
};

// Returns the (sorted) tiddlers selected by the parameter.
//
// The action is not yet performed.
//
// @parameter see performMacro
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.getTiddlers = function(parameter) {
	return this.getTiddlersAndContext(parameter).tiddlers;
};

// Performs the macros with the given parameter.
//
// @param parameter holds the parameter of the macro as separate properties.
//				  The following properties are supported:
//
//						place
//						whereClause
//						sortClause
//						sortAscending
//						actionName
//						actionParameter
//						scriptText
//						tiddlyWikiPath
//
//					All properties are optional. 
//					For most actions the place property must be defined.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.performMacro = function(parameter) {
	var tiddlersAndContext = this.getTiddlersAndContext(parameter);

	// Perform the action
	var actionName = parameter.actionName ? parameter.actionName : "addToList";
	var action = config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions[actionName];
	if (!action) {
		this.handleError(parameter.place, "Unknown action '"+actionName+"'.");
		return;
	}

	var actionHandler = action.handler;
	actionHandler(parameter.place, tiddlersAndContext.tiddlers, parameter.actionParameter, tiddlersAndContext.context);
};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//  The actions 
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Internal.
//
// --- The addToList Action -----------------------------------------------
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions.addToList.handler = function(place, tiddlers, parameter, context) {
	// Parse the parameter
	var p = 0;

	// Check for extra parameters
	if (parameter.length > p) {
		config.macros.forEachTiddler.createExtraParameterErrorElement(place, "addToList", parameter, p);
		return;
	}

	// Perform the action.
	var list = document.createElement("ul");
	place.appendChild(list);
	for (var i = 0; i < tiddlers.length; i++) {
		var tiddler = tiddlers[i];
		var listItem = document.createElement("li");
		list.appendChild(listItem);
		createTiddlyLink(listItem, tiddler.title, true);
	}
};

abego.parseNamedParameter = function(name, parameter, i) {
	var beginExpression = null;
	if ((i < parameter.length) && parameter[i] == name) {
		i++;
		if (i >= parameter.length) {
			throw "Missing text behind '%0'".format([name]);
		}
		
		return config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[i]);
	}
	return null;
}

// Internal.
//
// --- The write Action ---------------------------------------------------
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions.write.handler = function(place, tiddlers, parameter, context) {
	// Parse the parameter
	var p = 0;
	if (p >= parameter.length) {
		this.handleError(place, "Missing expression behind 'write'.");
		return;
	}

	var textExpression = config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[p]);
	p++;

	// Parse the "begin" option
	var beginExpression = abego.parseNamedParameter("begin", parameter, p);
	if (beginExpression !== null) 
		p += 2;
	var endExpression = abego.parseNamedParameter("end", parameter, p);
	if (endExpression !== null) 
		p += 2;
	var noneExpression = abego.parseNamedParameter("none", parameter, p);
	if (noneExpression !== null) 
		p += 2;

	// Parse the "toFile" option
	var filename = null;
	var lineSeparator = undefined;
	if ((p < parameter.length) && parameter[p] == "toFile") {
		p++;
		if (p >= parameter.length) {
			this.handleError(place, "Filename expected behind 'toFile' of 'write' action.");
			return;
		}
		
		filename = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getLocalPath(config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[p]));
		p++;
		if ((p < parameter.length) && parameter[p] == "withLineSeparator") {
			p++;
			if (p >= parameter.length) {
				this.handleError(place, "Line separator text expected behind 'withLineSeparator' of 'write' action.");
				return;
			}
			lineSeparator = config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[p]);
			p++;
		}
	}
	
	// Check for extra parameters
	if (parameter.length > p) {
		config.macros.forEachTiddler.createExtraParameterErrorElement(place, "write", parameter, p);
		return;
	}

	// Perform the action.
	var func = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(textExpression, context);
	var count = tiddlers.length;
	var text = "";
	if (count > 0 && beginExpression)
		text += config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(beginExpression, context)(undefined, context, count, undefined);
	
	for (var i = 0; i < count; i++) {
		var tiddler = tiddlers[i];
		text += func(tiddler, context, count, i);
	}
	
	if (count > 0 && endExpression)
		text += config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(endExpression, context)(undefined, context, count, undefined);

	if (count == 0 && noneExpression) 
		text += config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(noneExpression, context)(undefined, context, count, undefined);
		

	if (filename) {
		if (lineSeparator !== undefined) {
			lineSeparator = lineSeparator.replace(/\\n/mg, "\n").replace(/\\r/mg, "\r");
			text = text.replace(/\n/mg,lineSeparator);
		}
		saveFile(filename, convertUnicodeToUTF8(text));
	} else {
		var wrapper = createTiddlyElement(place, "span");
		wikify(text, wrapper, null/* highlightRegExp */, context.inTiddler);
	}
};


// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//  Helpers
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.createContext = function(placeParam, whereClauseParam, sortClauseParam, sortAscendingParam, actionNameParam, actionParameterParam, scriptText, tiddlyWikiPathParam, inTiddlerParam) {
	return {
		place : placeParam, 
		whereClause : whereClauseParam, 
		sortClause : sortClauseParam, 
		sortAscending : sortAscendingParam, 
		script : scriptText,
		actionName : actionNameParam, 
		actionParameter : actionParameterParam,
		tiddlyWikiPath : tiddlyWikiPathParam,
		inTiddler : inTiddlerParam, // the tiddler containing the <<forEachTiddler ...>> macro call.
		viewerTiddler : config.macros.forEachTiddler.getContainingTiddler(placeParam) // the tiddler showing the forEachTiddler result
	};
};

// Internal.
//
// Returns a TiddlyWiki with the tiddlers loaded from the TiddlyWiki of 
// the given path.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.loadTiddlyWiki = function(path, idPrefix) {
	if (!idPrefix) {
		idPrefix = "store";
	}
	var lenPrefix = idPrefix.length;
	
	// Read the content of the given file
	var content = loadFile(this.getLocalPath(path));
	if(content === null) {
		throw "TiddlyWiki '"+path+"' not found.";
	}
	
	// Locate the storeArea div's
	var posOpeningDiv = content.indexOf(startSaveArea);
	var posClosingDiv = content.lastIndexOf(endSaveArea);
	if((posOpeningDiv == -1) || (posClosingDiv == -1)) {
		throw "File '"+path+"' is not a TiddlyWiki.";
	}
	var storageText = content.substr(posOpeningDiv + startSaveArea.length, posClosingDiv);
	
	// Create a "div" element that contains the storage text
	var myStorageDiv = document.createElement("div");
	myStorageDiv.innerHTML = storageText;
	myStorageDiv.normalize();
	
	// Create all tiddlers in a new TiddlyWiki
	// (following code is modified copy of TiddlyWiki.prototype.loadFromDiv)
	var tiddlyWiki = new TiddlyWiki();
	var store = myStorageDiv.childNodes;
	for(var t = 0; t < store.length; t++) {
		var e = store[t];
		var title = null;
		if(e.getAttribute)
			title = e.getAttribute("tiddler");
		if(!title && e.id && e.id.substr(0,lenPrefix) == idPrefix)
			title = e.id.substr(lenPrefix);
		if(title && title !== "") {
			var tiddler = tiddlyWiki.createTiddler(title);
			tiddler.loadFromDiv(e,title);
		}
	}
	tiddlyWiki.dirty = false;

	return tiddlyWiki;
};


	
// Internal.
//
// Returns a function that has a function body returning the given javaScriptExpression.
// The function has the parameters:
// 
//	 (tiddler, context, count, index)
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction = function (javaScriptExpression, context) {
	var script = context["script"];
	var functionText = "var theFunction = function(tiddler, context, count, index) { return "+javaScriptExpression+"}";
	var fullText = (script ? script+";" : "")+functionText+";theFunction;";
	return eval(fullText);
};

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.findTiddlers = function(whereClause, context, tiddlyWiki) {
	var result = [];
	var func = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(whereClause, context);
	tiddlyWiki.forEachTiddler(function(title,tiddler) {
		if (func(tiddler, context, undefined, undefined)) {
			result.push(tiddler);
		}
	});
	return result;
};

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.createExtraParameterErrorElement = function(place, actionName, parameter, firstUnusedIndex) {
	var message = "Extra parameter behind '"+actionName+"':";
	for (var i = firstUnusedIndex; i < parameter.length; i++) {
		message += " "+parameter[i];
	}
	this.handleError(place, message);
};

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.sortAscending = function(tiddlerA, tiddlerB) {
	var result = 
		(tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue == tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue) 
			? 0
			: (tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue < tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue)
			   ? -1 
			   : +1; 
	return result;
};

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.sortDescending = function(tiddlerA, tiddlerB) {
	var result = 
		(tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue == tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue) 
			? 0
			: (tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue < tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue)
			   ? +1 
			   : -1; 
	return result;
};

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.sortTiddlers = function(tiddlers, sortClause, ascending, context) {
	// To avoid evaluating the sortClause whenever two items are compared 
	// we pre-calculate the sortValue for every item in the array and store it in a 
	// temporary property ("forEachTiddlerSortValue") of the tiddlers.
	var func = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(sortClause, context);
	var count = tiddlers.length;
	var i;
	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
		var tiddler = tiddlers[i];
		tiddler.forEachTiddlerSortValue = func(tiddler,context, undefined, undefined);
	}

	// Do the sorting
	tiddlers.sort(ascending ? this.sortAscending : this.sortDescending);

	// Delete the temporary property that holds the sortValue.	
	for (i = 0; i < tiddlers.length; i++) {
		delete tiddlers[i].forEachTiddlerSortValue;
	}
};


// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.trace = function(message) {
	displayMessage(message);
};

// Internal.
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.traceMacroCall = function(place,macroName,params) {
	var message ="<<"+macroName;
	for (var i = 0; i < params.length; i++) {
		message += " "+params[i];
	}
	message += ">>";
	displayMessage(message);
};


// Internal.
//
// Creates an element that holds an error message
// 
config.macros.forEachTiddler.createErrorElement = function(place, exception) {
	var message = (exception.description) ? exception.description : exception.toString();
	return createTiddlyElement(place,"span",null,"forEachTiddlerError","<<forEachTiddler ...>>: "+message);
};

// Internal.
//
// @param place [may be null]
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.handleError = function(place, exception) {
	if (place) {
		this.createErrorElement(place, exception);
	} else {
		throw exception;
	}
};

// Internal.
//
// Encodes the given string.
//
// Replaces 
//	 "$))" to ">>"
//	 "$)" to ">"
//
config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode = function(s) {
	var reGTGT = new RegExp("\\$\\)\\)","mg");
	var reGT = new RegExp("\\$\\)","mg");
	return s.replace(reGTGT, ">>").replace(reGT, ">");
};

// Internal.
//
// Returns the given original path (that is a file path, starting with "file:")
// as a path to a local file, in the systems native file format.
//
// Location information in the originalPath (i.e. the "#" and stuff following)
// is stripped.
// 
config.macros.forEachTiddler.getLocalPath = function(originalPath) {
	// Remove any location part of the URL
	var hashPos = originalPath.indexOf("#");
	if(hashPos != -1)
		originalPath = originalPath.substr(0,hashPos);
	// Convert to a native file format assuming
	// "file:///x:/path/path/path..." - pc local file --> "x:\path\path\path..."
	// "file://///server/share/path/path/path..." - FireFox pc network file --> "\\server\share\path\path\path..."
	// "file:///path/path/path..." - mac/unix local file --> "/path/path/path..."
	// "file://server/share/path/path/path..." - pc network file --> "\\server\share\path\path\path..."
	var localPath;
	if(originalPath.charAt(9) == ":") // pc local file
		localPath = unescape(originalPath.substr(8)).replace(new RegExp("/","g"),"\\");
	else if(originalPath.indexOf("file://///") === 0) // FireFox pc network file
		localPath = "\\\\" + unescape(originalPath.substr(10)).replace(new RegExp("/","g"),"\\");
	else if(originalPath.indexOf("file:///") === 0) // mac/unix local file
		localPath = unescape(originalPath.substr(7));
	else if(originalPath.indexOf("file:/") === 0) // mac/unix local file
		localPath = unescape(originalPath.substr(5));
	else // pc network file
		localPath = "\\\\" + unescape(originalPath.substr(7)).replace(new RegExp("/","g"),"\\");	
	return localPath;
};

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Stylesheet Extensions (may be overridden by local StyleSheet)
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
//
setStylesheet(
	".forEachTiddlerError{color: #ffffff;background-color: #880000;}",
	"forEachTiddler");

//============================================================================
// End of forEachTiddler Macro
//============================================================================


//============================================================================
// String.startsWith Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns true if the string starts with the given prefix, false otherwise.
//
version.extensions["String.startsWith"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
String.prototype.startsWith = function(prefix) {
	var n =  prefix.length;
	return (this.length >= n) && (this.slice(0, n) == prefix);
};



//============================================================================
// String.endsWith Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns true if the string ends with the given suffix, false otherwise.
//
version.extensions["String.endsWith"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
String.prototype.endsWith = function(suffix) {
	var n = suffix.length;
	return (this.length >= n) && (this.right(n) == suffix);
};


//============================================================================
// String.contains Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns true when the string contains the given substring, false otherwise.
//
version.extensions["String.contains"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
String.prototype.contains = function(substring) {
	return this.indexOf(substring) >= 0;
};

//============================================================================
// Array.indexOf Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns the index of the first occurance of the given item in the array or 
// -1 when no such item exists.
//
// @param item [may be null]
//
version.extensions["Array.indexOf"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
Array.prototype.indexOf = function(item) {
	for (var i = 0; i < this.length; i++) {
		if (this[i] == item) {
			return i;
		}
	}
	return -1;
};

//============================================================================
// Array.contains Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns true when the array contains the given item, otherwise false. 
//
// @param item [may be null]
//
version.extensions["Array.contains"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
Array.prototype.contains = function(item) {
	return (this.indexOf(item) >= 0);
};

//============================================================================
// Array.containsAny Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns true when the array contains at least one of the elements 
// of the item. Otherwise (or when items contains no elements) false is returned.
//
version.extensions["Array.containsAny"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
Array.prototype.containsAny = function(items) {
	for(var i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {
		if (this.contains(items[i])) {
			return true;
		}
	}
	return false;
};


//============================================================================
// Array.containsAll Function
//============================================================================
//
// Returns true when the array contains all the items, otherwise false.
// 
// When items is null false is returned (even if the array contains a null).
//
// @param items [may be null] 
//
version.extensions["Array.containsAll"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"};
//
Array.prototype.containsAll = function(items) {
	for(var i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {
		if (!this.contains(items[i])) {
			return false;
		}
	}
	return true;
};


} // of "install only once"

// Used Globals (for JSLint) ==============
// ... DOM
/*global 	document */
// ... TiddlyWiki Core
/*global 	convertUnicodeToUTF8, createTiddlyElement, createTiddlyLink, 
			displayMessage, endSaveArea, hasClass, loadFile, saveFile, 
			startSaveArea, store, wikify */
//}}}


/***
!Licence and Copyright
Copyright (c) abego Software ~GmbH, 2005 ([[www.abego-software.de|http://www.abego-software.de]])

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
materials provided with the distribution.

Neither the name of abego Software nor the names of its contributors may be
used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
prior written permission.

THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT
SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
***/

!!!Even a person who is not fully virtuous tends to have a variety of friendships. About these, Aristotle would say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Friendships, for a person who lacks virtue, are all merely for the sake of pleasure and/or practical benefits.]>
{{red{No... no; friendships for pleasure and utility are less than ideal, but there may be friendships of the right kind (for the sake of the good) between people who are not themselves perfectly good. This is especially clear when Aristotle talks about the love of parents for children (and “friendship” is not distinct from love, on his account).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) A person who lacks virtue cannot have a friendship with a fully virtuous person.]>
{{red{No... there can be friendships across different levels of virtue
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) In the development and improvement of character, friends play a vital role.]>
{{green{Yes. It is friends who can help us reflect on our habits, improve them, and become more continent -- and, if we are still young, can help us achieve full virtue.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Friendships between people who lack virtue tend not to endure as well as friendships between fully virtuous people.]>
{{green{Yes. Both because more of their friendships are for pleasure and utility AND because less-than-virtuous friendships are more vulnerable to changes of status and fortune...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) For a young person, who is not yet fully virtuous, the most important kind of friendships is friendship with parents.]>
{{green{Yes. though “friendship” (the word in English) applies only awkwardly to parents (and spouses, etc), Aristotle’s “philia” is a broader concept.
}}}
===
}}}

Here's an efficient cartoon-board video overview of debates around [[moral status|https://www.khanacademy.org/partner-content/wi-phi/wiphi-value-theory/wiphi-ethics/v/moral-status]]

One comment worth extracting from that overview is Kenneth Goodpaster's radical challenge:
>Sentience, or the capacity to have conscious experiences, is only a tool that evolution gave us in order to survive and reproduce. So why should morality privilege those of us who happen to survive by feeling pleasures and pains over other living organisms who happen to survive and reproduce in other ways?

[img(100%,auto)[Kant's four examples|https://www.dropbox.com/s/slmznpx152df36w/Kant_%C2%A71%C2%B6revised%20landscape%202019.png?raw=1]]

{{outline{Thanks for making PHIL 212 a pleasure to lead this semester. Best of luck in your work at Wesleyan!
[img[grading|https://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/home/espringer/web/images/grading.jpg]]
}}}

!!!Many who deny moral status to non-humans generally still wish to grant moral status to infants, the cognitively disabled, and other “marginal” cases. In response to such attempts, Gruen claims…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) although animals may lack various morally-important qualities, we must attribute the same moral status to animals and to all human beings who lack those same features.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) If they rely on species membership alone, they have no account of why human beings matter.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) even if we conclude that there are good reasons to grant a certain moral status to all humans, we should still take animal suffering much more seriously than our culture currently does.]>
{{green{Yes. 351-352
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) all animals deserve the same rights, because speciesism is not justifiable.]>
{{red{No... Gruen is skeptical of “rights” as a strategy, and also does not say straightforwardly that speciesism is wrong; it is wrong if it has no basis...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Fox’s initially attempt to draw this human/non-human line by appealing to the conditions we could imagine ourselves to have been in, but this position requires faulty assumptions about our capacity for imagination.]>
{{green{Yes. 344-345: species membership does not involve special insight into others with very different conditions from one’s own.
}}}
===
}}}

<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("Gruen") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
    sortBy
       'tiddler.modified'
    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged with \"Gruen\"//"'
>>

[img[gruen|https://wesfiles.wesleyan.edu/home/espringer/web/images/GruenDiagram2.png]]

!!!Happiness, on Mill’s understanding of it, can be contrasted with…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Aristotle’s eudaimonia, because the latter applies only to someone who is morally good (virtuous).]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle’s “eudaimonia” //cannot// be exemplified by a person who is not virtuous. Mill’s happiness //could// be achieved by a person with a morally flawed character. It’s unlikely, but 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the stoic concept of ataraxia (tranquility), which Mill finds insufficient because it does not include excitement or emotional contrast.]>
{{green{Yes. It would be too extreme to say that Mill //rejects// ataraxia; he rejects it as a //complete// ideal. It is one of two aspects of happiness, and thus it is clearly distinct from but relevant to Mill’s happiness. See p. 13 on the need for a balance between tranquility and excitement, either of which alone, however, may be very satisfying if achieved in high degree.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Mill’s own conception of the general good, which an individual might promote well without achieving individual happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. Those who are generally sensitive to others’ happiness //tend// to be happier (in a civilized world), but there’s no guarantee. See pp. 15-16: “Unquestionably it is possible to do without happiness;... [as is] done voluntarily by the hero or the martyr, for the sake of something which he prizes more than his individual happiness... this self-sacrifice must be for some end... All honor to those who can abnegate for themselves the personal enjoyment of life when by such renunciation they contribute worthily to increase the amount of happiness in the world...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Aristotle’s eudaimonia, which clearly cannot be evaluated well by the individual herself.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle’s eudaimonia can be affected by facts beyond one’s knowledge, including events after death. The individual is also in a poor position to know whether she is wise enough to judge the standard of virtue, which is essential to eudaimonia.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Kant’s notion of happiness as a psychological state that we cannot reliably bring about through reason and calculation.]>
{{green{Yes. Kant does say this about happiness. One might reasonably //infer// that Kant’s happiness is a more animalistic kind of satisfaction, but it doesn’t follow directly.
}}}
===
}}}

;TWO broad strategies for bringing moral theory to bear on environmental problems:
:*Apply familiar theoretical tools in novel ways.  
:*Argue for the development of new (or neglected) moral concepts.

;"tragedy of the commons": 
:a conceptual tool of modeling and diagnosis that belongs to the broad tradition of game theory.

;Lessons brought home by "prisoners' dilemma" tradition:
:Under certain circumstances, it is rational for //each// person to make their individual choices in ways that //add up// to poor collective outcomes.
:If there is a solution to "how best to act" in such scenarios, it involves changing the background conditions that cause the dilemma.

Callicott's addition:
If what you're personally interested in is something like "environmental moral status", then you're in another kind of prisoners' dilemma. If all environmentally-aware individuals act to minimize their *individual* environmental impact, the overall environmental outcome is worse.

So again, with Hardin: Environmental problems require solutions at the level of policy.

From [[Wesleyan Student Handbook:|http://www.wesleyan.edu/studenthandbook/StudentHandbook09-10.pdf]]
{{outline{
A university is an elaborate and in some ways fragile institution that exists to provide a ''free and favorable environment for teaching and learning.'' The university community, therefore, has a need to be able to hold its members accountable for actions that damage the environment, infringe upon the rights of other individuals, or otherwise hinder the community in achieving its purpose.}}}
{{outline{
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNIVERSITY TO ITS MEMBERS
2.  Protection from discrimination and abuse:
## Wesleyan University prohibits discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, gender, age, disability, national or ethnic origin, veteran status, or any other basis protected by local, state or federal law in any activity administered by the University. 
## Also ''prohibited'' is any form of ''discriminatory harassment'' performed by a member or members of the University against any other individual or groups. Discriminatory harassment may include any action or statement ''intended to insult, stigmatize, or degrade an individual or group'' on the basis of the categories of discrimination listed in 2a. 
##  Sexual misconduct, including, but not limited to, sexual harassment, coercion, and threats or use of force, is prohibited.
{{center{...}}}7. The right to abstain from performing acts and the ''right to be protected against actions that may be harmful to the health or emotional stability of the individual'' or that degrade the individual or infringe upon his/her personal dignity.}}}
{{outline{
THE CODE OF NON-ACADEMIC CONDUCT
Harassment and abuse, intentionally directed toward individuals or groups, may include at least the following forms: the intentional use or threat of physical violence, coercion, intimidation, and verbal harassment and abuse. Wesleyan University’s commitment to nondiscrimination means that intentional discriminatory harassment may be punished more severely than nondiscriminatory or unintentional forms of harassment.
}}}

{{outline{
Students and student organizations should be free to examine and discuss all questions of interest to them and to express opinions publicly and privately. They should always be free to support causes by orderly means that do not disrupt the regular and essential operation of the institution. At the same time, it should be made clear to the academic and the larger community that in their public expressions or demonstrations, students or student organizations speak only for themselves.<br>—[[Student Handbook Appendix A, IV(B)|http://www.wesleyan.edu/studenthandbook/3_joint_statement.html]]}}}

+++!!!!!*[Bennett on chalking at Wes]
|But regulating the language of chalking would constitute a ''speech code,'' Mr. Bennett said in an e-mail message to students. That would put the university in the position of acting as a de facto censor of communal speech.|
===

<<<
Marx was convinced that, with adjustments and reinterpretations, the structure and organizing concepts of Hegelian philosophy could withstand this [Feuerbach's] radical shift from a form of idealism to a form of materialism.{{right{(editor's intro., "Morality as Ideology")}}}
<<<
; Hegel...
: took Kant's "Copernican" philosophy of understanding as a point of departure, and added historicism.
; Kant's "categories of understanding" 
|!Quantity |(unity, plurality, and totality)|
|!Quality|(reality, negation, limitation)|
|!Relation|(substance - accident, cause - effect, reciprocity)|
|!Modality|(possibility, existence, necessity)|

Hegel claims, in his critical response to Kant, that the concepts that structure our thought evolve over time, and through a process of dialectic (dialogue, development of voices from one another).

When we read Marx in the context of moral theory, this is the central point: that the concepts that structure our //moral// thought might be seen as contingent, as emerging because of historical developments, and as likely to be replaced through further change.

>In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $400 for the radium and charged $4,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money and tried every legal means, but he could only get together about $2,000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So, having tried every legal means, Heinz gets desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.
!!INTERVIEWER asks a series of questions:
;1. Should Heinz steal the drug?
: 1a. Why or why not?
;2. Is it actually right or wrong for him to steal the drug?
: 2a. Why is it right or wrong?
;3. Does Heinz have a duty or obligation to steal the drug?
: 3a. Why or why not?
;4. If Heinz doesn't love his wife, should he steal the drug for her? Does it make a difference in what Heinz should do whether or not he loves his wife?
: 4a. Why or why not?
;5. Suppose the person dying is not his wife but a stranger. Should Heinz steal the drug for the stranger?
: 5a. Why or why not?
;6. Suppose it's a pet animal he loves. should Heinz steal to save the pet animal?
: 6a. Why or why not?
;7. Is it important for people to do everything they can to save another's life?
: 7a. Why or why not?
;8. It is against the law for Heinz to steal. Does that make it morally wrong?
: 8a. Why or why not?
;9. In general, should people try to do everything they can to obey the law?
: 9a. Why or why not?
: 9b. How does this apply to what Heinz should do?
;10. In thinking back over the dilemma, what would you say is the most responsible thing for Heinz to do?
: 10a. Why?

/%
|Name|HideTiddlerBackground|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#HideTiddlerBackground|
|Version|0.0.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|script|
|Requires|InlineJavascriptPlugin|
|Overrides||
|Description|hide a tiddler's background and border (if any)|

Usage: <<tiddler HideTiddlerBackground>>

%/<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="HideTiddlerBackground") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("*");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++) if (hasClass(nodes[i],"viewer")) {
		var s=nodes[i].style;
		s.backgroundImage="none";
		s.backgroundColor="transparent"
		s.borderColor="transparent";
		s.borderWidth=0;
		s.margin=0;
		s.padding=0;
		break;
	}
</script>

/%
|Name|HideTiddlerTags|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#HideTiddlerTags|
|Version|0.0.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|script|
|Requires|InlineJavascriptPlugin|
|Overrides||
|Description|hide a tiddler's tagged/tagging display elements|

Usage: <<tiddler HideTiddlerTags>>

%/<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>

/%
!info
|Name|HideTiddlerTitle|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#HideTiddlerTitle|
|Version|2.0.1|
|Author|Eric Shulman|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|transclusion|
|Description|hide a tiddler's title and subtitle (date and author)|
Usage:
<<<
{{{
<<tiddler HideTiddlerTitle>>
<<tiddler HideTiddlerTitle with: TiddlerTitle>>
}}}
<<<
!end
!show
<<tiddler {{
	var title="$1";
	if (title=='$'+'1')
		title=(story.findContainingTiddler(place)||place).getAttribute('tiddler')||'';
	var t=story.getTiddler(title); if (t) {
		var e=t.getElementsByTagName('*');
		for (var i=0; i<e.length; i++)
			if (hasClass(e[i],'title')||hasClass(e[i],'subtitle')) e[i].style.display='none';
	}
'';}}>>
!end
%/<<tiddler {{
	var src='HideTiddlerTitle';
	src+(tiddler&&tiddler.title==src?'##info':'##show');}}
with: [[$1]]>>

/***
|Name:|HideWhenPlugin|
|Description:|Allows conditional inclusion/exclusion in templates|
|Version:|3.2a|
|Date:|27-Jun-2011|
|Source:|http://mptw.tiddlyspot.com/#HideWhenPlugin|
|Author:|Simon Baird <simon.baird@gmail.com>|
|License:|http://mptw.tiddlyspot.com/#TheBSDLicense|
For use in ViewTemplate and EditTemplate. Example usage:
{{{<div macro="showWhenTagged Task">[[TaskToolbar]]</div>}}}
{{{<div macro="showWhen tiddler.modifier == 'BartSimpson'"><img src="bart.gif"/></div>}}}

Warning: the showWhen and hideWhen macros will blindly eval paramString.
This could be used to execute harmful javascript from a tiddler.

(TODO: Make some effort to sanitize paramString. Perhaps disallow the equals sign?)
***/
//{{{

window.hideWhenLastTest = false;

window.removeElementWhen = function(test,place) {
  window.hideWhenLastTest = test;
  if (test) {
    jQuery(place).empty()
    place.parentNode.removeChild(place);
  }
};

merge(config.macros,{

  hideWhen: { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( eval(paramString), place );
  }},

  showWhen: { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( !eval(paramString), place );
  }},

  hideWhenTagged: { handler: function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( tiddler.tags.containsAll(params), place );
  }},

  showWhenTagged: { handler: function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( !tiddler.tags.containsAll(params), place );
  }},

  hideWhenTaggedAny: { handler: function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( tiddler.tags.containsAny(params), place );
  }},

  showWhenTaggedAny: { handler: function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( !tiddler.tags.containsAny(params), place );
  }},

  hideWhenTaggedAll: { handler: function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( tiddler.tags.containsAll(params), place );
  }},

  showWhenTaggedAll: { handler: function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( !tiddler.tags.containsAll(params), place );
  }},

  hideWhenExists: { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( store.tiddlerExists(params[0]) || store.isShadowTiddler(params[0]), place );
  }},

  showWhenExists: { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( !(store.tiddlerExists(params[0]) || store.isShadowTiddler(params[0])), place );
  }},

  hideWhenTitleIs: { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( tiddler.title == params[0], place );
  }},

  showWhenTitleIs: { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( tiddler.title != params[0], place );
  }},

  'else': { handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
    removeElementWhen( !window.hideWhenLastTest, place );
  }}

});

//}}}

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "HomeItems">>
<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTitle") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("*");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"title")||hasClass(nodes[i],"subtitle"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>
<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagging")||hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>
<script label="$1" title="FULLSCREEN: toggle display of mainmenu, sidebar, and page header">
	window.toggleFullScreen=function() {
		config.options.chkFullScreen=!config.options.chkFullScreen;
		var showmm=!config.options.chkFullScreen && config.options.chkShowLeftSidebar!==false;
		var showsb=!config.options.chkFullScreen && config.options.chkShowRightSidebar!==false;
		var showcrumbs=!config.options.chkFullScreen && config.options.chkShowBreadcrumbs!==false
			&& config.macros.breadcrumbs && config.macros.breadcrumbs.crumbs.length;
		var cw=document.getElementById('contentWrapper');
		var da=document.getElementById('displayArea');
		var mm=document.getElementById('mainMenu');
		var sb=document.getElementById('sidebar');
		var sm=document.getElementById('storyMenu');
		var bc=document.getElementById('breadCrumbs');
		if (cw){
			for (var i=0; i<cw.childNodes.length; i++)
				if (hasClass(cw.childNodes[i],'header')) { var h=cw.childNodes[i]; break; }
			if (h) h.style.display=!config.options.chkFullScreen?'block':'none';
		}
		if (mm) {
			mm.style.display=showmm?'block':'none';
			da.style.marginLeft=showmm?(config.options.txtDisplayAreaLeftMargin||''):'1em';
		}
		if (sb) {
			sb.style.display=showsb?'block':'none';
			da.style.marginRight=showsb?(config.options.txtDisplayAreaRightMargin||''):'1em';
		}
		if (sm)
			sm.style.display=!config.options.chkFullScreen ?'block':'none';
		if (bc)
			bc.style.display=showcrumbs?'block':'none';

		var label=('$'+'1'=='$1')?'fullscreen':'$1';
		var altlabel='$2'; if ('$'+'2'=='$2') altlabel=label;

		if (typeof(place)!="undefined" && place!=window.place)
			place.innerHTML=!config.options.chkFullScreen?label:altlabel;

		var b=document.getElementById('restoreFromFullscreenButton');
		if (b) removeNode(b);
		else { 
			var b=createTiddlyElement(null,'span','restoreFromFullscreenButton','selected');
			b.innerHTML='&loz;';
			b.title='RESTORE: redisplay page header, menu and sidebar';
			b.onclick=window.toggleFullScreen;
			var s=b.style;
			s.position='fixed'; s.zIndex='1001'; s.top='.3em'; s.right='.3em';
			s.border='2px outset ButtonFace'; s.padding='0px 3px'; s.cursor='pointer'; s.fontSize='8pt';
			s.backgroundColor='ButtonFace'; s.color='ButtonText !important;'; s.MozAppearance='button';
			document.body.insertBefore(b,null);
		}
		return false;
	};
	window.toggleFullScreen();
	return false;
</script><script>
	place.lastChild.innerHTML=('$'+'1'=='$1')?'fullscreen':'$1';
</script>

>''I. INTRODUCTION''
>In an academic community, learning and evaluation require explicit and shared agreements on intellectual honesty and academic integrity.  At Wesleyan, these values and the standards of academic conduct they imply constitute the Honor Code, the affirmation of which is a condition of enrollment.  Adjudication of alleged violations of the honor code issue from an Honor Board, comprised of students.  The board ensures consistent interpretation and sanctions for violations while serving as a constant reminder of communal principles.  Violations against the code are violations against the community, the ultimate source of the principles articulated below.  Accordingly, upon witnessing or otherwise becoming aware of an apparent violation, members of the community have an obligation to report the violation or to discuss it with the appropriate faculty member, a member of the Honor Board, or the Vice President for Student Affairs.
>''II. THE HONOR CODE''
>''A. The Pledge''
>The pledge is an affirmation of each student's agreement to adhere to the standards of academic integrity set by Wesleyan's Honor Code.  In order to promote constant awareness of the Honor Code, faculty are encouraged to ask students to sign the pledge when submitting any academic exercise for evaluation.  The pledges read as follows:
>''For papers and similar written work:''
>In accordance with the Honor Code, I affirm that this work is my own and all content taken from other sources has been properly acknowledged.
>''For tests and other academic exercises:''
>In accordance with the Honor Code, I affirm that this work has been completed without improper assistance.

!!!As an emprically-oriented thinker, Mill confronts the question how people can in practice take the general happiness seriously as a moral standard; and he claims…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) socialization can shape conscience to take a variety of forms, including a utilitarian form.]>
{{green{Yes. p 31 (¶8) of Chapter Three emphasizes social malleability of conscience.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) religious sentiments can (and should) serve to promote utility.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 30, p. 33 on religious aspects of conscience
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that any rational person recognizes that others’ happiness is as intrinsically valuable as his or her own happiness, and hence recognizes a duty of impartiality.]>
{{red{No... This would be a rather Kantian strain of reasoning; Mill does not appeal to reason here.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the most reliable way for anyone to promote their own happiness is to promote the general happiness, of which their own happiness is a part.]>
{{red{No... Nothing quite so direct; Mill admits that social conditions influence how intertwined one’s own happiness is with the general happiness!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that although uncivilized people might experience a conflict between their own happiness and that of everyone else, the bonds of society have make these two goals identical.]>
{{red{No... careful -- Mill does think civilization tends toward progress in our identification with others, but it is not a matter of logic -- certainly not “in the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live...” p. 34
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Human beings (unlike angels, Kant imagines) must see themselves as belonging not only to the intelligible order, but also to the temporal world of the senses. This implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) if psychology finds a good explanation for someone’s action, it does not make sense to hold that person morally responsible.]>
{{red{No... Kant will hold us responsible as long as we *also* recognize ourselves as members of the intelligible world.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the only way duty can command our obedience is through a kind of moral sense, which makes us feel good about acting morally.]>
{{red{No... We can take an interest in acting morally, but there is nothing personal about this interest...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) for both ourselves and others, there cannot be clear evidence showing that a person has acted autonomously and out of respect for duty.]>
{{green{Yes. We may always suspect some sort of sensible incentive at work, perhaps unconsciously.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) we cannot be expected to act morally unless our inclinations and habits align with moral duty, creating an incentive to perform the right action.]>
{{red{No... Arisotle would like this conclusion, and Kant has some explaining to do about how to resist it. Nevertheless, he does not think acting morally requires any particular training, experience, or incentive. However, insofar as we *are* also subject to empirical laws, this inference would be reasonable.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that our lives are all different in their empirical circumstances, and therefore people recognize different and potentially conflicting moral laws.]>
{{red{No... Kant would resist this claim, but some would say he should consider it.
}}}
===
}}}

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "diagh">>

var f=config.formatters[config.formatters.findByField("name","image")];
f.match="\\[[<>]?[Ii][Mm][Gg](?:\\([^,]*,[^\\)]*\\))?\\[";
f.lookaheadRegExp=/\[([<]?)(>?)[Ii][Mm][Gg](?:\(([^,]*),([^\)]*)\))?\[(?:([^\|\]]+)\|)?([^\[\]\|]+)\](?:\[([^\]]*)\])?\]/mg;
f.handler=function(w) {
	this.lookaheadRegExp.lastIndex = w.matchStart;
	var lookaheadMatch = this.lookaheadRegExp.exec(w.source)
	if(lookaheadMatch && lookaheadMatch.index == w.matchStart) {
		var floatLeft=lookaheadMatch[1];
		var floatRight=lookaheadMatch[2];
		var width=lookaheadMatch[3];
		var height=lookaheadMatch[4];
		var tooltip=lookaheadMatch[5];
		var src=lookaheadMatch[6];
		var link=lookaheadMatch[7];

		// Simple bracketted link
		var e = w.output;
		if(link) { // LINKED IMAGE
			if (config.formatterHelpers.isExternalLink(link)) {
				if (config.macros.attach && config.macros.attach.isAttachment(link)) {
					// see [[AttachFilePluginFormatters]]
					e = createExternalLink(w.output,link);
					e.href=config.macros.attach.getAttachment(link);
					e.title = config.macros.attach.linkTooltip + link;
				} else
					e = createExternalLink(w.output,link);
			} else 
				e = createTiddlyLink(w.output,link,false,null,w.isStatic);
			addClass(e,"imageLink");
		}

		var img = createTiddlyElement(e,"img");
		if(floatLeft) img.align="left"; else if(floatRight) img.align="right";
		if(width||height) {
			var x=width.trim(); var y=height.trim();
			var stretchW=(x.substr(x.length-1,1)=='+'); if (stretchW) x=x.substr(0,x.length-1);
			var stretchH=(y.substr(y.length-1,1)=='+'); if (stretchH) y=y.substr(0,y.length-1);
			if (x.substr(0,2)=="{{")
				{ try{x=eval(x.substr(2,x.length-4))} catch(e){displayMessage(e.description||e.toString())} }
			if (y.substr(0,2)=="{{")
				{ try{y=eval(y.substr(2,y.length-4))} catch(e){displayMessage(e.description||e.toString())} }
			img.style.width=x.trim(); img.style.height=y.trim();
			if (stretchW||stretchH) config.formatterHelpers.addStretchHandlers(img,stretchW,stretchH);
		}
		if(tooltip) img.title = tooltip;

		// GET IMAGE SOURCE
		if (config.macros.attach && config.macros.attach.isAttachment(src))
			src=config.macros.attach.getAttachment(src); // see [[AttachFilePluginFormatters]]
		else if (config.formatterHelpers.resolvePath) { // see [[ImagePathPlugin]]
			if (config.browser.isIE || config.browser.isSafari) {
				img.onerror=(function(){
					this.src=config.formatterHelpers.resolvePath(this.src,false);
					return false;
				});
			} else
				src=config.formatterHelpers.resolvePath(src,true);
		}
		img.src=src;
		w.nextMatch = this.lookaheadRegExp.lastIndex;
	}
}

config.formatterHelpers.imageSize={
	tip: 'SHIFT-CLICK=show full size, CTRL-CLICK=restore initial size',
	dragtip: 'DRAG=stretch/shrink, '
}

config.formatterHelpers.addStretchHandlers=function(e,stretchW,stretchH) {
	e.title=((stretchW||stretchH)?this.imageSize.dragtip:'')+this.imageSize.tip;
	e.statusMsg='width=%0, height=%1';
	e.style.cursor='move';
	e.originalW=e.style.width;
	e.originalH=e.style.height;
	e.minW=Math.max(e.offsetWidth/20,10);
	e.minH=Math.max(e.offsetHeight/20,10);
	e.stretchW=stretchW;
	e.stretchH=stretchH;
	e.onmousedown=function(ev) { var ev=ev||window.event;
		this.sizing=true;
		this.startX=!config.browser.isIE?ev.pageX:(ev.clientX+findScrollX());
		this.startY=!config.browser.isIE?ev.pageY:(ev.clientY+findScrollY());
		this.startW=this.offsetWidth;
		this.startH=this.offsetHeight;
		return false;
	};
	e.onmousemove=function(ev) { var ev=ev||window.event;
		if (this.sizing) {
			var s=this.style;
			var currX=!config.browser.isIE?ev.pageX:(ev.clientX+findScrollX());
			var currY=!config.browser.isIE?ev.pageY:(ev.clientY+findScrollY());
			var newW=(currX-this.offsetLeft)/(this.startX-this.offsetLeft)*this.startW;
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			if (this.stretchH) s.height=Math.floor(Math.max(newH,this.minH))+'px';
			clearMessage(); displayMessage(this.statusMsg.format([s.width,s.height]));
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		return false;
	};
	e.onmouseup=function(ev) { var ev=ev||window.event;
		if (ev.shiftKey) { this.style.width=this.style.height=''; }
		if (ev.ctrlKey)  { this.style.width=this.originalW; this.style.height=this.originalH; }
		this.sizing=false;
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		return false;
	};
	e.onmouseout=function(ev) { var ev=ev||window.event;
		this.sizing=false;
		clearMessage();
		return false;
	};
}

!!!Aristotle de-emphasizes values that are central to the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as humility and equality. For example, Aristotle claims or implies:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that a good person is entirely free from the feeling of appropriate shame.]>
{{green{Yes. That’s Aristotle’s claim, much as it might surprise us! This does not mean that the virtuous person has no understanding of when shame *would* be appropriate. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) we cannot be magnificent unless we have experienced opportunities to practice and refine our habits in managing money and resources.]>
{{green{Yes. Perhaps we could develop good habits with *little* resources - but not in the absence of resources altogether.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that we should pay more attention to the opinions of those who are considered fortunate and worthy.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle doesn’t think that fortune or social status makes a person a perfect judge, but he does take their views to serve as better starting-points for reflection.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that it is easier to develop a full set of virtues when a person is free from economic hardship and material need.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. He would even make the stronger claim that it is *impossible* to develop a *full* set without having had some resources along the way. (Note, however, that the fact that a stronger claim can be made does not make the weaker claim false.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the virtuous person is self-sufficient, not dependent on others.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle does praise self-sufficiency of a certain kind in this reading, although we’ll also see, in his discussion of friendship, that he does not think a virtuous person can *become* virtuous without friends; nor does a virtuous person ever prefer to be without friends. Still, once the virtuous person is mature, these relations are not relations of dependence.
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[euthyphro_map|https://www.dropbox.com/s/7yctv1hebj75srq/malcolm_x_angela_davis.png?raw=1]]

<<include "http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/proxy/reasoningwell.tiddlyspot.com">>

/***
|''Name:''|abego.IncludePlugin|
|''Version:''|1.0.1 (2007-04-30)|
|''Type:''|plugin|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#IncludePlugin|
|''Author:''|Udo Borkowski (ub [at] abego-software [dot] de)|
|''Documentation:''|[[IncludePlugin Documentation|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#%5B%5BIncludePlugin%20Documentation%5D%5D]]|
|''Community:''|([[del.icio.us|http://del.icio.us/post?url=http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/index.html%23IncludePlugin]]) ([[Support|http://groups.google.com/group/TiddlyWiki]])|
|''Copyright:''|&copy; 2007 [[abego Software|http://www.abego-software.de]]|
|''Licence:''|[[BSD open source license (abego Software)|http://www.abego-software.de/legal/apl-v10.html]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.1.3|
|''Browser:''|Firefox 1.5.0.9 or better; Internet Explorer 6.0|
***/
/***
This plugin's source code is compressed (and hidden). Use this [[link|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/archive/IncludePlugin/Plugin-Include-src.1.0.0.js]] to get the readable source code.
***/
///%
if(!window.abego){window.abego={};}var invokeLater=function(_1,_2,_3){return abego.invokeLater?abego.invokeLater(_1,_2,_3):setTimeout(_1,_2);};abego.loadFile=function(_4,_5,_6){var _7=function(_8,_9,_a,_b,_c){return _8?_5(_a,_b,_9):_5(undefined,_b,_9,"Error loading %0".format([_b]));};if(_4.search(/^((http(s)?)|(file)):/)!=0){if(_4.search(/^((.\:\\)|(\\\\)|(\/))/)==0){_4="file://"+_4;}else{var _d=document.location.toString();var i=_d.lastIndexOf("/");_4=_d.substr(0,i+1)+_4;}_4=_4.replace(/\\/mg,"/");}loadRemoteFile(_4,_7,_6);};abego.loadTiddlyWikiStore=function(_f,_10,_11,_12){var _13=function(_14,_15){if(_12){_12(_14,"abego.loadTiddlyWikiStore",_15,_f,_11);}};var _16=function(_17,_18){var _19=_18.indexOf(startSaveArea);var _1a=_18.indexOf("<!--POST-BODY-END--"+">");var _1b=_18.lastIndexOf(endSaveArea,_1a==-1?_18.length:_1a);if((_19==-1)||(_1b==-1)){return config.messages.invalidFileError.format([_f]);}var _1c="<html><body>"+_18.substring(_19,_1b+endSaveArea.length)+"</body></html>";var _1d=document.createElement("iframe");_1d.style.display="none";document.body.appendChild(_1d);var doc=_1d.document;if(_1d.contentDocument){doc=_1d.contentDocument;}else{if(_1d.contentWindow){doc=_1d.contentWindow.document;}}doc.open();doc.writeln(_1c);doc.close();var _1f=doc.getElementById("storeArea");_17.loadFromDiv(_1f,"store");_1d.parentNode.removeChild(_1d);return null;};var _20=function(_21){_13("Error when loading %0".format([_f]),"Failed");_10(undefined,_f,_11,_21);return _21;};var _22=function(_23){_13("Loaded %0".format([_f]),"Done");_10(_23,_f,_11);return null;};var _24=function(_25,_26,_27,_28){if(_25===undefined){_20(_28);return;}_13("Processing %0".format([_f]),"Processing");var _29=config.messages.invalidFileError;config.messages.invalidFileError="The file '%0' does not appear to be a valid TiddlyWiki file";try{var _2a=new TiddlyWiki();var _2b=_16(_2a,_25);if(_2b){_20(_2b);}else{_22(_2a);}}catch(ex){_20(exceptionText(ex));}finally{config.messages.invalidFileError=_29;}};_13("Start loading %0".format([_f]),"Started");abego.loadFile(_f,_24,_11);};(function(){if(abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder){return;}var _2c="waiting";var _2d="loading";var _2e=1000;var _2f=-200;var _30=-100;var _31=-300;var _32;var _33=[];var _34={};var _35=[];var _36;var _37=[];var _38;var _39=function(){if(_32===undefined){_32=config.options.chkUseInclude===undefined||config.options.chkUseInclude;}return _32;};var _3a=function(url){return "No include specified for %0".format([url]);};var _3c=function(){var _3d=_35;_35=[];if(_3d.length){for(var i=0;i<_37.length;i++){_37[i](_3d);}}};var _3f;var _40=function(){if(_36!==undefined){clearInterval(_36);}_3f=0;var _41=function(){abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.sendProgress("","","Done");};_36=setInterval(function(){_3f++;if(_3f<=10){return;}clearInterval(_36);_36=undefined;abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.sendProgress("Refreshing...","","");refreshDisplay();invokeLater(_41,0,_2f);},1);};var _42=function(_43){var _44;for(var i=0;i<_33.length;i++){var _46=abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getStore(_33[i]);if(_46&&(_44=_43(_46,_33[i]))){return _44;}}};var _47=function(){if(!window.store){return invokeLater(_47,100);}var _48=store.fetchTiddler;store.fetchTiddler=function(_49){var t=_48.apply(this,arguments);if(t){return t;}if(config.shadowTiddlers[_49]!==undefined){return undefined;}if(_49==config.macros.newTiddler.title){return undefined;}return _42(function(_4b,url){var t=_4b.fetchTiddler(_49);if(t){t.includeURL=url;}return t;});};if(_33.length){_40();}};var _4e=function(){if(!window.store){return invokeLater(_4e,100);}var _4f=store.getTiddlerText("IncludeList");if(_4f){wikify(_4f,document.createElement("div"));}};var _50=function(_51){var _52=function(){var _53=store.forEachTiddler;var _54=function(_55){var _56={};var _57;var _58=function(_59,_5a){if(_56[_59]){return;}_56[_59]=1;if(_57){_5a.includeURL=_57;}_55.apply(this,arguments);};_53.call(store,_58);for(var n in config.shadowTiddlers){_56[n]=1;}_56[config.macros.newTiddler.title]=1;_42(function(_5c,url){_57=url;_5c.forEachTiddler(_58);});};store.forEachTiddler=_54;try{return _51.apply(this,arguments);}finally{store.forEachTiddler=_53;}};return _52;};var _5e=function(_5f,_60){return _5f[_60]=_50(_5f[_60]);};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder={};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.setProgressFunction=function(_61){_38=_61;};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getProgressFunction=function(_62){return _38;};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.sendProgress=function(_63,_64,_65){if(_38){_38.apply(this,arguments);}};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.onError=function(url,_67){displayMessage("Error when including '%0':\n%1".format([url,_67]));};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.hasPendingIncludes=function(){for(var i=0;i<_33.length;i++){var _69=abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getState(_33[i]);if(_69==_2c||_69==_2d){return true;}}return false;};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getIncludes=function(){return _33.slice();};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getState=function(url){var s=_34[url];if(!s){return _3a(url);}return typeof s=="string"?s:null;};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getStore=function(url){var s=_34[url];if(!s){return _3a(url);}return s instanceof TiddlyWiki?s:null;};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.include=function(url,_6f){if(!_39()||_34[url]){return;}var _70=this;_33.push(url);_34[url]=_2c;var _71=function(_72,_73,_74,_75){if(_72===undefined){_34[url]=_75;_70.onError(url,_75);return;}_34[url]=_72;_35.push(url);invokeLater(_3c);};var _76=function(){_34[url]=_2d;abego.loadTiddlyWikiStore(url,_71,null,_38);};if(_6f){invokeLater(_76,_6f);}else{_76();}};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.forReallyEachTiddler=function(_77){var _78=function(){store.forEachTiddler(_77);};_50(_78).call(store);};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getFunctionUsingForReallyEachTiddler=_50;abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.useForReallyEachTiddler=_5e;abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.addListener=function(_79){_37.push(_79);};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.addListener(_40);if(config.options.chkUseInclude===undefined){config.options.chkUseInclude=true;}config.shadowTiddlers.AdvancedOptions+="\n<<option chkUseInclude>> Include ~TiddlyWikis (IncludeList | IncludeState | [[help|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#%5B%5BIncludePlugin%20Documentation%5D%5D]])\n^^(Reload this ~TiddlyWiki to make changes become effective)^^";config.shadowTiddlers.IncludeState="<<includeState>>";var _7a=function(e,_7c,_7d){if(!anim||!abego.ShowAnimation){e.style.display=_7c?"block":"none";return;}anim.startAnimating(new abego.ShowAnimation(e,_7c,_7d));};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getDefaultProgressFunction=function(){setStylesheet(".includeProgressState{\n"+"background-color:#FFCC00;\n"+"position:absolute;\n"+"right:0.2em;\n"+"top:0.2em;\n"+"width:7em;\n"+"padding-left:0.2em;\n"+"padding-right:0.2em\n"+"}\n","abegoInclude");var _7e=function(){var e=document.createElement("div");e.className="includeProgressState";e.style.display="none";document.body.appendChild(e);return e;};var _80=_7e();var _81=function(_82){removeChildren(_80);createTiddlyText(_80,_82);_7a(_80,true,0);};var _83=function(){invokeLater(function(){_7a(_80,false,_2e);},100,_30);};var _84=function(_85,_86,_87,url,_89){if(_87=="Done"||_87=="Failed"){_83();return;}if(_86=="abego.loadTiddlyWikiStore"){_3f=0;if(_87=="Processing"){_81("Including...");}}else{_81(_85);}};return _84;};abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.setProgressFunction(abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getDefaultProgressFunction());config.macros.include={};config.macros.include.handler=function(_8a,_8b,_8c,_8d,_8e,_8f){_8c=_8e.parseParams("url",null,true,false,true);var _90=parseInt(getParam(_8c,"delay","0"));var _91=_8c[0]["url"];var _92=getFlag(_8c,"hide",false);if(!_92){createTiddlyText(createTiddlyElement(_8a,"code"),_8d.source.substring(_8d.matchStart,_8d.nextMatch));}for(var i=0;_91&&i<_91.length;i++){abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.include(_91[i],_90);}};config.macros.includeState={};config.macros.includeState.handler=function(_94,_95,_96,_97,_98,_99){var _9a=function(){var s="";var _9c=abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getIncludes();if(!_9c.length){return "{{noIncludes{\nNo includes or 'include' is disabled (see AdvancedOptions)\n}}}\n";}s+="|!Address|!State|\n";for(var i=0;i<_9c.length;i++){var inc=_9c[i];s+="|{{{"+inc+"}}}|";var t=abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.getState(inc);s+=t?"{{{"+t+"}}}":"included";s+="|\n";}s+="|includeState|k\n";return s;};var _a0=function(){removeChildren(div);wikify(_9a(),div);if(abego.TiddlyWikiIncluder.hasPendingIncludes()){invokeLater(_a0,500,_31);}};var div=createTiddlyElement(_94,"div");invokeLater(_a0,0,_31);};var _a2=Tiddler.prototype.isReadOnly;Tiddler.prototype.isReadOnly=function(){return _a2.apply(this,arguments)||this.isIncluded();};Tiddler.prototype.isIncluded=function(){return this.includeURL!=undefined;};Tiddler.prototype.getIncludeURL=function(){return this.includeURL;};var _a3={getMissingLinks:1,getOrphans:1,getTags:1,reverseLookup:1,updateTiddlers:1};for(var n in _a3){_5e(TiddlyWiki.prototype,n);}var _a5=function(){if(abego.IntelliTagger){_5e(abego.IntelliTagger,"assistTagging");}};var _a6=function(){if(config.macros.forEachTiddler){_5e(config.macros.forEachTiddler,"findTiddlers");}};_47();invokeLater(_4e,100);invokeLater(_a5,100);invokeLater(_a6,100);})();
//%/

!!!In his discussion of our relation to pleasures and desires, Aristotle claims or implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) With many people, the most we can expect is that they can be motivated to act reasonably well, not that they will consistently enjoy virtuous action.]>
{{green{Yes. VII 10 1152a
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that our actions always reflect what we believe, at least unconsciously, to be best.]>
{{red{No... No; this is something like Socrates’ view, and Aristotle rejects it. See Book VII §2 forward, where Aristotle distances himself from Socrates’ view.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Pleasure itself is good, but all things are pleasant only to a degree;  overindulgence in any pleasure leads to pain.]>
{{red{No... 1154. Note Aristotle argues that some things are “pleasant by nature” and cannot be overindulged.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that both temperance and continence are virtues, but temperance contributes more directly to one’s happiness.]>
{{red{No... Continence is not a virtue (See distinctions in first sentence of Book VII). The second part of this suggestion is correct, however: temperance fosters one’s happiness better than mere continence, both because activity that comes from a fluently virtuous disposition is more wise, and because temperate people’s good actions are in harmony with their desires, and lead to more reliable and profound pleasures.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Intemperance, which involves a faulty perception of what is good, is ultimately more blameworthy than incontinence.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes -- there’s a sense in which incontinence is “worse”, but it’s worse from the agent’s own point of view. From the social critic’s point of view, the intemperate (“self-indulgent”) person is more in need of correction, for they are not even aware of any problem in their choice. Issue briefly discussed at VII§2(5), 1146a30, and then in detail at VII §8.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Book VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics discusses “incontinence” (akrasia, or lack of self-restraint), which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) … shows that a person does not really know what virtue requires.]>
{{red{No... Not really; this is a good statement of Socrates’ position, against which Aristotle argues. (Aristotle does, however, admit that there may be a certain kind of ignorance involved in incontinence.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) … makes a person&nbsp;morally equivalent to an animal who cannot be guided by reason.]>
{{red{No... Brutishness/bestiality is different — that’s not “being home” as a deliberate chooser, at all — neither making a decision nor being regretful of one’s action at the moment of action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) … is a vice of deficiency; there is another vice corresponding to too much self-restraint.]>
{{red{No... Incontinence is not a vice. Also, one cannot have too much continence or self-restraint in Arsitotle’s sense, as it means simply being able to control one’s impulses, and there’s no such thing as too much of that, on Aristotle’s account. The virtuous person isn’t called on to exercise much self-restraint, 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) … is especially painful, because incontinent people experience inner conflict.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed. Vice is more blameworthy, but akrasia is more painful. (See his discussion of the paradox about which is worse, near beginning of Book VII)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) … is not actually blameworthy; the incontinent person has already tried self-blame, and being subject to blame clearly does not work to change them.]>
{{red{No... The second half has some truth (made vivid in the “puzzle” passage about what to drink when water causes choking). Still, Aristotle clearly does find incontinence to be blameworthy, albeit less so than intemperance and other vices.
}}}
===
}}}

Incontinence Foolishness Virtue?
>Q: “A certain argument, then, concludes that foolishness combined with incontinence is virtue. For incontinence makes someone act contrary to what he supposes [is right]; but since he supposes that good things are bad and that it is wrong to do them, he will do the good actions, not the bad.”  CIT: Aristotle Book VII, 1146a 25
|Aristotle seems to undermine much of his argument with this statement. By saying this, he is supposing that adding two wrongs together, incontinence and foolishness, the byproduct is virtue. The end result may be the opposite of the wrong the person intended, but that person is still incontinent, and cannot be virtuous no matter how crazy. Aristotle’s argument seems to create a world where one can be virtuous no matter how heinous, as long as one tacks on craziness to reverse good and bad. Isn’t one of the main reasons incontinence is better than intemperance because of the intrinsic knowledge of good reason? Aristotle may respond the result is not virtue, but it is better than normal incontinence.(118 words)|@@Let's look at context!@@|

/***
|Name|InlineJavascriptPlugin|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#InlineJavascriptPlugin|
|Version|1.6.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <<br>>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|plugin|
|Requires||
|Overrides||
|Description|Insert Javascript executable code directly into your tiddler content.|

''Call directly into TW core utility routines, define new functions, calculate values, add dynamically-generated TiddlyWiki-formatted output'' into tiddler content, or perform any other programmatic actions each time the tiddler is rendered.
!!!!!Usage
<<<
When installed, this plugin adds new wiki syntax for surrounding tiddler content with {{{<script>}}} and {{{</script>}}} markers, so that it can be treated as embedded javascript and executed each time the tiddler is rendered.

''Deferred execution from an 'onClick' link''
By including a {{{label="..."}}} parameter in the initial {{{<script>}}} marker, the plugin will create a link to an 'onclick' script that will only be executed when that specific link is clicked, rather than running the script each time the tiddler is rendered.  You may also include a {{{title="..."}}} parameter to specify the 'tooltip' text that will appear whenever the mouse is moved over the onClick link text

''External script source files:''
You can also load javascript from an external source URL, by including a src="..." parameter in the initial {{{<script>}}} marker (e.g., {{{<script src="demo.js"></script>}}}).  This is particularly useful when incorporating third-party javascript libraries for use in custom extensions and plugins.  The 'foreign' javascript code remains isolated in a separate file that can be easily replaced whenever an updated library file becomes available.

''Display script source in tiddler output''
By including the keyword parameter "show", in the initial {{{<script>}}} marker, the plugin will include the script source code in the output that it displays in the tiddler.

''Defining javascript functions and libraries:''
Although the external javascript file is loaded while the tiddler content is being rendered, any functions it defines will not be available for use until //after// the rendering has been completed.  Thus, you cannot load a library and //immediately// use it's functions within the same tiddler.  However, once that tiddler has been loaded, the library functions can be freely used in any tiddler (even the one in which it was initially loaded).

To ensure that your javascript functions are always available when needed, you should load the libraries from a tiddler that will be rendered as soon as your TiddlyWiki document is opened.  For example, you could put your {{{<script src="..."></script>}}} syntax into a tiddler called LoadScripts, and then add {{{<<tiddler LoadScripts>>}}} in your MainMenu tiddler.

Since the MainMenu is always rendered immediately upon opening your document, the library will always be loaded before any other tiddlers that rely upon the functions it defines.  Loading an external javascript library does not produce any direct output in the tiddler, so these definitions should have no impact on the appearance of your MainMenu.

''Creating dynamic tiddler content''
An important difference between this implementation of embedded scripting and conventional embedded javascript techniques for web pages is the method used to produce output that is dynamically inserted into the document:
* In a typical web document, you use the document.write() function to output text sequences (often containing HTML tags) that are then rendered when the entire document is first loaded into the browser window.
* However, in a ~TiddlyWiki document, tiddlers (and other DOM elements) are created, deleted, and rendered "on-the-fly", so writing directly to the global 'document' object does not produce the results you want (i.e., replacing the embedded script within the tiddler content), and completely replaces the entire ~TiddlyWiki document in your browser window.
* To allow these scripts to work unmodified, the plugin automatically converts all occurences of document.write() so that the output is inserted into the tiddler content instead of replacing the entire ~TiddlyWiki document.

If your script does not use document.write() to create dynamically embedded content within a tiddler, your javascript can, as an alternative, explicitly return a text value that the plugin can then pass through the wikify() rendering engine to insert into the tiddler display.  For example, using {{{return "thistext"}}} will produce the same output as {{{document.write("thistext")}}}.

//Note: your script code is automatically 'wrapped' inside a function, {{{_out()}}}, so that any return value you provide can be correctly handled by the plugin and inserted into the tiddler.  To avoid unpredictable results (and possibly fatal execution errors), this function should never be redefined or called from ''within'' your script code.//

''Accessing the ~TiddlyWiki DOM''
The plugin provides one pre-defined variable, 'place', that is passed in to your javascript code so that it can have direct access to the containing DOM element into which the tiddler output is currently being rendered.

Access to this DOM element allows you to create scripts that can:
* vary their actions based upon the specific location in which they are embedded
* access 'tiddler-relative' information (use findContainingTiddler(place))
* perform direct DOM manipulations (when returning wikified text is not enough)
<<<
!!!!!Examples
<<<
an "alert" message box:
><script show>
	// uncomment this: alert('InlineJavascriptPlugin: this is a demonstration message');
</script>
dynamic output:
><script show>
	return (new Date()).toString();
</script>
wikified dynamic output:
><script show>
	return "link to current user: [["+config.options.txtUserName+"]]";
</script>
dynamic output using 'place' to get size information for current tiddler:
><script show>
   if (!window.story) window.story=window;
   var title=story.findContainingTiddler(place).id.substr(7);
   return title+" is using "+store.getTiddlerText(title).length+" bytes";
</script>
creating an 'onclick' button/link that runs a script:
><script label="click here" title="clicking this link will show an 'alert' box" show>
   if (!window.story) window.story=window;
   alert("Hello World!\nlinktext='"+place.firstChild.data+"'\ntiddler='"+story.findContainingTiddler(place).id.substr(7)+"'");
</script>
loading a script from a source url:
>http://www.TiddlyTools.com/demo.js contains:
>>{{{function demo() { alert('this output is from demo(), defined in demo.js') } }}}
>>{{{alert('InlineJavascriptPlugin: demo.js has been loaded'); }}}
><script src="demo.js" show>
	return "loading demo.js..."
</script>
><script label="click to execute demo() function" show>
	demo()
</script>
<<<
!!!!!Installation
<<<
import (or copy/paste) the following tiddlers into your document:
''InlineJavascriptPlugin'' (tagged with <<tag systemConfig>>)
<<<
!!!!!Revision History
<<<
''2007.02.19 [1.6.0]'' added support for title="..." to specify mouseover tooltip when using an onclick (label="...") script
''2006.10.16 [1.5.2]'' add newline before closing '}' in 'function out_' wrapper.  Fixes error caused when last line of script is a comment.
''2006.06.01 [1.5.1]'' when calling wikify() on script return value, pass hightlightRegExp and tiddler params so macros that rely on these values can render properly
''2006.04.19 [1.5.0]'' added 'show' parameter to force display of javascript source code in tiddler output
''2006.01.05 [1.4.0]'' added support 'onclick' scripts.  When label="..." param is present, a button/link is created using the indicated label text, and the script is only executed when the button/link is clicked.  'place' value is set to match the clicked button/link element.
''2005.12.13 [1.3.1]'' when catching eval error in IE, e.description contains the error text, instead of e.toString().  Fixed error reporting so IE shows the correct response text.  Based on a suggestion by UdoBorkowski
''2005.11.09 [1.3.0]'' for 'inline' scripts (i.e., not scripts loaded with src="..."), automatically replace calls to 'document.write()' with 'place.innerHTML+=' so script output is directed into tiddler content.  Based on a suggestion by BradleyMeck
''2005.11.08 [1.2.0]'' handle loading of javascript from an external URL via src="..." syntax
''2005.11.08 [1.1.0]'' pass 'place' param into scripts to provide direct DOM access 
''2005.11.08 [1.0.0]'' initial release
<<<
!!!!!Credits
<<<
This feature was developed by EricShulman from [[ELS Design Studios|http:/www.elsdesign.com]]
<<<
!!!!!Code
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.inlineJavascript= {major: 1, minor: 6, revision: 0, date: new Date(2007,2,19)};

config.formatters.push( {
	name: "inlineJavascript",
	match: "\\<script",
	lookahead: "\\<script(?: src=\\\"((?:.|\\n)*?)\\\")?(?: label=\\\"((?:.|\\n)*?)\\\")?(?: title=\\\"((?:.|\\n)*?)\\\")?( show)?\\>((?:.|\\n)*?)\\</script\\>",

	handler: function(w) {
		var lookaheadRegExp = new RegExp(this.lookahead,"mg");
		lookaheadRegExp.lastIndex = w.matchStart;
		var lookaheadMatch = lookaheadRegExp.exec(w.source)
		if(lookaheadMatch && lookaheadMatch.index == w.matchStart) {
			if (lookaheadMatch[1]) { // load a script library
				// make script tag, set src, add to body to execute, then remove for cleanup
				var script = document.createElement("script"); script.src = lookaheadMatch[1];
				document.body.appendChild(script); document.body.removeChild(script);
			}
			if (lookaheadMatch[5]) { // there is script code
				if (lookaheadMatch[4]) // show inline script code in tiddler output
					wikify("{{{\n"+lookaheadMatch[0]+"\n}}}\n",w.output);
				if (lookaheadMatch[2]) { // create a link to an 'onclick' script
					// add a link, define click handler, save code in link (pass 'place'), set link attributes
					var link=createTiddlyElement(w.output,"a",null,"tiddlyLinkExisting",lookaheadMatch[2]);
					link.onclick=function(){try{return(eval(this.code))}catch(e){alert(e.description?e.description:e.toString())}}
					link.code="function _out(place){"+lookaheadMatch[5]+"\n};_out(this);"
					link.setAttribute("title",lookaheadMatch[3]?lookaheadMatch[3]:"");
					link.setAttribute("href","javascript:;");
					link.style.cursor="pointer";
				}
				else { // run inline script code
					var code="function _out(place){"+lookaheadMatch[5]+"\n};_out(w.output);"
					code=code.replace(/document.write\(/gi,'place.innerHTML+=(');
					try { var out = eval(code); } catch(e) { out = e.description?e.description:e.toString(); }
					if (out && out.length) wikify(out,w.output,w.highlightRegExp,w.tiddler);
				}
			}
			w.nextMatch = lookaheadMatch.index + lookaheadMatch[0].length;
		}
	}
} )
//}}}

//{{{
config.formatters.unshift( {
    name: "inlinesliders",
    match: "\\+\\+\\+\\+|\\<slider",
    lookaheadRegExp: /(?:\+\+\+\+|<slider) (.*?)(?:>?)\n((?:.|\n)*?)\n(?:====|<\/slider>)/mg,
    handler: function(w)
    {
        this.lookaheadRegExp.lastIndex = w.matchStart;
        var lookaheadMatch = this.lookaheadRegExp.exec(w.source)
        if(lookaheadMatch && lookaheadMatch.index == w.matchStart )
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Which of the following claims (circle any number) captures agreement among your group?
	Note, for most purposes, "ethics" and "morality" will count as synonymous terms in this course.

## Morality ultimately (consciously or unconsciously) depends on religion or faith for its motivation.
## It is usually pointless to try to change people’s ideas about morality, because moral opinions are personal and often emotional.
##  A person cannot achieve a good moral perspective in the complete absence of good role models or teachers.
## Morality demands that we attend to those in greatest need, who may not be those we know and love.
## Morality sometimes conflicts pretty directly with human nature.
## Moral ideas are always reflections of a culture's power-structure.

!!!Discuss the following  claims about this class and its assignments, and circle any claims that, upon reflection and deliberation, your group is ready to endorse.…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Micro-essay assignments are short so that they can be completed quickly after finishing the reading.]>
{{red{No... Micro-essay assignments are limited to 120 words, but not for the sake of quickness. Their length is limited to encourage conciseness, to facilitate discussion, and to allow for clear feedback.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Philosophical writing, as practiced in this course, requires expressing opinions clearly and backing them up with reasons.]>
{{red{No... “Expressing opinion” is not required at all, and may interfere with good reflective work. Philosophical writing requires considering the relations between reasons and conclusions, and approaching some conclusions about the problem or question as a whole.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) In order to read carefully, most philosophy texts require about two minutes per page.]>
{{red{No... IN some cases, philosophical texts require much more time.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Philosophical questions are timeless, which explains why philosophy has made no progress despite being studied for many centuries.]>
{{red{No... Philosophical questions certainly evolve over time. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Ethics is a social science that focuses on the variety of norms people apply to their actions.]>
{{red{No... Ethics does not require research into what people’s actual norms are (though that may be inspiring!); instead, it requires reflection on norms and values themselves.
}}}
===
}}}

Which of the following claims (circle any number) captures agreement among your group?
//Note, for most purposes, "ethics" and "morality" will count as synonymous terms in this course.//

## Morality ultimately (consciously or unconsciously) depends on religion or faith for its motivation.
## Attitudes about what is right and wrong are based in emotions and feelings, and people cannot convince one another to share these feelings.
## A person cannot recognize good moral principles in the complete absence of good role models or teachers.
## Morality demands that we attend to those in greatest need, who may not be those we know and love.
## Morality sometimes conflicts pretty directly with human nature.
## Moral ideas are always reflections of a culture's power-structure.

In the space below, please ''comment'' briefly on the questions about which there was ''greatest controversy'' among your group, and why.

!!!MLK discusses the distinction between just and unjust laws, stating or implying that …
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) only a just law is a law in the true sense.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) unjust laws must be disobeyed.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) people of conscience can disagree about which laws are just and unjust. ]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) unjust laws are the source of unhealthy tension, even if that tension is below the surface.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) unjust laws are not democratically structured.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Jeff McMahan considers widely accepted accounts of the difference between the rightness or justice of a war (jus ad bellum) and the rightness or justness of particular actions taken in a war (jus in bellum). [[Listen first to this podcast snippet (start at 46-min mark)|https://www.revealnews.org/episodes/take-no-prisoners-inside-a-wwii-american-war-crime/]]. Considering the story of Frank Hartzell, McMahan would say:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The moral status of the two German men who were killed is not settled simply by knowing that they were on the “unjust” side of a war; we would also need to know the degree of their ignorance about the nature of their war, whether they had been coerced into military service, and whether they had made efforts to protest or resist.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Since Frank was under duress had been ordered to “take no prisoners” prior to this action, a war crime (such as this execution of men who had surrendered) might coinceivably be excused, but not justified.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Whether these two soldiers were “innocent” (in the sense of the theory of just war) depends not on whether they were guilty of unjust aggression, but on whether they pose a threat.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) To the degree that we think Americans’ involvement in WWII was just, we should see the actions of soldiers such as Frank Hartzell as morally justified.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Nazi soldiers, in virtue of their war being unjust, had forfeited all right to defensive force; it would not have been permissible for them, at the moment prior to Hertzell’s choice, to kill him pre-emptively.]>
{{red{No... This is the most difficult case. See p. 28
}}}
===
}}}

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[>img(20%,auto)[Kant|http://www.philosophers.co.uk/immanuel-kant.jpg]]Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German-speaking Prussian thinker, and the first philosopher appointed to a professional academic position //as// a philosopher (rather than as, say, a theologian or scientist). His overall body of work focuses on the nature of reason and the limits of what can be known.
----
See also [[Korsgaard]]

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!!!Hegel:
|!Subject|!Object|         contradiction / opposition       (Taken from Kant, and historicized)|
|!Thesis|!Antithesis|are eventually resolved (according to Hegel) into...|
|>|!Synthesis|the Absolute Ideal perspective|
+++!!![Existentialism]>
The Absolute perspective is not possible; 
human subjectivity, despite its tensions, must (always) be embraced.
|!Being|!Not-being|This tension is not overcome with some further synthesis (p. 263)|
===

;a priori vs. a posteriori ...
:A priori: grasped without recourse to specific experience or experimentation: matters of definition
:A posteriori: grasped through specific experiences, subject to experimental evidence
Kant offers an a priori approach to understanding the concept of moral goodness.

;empiricism:
:Is moral correctness a matter of habituation through certain ''experiences'', as Aristotle claimed?
;rationalism, by contrast:
:Might there be some kernel of moral understanding that reason brings to experience, culture, and learning?

;Two thoughts on Kant as POLITICAL figure:
:(a) If morality can be understood apart from teaching, there’s no “bad upbringing" excuse for irresponsible conduct.
:(b) if morality does not depend on experience, “moral authority” is no longer an obvious need.

;What is a good will, on this account?
:good will = reason in practice = principles in action = lawfulness (respect for duty)

;Puzzle: What is Kant’s attitude towards acting out of beneficent inclinations?
:Two interpretations:
::(a) Anti-happiness interpretation
::: ... This is tempting, but has disadvantages...
::(b) The epistemic interpretation...
+++>An action cannot serve as a clear illustration of moral worth unless it runs counter to inclination.
===

NOTE: Some think Kant’s a priori approach means that there’s no such thing as moral growth, learning, or progress -- our moral capacity is "all there, all along".

Like Plato’s theory of forms, Kant’s theory of moral concepts does allow for education; yet the process of education is one of attunement to transcendent ideas. Education in ethics would be more like education in //geometry// than education in history: sharpening of perception and reflective consistency, so that even people from different backgrounds would come to the same results. Further, our judgment in practice (what counts as a lie, which beings are persons) can improve through reflection on experience.

!!!Kant’s ethics resonate in some ways with Epictetus’ stoicism, and yet there are important points of contrast. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) A person who achieves stoic peace of mind (ataraxia — happiness or contentment according to Epicetus) could never count as a clear example of moral goodness for Kant.]>
{{green{Yes. The key here is the concept of a “clear example.” While Kant clearly makes room for the idea of someone who really is choosing for moral reasons and also taking pleasure in their actions, he denies that these are good *examples.* If you want to represent a clear case of moral action to yourself, you need to imagine a case in which inclination and duty pull in opposite directions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Epictetus and Kant both believe that making choices according to reason tends to bring a kind of happiness or contentment.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus promises a kind of subjective well-being to those who pursue stoic practices. But Kant makes no such guarantee, and even imagines that a person with perfectly good will could still fail to experience happiness; happiness is more like lucky grace than something we can "achieve". Kant would especially warn us against *expecting* happiness to follow from good choices, since that expectation invites a confusion of motives.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Kant would approve of Epictetus’ insistence that we should make choices based on reason, which means (among other things) not focusing on results that are not really “up to us.”]>
{{green{Yes. On this point they are indeed parallel and quite compatible; while Epictetus doesn’t call it “morality,” his account of proper use of the faculty of choice, just like Kant’s, focuses on deciding to choose well, which amounts to focusing well on what is “up to us” rather than “externals” or any concern with getting results.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Epictetus and Kant both think that it is possible for a person to discipline their desires through practice.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus certainly is optimistic that one can reshape desires and emotions through practice; Kant does not portray us as having any influence over our own desires or emotions. At best we can resolve to choose morally without being distracted by these.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Epictetus does not blame people, suggesting that they generally act on what seems good from their perspective; Kant does think people are often blameworthy and fail to do what they themselves know is right.]>
{{green{Yes. For Epictetus there’s no concept of moral perversion, “sinfulness” or vicious selfishness. Those who fail to put things in proper perspective are lacking insight, but they’re not blameworthy. Indeed, blame generally does not have a role in stoic ethics, as blame is a way of being at odds with nature, wanting things to happen differently from how they do.
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/spa/vs5pdi7981vsfr0/dc26rthj.png]]

+++!!!!!*[393: Ancient virtues aren’t good without qualification]
|[Virtues of] Moderation in emotions and passions, self-control, and calm deliberation are not only good in many respects but even seem to constitute part of the intrinsic worth of a person. But they are far from being called good without qualification (however unconditionally they were commended by the ancients). For without the principles of good will, they can become extremely bad; the coolness of a villain makes him not only much more dangerous but also immediately more abominable in our eyes...|
===
+++!!!!!*[395.02: Organs are well adapted to ends.]
|In the natural constitution of an organized  being...  there be taken as a principle that in such a being no organ is to be found for any end unless it be the most fit and the best adapted for that end.|
===
+++!!!!!*[395.04: If happiness were the purpose of reason...]
|Now if that being’s preservation, welfare, or in a word its happiness, were the real end of nature in the case of a being having reason and will, then nature would have hit upon a very poor arrangement in having the reason of the creature carry out this purpose.  For all the actions which such a creature has to perform with this purpose in view, and the whole rule of his conduct would have been prescribed much more exactly by instinct…|
===
+++!!!!!*[396: Reason has a more worthy purpose]
|There lies at the root of such judgments, rather, the idea that existence has another and much more worthy purpose, for which, and not for happiness, reason is quite properly intended, and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private purpose of men must, for the most part, defer.  |
===
+++!!!!!*[397: Actions in accord with inclination, & with duty]
|[1] All actions already recognized as contrary to duty...
[2] those actions which are really in accordance with duty, yet to which men have no immediate inclination, but perform them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination. ... to decide whether [it is] done from duty or from some selfish purpose is easy. 
[3] where the action accords with duty and the subject has in addition an immediate inclination to do the action. 
For example, that a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced purchaser certainly accords with duty; and where there is much commerce, the prudent merchant does not overcharge but keeps to a fixed price for everyone.  his own advantage required him to do it. He cannot, however, be assumed to have in addition [as in the third case] an immediate inclination toward his buyers...|
===
+++!!!!!*[398: Preserving one’s life from duty]
|On the other hand,to preserve one’s life is a duty; and, furthermore, everyone has also an immediate inclination to do so. But on this account the often anxious are taken by most men for it has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim of their action has no moral content. They preserve their lives, to be sure, in accord with duty, but not from duty. On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the taste for life, if an unfortunate man, strong in soul and more indignant at his fate than despondent or dejected, wished for death and yet preserves his life without loving it—not from inclination or fear, but from duty—then his maxim indeed has a moral content.|
===
+++!!!!!*[398: Charity without sympathy]
|Suppose then the mind of this friend of mankind  to be clouded over with his own sorrow so that all sympathy with the lot of others is extinguished, and suppose him still to have the power to benefit others in distress, even though he is not touched by their trouble because he is sufficiently absorbed with his own; and now suppose that, even though no inclination moves him any longer, he nevertheless tears himself from this deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty—then for the first time his action has genuine more worth.|
===
+++!!!!!*[399: LOVE: What scripture  commands is not inclination]
|Undoubtedly in this way also are to be understood those passages of Scripture which command us to love our neighbor and even our enemy.  For love as an inclination cannot be commanded; but beneficence from duty, when no inclination impels us and even when a natural an unconquerable aversion opposes such beneficence, is practical, and not pathological, love.  Such love resides in the will and not in the propensities of feeling, in principles of action and not in tender sympathy; and only this practical love can be commanded.|
===
+++!!!!!*[399: To be beneficent where one can is a duty]
|To be beneficent where one can is a duty... not from inclination but from duty.|
===
+++!!!!!*[400: Third proposition]
|The third proposition...follows... : Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law. I can indeed have an inclination for an object as the effect of my proposed action; but I can never have respect for such an object, just because it is merely an effect and is not an activity of the will. I can have no respect for inclination as such, whether my own or that of another... Now an action done from duty must altogether exclude the influence of inclination and therewith every object of the will. Hence there is nothing left which can determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law... the will can be subjectively determined by the maxim that I should follow such a law even even if all my inclinations are thereby thwarted.|
===
+++!!!!!*[401: Moral worth does not depend on effects, but on representing law.]
|Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected from it nor in any principle of action that needs to borrow its motive from this expected effect. For all these effects (agreeableness of one’s condition and even the furtherance of other people’s happiness) could have been brought about also through other causes and would not have required the will of a rational being, in which the highest and unconditioned good can alone  be found. Therefore, the pre-eminent good which is called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself...|
===
+++!!!!!*[402: What sort of law... if duty is not vain delusion.]
|But what sort of law can that be the thought of which must determine the will without reference to any expected effect, so that the will can be called absolutely good without qualification? Since I have deprived the will of every impulses that might arise for it from obeying any particular law, there is nothing left to serve the will as principle except the universal conformity of its actions to law as such, i.e., I should never act except in such  a way that I can also will that my maxim should  become a universal law. Here mere conformity to law as such without having as its basis any law determining particular actions) serves the will as principle and so much so serves it if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical concept.|
===
+++!!!!!*[402: Lying promise?]
|When I am in distress, may I make a promise with the intention of not keeping it? ... I clearly see that escape from some present difficulty by means of such a promise is not enough. In addition I must carefully consider whether from this lie there may later arise far greater inconvenience for me than from what I now try to escape. Furthermore, the consequences of my false promise are not easy to foresee, even with all my supposed cunning; loss of confidence in me might prove to be far more disadvantageous than the misfortune which I now try to avoid. The more prudent way might be to act according to a universal  maxim and to make it a habit not to promise anything without intending to keep it. But that such a maxim is, nevertheless, always based on nothing but a fear of consequences becomes clear to me at once.|
===

Nature as determinate mechanism:
Newton’s Laws were published in 1687, and educated people by Kant’s time tended to accept the following:

;Material determinism:
:All matter in nature acts in ways that we can expect to explain (in theory) by causal mechanical principles.
:Human bodies are made of natural matter.
+++[So... — — — — — — — —]
:Human bodies act in ways that we can expect to explain by causal mechanical principles.
The application of natural-science patterns of explanation to human action thus has led to a
''crisis for ideas of human moral responsibility.''
===

+++!!!![Nature seems to be a realm of HETERONOMY]
;~HETERO-NOMY
:ruled by what's other/different
::What the billiard ball does depends on what things act on it. 
::What my arm muscle does depends on what things act on it. 
::What a neuron does depends on what things act on it.
===
+++!!!![Can human beings resist the causal determination of natural forces?]
;~AUTO-NOMY
:self-governing, self-ruling
:In Kant's sense "autonomy" means FREEDOM, which also means GOOD WILL which also means MORAL PRINCIPLE

Human action = the domain of human CHOICE = Choosing things for REASONS = choosings on principles
===

!!!Kant distinguishes acting in accord with duty from acting from duty. About this distinction, he claims or implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) it is difficult to find any clear example of action performed from duty, since virtually any actions, however decent, might turn out to be well-explained via selfish motives.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) acting from duty is never a matter of trying to bring about a certain causal result or effect, but is instead a matter of acting on the right principle.]>
{{green{Yes. indeed. See ¶16 “Thus moral worth does not lie in effect or in expectation of effect...”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) when our behavior towards someone is intended to help us achieve our own goals, we are not acting in accord with duty.]>
{{red{No... In this situation we may well be acting //in accord with// duty, just not //from// duty.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Respect is an emotional inclination that can motivate us to treat others well, but true moral action requires that we not rely on emotion.]>
{{red{No... Kant discusses respect at AK400, “The third proposition...” and clearly denies, there, that respect is an inclination (hence it is not exactly an emotion, but a different kind of affective awareness).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the desire to imitate an exemplary person does not represent genuinely moral motivation.]>
{{green{Yes. 409: Imitation has no place at all in moral matters.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In discussing heteronomy (the opposite of autonomy), Kant claims or implies that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we are heteronomous whenever our actions conform to legal codes, because they are external.]>
{{red{No... We can -- and often do -- conform to legal codes precisely because reason persuades us that we have a duty to do so.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) emotional responses -- even emotions about moral duty -- are to be counted as heteronomous influences.]>
{{green{Yes. Respect is a “feeling” about morality, but NOT emotion, according to Kant (not inlination, not passion, but a reasoned respons)... See last f.n. to §1.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) heteronomy means acting in ways that cannot be understood by reference to any law or principle.]>
{{red{No... Heteronomous action is governed by principles too — but principles/laws of nature, not of reason.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) religious invocations of the afterlife, and its just desserts, tend implicitly to treat human motivation as heteronomous.]>
{{green{Yes. Any appeal to rewards (even divine rewards) implies an external control on our actions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) anything that is not a rational being is properly understood as heteronomous.]>
{{green{Yes. Non-rational beings are heteronomous: determined by natural law (which is outside of themselves).
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Suppose you resisted a temptation, on some occasion, to lie to a friend. Even if you then decided to tell the truth, Kant would deny that there is any moral worth in your act IF the explanation for your choice was…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) You realized that every dishonest action makes it harder to achieve virtue.]>
{{green{Yes. Virtue is Aristotle’s concern, but not Kant’s. The problem with a wrong action does not involve what it leads to (within the self or beyond the self). When an action is immoral, the problem is in the principle of the action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) You decided that a good moral principle is to use your own preferences as a guideline to understand what your friend wants.]>
{{green{Yes. This may be tricky, but no. Kant is interested in good moral principles, but moral principles aren’t about preferences, and assuming that others want want we personally want is especially dangerous, for Kant.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) You realized that the truth would ultimately bring the best outcome for your friend.]>
{{green{Yes. This motive is preoccupied with consequences, which we cannot reliably control.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) You knew that sooner or later you would feel bad about lying.]>
{{green{Yes. This motive is ultimately self-interested.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) You recognized that acting otherwise would be irrational.]>
{{red{No... This is the essence of moral reasoning, for Kant
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Suppose you are tempted to lie to a friend, in order to avoid unnecessary pain and discouragement for your friend. Based on the first section of Kant’s Groundwork, we should expect Kant to say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) You should decide based on whether you would later feel bad about lying.]>
{{red{No. This kind of motivation is based on avoidance of a painful emotion, guilt; wondering whether you'll feel guilty is an unreliable method of adhering to duty.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) You should tell the truth, even if it is difficult, because establishing a habit of honesty will make your character more virtuous.]>
{{red{No. Virtue is Aristotle’s concern, but not Kant’s. The problem with a wrong action does not involve what it leads to (within the self or beyond the self). When an action is immoral, the problem is in the principle of the action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) You should tell the truth because the truth ultimately would bring the best outcome for your friend.]>
{{red{No. Kant agues that trying to secure any particular result or outcome (even if it is a good one) is not what duty involves.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Telling the truth is morally worthy only if you do it for the right reason, out of duty.]>
{{green{Yes, exactly. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) The morality of lying, in such a case, must be determined by appeal to reason.]>
{{green{Yes... All moral determinations must be made through appeal to reason, on Kant's account.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant defends the need for a purely formal a priori grasp of moral principles, arguing along the way that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) genuinely worthy action is ultimately undermined when methods of moral education point to incentives, such as eternal reward, for acting well.]>
{{yellow{Maybe. Moral education does backfire and cause confusion and (Kant says) when it emphasizes incentives, but it doesn't ever simply *prevent* someone from recognizing the importance of acting from duty, since that recognition depends on reasons that a person can recognize a priori.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) when our decent behavior towards someone is actually motivated by our individual desires, we are not acting in accord with duty.]>
{{red{No... In this situation we may well be acting //in accord with// duty, just not //from// duty.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) the desire to imitate those we admire (role models) does not represent genuinely moral motivation.]>
{{green{Yes. 409: Imitation has no place at all in moral matters.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) a knowledge of human nature, and of anthropological differences, may help us apply moral principles in particular cases, but it cannot help us define them.]>
{{green{Yes. 412: In this way all morals, which require anthropology in order to be //applied// to humans, must be entirely expounded at first independently of anthropology as pure philosophy...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) morality depends upon the possibility of recognizing an imperative that is not hypothetical — that is, neither a matter of skill nor of prudence.]>
{{green{Yes. The non-hypothetical imperative is the categorical imperative; imperatives of skill and of prudence are the two kinds of hypothetical imperatives.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Kant’s discussion, the categorical imperative…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) requires us never to treat another person as a means to our own ends in any way.]>
{{red{No... Never treat someone *only* as a means.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) requires detailed understanding of human nature.]>
{{red{No... Applying the imperative in practice may require experience of human nature, but knowing it does not.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) can be distinguished from hypothetical imperatives, which we can always opt out of.]>
{{green{Yes. True, although we might not find it easy to “opt out of” the imperatives of prudence, because we may not be capable of choosing not to care about our own happiness...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) reveals the irrationality of immoral actions, since we cannot endorse our immoral action without some kind of contradiction.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the crux of Kant’s method.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) requires that we decide, when faced with a moral dilemma, based on whether our actions would have bad results if everyone acted the same way.]>
{{red{No... Not quite. Many critics think that this is the gist of Kant’s argument, but his reasoning does not revolve around results, but rather around the //implications// of one’s will.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant illustrates the reasoning process of the categorical imperative with four hypothetical examples, arguing that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) one who commits suicide out of despair violates a perfect duty, and shows lack of respect for humanity.]>
{{green{Yes. K’s argument about suicide hangs on seeing human life as not disposable — not open to cost-benefit logic — but intrinsically worthy of respect. Note this doesn’t entail that Kant condemns *all* suicide as immoral; the argument is that a certain kind of suicidal intention exempts the agent from the very kind of efforts that she/he wished others would have done more (i.e., to make the world worthwhile).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) it’s possible to imagine a coherent world where nobody ever develops their talents, but it’s not possible for us to prefer such a world.]>
{{green{Yes. There’s nothing incoherent about a world without language, technology, culture, infrastructure, etc (the very tools of action); the problem is the will can’t embrace such a world.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that one who wishes not to contribute to charity cannot reasonably argue that he or she is perfectly consistent in the wish neither to receive nor to give it.]>
{{green{Yes. See especially the footnote beneath 430 — [“Don’t confuse this with a trivial notion of the golden rule”]
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) falsely promising to pay money back is justifiable only when life is at stake.]>
{{red{No... If there’s a perfect duty, Kant makes no exception for the purpose of “saving” (extending, prolonging) a human life.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) some prohibited maxims are rejected by reason because they cannot conceivably be universalized; other maxims could in theory function as  laws of nature, but we could not actually will to live in such a world.]>
{{green{Yes. This distinction (not conceivable as universal law, vs not willable as such) is the point  of the paragraph after the fourth example, 424.
}}}
===
}}}

How does Kant aim to convince us that only good will, or good intentions, can be good without qualification? What does he mean by "good will"? What drives Kant to seek a "pure" and "philosophical" account of morals to clarify the popular view?

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Kant1">>

[[GMM15]]
[[<< back to Nussbaum|Nussbaum]] ... [[forward to Kant2>>|Kant2]]

Kant interprets each human action as guided by some imperative, or maxim. What distinctions are drawn among kinds of imperative? How would he respond to someone who suggests that all action is motivated just by the goals (ends) a particular agent happens to have (contingently) at the moment?

Today we'll discuss: ... FOUR example duties, THREE formulations, TWO kinds of imperative, ... and ONE universal reason!

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[[<< back to Kant1|Kant1]] ... [[forward to Kant3>>|Kant3]]

Kant claims we can't coherently think of our actions as free from any kind of obedience to law. What kinds of law might apply to action? How does Kant's concept of autonomy link the ideas of freedom and responsibility? How does moral obligation illustrate humanity's peculiar relation to Kant's two "worlds" of sense and of intelligence?

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[[<< back to Kant2|Kant2]] ... [[forward to Korsgaard>>|Korsgaard]]

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!!!Robin Wall Kimmerer, informed by both indigenous Potawatomi teachings and scientific research findings, offers an account of gratitude and reciprocity in our relation to plants. In comparing her account to other theories we have studied, we might point out…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) While Aristotle elevates human beings above other animals and plants, Kimmerer’s cosmology treats non-human animals, and plants, as elders.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes; Aristotle’s account of different organisms is a hierarchy based on capacities (nutrition, appetite-and-perception, reason); Kimmerer’s is an extended family relations model. Though the word “elder” may not be in this particular chapter, the concept of being an elder follows fairly readily from the claim that she was “raised by” strawberries -- combining her idea that plants are “teachers” with her idea that other species “give their lives for our own” such that our lives, from the beginning, are a product of their giving even before we can enact gratitude and reciprocity.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Like Noddings, Kimmerer suggests that the most important thing human beings give one another is “time, attention and care,” and that receiving a gift well involves something quite different from giving back directly to the giver.]>
{{green{Yes. Kimmerer p. 25. Arguably, the gift, in Kimmerer, is never best seen as “the thing” (execept when the thing is doing the giving), but as the time, attention, and care that a gift-giver puts into shaping, recognizing, carrying, or otherwise putting special efforts into making the gift possible.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Like Martin Luther King, Jr., Kimmerer would support an account of “conscience” that makes it not simply an individual belief, but a process of attunement and responsiveness.]>
{{green{Yes. This connection is admittedly a stretch, and King’s account (at least in the Birmingham Letter) does not reach beyond the human. Still, his account of conscience is much more  a //practice// (of coming-together, of seeing eye-to-eye) than anything like a stubbornly internal voice of conviction. The places where Kimmerer offers something like imperatives (”Water is a gift... Don’t buy it.”) suggest that the imperative comes from attunement within networks of relation, rather than anything like an //a priori// principle.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Like Kant, Kimmerer thinks that the practices and attitudes connected with the market economy (transactions based on price) are at odds with the practices and attitudes connected with respect and dignity, which involve not treating a thing as a means to one’s own ends, such as nutrition]>
{{green{Yes. Debatable... (This question offers a stimulus to discussion more than a clear answer.) Kant’s opposition between “price” and “dignity” is more dichotomous than Kimmerer’s. On Kimmerer’s model, respect overlaps with uses such as eating; Kant sets up what Rawles calls a “no-trespassing” account of respect, while Kimmerer thinks of reciprocity as allowing for consumption within networks of gratitute and appreciation. (Then again, Kant also says respect involves never treating a being “as a means ONLY,” and conceivably there could be a Kantian account of respecting a being that one eats; in practice, animal-treatment ethicists who invoke Kantian respect, like Tom Regan, think that respect and consumption are incompatible.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Like Plumwood, Kimmerer believes that imagination and narrative play (or should play) a vital role in re-orienting us toward more sustainable practices.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, Kimmerer’s interest in metaphor and in story (p. 29, p. 31) resonate with Plumwood’s suggestion that a profound rethinking requires depicting nature differently through writing (pp. 45-46 in Plumwood)
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[King|https://media.newyorker.com/photos/59097fc01c7a8e33fb390a18/master/w_727,c_limit/Hedin-MartinLutherKingJrsSearingAnti-WarSpeechFiftyYearsLater-2.jpg]]Martin Luther King, Jr (1929-1968) was an American Baptist minister and Nobel Peace Prize winner who developed his reflections on non-violence, love, and dialogue in the context of the movement for desegregation and ~African-American civil rights.
----   
How does Martin Luther King resolve the apparent tension of defying some laws while expecting anti-racist laws to be followed? Could King make an argument for non-violent resistance without using religious premises? What are the most basic points that explain the divergence between King and Malcolm X on defiance of the state?
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[[<< back to Epictetus|Epictetus]] ... [[forward to Aristotle >>|B1 Aristotle (up to 1115a)]]

!!!King and Socrates would be in agreement about the following claims:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) In order to resist unjust human authority, one needs a spiritual or religious inspiration for the development of conscience.]>
{{red{No... This is an interesting theme to explore, but we have no evidence that either thinker would claim divine or religious inspiration is *necessary*...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) If Socrates’ conviction and sentence had resulted from an unjust law, then it would have been right for him to escape his death sentence.]>
{{red{No... King is steadfast, in his rhetoric, about the importanc of accepting  the punishment dictated by law. Perhaps  that would change if the law bypassed all due process for convicts, but there is no sign that King would have enouraged Socrates (who lived in a procedurally ordered, albeit imperfect, state) to duck his sentence.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) it is unjustified to inflict harm in return for harm.]>
{{green{Yes. Both make such explicit claims.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) The majority of people do not do wrong knowingly and willingly; it is out of ignorance or misunderstanding that people act unjustly.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes! Both thinkers show charitable interpretation for (most of) their opponents. King addresses white moderates as the real obstacle to justice, but does not accuse them of knowingly obstructing justice. (The KKK and other ideological segregationists may do so, but he is unconcerned with addressing the actively hateful minority.) Socrates, meanwhile, claims that no-one knowingly does wrong, but only does wrong out of ignorance.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) How things turn out (in the material world) does not matter; what matters is that one acts with individual integrity and keeps one’s own soul pure.]>
{{red{No... Socrates rhetoric pulls this way, but not Kings. First, one’s own soul is not pure if the external world is unjust. Second, he does care very much how things turn out, even if one’s pursuit of such moral ends must be constrained according to moral means.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!![moodle details]
# You can ''subscribe'' to threads, or to a whole unit forum
# Keep an eye out for shared constructive feedback on other students' posts 
===
+++!!![Reading for next session: first section of Aristotle, to 1115]
# Write a passage commentary if it's your turn (new unit!). Post it //by midnight//
# Take a look at other students' commentaries, if it's not your turn.
===

[<img[MLK|http://seattletimes.com/art/mlk/index.jpg]]
+++!!![Foundational vs Dialogical reasoning]
Should we criticize a reasoner for relying on premises that are accepted by a local audience, but which are not themselves certain?
King takes religious ideals as common ground premises for his argument.

Foundationalism: the attempt to establish reasoning on objectively certain grounds
Dialogical reason: acceptance of actually-shared beliefs as reasonable starting-points

Arguments by analogy are essentially dialogical: the audience presumably finds one case clear, and the controversial case is shown to bear similarities to it...

King’s arguments by analogy exemplify dialogical reasoning...

(Could King have made his case better with foundational arguments?)

Genuine vs. Spurious objections:
;Genuine objection against a premise: 
:offering reasons to believe the premise is false or likely false.
;Spurious objection: 
:pointing out that a claim //has not been proven//, 
:or that //not everyone believes// it, 
:or that some of its //terms have not been defined//. (Note the demand for definition can be infinitely regressive!)

===
+++!!![Defiance and Obedience]
The Euthyphro raised, in a roundabout way, the question of moral authorities.
Parents, Gods, Majority opinion, Law -- all of these are often taken as “guides” to action.

Tension: 	(1) We seem to require guides: prophets, role models, parents, laws...
		(2) We need to be able to question whether any such guides are really right.

One frequent worry is that King seems to appeal to divine revelation, and thus to stand on shaky ground.
Yet we can distinguish between ''apocryphal'' and ''prophetic'' strands of Christianity.

Socrates, Epictetus, and Martin Luther King, Jr. all held radical non-conformist moral views. So did Malcolm X. 
:How do their approaches to justice differ?
;In particular:
:What kinds of ''constraints'' deserve respect when we are convinced of an existing injustice?

Problem: suppose people might sometimes be //incorrectly// convinced that there is injustice.
Is there any kind of response we could recommend which both 
:(1) would address and undermine injustice if they are correct, and yet
:(2) would not create new injustices in the event the initial conviction was faulty?
===
+++!!![Distinguishing Just and Unjust Laws]
King offers many criteria in response to the question,
“How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust?”

|!Just Law:|!Unjust Law:|
|squares with moral law or law of God|out of harmony with the moral law|
|rooted in eternal law and natural law|//not// rooted in eternal and natural law|
|//uplifts// human personality|//degrades and distorts// personality|
|with consent of those affected|passed without enfranchisement|
|treats people equally|treats people differently|
|in accord with moral law, natural law, God’s law|not in accord...|
|[order applied justly]	|[order applied unjustly]|
===
+++!!![Natural Law, Conventional Law]
King appeals to ''natural law''... What does he mean?
Distinguish NATURAL from CONVENTIONAL law:
{{indent{Conventional law is made by human powers. 
   Natural law would be lawfuless and justice as understood apart from particular political powers:
 the idea of lawfulness, or the "rule of law" in an abstract sense}}}
The tradition of natural law holds that certain understandings come with human nature.
===

!!!King’s discussion of justice…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) acknowledges that conscience differs and that some reasonable people believe segregation laws to be just.]>
{{red{No... The notion that conscience is subjective plays no role in this text; conscience is not the same as individual conviction.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) requires rejecting the Stoic idea that each person’s psychological well-being depends only on her or his own choice of perspective.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes! King says “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere,” implying that one can’t just be content to have one’s own “house in order” — one’s ability to thrive is bound up with events beyond one’s own control.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) requires support from Judeo-Christian premises in order to justify civil disobedience.]>
{{red{No... Although King draws on Judeo-Christian premises for this particular audience, he also provides parallel arguments that appeal to secular public ideals.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) if applied to Socrates’ case, would imply that Socrates had a duty to defy his death sentence and escape.]>
{{red{No... King’s civil disobedience process requires submitting to legal penalties; clearly, King and Socrates do not differ substantially on this point.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) implies that the world inevitably becomes less unjust over time.]>
{{red{No... Clearly, King argues against the “inevitability” of justice; progress is not “unavoidable,” but it comes only through efforts.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!*[1: Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.]>But more basically, I am in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their "thus saith the Lord" far beyond the boundaries of their home towns, and just as the Apostle Paul left his village of Tarsus and carried the gospel of Jesus Christ to the far corners of the Greco-Roman world, so am I compelled to carry the gospel of freedom beyond my own home town. Like Paul, I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call for aid. Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states. I cannot sit idly by in Atlanta and not be concerned about what happens in Birmingham. Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial "outside agitator" idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds. ===
+++!!!!*[1: to create crisis and tension]>You may well ask: "Why direct action? Why sit-ins, marches and so forth? Isn't negotiation a better path?" You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension as part of the work of the nonviolent-resister may sound rather shocking. But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word "tension." I have earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive, nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could rise from the bondage of myths and half-truths to the unfettered realm of creative analysis and objective appraisal, we must we see the need for nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic heights of understanding and brotherhood.===
+++!!!!*[2: privileged groups seldom give up... voluntarily.]>I have hope that Mr. Boutwell will be reasonable enough to see the futility of massive resistance to desegregation. But he will not see this without pressure from devotees of civil rights. My friends, I must say to you that we have not made a single gain in civil rights without determined legal and nonviolent pressure. Lamentably, it is an historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up their privileges voluntarily. Individuals may see the moral light and voluntarily give up their unjust posture; but, as Reinhold Niebuhr has reminded us, groups tend to be more immoral than individuals. We know through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed. Frankly, I have yet to engage in a direct-action campaign that was "well timed" in the view of those who have not suffered unduly from the disease of segregation. For years now I have heard the word "Wait!" It rings in the ear of every Negro with piercing familiarity. This "Wait" has almost always meant 'Never." We must come to see, with one of our distinguished jurists, that "justice too long delayed is justice denied." ===
+++!!!!*[2: An unjust law is no law at all.]>One may well ask: "How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?" The answer lies in the fact that there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Conversely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws. I would agree with St. Augustine that "an unjust law is no law at all"===
+++!!!!*[2: criteria of justice]>A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust. ... Let us consider a more concrete example of just and unjust laws. An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. By the same token, a just law is a code that a majority compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow itself. This is sameness made legal. Let me give another explanation. A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enacting or devising the law. ... Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its application. For instance, I have been arrested on a charge of parading without a permit. Now, there is nothing wrong in having an ordinance which requires a permit for a parade. But such an ordinance becomes unjust when it is used to maintain segregation and to deny citizens the First Amendment privilege of peaceful assembly and protest. ===
+++!!!!*[2: Segregation meets criteria]>...All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. Segregation, to use the terminology of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, substitutes an "I-it" relationship for an "I-thou" relationship and ends up relegating persons to the status of things. Hence segregation is not only politically, economically and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and awful. Paul Tillich said that sin is separation. Is not segregation an existential expression 'of man's tragic separation, his awful estrangement, his terrible sinfulness? Thus it is that I can urge men to obey the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court, for it is morally right; and I can urge them to disobey segregation ordinances, for they are morally wrong. Who can say that the legislature of Alabama which set up that state's segregation laws was democratically elected? Throughout Alabama all sorts of devious methods are used to prevent Negroes from becoming registered voters, and there are some counties in which, even though Negroes constitute a majority of the population, not a single Negro is registered. Can any law enacted under such circumstances be considered democratically structured?===
+++!!!!*[2: not... evading or defying the law]>I hope you are able to see the distinction I am trying to point out. In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law, as would the rabid segregationist. That would lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty. I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law.===
+++!!!!*[3: Extreme? I... stand between these two]>You speak of our activity in Birmingham as extreme. At fist I was rather disappointed that fellow clergymen would see my nonviolent efforts as those of an extremist. I began thinking about the fact that stand in the middle of two opposing forces in the Negro community. One is a force of complacency, made up in part of Negroes who, as a result of long years of oppression, are so drained of self-respect and a sense of "somebodiness" that they have adjusted to segregation; and in part of a few middle class Negroes who, because of a degree of academic and economic security and because in some ways they profit by segregation, have become insensitive to the problems of the masses. The other force is one of bitterness and hatred, and it comes perilously close to advocating violence. It is expressed in the various black nationalist groups that are springing up across the nation, the largest and best-known being Elijah Muhammad's Muslim movement. Nourished by the Negro's frustration over the continued existence of racial discrimination, this movement is made up of people who have lost faith in America, who have absolutely repudiated Christianity, and who have concluded that the white man is an incorrigible "devil." I have tried to stand between these two forces, saying that we need emulate neither the "do-nothingism" of the complacent nor the hatred and despair of the black nationalist.===
+++!!!!*[4: an extremist for love]>But though I was initially disappointed at being categorized as an extremist, as I continued to think about the matter I gradually gained a measure of satisfaction from the label. Was not Jesus an extremist for love: "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you." Was not Amos an extremist for justice: "Let justice roll down like waters and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream." Was not Paul an extremist for the Christian gospel: "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." Was not Martin Luther an extremist: "Here I stand; I cannot do otherwise, so help me God." And John Bunyan: "I will stay in jail to the end of my days before I make a butchery of my conscience." And Abraham Lincoln: "This nation cannot survive half slave and half free." And Thomas Jefferson: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that an men are created equal ..." So the question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists we will be. Will we be extremists for hate or for love? Will we be extremist for the preservation of injustice or for the extension of justice? In that dramatic scene on Calvary's hill three men were crucified. We must never forget that all three were crucified for the same crime—the crime of extremism. Two were extremists for immorality, and thus fell below their environment. The other, Jesus Christ, was an extremist for love, truth and goodness, and thereby rose above his environment. Perhaps the South, the nation and the world are in dire need of creative extremists.===
+++!!!!*[5: moral means and ends]>Over the past few years I have consistently preached that nonviolence demands that the means we use must be as pure as the ends we seek. I have tried to make clear that it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends. But now I must affirm that it is just as wrong, or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to preserve immoral ends.===

!!!Reading “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” we should imagine that if M.L. King were to comment upon the events of Aug 2014 — specifically the shooting of Michael Brown in Missouri and related events — King would claim…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) racism is no longer perpetuated by unjust laws, but it can endure because just laws are applied unjustly.]>
{{red{No... Perhaps there are no explicit segregation laws, but King never suggests that segregation is the only kind of injustice, and various current laws may well fit King’s description of unjust laws.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) it is unjust to seek to escape law enforcement, even when law enforcement acts unjustly.]>
{{red{No... King himself vows to abide by due process and accept legal punishments, and his strategy of non-violent civil disobedience insists on accepting penalties. However, he never claims that those who avoid unjust punishments (or who try to save themselves or fight back) are unjust.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) the incomplete success of the civil rights movement can be traced partly to its failure to adhere more directly to Christian teachings.]>
{{red{No... King’s Christian references, especially in this letter addressed to clergy, aim to inspire and appeal to non-violent ideals. However, he makes no claim to the effect that Christianity (in particular) is essential to civil rights or to justice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) an officer such as Darren Wilson can be said to act justly if he acts not on prejudice but on his personal conscience.]>
{{red{No... Although King praises conscience, nothing about his conscience is “personal” or mired in purely subjective intuitions. The justice of a person’s actions depends on more than their own feelings or attitudes.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) each person is responsible for her or his own feelings of bitterness or despair; each person can retain their own integrity no matter how much injustice surrounds them.]>
{{red{No... The long passage about how injustice “distorts personality” and “the cup of endurance running over” suggests that King would resist this pure stoic claim.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!King’s religious perspective might be characterized as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) highly critical of many established churches and clergy, which fail to take clear stands on matters of social justice.]>
{{green{Yes. This, of course, is the central point of King’s //Letter//
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) placing faith in a shared human conscience that can be awakened by certain experiences of tension.]>
{{green{Yes. Conscience, on King’s portrayal, is not a subjective faculty (he doesn’t speak of “my conscience” or “his conscience” but rather “human conscience” and “the conscience of the community”); it is shared and unifying social phenomenon.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) a challenge to the separation of church and state, since he appeals to religious concepts in explaining what is just.]>
{{red{No... Though we may ask difficult questions about how to tease apart King’s religious and secular ideals, his text does not raise doubts about the possibility of a secular and democratic form of justice. (Presumably, King would expect that any such secular justice would generally coincide with what he calls “God’s law,” but religion need not be playing any formal role.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) a progressive and humanist response to the Euthyphro dilemma: religion must be interpreted by conscience; revelation (such as the Bible) cannot be trusted as a simple and external authority about right and wrong.]>
{{green{Yes. King does not take the fundamentalist attitude of reading the Bible as a verbatim guide to morals (in which case slavery, polygamy, stoning for adultery, etc., are all fine), but instead treats the Bible as a text that helps inspire communities in their aspiration to make the world more just.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) a search for redemption in the afterlife rather than within the mortal realm.]>
{{red{No... He denounces the “other-worldly” (apocalyptic) Christianity for failing to rise to the “prophetic” ideal — that is, the ideal of transforming the actual earthly realm to make it more like 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Martin Luther King Jr. urges his followers to…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) resist any law that is imposed on a minority by a majority.]>
{{red{No... no; more conditions are required before a law counts as unjust
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) have faith that oppressive conditions will change with time.]>
{{red{No... tricky: we need confidence that they will change, but it is not a passive faith that they will change without our action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) produce tension in order to provoke negotiations.]>
{{red{No... note to produce tension, but to bring tensions to the surface...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) defy laws that are unjust.]>
{{red{No... “not defying or evading” but breaking openly and lovingly, and accepting the penalties
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) define justice in Christian terms, and seek to replace non-Christian ideals of justice with Christian ones.]>
{{red{No... tricky! Justice itself seems to be deeper than Christianity, for King. Note he has an ecumenical and democratic ideal that does not require Christianity to begin with.
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[http://totallyhistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Lawrence-Kohlberg.jpg]]Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-1978) was a psychologist most known for his account of moral development, inspired by Piaget's general model of cognitive stages. Though Kohlberg posited a fixed and universal sequence of stages, the details of social and cultural experience were taken to affect the content of moral attitudes at each stage, as well as how individuals progressed through developmental "threshold" moments.

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[[<< back to Plumwood|Plumwood]] ... [[forward to Noddings>>|Noddings]]

+++!!!!!*[499: anxiety about teaching values]
|Most teachers are aware that they are teaching values... and are very concerned as to whether this teaching is unjustified indoctrination... confusion is apparent... I will attempt to demonstrate that moral education can be free form the charge of cultural relativity and arbitrary indoctrination that inhibits [this teacher] wen she talks about cheating.|
===
+++!!!!!*[499: cop-out solutions]
|**Cop-out Solutions to the Relativity Problem** <br>One... to call moral education socialization...<br>second... to rely on vaguely positive and honorific-sounding terms such as “moral values”<br>third... defining moral values in terms of … a “bag of virtues”... (”character education”)<br>last... to lie  back and enjoy it... called value clarification.|
===
+++!!!!!*[504: lesson: “our values are different”]
|As an example, one child might make a moral decision in term of avoiding punishment, another in terms of the  welfare of other people, another in tersm of certain rules, another in terms of getting the most for himself. The children are them to be encouraged to discuss their values with each other and to recognize that everyone has different values. Whether or not “the welfare of others” is a more adequate value than “avoiding punishment” is not an issue to be raised by the teacher. Rather, the teaching in instructed to teach only that “our values are different.”|
===
+++!!!!!*[504: values clarification not sufficient]
|Now I am not criticizing the value clarification approach itself. It is a basic and valuable component of the new social studies curricula, ... My point is, rather, that value clarification is not a sufficient solution to the relativity problem. Furthermore, the actual teaching of relativism is itself an indoctrination or teaching of a fixed belief, a belief that we are going to show is not true scientifically or philosophically.|
===
+++!!!!!*[505: Stages typology]
|**A Typological Scheme on the Stages of Moral Thought**<br>My colleagues and I were the first... to do detailed cross-cultural studies on the development of moral thinking...<br>1. We often make different decisions and yet have the same basic moral values.<br>2. Our values tend to originate inside ourselves as we process our social experience.<br>3. In every culture and subculture... the same basic moral values and the same steps toward moral maturity are found.<br>4. Basic values [differ due mostly to] different levels of maturity… Exposure to others more mature… helps stimulate maturity…|
===
+++!!!!!*[508: Piaget’s stages as inspiration]
|Piaget started the modern study of child development by recognizing that the child... was puzzled by the basic questions...: the meaning of space, time, causality, life, death, right and wrong,… but answered them in a very different way from the adults. ... a difference in stage or quality of thinking, rather than a difference in amount of knowledge or accuracy of thinking. <br>My own work on morality started  from Piaget’s notions of stages and Piaget’s notion that the child was a philosopher. … I have gradually elaborated... a typological scheme describing general stages of  moral thought that can be defined independently of the specific content of particular moral decisions or actions. We studied seventy-five American boys from early adolescence on. These youths were continually presented with hypothetical moral dilemmas... on the basis of their reasoning... at a given age, we constructed the typology of definite and universal levels of development in moral thought.<br>|
===
+++!!!!!*[505: Heinz dilemma]
|In Europe, a woman was  near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of  cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. … The drug as expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. … The sick woman’s husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could  get together only about $1,000, with was half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked  him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, “No, I discovered the drug and I’m going to make money from it. Heinz got desperate and  broke into the man’s store to steal the drug for him wife.<br>Should the husband have done that? Was it right or wrong? Is your decision ... objectively right... morally universal, or ... personal opinion?|
===
+++!!!!!*[506: Bob’s relativist confusion]
|“It’s all relative; what I would do is steal the drug. I can’t say that’s right or wrong or that it’s what everyone should do.” ... Bob’s relativism rests on a confusion. The confusion is that between relativity as a social science fact that different people do have different moral values and relativity as the philosophic claim that people ought to have different moral values, that no moral values are justified for all people.|
===
+++!!!!!*[510: LEVELS & STAGES]
|• preconventional level (4-10)<br>Stage 1: Punishment and Obedience Orientation<br>Stage 2: Instrumental Relativist Orientation<br>• conventional level<br>Stage 3: Interpersonal Concordance or “Good Boy - Nice Girl” Orientation<br>Stage 4: Society Maintaining Orientation<br>• postconventional or autonomous<br>Stage 5: Social Contract Orientation<br>Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principle Orientation|
===
+++!!!!!*[515: culmination of stage 6]
|In a genuine and culturally universal sense, these steps lead toward an increased morality of value judgment, where morality is considered as a form of judging , as it has been in a philosophic tradition running from... Kant to... “ordinary language” philosophers. At Stage 6 people have disentangled judgments of —  or language about —  human life from status and property values (Stage 1); from its uses to others (Stage 2); from interpersonal affection (Stage 3); and so on; they have a means of moral judgment that is universal and impersonal. Stage 6 people answer in moral words such as duty or morally right and use them in a way implying universality, ideals and impersonality. They think and speak in phrases such as “regardless of who it was” or “I would do it in spite of punishment.”|
===
+++!!!!!*[515: cultural difference]
|Many [Taiwanese] boys said, “He should steal the food for his wife because if she dies he’ll have to pay for her funeral, and that costs a lot.”<br>Figures 1.1 and 1.2 indicate the cultural universality of the sequence of stages we have found. Figure 1.1 presents the age trends for middle-class urban boys in the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico. At age ten in each country, the order of use of each stage is the same as the order of its difficulty or maturity.<br>... stage 5 thinking is much more salient in the United States than in Mexico or Taiwan. Nevertheless, it is present in the other countries, ... Figure 1.2 shows  strikingly similar results from tow isolated villages, one in Yucatan, one in Turkey, Although conventional moral thought increases steadily from ages ten to sixteen, it still has not achieved a clear ascendancy over preconventional thought.|
===
+++!!!!!*[516: class differences]
|Trends for lower-class <br>urban groups are intermediate in the rate of development between those  for he middle-class and  for the village boys. In the three divergent cultures that I studied, middle-class children were ound to be more advanced in moral judgment than matched lower-class children. This was not due to the fact that the middle-class children heavily favored some one type of thought that could be seen as corresponding to the prevailing  middle-class pattern. Instead, middle-class and working-class children move through the same sequences, but the middle-class children move faster and farther.|
===
+++!!!!!*[520: to stimulate moral growth]
|The way to stimulate stage growth is to pose real or hypothetical dilemmas to students ... arouse disagreement and uncertainty as to what is right. The teacher’s primary role is ... to ask Socratic questions that arouse  student reasoning and focus student listening on one another’s reasons. <br>... Rest (1973) [showed] that students prefer the highest stage of reasoning they comprehend but that they do not comprehend more than one stage above their own. As a result, assimilation of reasoning occurs primarily when it is the next  stage up from the student’s level. Developmental moral discussion thus arouses cognitive-moral conflict and exposes students to reasoning by other students at the next stage above their own. <br>Unlike values clarification, [the developmental approach is] not relativistic but... based on universal goals and principles. It asks the student for reasons, on the assumption that some reasons are more adequate than others.|
===

!!!Kohlberg begins his article by discussing how educators who are worried about indoctrination might discuss a moral issue such as cheating. His overall argument suggests…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Young children are unlikely to think in terms of social contracts or universal principles, so their teachers should focus on prompting their reasoning to conform to local cultural conventions.]>
{{red{No... It is true that children are not generally able to absorb and evaluate reasons that are more than one level ahead of their current moral development, but Kohlberg never suggests that teachers should therefore focus on “talking down” to the students’ current (or next) level of reasoning.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Since a norm against cheating is necessary for education to progress, educators must establish this ideal clearly, even if more personal questions about values are open to individual choice through a “values clarification” method.]>
{{red{No... Someone might make the argument in the first part of this sentence, but Kohlberg does not. More importantly, he doesn’t think the second half is correct: we need more than the “values clarification” method.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) 13-year-old children raised in an isolated village in Turkey or Yacatan are more likely than middle-class children of the United States to rationalize in favor of cheating.]>
{{red{No... A majority of 13-year olds in these villages get scored as “pre-conventional” on Kohlberg’s scale (unlike in the US, where the majority have reached “conventional” by that age), HOWEVER, pre-conventional reasoners (assuming K is right to score them that way!) are still likely to express strong opposition to cheating -- on pre-conventional grounds (pointing to the threat of punishment in particular). 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) There may be conventional moral norms that forbid cheating, but post-conventional moral thinkers no longer have any reason to disapprove of cheating.]>
{{red{No... It’s true that post-conventional thinkers will not SIMPLY appeal to convention in rejecting cheating, AND there may even be cases in which reasons not to cheat are overruled by other reasons. HOWEVER, reflection on what makes for a GOOD convention (whether social norms against cheating are good ones to have) are post-conventional in their style of reasoning, and are likely to yield a strong reason to disapprove of cheating.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Someone who reasons at the post-conventional level will act in a way that is not affected by the motivation to avoid punishment or secure the approval of others.]>
{{red{No... Note: Kohlberg has made no claims about ACTUAL motivation. The theory is about how people discuss moral REASONS. A post-conventional individual might say the RIGHT thing to do has nothing to do with social approval or punishment, and yet still act on those non-moral incentives.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In challenging moral relativism, Kohlberg argues or implies:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that teachers are irresponsible if they abdicate their responsibility to instill values.]>
{{red{No... Teachers are irresponsible if they positively endorse relativism, but Kohlberg would equally discourage them from trying to “instill values”. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) A person in a higher moral stage is more likely to give the correct answer to a moral dilemma.]>
{{red{No... 514-15 -- At higher moral stages, people tend to use more sophisticated patterns of moral reasoning, but Kohlberg carefully guards against the suggestion that any particular answer goes along with advanced reasoning.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Although cultures do differ in their values, the explanation, in some cases, is that some cultures are more morally ignorant than others.]>
{{red{No... “Ignorant” suggests a lack of substantively correct information; it’s true that some populations include statistically fewer post-conventional reasoners, but Kohlberg’s view does not portray lower stages as “ignorant”.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) The development of abstract reasoning makes it possible for people to engage in moral reflections that challenge the particular values around them.]>
{{green{Yes. 518
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Differences in cultural environment do affect the details of people’s reasoning at the conventional stage, but they have no effect on a person’s rate of progress through the formal developmental stages.]>
{{red{No... The sequence is not affected, but pace (and presumably whether one ever reaches post-conventional reasoning) may be affected by cultural environment. (517)
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kohlberg argues that variation in people’s answers to a moral question…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) is possible even for people who occupy the same stage of moral development.]>
{{green{Yes. As long as their basic approach to justification is similar, they share a moral stage of development.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) may be explained partly by people’s different development stages.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) reflects a diversity of moral styles that needs to be respected and promoted.]>
{{red{No... Kohlberg is committed to arguing that moral development *can* be promoted in a classroom; he does not support “teaching” of values, but he does support activities that prompt moral reflection and growth.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) tends to be less pronounced within a cross-cultural sample of stage-six reasoners compared to a cross-cultural sample of stage-four moral reasoners.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 519: “in the higher postconventional levels, Socrates, Lincoln, Thoreau, and Martin Luther King tend to speak without confusion of ctongues, as it were. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) are nothing more than different applications of one shared moral framework; all children innately arrive at the basic moral principles, regardless of cultural training.]>
{{red{No... Although K claims all children arrive at the principle that killing is wrong, he makes no general claim that *the* basic moral principles are (all) derived by all children. Also, people at different stages do not share a single moral framework.
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Korsgaard|http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.2008.jpg]]Christine Korsgaard (1952–) is an academic philosopher who has developed a broadly Kantian account of agency, reasons, and morality, extending and amending it to make it more plausible to today's thinkers. 
----
In "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil", Korgaard gives Kantian reasons to challenge Kant's own claim (defended in the essay "On a Supposed Right to Lie..." that appears as an appendix to our Hackett edition of the //Grounding//): that lying is never permissible. 
To what extent do Korsgaard's arguments preserve the spirit of Kant's account of morality? To what extent do they represent a substantial deviation from Kant's ideals? Can you imagine ways in which Kant might respond to her suggestions, giving reasons to resist Korsgaard's variation on his view?

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[[<< back to Kant3|Kant3]] ... [[forward to midterm>>|midterm]]

>>the danger [is] not ... doing harm ... but ... doing wrong... And such wrongdoing would occur if I made the duty of truthfulness, which is wholly unconditional... into a conditional duty  subordinate to other considerations. (Ak 429 in "On a Supposed Right to Lie")
>Kant’s moral rigor seems implausibly naive wherever one’s honesty would be used for evil purposes. Kant himself insists that even a “benevolent motive” (saving lives) cannot justify a lie. Still, we might try amending Kant’s ethics, affirming the ideal of Respect for Humanity (as ends in themselves), while marking some confrontations with evil as demanding intervention rather than acting “as if” one were in a Kingdom of Ends. Such a two-tiered approach would always retain the Universal Law formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which is arguably less strict. Kant would counter that the benevolent liar embraces an impossible moral project, namely controlling outcomes. The double-level Kantian must indeed be humbled by this worry. [113 words]

Kant denies that moral agency should be concerned with achieving (or preventing) causal results. In response, Korsgaard argues…

!!!According to Korsgaard, Kant’s rigorism is tied to his narrow view of moral responsibility (on which we are each responsible for acting in a morally ideal way, and *not* responsible for evils and harms brought about through others’ action). Korsgaard takes a somewhat different view of moral responsibility, arguing…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The multiple formulations of Kant’s Categorical Imperative do not yield exactly the same results in all cases; the Formula of Humanity is a stricter standard.]>
{{green{Yes. Precisely. Korsgaard does want to retain the Universal Law formulation as essential, even in confronting evil.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Some consequences -- namely, evils that threaten human liberty -- are to be prevented by whatever means are necessary.]>
{{red{No... “By any means necessary” is not an attitude Korsgaard endorses, even faced with terrible consequences. We must still always act on principles (maxims) that pass the basic test of universalizability.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Usually Kantian agents are not responsible for the outcome of their actions; but if one does choose (for moral reasons) to intervene in others’ actions, then one *makes oneself* responsible for whether or not the outcome is good.]>
{{green{Yes. We //may// take on the task of averting evil, but then we had better succeed... “when one undertakes the ends of their action as a part of the maxim...” (145)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Duty is about improving the actual world around us, rather than respecting everyone as if we were already living in an ideal one.]>
{{red{No... This sounds nice, but it’s not compatible with her two-level theory. Korsgaard would argue against any broad mission to “improve the actual world” through making exceptions to ideal duties... *Only* in encounters with evil do we weigh consequences in this “second-best” or “non-ideal” level of morality, and when we resort to that, regret is a reasonable feeling. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Kant’s Stoic notion of will -- whereby wrongdoers damage their own integrity more than they can ever damage the humanity of others -- is a dubious aspect of Kant’s moral philosophy.]>
{{green{Yes. Korsgaard is rejecting this view: that external effects of an action have no moral meaning; evil lies only in intention. (Really, on Kant’s view, there’s a sense in which you can’t really prevent evil at all anyway, since it’s internal to the will of the evildoer.)
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Korsgaard claims it is sometimes justifiable to step back from Kantian rigor  — in particular, from his imperative “Never tell a lie.” Yet being well-intentioned is not enough to make a lie acceptable. Korsgaard’s non-ideal account puts constraints on the moral role of lying, arguing that:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we know for sure what the consequences of our actions will be.]>
{{red{No... This is too high a bar; on Korsgaard’s view, we are staking our moral status on getting things right, but that does not mean that we ever possess perfect knowledge. “... a risk we might... be willing to take...”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) even when a lie is permissible, it is never something we can justly demand of another person.]>
{{green{Yes. This is tricky. While it may be morally BETTER to lie so as to prevent evil, Korsgaard admits that “pulling it off” requires a level of confident judgment and skill that we cannot expect of everyone. Hence, we cannot //blame// someone for sticking to the clear bright line of Kantian respect.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we must be sure, first, that we ourselves are “free from sin”.]>
{{red{No... This is an impossibly high standard, according to any Kantian, and it’s simply no part of Korsgaard’s argument. However, it does raise an important concern from the orthodox Kantian perspective... <br>Do we will a world in which anyone who THINKS we’re up to no good (and who might be somewhat justified in that perception) feels free to treat us with manipulative disrespect?
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) we must be confronting a case of evil.]>
{{green{Yes. This is Korsgaard’s explicit constraint — that we be acting on a maxim of refusing to be used as a tool of evil. NOTE, however, that on Kant’s view, there is no clear line between “evil” and ordinary corruption and moral weakness. But Korsgaard distinguishes "trivial evil" (where a deceiver is underhanded but not nefarious) from real cases of evil. The "lying philanthropist" has no grounds for complaint if you lie (because they're in an "unprotected position" —&nbsp;*However* there's still not a good positive reason to lie. See her summary on p. 151: "When dealing with evil circumstances we may depart from [the full Kantian] ideal"...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the “victim” of our lie or coercion must already be participating in lying or coercive actions.]>
{{green{Yes. So, what is *not* permitted is manipulating or sacrificing any third (”innocent”) party in order to derail an evildoer; nor is it permissible to deceive an innocent person just to protect them from painful emotions, etc. The “loophole” in Kant’s first formulation permits us to respond to evil coercion with coercive countermeasures, or to respond to evil deception with deceptive countermeasures. (It’s unclear, admittedly, whether Korsgaard’s argument licenses responding to evil deception with //coercion//, or responding to evil coercion with //deception//.)
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!![Introduction of the problem]>
whether and how to rescue Kant from the apparently unreasonably duty not to lie
===
+++!!!![Universal Law]>
There //could// be a universal practice [of lying to the murderer at the door]
===
+++!!!![Humanity]
|Lying cannot be a case of treating the other as an end; the other "cannot possibly consent". (138)|
|Any action which depends for its nature and efficacy on the other's ignorance or powerlessness fail this test. (139)|
===
+++!!!![The Kingdom of Ends]
|We are... forbidden to take attitudes toward [another person] which involve regarding her as not in control of herself... as not using her reason. (141)|
===
+++!!!![Humanity and Universal Law]
|Any violation of the Formula of Universal Law is also a violation of the Formula of Humanity ... [which] is stricter. (143-4)|
===
+++!!!![Two Casuistical Problems]
|The philanthropist, like the murderer, has placed himself in a morally unprotected position by his own deception. (145)|
===
+++!!!![Ideal and Nonideal Theory]
As in Rawls...
===
+++!!!![Kantian Nonideal Theory]
|The Formulas of Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends will provide the ideal which governs our daily conduct. When dealing with evil circumstances we may depart from this ideal. .. the Formula of Humanity is inapplicable because it is not designed f or use when dealing with evil. But it can still guide our conduct. It defines the goal toward which we are working. (151)|
===
+++!!!![Conclusion]
|the resources of a double-level theory may be available to the Kantian...<br>
[W]here the attemp to live up to [the Kantian ideal] would make you a tool of evil, you should not do so. In evil circumstances, but only then, the Kingdom of Ends can become a goal to seek rather than an ideal to live up to (153)| 
===

+++!!!!!*[133: rigorism: two claims]
|The most well-known example of [Kant’s] “rigorism,” as it is sometimes called, concerns Kant’s views on our duty to tell the truth. (NOTE...)
... Kant seems to endorse the following pair of claims... [1] one must never under any circumstances or for any purpose tell a lie; [2] second, if one does tell a lie one is responsible for all the consequences that ensue, even if they were completely unforeseeable.|
===
+++!!!!!*[134: First, ... Kant’s defenders are right in thinking that... under]
|First, ... Kant’s defenders are right in thinking that... under the Formula of Universal Law, this particular lie can be shown to be permissible.|
===
+++!!!!!*[134: Second... when the case is treated [with] the Formulas]
|Second... when the case is treated [with] the Formulas of Humanity and the Kingdom of Ends, it becomes clear why Kant is committed to the view that lying is wrong in every case... Kant’s rigorism about lying... comes from an attractive ideal of human relations which is the basis of his ethical system. If Kant is wrong in his conclusion about lying to the murderer at the door, it is for the interesting and important reason that morality itself snometimes allows or been requires us to do something that f rom an ideal perspective is wrong. THe case does not impugn Kant’s ethics as an ideal system. Instead, it shows that we need special principles for dealing with evil.|
===
+++!!!!!*[135: My third aim is to discuss the structure that]
|My third aim is to discuss the structure that an ethical system must have in order to accommodate such special principles.|
===
+++!!!!!*[136: in most cases lying falls squarely into the category]
|... in most cases lying falls squarely into the category of the sort of action Kant considers wrong: actions whose efficacy depends upon the fact that most people do not engageg in them, and which therefore can only be performed by someone who makes an exception of himself.|
===
+++!!!!!*[136: A murderer... must suppose that you do not know]
|A murderer... must suppose that you do not know who he is and what he has in mind.... The lie wil lbe efficacious... because the murderer supposes you do not know what circumstances you are in — that is, that you do not know you are addressing a murderer — and so does not conclude from the fact that people in those cirumstances always lie that you will lie.|
===
+++!!!!!*[137: When we apply the Formula of Humanity, however, the]
|When we apply the Formula of Humanity, however, the argument against lying... applies to any lie whatever ... The perfect duties — that is, the duties of justice, and, ... the duties of respect — arise from the obligation to make each human being’s capacity for autonomous choice the condition of the value of every other end. ... an action is contrary to perfect duty if it is not possible for the other to assent to it or to hold its end. ... it must not be merely that your victim will not like the way you propose to act... but that something makes it impossible for her to assent to it ... People cannot assent... when they are given no chance to do so. The most obvious instance of this is when coercion is used. But it is also true of deception: the victim of the false promise cannot assent to it because he doesn’t know it is what he is being offered. ... even when the victim of such conduct does h appen to know waht is going on... [that] knowledge makes it impossible... to accept the deceitful promise in the ordinary way.|
===
+++!!!!!*[140: According the Formula of Humanity, coercion and deception are]
|According the Formula of Humanity, coercion and deception are the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing to others — the roots of all evil. Coercion and deceptiuon violate the conditions of possible assent, and all actions which depend for their nature and efficacy on their coercive or deceptive charater are ones that others cannot assent to. Coercion and deception also make it impossebl for others to choose to contribute to our ends. ... in any cooperative project — whenever you need toh decisions and actions of others in order to bring about your end — everyone who is to contribute must be ina position to choose to contribute to the end.|
===
+++!!!!!*[140: deception: using another’s reason as tool]
|THE KINGDOM OF ENDS ——— On Kant’s view, the will is a kind of causality. A person, an end in itself, is a free cause, which is to say a first cause. By contrast, a thing, a means, is i merely mediate cause, a link in the chain. A first cause is, obviously, the initiator of a causal chain, hence a real determiner of what wil happen. The iead of deciding for yourself whether you will contribute to a given end can be represented as a decision whether to initiate that causal chain which constitutes your contribution. Any action which prevens or diverts you from making this initiating decision is one that treats you as a mediate rather than a firts cause; hence as a mere means, a thing, a tool. Coercion and deception both do othis. And deception treats you as a mediate cause in a specifc way: it treats your reason as a mediate cause. The false promise thingks: if I tell her I will pay her back next week, then she will choose to give me the money. You reason is worked, like a machine. the deceived tries to determine what levelrs to pull to get the desired results from you. ... it is a direct violation of autonomy.|
===
+++!!!!!*[143: different results]
|If the foreging casuastical anylises are correc,t the applying the Formula of Universal Law and the Formula of Humanity leads to different answers int he case of lying to the murderer... This result impugns Kant’s belief tha thteh formulas are equivalent. But... the two formulas can be shown to be expressions of the same b asic theory... Suppose that your maxim is in violation of the Formula of Universal Law. You are making an exception of yourself, doing something that everyone in your circumsatnces could not do. What this means is that you are treating the reason you have for the action as if eit were stronger, had more justifying force, that anyone else’s exactly similar reason...This argument, of course, only goes in one direction. ... The Formula of Humanity is stricter that the Formula of Universal Law...|
===
+++!!!!!*[143: responsibility for consequences of lie]
|If you make a straightforward appeal to the reason of another peron, your responsibility ends there and the other’s responsibility begins. But the liar tries to take the consequences out of the hands of others; he’ and not they, will determine what form their contribution to destiny will take. By refusing to share with others the ddetermination of events, the liar takes te world into his own hands, and makes the events his own. The resultls, good or bad, are imputable to him, at least in his own conscience. It does not follow from this, of course, that this is a risk one will never want to take.|
===
+++!!!!!*[145: reasons to lie]
|There are two reasons to lie... First, we have a duty of mutual aid. This is an imperfect duty... Notice that if the lie were impermissible, this duty would hav eno force. ... The second reason is one of self-respect. The murderer wans to make you a tool of eil; he regards your integrity as a useful sort of predictability. He is trying to use you, and you good will, as a means to an evil end. You owe int to humanity in your own person not to allow your honesty to be used as a resource for evil. I think this would be aperfect duty of virtue...|
===
+++!!!!!*[150: The point of a double-level theory is to]
|The point of a double-level theory is to give us both a definite and well-defined sphere of responsibility for everyday life and some guidance, at least, about when we may or must take the responsibility of violating ideal standards. The common-sense approach... uses an intutive quantitative measure: we depart from our ordinary rules and standards of conduct when the consequences of following them would be “very bad.” [First]... it leaves us on our own about determining how bad. Second... it leads down a familiar consequentialist slippery slope... A double-level theory substitutes something better than this rough quantitative measure. ... the measure of “very bad” is... bade enough to interfere with the reality of liberty.|
===
+++!!!!!*[151: REGRET & double-level theory]
|Another advantage of a double-level theory is the explanation it offers of the other phenomenon Williams is concerned about: that of regret for doing a certain kind of action even if in the circumstances it was the “right” thing. ... We will regret having to depart from the ideal standard... we identify with this standard and think of our autonomy in terms of it. Regret for an action we would not do under ideal circumastnces seems appropriate even if we have done what is clearly the right thing.|
===

!!!Korsgaard does not entirely agree with Kant, but she supports her view with Kant’s own claims, such as:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we should not allow our rights to be violated with impunity.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) nations should not be pacifist in a way that makes them easily victimized.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 154
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that the categorical imperative has two different levels of rigor.]>
{{red{No... Kant himself believes that the multiple formulations converge in their results, a fact Korsgaard notes on p. 143.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) some persons demonstrate through their actions that they do not deserve to be treated with respect.]>
{{red{No... This view cannot possibly be ascribed to Kant, and Korsgaard does not try. Whether she herself believes it is another matter, but it seems she does not. She comes close at p. 145 in claiming that the deceiver places “himself in a morally unprotected position”. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) one of our perfect duties is to promote the realization of the Kingdom of Ends on earth.]>
{{red{No... No; no kind of “promotion” of things on earth can be a perfect duty; whether such a Kingdom is actually realized by human beings is beyond my sphere of responsibility.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Korsgaard argues for a double level moral theory, claiming that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Sometimes we must violate rigorous moral standards, because moral perfection, of the kind Kant described, is unrealistic and unattainable.]>
{{red{No... Although many find Kant unattractive because his rigorism is too demanding, the exceptions Korsgaard has in mind do not make morality easier to achieve in practice. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) When dealing with cases of evil, there is no role for the Formula of Humanity or Kingdom of Ends.]>
{{red{No... They still do have the role of marking the ideal toward which we aim to bring the actual world.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The Formulas of Humanity and Universal Law will sometimes yield different results in evaluating the same maxim of action.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the key premise. Note Kant himself never recognizes any such difference in results.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) When a person abandons the ideal standard and lies (with the intention of thwarting evil), she or he takes responsibility for the consequences, even if they are unexpected.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, this is a central point on which Korsgaard defends Kant’s reasoning. But Kant had claimed that one should never try to become responsible for consequences in this way, and Korsgaard disagrees.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Although it may be permissible in some cases to manipulate someone who is acting on evil intentions, such manipulation is still morally regrettable.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the point of Korsgaard’s reflection on Bernard Williams. A consequentialist (single-level moral theorist) has no room for this kind of regret.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Korsgaard claims it is sometimes justifiable to step back from Kantian rigor  — in particular, from his imperative “Never tell a lie.” Yet Korsgaard argues for clear limits on permissible lies:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we must be confronting a case of evil.]>
{{green{Yes. This is Korsgaard’s explicit constraint — that we be acting on a maxim of refusing to be used as a tool of evil. NOTE, however, that on Kant’s view, there is no clear line between “evil” and ordinary corruption and moral weakness. So, this is another point at which we might cross-examine Korsgaard further...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) we know for sure what the consequences of our actions will be.]>
{{red{No... This is too high a bar; on Korsgaard’s view, we are staking our moral status on getting things right, but that does not mean that we ever possess perfect knowledge. “... a risk we might... be willing to take...”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) lying may sometimes be permissible, but it is never something we can justly demand of another person.]>
{{green{Yes. This is tricky. While it may be morally BETTER to lie so as to prevent evil, Korsgaard admits that “pulling it off” requires a level of confident judgment and skill that we cannot expect of everyone. Hence, we cannot //blame// someone for sticking to the clear bright line of Kantian respect.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the “victim” of our lie or coercion must already be participating in lying or coercive actions.]>
{{green{Yes. So, what is *not* permitted is manipulating or sacrificing any third (”innocent”) party in order to derail an evildoer; nor is it permissible to deceive an innocent person just to protect them from painful emotions, etc. The “loophole” in Kant’s first formulation permits us to respond to evil coercion with coercive countermeasures, or to respond to evil deception with deceptive countermeasures. (It’s unclear, admittedly, whether Korsgaard’s argument licenses responding to evil deception with //coercion//, or responding to evil coercion with //deception//.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we must be sure, first, that we ourselves are “free from sin”.]>
{{red{No... This is an impossibly high standard, according to any Kantian, and it’s simply no part of Korsgaard’s argument. However, it does raise an important concern from the orthodox Kantian perspective... <br>Do we will a world in which anyone who THINKS we’re up to no good (and who might be somewhat justified in that perception) feels free to treat us with manipulative disrespect?
}}}
===
}}}

Best end-of-semester wishes to all, with a special acknowledgment of graduating seniors. I trust you'll carry your concerns and commitments far beyond campus.

!!!Kant claims that all actions and events are manifestations of some kind of law. He further argues…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we can aspire to be free (in a practical sense) from natural law only by formulating moral laws for ourselves, and acting autonomously on such principles.]>
{{green{Yes. See 448 (and throughout)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that when human beings do act on the moral law, their actions cannot be explained by psychological laws.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s view illustrates compatibilism about causal necessity and moral responsibility.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) speculative philosophy proves that we have freedom of the will, even if we never experience it directly.]>
{{red{No... Alas, “proof” is too strong a word; we may be satisfied that the belief is essential to us, and that it is reasonable, but not that it is certainly true.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) laws can be either those of nature (regulating the sensible world) or those of reason (regulating the intelligible world).]>
{{green{Yes. This is explicit in the last reading as well, starting at Ak412: “Everything in nature works according to laws...”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that human beings need not see themselves as bound by the moral law, because sometimes their actions are fully explained by the laws of nature.]>
{{red{No... Kant’s argument for believing in our freedom is a “transcendental” argument: presupposing our freedom is the only way to make sense of our lives and experiences.
}}}
===
}}}

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1. Offer one or two thoughts about your long-term path, moving through and forward from your time here at Wesleyan.
2. How do you understand the relationship between your experience at Wesleyan and (choose one) that path?
3. What kind of reflective connection or intersection can you articulate between that long-term project/path/narrative and *moral* considerations?

[Next, how our reflections here illuminate (or provide critical angles on) Dewey's article, and also on our semester's work.]

How does Martin Luther King resolve the apparent tension of defying some laws while expecting anti-racist laws to be followed? Could King make an argument for non-violent resistance without using religious premises? What are the most basic points that explain the divergence between King and Malcolm X on defiance of the state?

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+++!!!!*[criminal to teach non-violence]>Concerning nonviolence, it is criminal to teach a man not to defend himself when he is the constant victim of brutal attacks.===
+++!!!!*[complementing King's work]>I want Dr. King to know that I didn’t come to Selma to make his job difficult. I really did come thinking I could make it easier. If the white people realize what the alternative is, perhaps they will be more willing to hear Dr. King.” — reportedly in conversation with Mrs. Coretta Scott King===
+++!!!!*[on justification of violence]>If violence is wrong in America, violence is wrong abroad. If it is wrong to be violent defending black women and black children and black babies and black men, then it is wrong for America to draft us, and make us violent abroad in defense of her. And if it is right for America to draft us, and teach us how to be violent in defense of her, then it is right for you and me to do whatever is necessary to defend our own people right here in this country.===
+++!!!!*[not Americans]>“We're not Americans, we're Africans who happen to be in America. We were kidnapped and brought here against our will from Africa. We didn't land on Plymouth Rock — that rock landed on us.”===
+++!!!!*[170: It has never been out of ... morality]>We never made one step forward until world pressure put Uncle Sam on the spot. And it was when he was on the spot that he allowed us to take a couple of steps forward. It has never been out of any internal sense of morality of legality or humanism that we were allowed to advance. You have been as cold as an icicle whenever it came to the rights of the black man in this country.===
+++!!!!*[171: The white person would not remain passive]>The Supreme Court desegregation decision was handed down over ten years ago. It has been implemented less than ten percent... nowhere in the country... has [the black man] been given an opportunity to function as a human being. Actually, in one sense, it’s our fault... The reason we never received te real thing is that we have not displayed any tendency to do the same for ourselves which other human beings do: to protect our humanity and project our humanity. <br>... Not a single white person in America would sit idly by and let someone do to him what we black men have been letting others do to us. The white person would not remain passive, peaceful, and nonviolent. The day the black man in this country shows others that we are just as human as they in reaction to injustice, that we are willing to die... only then will our people be recognized as human beings. ===
+++!!!!*[172: by any means necessary]>I, for one, think the best way to stop the Ku Klux Klan is to talk to the Ku Klux Klan in the only language it understands, for you can’t talk French to someone who speaks German and communicate. ... Racists know only one language, and... In order to get any kind of point across our people must speak whatever language the racist speaks. The government can’t protect us. The government has not protected us. It is time for us to do whatever is necessary by any means necessary to protect ourselves. <br>[Dec 16, 1964, Harvard Law School]===

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[>img(25%,25%)[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-MHfgguU9l_8/T5y_VsSOTiI/AAAAAAAAC-g/OpdPtiqNPnU/s320/KARL-MARX.jpg]]Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a German philosopher, economist, journalist, and revolutionary communist. His philosophical ideas develop a materialist variation on Hegel's historicism. 
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[[<< back to Rawles|Rawles]] ... [[forward to Nietzsche>>|Nietzsche]]

!!!As we have seen in other texts, Marx’s normative views (about what matters, what deserves criticism, etc.) go hand-in-hand with a particular account of human nature. On Marx’s account of human nature…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Human nature is a kind of animal nature, rooted in our relation to material needs and the activity through which we satisfy those needs.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. And because we make the means of our subsistence, the satisfaction of needs tends to give birth to new needs (needs in connection with our new means of subsistence).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Human nature has been corrupted by capitalism, and needs to be returned to a more organic pre-industrial economy.]>
{{red{No... Although capitalism involves an acute form of alienation (which might be likened to corruption), Marx never advocates trying to go “backward” with history. History is a “dialectic” process that must respond to new developments and resolve contradictions as they emerge.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Humans differ most importantly from other animals in our capacity to generate ideas that transcend the world of physical needs.]>
{{red{No... Curiously, Aristotle might have said this about human reason. Marx denies that we ever achieve such transcendence, though we may have the illusion of doing so.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Mental phenomena (philosophy, religion, etc.) emerge out of material conditions, and are never independent of these.]>
{{green{Yes. This is a crucial Marxist premise; ideas are never really a priori, even if they seem so. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Human motivation is naturally governed by the desire to maximize material gain.]>
{{red{No... “Materialism” may have this connotation, but that’s not the philosophical sense of the word. On the contrary, the fixation on maximizing exchangeable goods emerges from a particular set of economic relations, and reflects those conditions.
}}}
===
}}}

; historicism
: malleability of nature and/or concepts according to historical forces.
; dialectical
: progressing by dialectic — specifically by a pattern of oppositions and synthesis, as in Hegel
; materialism
: doctrine that reality is material [opposed to idealism and dualism] 
;; material basis of ideology
:: correlation between ruling economic classes and “ruling ideas” of a society.
; praxis (“self-activity” in our translation)
: conscious cooperative transformation of the material world to meet human needs
; alienation
: separation of the human being from the activities that define human existence as such.

Marx’s relevance to moral philosophy:
	* A program for economic revolution
	* Roots of skeptical and relativist arguments
;How does Marx justify having a normative point of view that challenges the actual dominant ideology?
:(a)  Marx predicts a shift of values.
:(b) Marx claims that there can be a better ideology:
::		The value of the labor is granted entirely to the laborer.
	
; What did Marx "fail to acknowledge"?
: ...

;If we’re stuck with an industrial economy, how do we eliminate industrial division of labor?
:Ans: reintegration of decision-making and labor
::(means reintegration of ownership and laboring)

;What are the ruling ideologies of our current society?
:That happiness is measured by money.
:That any being should be satisfied with activity insofar as it brings money.
:That “laizzez-faire” economic arrangements (market forces) are just by definition.

!!!Marx’s philosophy prioritizes the relevance of economics to human life, arguing (or implying)…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) when a person doesn’t work, or when a person does not direct her own work, a vital element of human functioning is disrupted.]>
{{green{Yes. 231
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) A philosophical idea or theory is true if it fits well with the current economic mode of life.]>
{{red{No... 221 Not really. The appeal of claims, their odds of being promulgated, their relevance -- all these are determined by conditions, but Marx does not embrace a full relativism about truth in general, especially philosophical truth. We may have trouble seeing beyond ideology, yet that difficulty is not a reason to give up on the notion of a DIFFERENCE between false consciousness and genuine insight into the conditions in which we live.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) since economics changes through history, philosophy must both attend to history and make a difference to it.]>
{{green{Yes. 225 This is key to Marx’s philosophy: writing is itself a form of work, and like any other work it must modify the world it encounters. Since the world it encounters is (on Marx’s view) a profoundly historical world, philosophy’s way of attending to the world requires attending to history, and changing the world means participating in historical change.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) workers are valued and rewarded, by the dominant class, in proportion to the value they produce through their labor.]>
{{red{No... No; alas workers are valued less as they produce more, given the appropriation of labor value.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) human functioning, like that of other animals, has no special connection to abstract and a prior reason; our activity ultimately revolves around survival,  reproduction, and comfort.]>
{{red{No... 228 (The problem is with the second part, that our activity revolves around survival, reproduction and comfort; Marx puts meaningful work at the center.)
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In making his radical claim that morality is merely a form of ideology, Marx is laying out the groundwork for an argument that also claims that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) philosophy — understood as a timeless description of reality — is one form of false consciousness that may be embraced by the ruling class.]>
{{green{Yes. Marx need not claim that *only* the ruling class are attracted to philosophical views that portray themselves as inert in this way, but philosophy (unlike religion) is generally associated with a certain kind of leisure, and philosophy that pretends to reflect timeless ideals helps to buttress the status quo.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) those who own the means of production have access to objective truth while those who are alienated from their production exhibit a false consciousness.]>
{{red{No... Those who own the means of production may also have false consciousness. Economic power does not necessarily bring about objectivity of perspective.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) individuals in the proletariat should be held responsible for their own self-deception when they embrace status quo moral ideas.]>
{{red{No... The language of “responsibility” here is misleading, to say the least: Marx thinks that people’s ideas are determined by the surrounding material-economic circumstances. On the other hand, if all you were thinking was “the workers engage in self-deception” (without focusing on responsibility) then there’s some plausibility here...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) systems of ethics are no more objective than are systems of religion.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the proletarian revolution would put an end to class struggle, which until then is propelled forward by the interaction of material-economic productive forces.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!!*[12: Capitalist ethic: the right to buy and sell labor is paramount.]
|Marx... believed that a society’s ethics is a reflection of the economic structure to which its technology has given rise. Thus a feudal economy in which serfs are tied to their lord’s land gives you the ethic of feudal chivalry based on the loyalty of knights and vassals to their lord, and the obligations of the lord to protect them in time of war. A capitalist economy requires a mobile labor force able to meet the needs of the market, so it breaks the tie between lord and vassal, substituting an ethics in which the right to buy and sell labor is paramount.<br>|
===
+++!!!!!*[12: Communications technology and a global ethic]
|Our newly interdependent global society, with its remarkable possibilities for linking people around the planet, gives us the material basis for a new ethic. Marx would have thought that such an ethic would serve the intersts of the ruling class, that is, the rich nations and the transnational corporations they have spawned. But perhaps our ethics is related to our technology in a looser, less deterministic, way than Marx thought. Ethics appears to have developed from the behavior and feelings of social mammals. It became distinct from anything we can observe in our closest nonhuman relatives when we started using our reasoning abilities to justify our behavior to other members of our group. If the group to which we must justify ourselves is the tribe, or the nation, then our morality is likely to be tribal, or nationalistic. If, however, the revolution in communications has created a global audience, then we might feel a need to justify our behavior to the whole world. This change creates the material basis for a new ethics that will serve the interests of all those who live on this planet in a way that, despite much rhetoric, no previous ethic has ever done.<br>(Singer, Practical Ethics?)|
===
+++!!!!!*[49: Humanity: historical animals]
|Men must be in a position to live in order to “make history.” But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. ... The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying and the instrument of satisfactions which have been acquired) leads to new needs; and this producing of new needs is the first historical act.<br><br>-German Ideology, p. 49 (trans. cited in Jaggar)|
===
+++!!!!!*[54: Praxis ... is essentially a social activity... cooperative in that]
|Praxis ... is essentially a social activity... cooperative in that it invariably involves some division of labor and draws on the knowledge, skills, and experience of earlier workers.<br><br>-Jaggar p. 54|
===
+++!!!!!*[223: Man can be distinguished from animals by ... ]
|Man can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or by anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization.|
===
+++!!!!!*[223: What people are = how they produce]
|The way in which  men produce their means of susbsistence depends first of all on the nature of the actual means of subsistence they find in existence and have to reproduce. This mode of production must not be considered simple as being the production of te physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individual express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.|
===
+++!!!!!*[224: from real activity to ideology]
|We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human  brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises.|
===
+++!!!!!*[225: Ruling material force = ruling intellectual force]
|The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production... the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.|
===
+++!!!!!*[272: commodification of the worker]
|we have shown that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity, the most miserable commodity; that the misery of the worker is inversely proportional to the power and volume of his production; that the necessary result of competition is the accumulation of capital in a few hands and thus ... the whole society must divide into the two classes of proprietors and propertyless workers. <br>The worker becomes poorer the more wealth he produces... Labor not only produces commodities. It also produces itself and the worker as a commodity, and indeed in the same proportion as it produces commodities in general.|
===
+++!!!!!*[273: Alienation]
|the object which labor produces, its product, stands opposed to it as an alien thing, as a power independent of the producer. The product of labor is labor embodied and made objective in a thing. ... <br>So much does the realization of labor appear as diminution that the laborer is diminished to the point of starvation.  ... Indeed, work itself becomes a thing of which he can take possession only with the greatest effort and with the most unpredictable interruptions.  So much does the appropriation of the object appear as alienation the the more objects the worker produces, the fewer he can own and the more he falls under the domination of his product, of capital.|
===
+++!!!!!*[275: Externalization of labor]
|What constitutes the externalization of labor? <br>First is the fact that labor is external to the laborer — that is, it is not part of is nature — and that the worker does not affirm himself in his work but denies himself, feels miserable and unhappy, develops no free physical and mental energy but  mortifies his flesh and ruins his mind. The worker, therefore feels at ease only outside work, and during work he is outside himself. He is at home when he is not working and when he is working he is not at home. His work, therefore, is not voluntary, but coerced. forced labor. It is not the satisfaction of a need but only a means to satisfy other needs. ... as soon as no physical or other pressure exists, labor is avoided like the plague. |
===
+++!!!!!*[277: Life activity and essence]
|The animal is immediately one with its life activity, not distinct from it. The animal is its life activity. Man makes his life activiy itself into an object of will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. ... Conscious life activity distinguishes man immediately from the life activity of the animal. ... Alienated labor reverses the relationship in that man since he is a conscious being, makes his life activity, his essence, only a means for his existence. |
===

!!!Marx’s philosophical stance has been called “materialism” —&nbsp;specifically a dialectical and historical materialism. According to this form of materialism…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) patterns of economic interaction, and historical changes in these, explain trends in philosophy, which in turn influence material life.]>
{{green{Yes, though I will accept either answer.  Marx certainly emphasizes *one* direction of the dialectic more than the other: he emphasizes (see p. 226) that ideas grow out of material conditions. Yet ideas may also serve as "ideology" or "apologia" for ruling systems -- implying that they do have some role in reproducing or regulating that material order.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Human life, like other forms of animal life, revolve around needs and interests, and these interests (in the human case) motivate the production of both ordinary physical goods and ideas.]>
{{green{Yes, though the wording may have been misleading. On this point (emphasis on how praxis develops out of a form of life), Marx overlaps with Aristotle. Human nature on Marx view, though, is itself evolving -- along with the tools and practices that are distinctive to particular ways of life.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The value of a philosophical text is determined by the amount of labor that goes into it.]>
{{red{No... This would be a catchy parody of Marx’s views, but no form of “labor” counts as labor unless it helps meet human needs, and not all philosophy does so.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) philosophical ideas are true only insofar as they satisfy market demands at a specific moment in history.]>
{{red{No... Although philosophical claims don’t achieve truth by mere “correspondence to reality,” Marx never suggests such a crassly reductive view. Philosophical claims are interventions that come out of a particular way of life, and Marx values them insofar as they genuinely improve the world around us so as to meet our needs better. Marx //might// say, however, that philosophical ideas are taken seriously (published, endorsed, circulated, etc.) only to the extent that they serve a useful role in the material world. Rather than say that such a role would make an idea "true," Marx encourages us to rethink how the rhetoric of truth suggests (misleadingly) that it is possible to transcend all material functions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we can make no //a priori// claims about human consciousness.]>
{{green{Yes. 224-225
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Marx claims that what we call “morality” often amounts only to an ideological tool of the dominant economic class. However, his writings suggest several important theses about values, including…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that human activity should be approached with a concern for dignity, not just exchange-value or price.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) human nature has been corrupted by capitalism, and needs to be returned to a more organic pre-industrial form of society.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that all people should be fully involved in making decisions about the conditions of their lives and work.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that human beings deserve working conditions that engage and interest them.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) human motivation is naturally governed by the desire to maximize material gain.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In arguing for the necessity of socialism, Marx claims:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) all practices of ownership or possession imply exploitation.]>
{{red{No... It’s ownership of the means of production (and this only) that create the tendency toward exploitation...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) while society imposes hierarchy and class division, people are by nature equal; so we all deserve to be compensated for our labor with the same material rewards.]>
{{red{No... “the same material rewards” phrase would make Marx roll over in his grave!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) socialism could not have come about except as a stage following upon industrialization.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 229
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) socialism will bring a truly universal sense of moral duty to everyone, regardless of class.]>
{{red{No... Marx rejects the notion of “morality” in any sense of “duty” or universal imperatives.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) only socialism resolves the problem of alienated labor by allowing people to make decisions about and identify with their productive activity.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

Choose one of these options:
;(A) Can conscience and self-interest conflict?
:Offer a discussion that includes, for each thinker you discuss, some account of what "conscience" might mean, what "self-interest" might mean, and how/when/why these motives conflict. (And: Do they truly conflict, or do they just seem to conflict?) Consider at least four authors, and remember that for some authors, you might want to discuss MULTIPLE possible interpretations… Integrate some comparative and evaluative remarks.
;(B) Talk about moral disagreement
:What do our texts suggest or illustrate about how I should (or shouldn't) treat those who do NOT act according to the moral ideals I myself may cherish? (How should we approach disagreement? What attitudes or strategies do we use when we confront what seems wrong to us? What kinds of ideals or standards can we be most morally confident about, and which ones should we think of as open to debate?) Mention and compare at least four authors, and remember to consider multiple interpretive variations on an author where appropriate, and include critical evaluative commentary.
;(C) What does reason have to do with it?
:How much — and in what ways — can reason provide moral guidance, according to our texts? What can it do (or show), and what is it powerless to do (or show)? Might our authors have somewhat different notions of what reason is (hence explaining differences in how they see its role in moral life)? Consider at least four authors; compare, contrast, and evaluate along the way.

|Unit| in-class question theme:<br> (repeated on exam for bullseye or OK scores) | default exam question theme: <br> (what to study following any other score on in-class question) |h
|!A |[[Pivotal passage at 11a...]]|The "Euthyphro dilemma…"|
|~|[[Socrates' ideas about acting rightly…]]|In the Crito, Socrates states or implies that “the majority” or “the many”…|
|~|[[Epictetus' dinner-guest advice…]]|Epictetus encourages a stance of acceptance toward all that is not “up to us,” and this includes…|
|~|[[Stoic and Socratic themes in King…]]|In his Letter from Birmingham Jail, Martin Luther King, Jr., appeals to “conscience,” about which he says…|
|B |[[Eudaimonia differs from 'happiness'…]]|Aristotle explicitly presents human beings as a kind of animal, and some of the consequences of this include…|
|~|[[Aristotle's idea of the mean…]] |Aristotle de-emphasizes values that are central to the ~Judeo-Christian tradition, such as humility and equality. For example, Aristotle claims or implies:…|
|~|[[Incontinence, or lack of self-governance, in Aristotle…]]|Aristotle’s ethics go hand in hand with his political philosophy, according to which…|
|~|[[According to Nussbaum, Aristotle's list of virtues…]]|Nussbaum distinguishes between “thin” and “thick” ideas of the virtues, going on to suggest…|
|!C |[[Kant compared to Epictetus…]]|Ordinary ideas about morality, according to Kant…|
|~|[[Kant's categorical imperative…]]|Kant illustrates the reasoning process of the categorical imperative with four hypothetical examples, arguing that…|
|~|[[Everything follows law…]]|The relation between morality and freedom, for Kant…|
|~|[[Three formulations…]]|Korsgaard new question (TBA at end of Korsgaard class session)|

For those who choose the [[take-home essay option]], the time allowed for the in-class part of the midterm exam (which will include only the multi-choices part) will be reduced by 30 min.

+++!!![130: the practical question, where to place the limit how]
>the practical question, where to place the limit how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control—is a subject on which nearly everthing remains to be done.
===

+++!!!*[132: The likings and  disikings of society, or of some]
>The likings and  disikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the  main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion.
===

+++!!!*[135: The object of this Esasy is to assert one]
>The object of this Esasy is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern ... That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any membr of a  civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. ... Oer himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.|
===

+++!!!*[303: We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean]
>We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.===

[>img(20%,auto)[Mill|https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/99/John_Stuart_Mill_by_London_Stereoscopic_Company%2C_c1870.jpg/1200px-John_Stuart_Mill_by_London_Stereoscopic_Company%2C_c1870.jpg]]John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was a British philosopher, political economist, and reformer. His philosophical work included not only ethics, but also psychology, scientific method, and political theory. Having inherited an ambitious vision and agenda from his father and from Jeremy [[Bentham]], J. S. Mill represents the public and philosophical pinnacle of the utilitarian reformist movement. Though he wrote in many areas, including scientific method, his two most widely-read philosophical works are //Utilitarianism// in moral philosophy and //On Liberty// in political theory.

The first two chapters of //Utilitarianism// seem like easy reading (especially after Kant), but they contain some detailed objection-reply sequences and many careful distinctions which will require philosophical discussion. What distinctions do you notice Mill making, and what is at stake for him in making them as he does? Unlike Kant, Mill appeals to many claims about psychology — how human beings actually experience things, and how they are influenced by their surroundings. Which of these claims stand out as significant, and why?

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>>[[<<back to Korsgaard|Korsgaard]] … [[forward to Mill Ch 3-4 >>|Mill2]]

In the core chapters of //Utilitarianism//, Mill offers an argument for treating happiness as the goal of morality, and also considers how people might become motivated to care about something that is not identical to their own happiness. 
Mill's arguments (like many other philosophers') have sometimes been accused of various [[fallacies|fallacy]] of reasoning. Do you notice patterns of reasoning that seem suspicious or misleading? Could Mill respond to those charges?

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>>[[<<back to Mill Ch 1-2|Mill1]] … [[forward to Mill Ch 5>>|Mill3]]

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</script>[[<< back to Mill ch 3-4|Mill2]] … [[forward to Rawles >>|Rawles]]

!!!Aspects of Mill’s utilitarianism are compatible with Aristotelian ideas about living well. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) For both, overall happiness requires not just pleasure, but also the avoidance of misfortunes and suffering.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed, though Aristotle’s virtuous person is more protected from misfortune than Mill’s moral agent.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) For both, a virtuous action counts as such because of its consequences.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle does care about observation and experience, but he never makes a direct appeal to the results of a trait or action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Pleasure has a role in living well, but not all pleasures are equally refined and worthy.]>
{{green{Yes. See Mill’s argument about higher and lower pleasures
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) For both, in some sense, the ultimate good is happiness; and a person cannot be happy without being moral.]>
{{red{No... Mill does not claim that happiness cannot be achieved without being moral; he will eventually argue that our moral traits, such as sympathy, enlarge our capacity for happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Although Mill usually focuses on the moral value of actions, he also emphasizes the importance of character traits which require cultivation and education.]>
{{green{Yes. This makes Mill’s view a mixed kind of consequentialism.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Mill seeks to ground his moral theory (utilitarianism) in a clear understanding of happiness, about which he suggests…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) We should judge an action (morally) not by whether the specific action actually turns out to promote happiness, but by whether the action was motivated by a concern for general happiness.]>
{{red{No... The key factor is not mentioned here: intention. The intention of an act (what it’s “up to” is neither as inward as Kantian motive nor as external as the particular consequences of an act.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Happiness is an emotion that stoics failed to appreciate sufficiently.]>
{{red{No... Happiness is not really an emotion for Mill, and the stoics didn’t fail to value it. Rather, they valued only one aspect of happiness (freedom from disturbance), while positive pleasures are also valuable.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Happiness is equivalent to pleasure, so long as we include the civilized pleasures of intelligence and virtue.]>
{{red{No... absence of pain is even more central
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) A form of pleasure is higher than another if someone who has experienced both would prefer even a small amount of the one pleasure to any quantity of the other.]>
{{red{No... Lower and higher forms are distinguished, but not so starkly! Mill does not disdain lower pleasures; they may be outweighed, but not in this dramatic fashion.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Happiness is generally diminished in people who do not care deeply for anything beyond themselves.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 14 (¶13 of Chap 2) -- selfishness is one thing that diminishes capacity for happiness.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Mill suggests that morality has roots in human nature. Human beings, on Mill’s account…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) naturally act only in ways that promote their own happiness.]>
{{red{No... Although our desires are oriented toward happiness (and the perceived means to happiness), it is possible for us to act (that is, to will) in ways that extend beyond individual happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) live in accord with their nature by limiting their desires to what can be reliably brought about by will.]>
{{red{No, this is Epictetus... Mill would agree that our desires may be somewhat shaped by considerations of what's realistic, but nothing like the full stoic withdrawal from anything that's short of //completely// under our control! Of course, Mill does acknowledge that stoic "tranquility" (//ataraxia//) gets at an aspect of happiness, but he insists that being "undisturbed" is only one aspect of happiness; the other aspect (positive joys and intense pleasures) is not well promoted by stoic strategies.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) each have moral feelings that lead to a strong sense of conscience, even though conscience develops differently in different people.]>
{{red{No... Mill does not think that EVERY person has “a perceptible degree” of moral feeling...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) have social sentiments that tends to lead us to associate others’ happiness with our own.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) have a moral purpose or function, so that we fail to realize our human potential unless we fully develop our moral capacities.]>
{{red{No... No, this is Aristotle... Mill does argue that moral capacities are "natural" -- but in context we see he is arguing not that they are our purpose, but just that they come to us "naturally" rather than "unnaturally;" our nature is open to them.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Regarding the distinction between “perfect” and “imperfect” moral duties, Mill claims (or implies) …
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Punishment is appropriate only for violations of perfect duties; for imperfect duties, enforcement has costs that outweigh the benefits.]>
{{red{No... For all punishment, Mill weighs costs against benefits to determine the appropriate means (legal, social, or private conscience), but there’s no correspondence between perfect duties and what’s appropriate to punish overtly.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Perfect duties are those around which we experience clear social consensus; imperfect duties, however, are more controversial.]>
{{red{No... Mill simply makes no such claim.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) When perfect duties are violated, legal enforcement is necessary to preserve the basic preconditions of society; imperfect duties, however, are those that should be punished only through social attitudes of disapproval.]>
{{red{No... Some perfect duties are not enforceable by law; some imperfect duties are. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) The pursuit of one’s own happiness is only an imperfect duty (as Kant claimed); considering one’s impact on the general happiness, however, is a perfect duty.]>
{{red{No... no duties to self for Mill. Meanwhile, considering impact on general utility is not a “duty” -- as such -- at all.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Perfect duties are matters of justice, and this is turn implies that some individual right is at stake in each case.]>
{{green{Yes. “This, therefore... duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right... this distinction [perfect vs imperfect duties] exactly coincides with ... justice and the [rest of] morality.”... 
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!*[35: Proof of desirability]
>The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible,  is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is  audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our  experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is  possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do  actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes  to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an  end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No  reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except  that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires  his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all  the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to  require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a  good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to  the aggregate of all persons.
===
+++!!!!*[36: The challenge: is it sole criterion?]
>Happiness has made out its title as  one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of  morality. ¶ But it has not, by this alone, proved itself to be the sole  criterion. To do that, it would seem, by the same rule, necessary to  show, not only that people desire happiness, but that they never  desire anything else. Now it is palpable that they do desire things  which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness.  They desire, for example, virtue, and the absence of vice, no less  really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue  is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of  happiness. And hence the opponents of the utilitarian standard deem  that they have a right to infer that there are other ends of human  action besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of  approbation and disapprobation. 
===
+++!!!!*[36: Virtue for its own sake]
>But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or  maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse.  It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is  to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion  of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue  is made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and  dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than  virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from  considerations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only  place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to  the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact  the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself,  without looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not  in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the  state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love  virtue in this manner- as a thing desirable in itself, even although,  in the individual instance, it should not produce those other  desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of  which it is held to be virtue.
===
+++!!!!*[37: Things originally means which become part of happiness]
>To illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is not the  only thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to  anything else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by  association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for  itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What, for example,  shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more  desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its  worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires  for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet  the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of  human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself;  .. From being a means to happiness, it has come to be  itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception of  happiness. <br>...The desire of  it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more  than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included  in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of  happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a  concrete whole; and these are some of its parts. 
===
+++!!!!*[39: psychology: aiming for happiness]
>If the opinion which  I have now stated is psychologically true- if human nature is so  constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of  happiness or a means of happiness, we can have no other proof, and  we require no other, that these are the only things desirable. If  so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it  the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it  necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a  part is included in the whole.
===
+++!!!!*[38: result: only happiness desired]
>It results from the preceding considerations, that there is in reality nothing desired except happiness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so. Those who desire virtue for its own sake, desire it either because the consciousness of it is a pleasure, or because the consciousness of being without it is a pain, or for both reasons united; as in truth the pleasure and pain seldom exist separately, but almost always together, the same person feeling pleasure in the degree of virtue attained, and pain in not having attained more. If one of these gave him no pleasure, and the other no pain, he would not love or desire virtue, or would desire it only for the other benefits which it might produce to himself or to persons whom he cared for.
===

!!!As an emprically-oriented thinker, Mill confronts the question how people can in practice take the general happiness seriously as a moral standard; and he claims…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) religious sentiments can (and should) serve to promote utility.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 30, p. 33 on religious aspects of conscience
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) socialization can shape conscience to take a variety of forms, including a utilitarian form.]>
{{green{Yes. p 31 (¶8) of Chapter Three emphasizes social malleability of conscience.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that any rational person recognizes that others’ happiness is as intrinsically valuable as his or her own happiness, and hence recognizes a duty of impartiality.]>
{{red{No... This would be a rather Kantian strain of reasoning; Mill does not appeal to reason here.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the most reliable way for anyone to promote their own happiness is for them to direct their actions toward the general happiness, of which their own happiness is a part.]>
{{red{No... Nothing quite so direct; Mill admits that social conditions influence how intertwined one’s own happiness is with the general happiness!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that although uncivilized people might experience a conflict between their own happiness and the happiness of humanity overall, the bonds of society have made these two goals identical.]>
{{red{No... careful -- Mill does think civilization tends toward progress in our identification with others, but it is not a matter of logic -- certainly not “in the comparatively early state of human advancement in which we now live...” p. 34
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In response to those who reject utilitarianism, Mill argues that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) religious ideals of morality are the product of superstition and have tended to undermine general happiness.]>
{{red{No... Mill’s text is hardly welcome to religious thinkers, but his own claim is that religion and “superstition” often capture the lessons of experience, however imperfectly. (Compare against Hume, whose utilitarianism disparages superstition, and some religion, more openly.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) even if it is difficult to know how to bring about happiness, it is certainly possible to reduce suffering -- and the reduction of suffering is as important as the promotion of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the point of Mill’s twelfth paragraph, beginning “The first...”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that the cultivation of various virtues and moral emotions enables people to promote utility more reliably than if they always thought directly about general utility.]>
{{green{Yes. Mill’s utilitarianism is “indirect” -- that is, the best way to promote utilitarian ends is NOT necessarily to TRY to promote utilitarian ends.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that the only reason some enjoyments are considered less noble and important than others is a sort of prejudice; all pleasure is equally good as long as it does not cause pain for anyone else.]>
{{red{No... Mill does argue that some pleasures are “higher” than others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) even those who appeal to a priori moral intuition, such as Kant, implicitly require us evaluate consequences.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; he rejects Kant’s own insistence that causal results play no real role in the categorical imperative.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Mill’s first two chapters often offer a more or less direct contrast against Kantian ideals, claiming…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Compared to Mill’s “inductive” method, Kant’s “intuitive” method differs in its premises, but often reaches compatible moral conclusions.]>
{{green{Yes. 3rd para
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Kant actually relies upon expected consequences in evaluating whether to accept a particular maxim.]>
{{green{Yes. 4th para
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) When human interests seem to conflict, we should seek social and legal reforms that will bring greater harmony.]>
{{green{Yes. I must again repeat...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Though Kant is right to judge actions by their motives, the right moral motive is to promote happiness.]>
{{red{No... moral worth depends on intention, not motive. Mill, unlike Kant, distinguishes these directly.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Sometimes happiness itself is best served by the Kantian (and Stoic) method of not focusing on what one wants.]>
{{green{Yes. Though it is only... tranquillity...
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In discussing the Trolley Problem and related dilemmas, podcasters Jad Abumrad and Robert Krulwich speak favorably of certain answers as following from “the moral math,” and seem to accept Greene’s suggestion that other ways of handling the dilemma represent more primitive responses. Mill would comment, in response to their discussion…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that although utilitarians encourage people to care about the general good, the general good also benefits from patterns of partiality and special concern for individuals, such as the way parents have disproportionately great sympathy for their own infants. ]>
{{green{Yes. This is difficult. Mill does not think it’s best that everyone actually think about the general good. He would likely neither blame the parent whose infant endangers the hiding community, nor blame the parent who actually stifles the child out of concern for the community. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Mill would likely approve of having a coordinated and public conversation about the priorities programmed into driverless cars for handling emergy collision situations.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) People should be cautious about split-second “math problem” scenarios like “save five lives by sacrificing one,” because drastic actions (like pushing a human obstacle in front of a trolley) bring complications that are difficult to sift through in the moment.]>
{{green{Yes. This is not so explicit in chapter 5, but at the end of Chapter 1 Mill talks about the importance of having general guidelines rather than trying to “calculate” in the moment. In the trolley problems that Greene describes, many potential complications are simply assumed to be resolved (one’s ability to push the large man, whether the trolley has a driver and/or brakes, the safety of the side tracks that the trolley would be diverted onto, the smooth functioning of switches and levers, the likelihood that workers will in fact orient to the actual trolley, the chances that you’ll end up making a much bigger mess, etc.) but in real life situations these complications cannot simply count as settled, and they complicate the “math”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Someone may feel resentful of being sacrificed in order to save others, but this sentiment is not rational, because a rational person aligns their own happiness with the general good.]>
{{red{No... Mill never claims that rationality requires completely aligning one’s happiness with the general good, though he thinks we can approach this condition through sympathy and education.  Further, it’s not clear that being resentful of being sacrificed is not actually justified (in Mill’s sense). Generally, it is a violation of a person’s rights to sacrifice them for the general good.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) In most cases, we should not approach real-life situations as cases of “moral math” if something like an individual’s rights are at stake, since violations of rights are matters of justice, which generally trump expedience]>
{{green{Yes. The difference between justice and expedience does not figure at all in the podcast, but it is a crucial distinction for Mill. Some shared expectations are so essential for well-being that Mill claims their protection warrants a level of vigilance that enjoys a general presumption against cost-benefit thinking (though some cases do challenge even that priority).
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Mill distinguishes so-called “perfect” and “imperfect” duties, about which he claims (or implies) …
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Perfect duties are matters of justice, and this is turn implies that some individual right is at stake in each case.]>
{{green{Yes. “Thus, therefore... duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are those moral obligations which do not give birth to any right... this distinction [perfect vs imperfect duties] exactly coincides with ... justice and the [rest of] morality.”... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The pursuit of one’s own happiness is only an imperfect duty (as Kant claimed); considering one’s impact on the general happiness, however, is a perfect duty.]>
{{red{No... Mill doesn’t argue for “duties to self” at all. Meanwhile, considering impact on general utility is not a “duty” -- as such -- at all. (Happiness-outcomes determine moral status, but you need not be thinking of these in order to do the right thing.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Perfect duties are those around which we experience clear social consensus; imperfect duties, however, are more controversial.]>
{{red{No... Though it sounds like a neat and attractive way to line things up, Mill simply makes no such claim.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Punishment is appropriate only for violations of perfect duties; for imperfect duties, enforcement has costs that outweigh the benefits.]>
{{red{No... For all punishment, Mill weighs costs against benefits to determine the appropriate means (legal, social, or private conscience), but there’s no correspondence between perfect duties and what’s appropriate to punish overtly.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) When perfect duties are violated, legal enforcement is necessary to preserve the basic preconditions of society; imperfect duties, however, are those that should be punished only through social attitudes of disapproval.]>
{{red{No... Some perfect duties are not enforceable by law; some imperfect duties are. 
}}}
===
}}}

>The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is  audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our  experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is  possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do  actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes  to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an  end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No  reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except  that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires  his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all  the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to  require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a  good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to  the aggregate of all persons. 

How can this argument be analyzed?
|For any {{{_______}}}: The only proof that something is {{{_______}}}able is that people {{{_______}}} it.|
|SO: The only proof that something is __desir__able is that people __desire__ it.|

Consider this rule for the evaluation of reasoning: 
Every objection must tackle either:
{{indent{
the plausibility of a premise, or 
the reliability of the argument's formal structure.
}}}
+++!!!![What kinds of objections might be raised in response to Mill's "proof" argument?]
Fallacy of equivocation: using the same word ("desirable") in two senses, exploiting the ambiguity of the word.
===

!!!Opponents often worry that utilitarianism collapses matters of justice into matters of usefulness, happiness-promotion, or expediency. Mill attempts to distinguish justice from “mere” expediency as follows:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The demands of justice are the most basic preconditions for people’s pursuit of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 59: Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules which concern the essentials of human well-being ... It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings... a person may possibly not need the benefits of others, but he always needs that they should not do him hurt
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Justice concerns matters of expedience that need to be regulated by law; whatever is unjust ought to be illegal.]>
{{red{No... p. 48 Mill speaks of “private injustice”; all injustices could be made illegal only if “tribunals” were perfect, only if “magistrates could be trusted so much”. Alas, sometimes there are heavy costs involved in getting government involved in regulating conduct.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Justice depends not only on our sympathetic concern for the general happiness, but also on the sentiments associated with punishment.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 51-52: two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice... the desire to punish ... and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Acting justly is a perfect duty, while promoting utility in general is an imperfect duty.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 49-50: [With] duties of perfect obligation ... a correlative //right// resides in some person... this distinction exactly coincides with that... between justice and other other obligations of morality.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) While popular conceptions of justice are essentially subject to conflicting intuitions, claims of expediency are more open to evidence, and may help resolve disputes about justice.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 55: “All these opinions [about punishment] are extremely plausible; and so long as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down to the principles which lies under justice and are the source of its authority, I am  unable to see how any of these reasoners can be refuted.... No one of them can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding...” p. 58 top “Justice has in this case [of fair remuneration] two sides to it... Each, from his own point of view, is unanswerable; and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the preference.”
}}}
===
}}}

!!!According to Charles Mills, idealization in moral theory…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) goes together with unrealistic models of human capacities and relationships.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is a problem because no theory can adequately capture the particular details of our complicated lives.]>
{{red{No... No; ethical caring may be necessary with familiars, too!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is associated with praise for concepts like purity and autonomy, which sound neutral, but in fact work to reinforce privilege.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) is defended by proponents like John Rawls, on the grounds that urgent political problems can only be resolved by reference to an ideal.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) tends to create experiences of cognitive dissonance for people who have experienced social marginalization and injustice.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

Consider models we have seen thus far:
||>|>|!Models of morality and moral motivation|
||!Kantian|!Utilitarian|!Care|
|!moral value:|principled intentions|greatest happiness, reduction of suffering|sustaining caring relations|
|!motivation:|respect|association with personal happiness|impulses arising from receiving care|
|{{green{pro}}}|helps us insist moral obligation applies to everyone|based on empirically compelling phenomenon|[[explanation of moral alienation]]|
|{{red{con}}}|little help in explaining differences in moral motivation|makes moral motivation not particularly distinct|[[embraces partiality]]|

!!!In response to Martin’s NYTimes article on protest, various authors we have read might claim…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Plumwood would add that the rationale for building fossil-fuel pipelines is based on a mechanistic worldview that separates human interests from those of the more-than-human world around us.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Marx would portray the oppressive “machine” here as essentially connected to capitalism as an economic system, and would argue that it can be resisted only by being overthrown.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Charles Mills supports the author’s project of identifying a problem even in the absence of any clear path to a solution.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Ahmed would ask us to interrogate the difference between Thoreau’s imagery of a machine with a destructive or oppressive function and a machine that “needs to be rebuilt”]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) King would endorse the choice made by Standing Rock protesters to insist on non-violence.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Naess’ philosophical account of deep ecology embraces diversity in several dimensions, including…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) diversity of attitudes about the value of natural phenomena — specifically, whether they have intrinsic or only instrumental value.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) a diversity of priorities for ecological action.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) a diversity of motives that animate people’s ecologically positive actions.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) diverse cultural ideas, all of which are equally true.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) diversity of deep philosophical views, including incompatible metaphysical or spiritual premises.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

{{{
++++(cookiename)!!!!!^width^*{{class{[label=key|tooltip][altlabel|alttooltip]}}}#panelID:>...
content goes here
===
}}}

/***
|Name|NestedSlidersPlugin|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#NestedSlidersPlugin|
|Documentation|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#NestedSlidersPluginInfo|
|Version|2.3.4|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|plugin|
|Requires||
|Overrides||
|Description|show content in nest-able 'slider' or 'floating' panels, without needing to create separate tiddlers for each panel|
This plugin adds new wiki syntax for embedding 'slider' panels directly into tiddler content.  
!!!!!Documentation
>see [[NestedSlidersPluginInfo]]
!!!!!Configuration
<<<
Enable animation for slider panels
<<option chkFloatingSlidersAnimate>> allow sliders to animate when opening/closing
>(note: This setting is in //addition// to the general option for enabling/disabling animation effects:
><<option chkAnimate>> enable animations (entire document)
>For slider animation to occur, you must also allow animation in general.

Debugging messages for 'lazy sliders' deferred rendering:
<<option chkDebugLazySliderDefer>> show debugging alert when deferring slider rendering
<<option chkDebugLazySliderRender>> show debugging alert when deferred slider is actually rendered
<<<
!!!!!Revision History
<<<
''2008.01.08 [*.*.*]'' plugin size reduction: documentation moved to ...Info and ...History tiddlers
''2007.12.28 - 2.3.4'' added hijack for Animator.prototype.startAnimating().  Previously, the plugin code simply set the overflow to "visible" after animation.  This code tweak corrects handling of elements that were styled with overflow=hidden/auto/scroll before animation by saving the overflow style and then restoring it after animation has completed.
|please see [[NestedSlidersPluginHistory]] for additional revision details|
''2005.11.03 - 1.0.0'' initial public release.  Thanks to RodneyGomes, GeoffSlocock, and PaulPetterson for suggestions and experiments.
<<<
!!!!!Code
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.nestedSliders = {major: 2, minor: 3, revision: 4, date: new Date(2007,12,28)};
//}}}

//{{{
// options for deferred rendering of sliders that are not initially displayed
if (config.options.chkDebugLazySliderDefer==undefined) config.options.chkDebugLazySliderDefer=false;
if (config.options.chkDebugLazySliderRender==undefined) config.options.chkDebugLazySliderRender=false;
if (config.options.chkFloatingSlidersAnimate==undefined) config.options.chkFloatingSlidersAnimate=false;

// default styles for 'floating' class
setStylesheet(".floatingPanel { position:absolute; z-index:10; padding:0.5em; margin:0em; \
	background-color:#eee; color:#000; border:1px solid #000; text-align:left; }","floatingPanelStylesheet");
//}}}

//{{{
config.formatters.push( {
	name: "nestedSliders",
	match: "\\n?\\+{3}",
	terminator: "\\s*\\={3}\\n?",
	lookahead: "\\n?\\+{3}(\\+)?(\\([^\\)]*\\))?(\\!*)?(\\^(?:[^\\^\\*\\[\\>]*\\^)?)?(\\*)?(?:\\{\\{([\\w]+[\\s\\w]*)\\{)?(\\[[^\\]]*\\])?(\\[[^\\]]*\\])?(?:\\}{3})?(\\#[^:]*\\:)?(\\>)?(\\.\\.\\.)?\\s*",
	handler: function(w)
		{
			lookaheadRegExp = new RegExp(this.lookahead,"mg");
			lookaheadRegExp.lastIndex = w.matchStart;
			var lookaheadMatch = lookaheadRegExp.exec(w.source)
			if(lookaheadMatch && lookaheadMatch.index == w.matchStart)
			{
				// var defopen=lookaheadMatch[1]
				// var cookiename=lookaheadMatch[2]
				// var header=lookaheadMatch[3]
				// var panelwidth=lookaheadMatch[4]
				// var transient=lookaheadMatch[5]
				// var class=lookaheadMatch[6]
				// var label=lookaheadMatch[7]
				// var openlabel=lookaheadMatch[8]
				// var panelID=lookaheadMatch[9]
				// var blockquote=lookaheadMatch[10]
				// var deferred=lookaheadMatch[11]

				// location for rendering button and panel
				var place=w.output;

				// default to closed, no cookie, no accesskey, no alternate text/tip
				var show="none"; var cookie=""; var key="";
				var closedtext=">"; var closedtip="";
				var openedtext="<"; var openedtip="";

				// extra "+", default to open
				if (lookaheadMatch[1]) show="block";

				// cookie, use saved open/closed state
				if (lookaheadMatch[2]) {
					cookie=lookaheadMatch[2].trim().slice(1,-1);
					cookie="chkSlider"+cookie;
					if (config.options[cookie]==undefined)
						{ config.options[cookie] = (show=="block") }
					show=config.options[cookie]?"block":"none";
				}

				// parse label/tooltip/accesskey: [label=X|tooltip]
				if (lookaheadMatch[7]) {
					var parts=lookaheadMatch[7].trim().slice(1,-1).split("|");
					closedtext=parts.shift();
					if (closedtext.substr(closedtext.length-2,1)=="=")	
						{ key=closedtext.substr(closedtext.length-1,1); closedtext=closedtext.slice(0,-2); }
					openedtext=closedtext;
					if (parts.length) closedtip=openedtip=parts.join("|");
					else { closedtip="show "+closedtext; openedtip="hide "+closedtext; }
				}

				// parse alternate label/tooltip: [label|tooltip]
				if (lookaheadMatch[8]) {
					var parts=lookaheadMatch[8].trim().slice(1,-1).split("|");
					openedtext=parts.shift();
					if (parts.length) openedtip=parts.join("|");
					else openedtip="hide "+openedtext;
				}

				var title=show=='block'?openedtext:closedtext;
				var tooltip=show=='block'?openedtip:closedtip;

				// create the button
				if (lookaheadMatch[3]) { // use "Hn" header format instead of button/link
					var lvl=(lookaheadMatch[3].length>6)?6:lookaheadMatch[3].length;
					var btn = createTiddlyElement(createTiddlyElement(place,"h"+lvl,null,null,null),"a",null,lookaheadMatch[6],title);
					btn.onclick=onClickNestedSlider;
					btn.setAttribute("href","javascript:;");
					btn.setAttribute("title",tooltip);
				}
				else
					var btn = createTiddlyButton(place,title,tooltip,onClickNestedSlider,lookaheadMatch[6]);
				btn.innerHTML=title; // enables use of HTML entities in label

				// set extra button attributes
				btn.setAttribute("closedtext",closedtext);
				btn.setAttribute("closedtip",closedtip);
				btn.setAttribute("openedtext",openedtext);
				btn.setAttribute("openedtip",openedtip);
				btn.sliderCookie = cookie; // save the cookiename (if any) in the button object
				btn.defOpen=lookaheadMatch[1]!=null; // save default open/closed state (boolean)
				btn.keyparam=key; // save the access key letter ("" if none)
				if (key.length) {
					btn.setAttribute("accessKey",key); // init access key
					btn.onfocus=function(){this.setAttribute("accessKey",this.keyparam);}; // **reclaim** access key on focus
				}
				btn.onmouseover=function(event) // mouseover on button aligns floater position with button
					{ if (window.adjustSliderPos) window.adjustSliderPos(this.parentNode,this,this.sliderPanel); }

				// create slider panel
				var panelClass=lookaheadMatch[4]?"floatingPanel":"sliderPanel";
				var panelID=lookaheadMatch[9]; if (panelID) panelID=panelID.slice(1,-1); // trim off delimiters
				var panel=createTiddlyElement(place,"div",panelID,panelClass,null);
				panel.button = btn; // so the slider panel know which button it belongs to
				btn.sliderPanel=panel; // so the button knows which slider panel it belongs to
				panel.defaultPanelWidth=(lookaheadMatch[4] && lookaheadMatch[4].length>2)?lookaheadMatch[4].slice(1,-1):"";
				panel.setAttribute("transient",lookaheadMatch[5]=="*"?"true":"false");
				panel.style.display = show;
				panel.style.width=panel.defaultPanelWidth;
				panel.onmouseover=function(event) // mouseover on panel aligns floater position with button
					{ if (window.adjustSliderPos) window.adjustSliderPos(this.parentNode,this.button,this); }

				// render slider (or defer until shown) 
				w.nextMatch = lookaheadMatch.index + lookaheadMatch[0].length;
				if ((show=="block")||!lookaheadMatch[11]) {
					// render now if panel is supposed to be shown or NOT deferred rendering
					w.subWikify(lookaheadMatch[10]?createTiddlyElement(panel,"blockquote"):panel,this.terminator);
					// align floater position with button
					if (window.adjustSliderPos) window.adjustSliderPos(place,btn,panel);
				}
				else {
					var src = w.source.substr(w.nextMatch);
					var endpos=findMatchingDelimiter(src,"+++","===");
					panel.setAttribute("raw",src.substr(0,endpos));
					panel.setAttribute("blockquote",lookaheadMatch[10]?"true":"false");
					panel.setAttribute("rendered","false");
					w.nextMatch += endpos+3;
					if (w.source.substr(w.nextMatch,1)=="\n") w.nextMatch++;
					if (config.options.chkDebugLazySliderDefer) alert("deferred '"+title+"':\n\n"+panel.getAttribute("raw"));
				}
			}
		}
	}
)

// TBD: ignore 'quoted' delimiters (e.g., "{{{+++foo===}}}" isn't really a slider)
function findMatchingDelimiter(src,starttext,endtext) {
	var startpos = 0;
	var endpos = src.indexOf(endtext);
	// check for nested delimiters
	while (src.substring(startpos,endpos-1).indexOf(starttext)!=-1) {
		// count number of nested 'starts'
		var startcount=0;
		var temp = src.substring(startpos,endpos-1);
		var pos=temp.indexOf(starttext);
		while (pos!=-1)  { startcount++; pos=temp.indexOf(starttext,pos+starttext.length); }
		// set up to check for additional 'starts' after adjusting endpos
		startpos=endpos+endtext.length;
		// find endpos for corresponding number of matching 'ends'
		while (startcount && endpos!=-1) {
			endpos = src.indexOf(endtext,endpos+endtext.length);
			startcount--;
		}
	}
	return (endpos==-1)?src.length:endpos;
}
//}}}

//{{{
window.onClickNestedSlider=function(e)
{
	if (!e) var e = window.event;
	var theTarget = resolveTarget(e);
	var theLabel = theTarget.firstChild.data;
	var theSlider = theTarget.sliderPanel
	var isOpen = theSlider.style.display!="none";

	// toggle label
	theTarget.innerHTML=isOpen?theTarget.getAttribute("closedText"):theTarget.getAttribute("openedText");
	// toggle tooltip
	theTarget.setAttribute("title",isOpen?theTarget.getAttribute("closedTip"):theTarget.getAttribute("openedTip"));

	// deferred rendering (if needed)
	if (theSlider.getAttribute("rendered")=="false") {
		if (config.options.chkDebugLazySliderRender)
			alert("rendering '"+theLabel+"':\n\n"+theSlider.getAttribute("raw"));
		var place=theSlider;
		if (theSlider.getAttribute("blockquote")=="true")
			place=createTiddlyElement(place,"blockquote");
		wikify(theSlider.getAttribute("raw"),place);
		theSlider.setAttribute("rendered","true");
	}
	// show/hide the slider
	if(config.options.chkAnimate && (!hasClass(theSlider,'floatingPanel') || config.options.chkFloatingSlidersAnimate))
		anim.startAnimating(new Slider(theSlider,!isOpen,e.shiftKey || e.altKey,"none"));
	else
		theSlider.style.display = isOpen ? "none" : "block";
	// reset to default width (might have been changed via plugin code)
	theSlider.style.width=theSlider.defaultPanelWidth;
	// align floater panel position with target button
	if (!isOpen && window.adjustSliderPos) window.adjustSliderPos(theSlider.parentNode,theTarget,theSlider);
	// if showing panel, set focus to first 'focus-able' element in panel
	if (theSlider.style.display!="none") {
		var ctrls=theSlider.getElementsByTagName("*");
		for (var c=0; c<ctrls.length; c++) {
			var t=ctrls[c].tagName.toLowerCase();
			if ((t=="input" && ctrls[c].type!="hidden") || t=="textarea" || t=="select")
				{ ctrls[c].focus(); break; }
		}
	}
	var cookie=theTarget.sliderCookie;
	if (cookie && cookie.length) {
		config.options[cookie]=!isOpen;
		if (config.options[cookie]!=theTarget.defOpen)
			saveOptionCookie(cookie);
		else { // remove cookie if slider is in default display state
			var ex=new Date(); ex.setTime(ex.getTime()-1000);
			document.cookie = cookie+"=novalue; path=/; expires="+ex.toGMTString();
		}
	}
	// prevent SHIFT-CLICK from being processed by browser (opens blank window... yuck!)
	// but allow plain click to bubble up to page background (to dismiss open popup, if any)
	if (e.shiftKey) { e.cancelBubble=true; if (e.stopPropagation) e.stopPropagation(); }
	return false;
}
//}}}

//{{{
// click in document background closes transient panels 
document.nestedSliders_savedOnClick=document.onclick;
document.onclick=function(ev) { if (!ev) var ev=window.event; var target=resolveTarget(ev);
	// call original click handler
	if (document.nestedSliders_savedOnClick)
		var retval=document.nestedSliders_savedOnClick.apply(this,arguments);
	// if click was inside transient panel (or something contained by a transient panel)... leave it alone
	var p=target;
	while (p)
		if ((hasClass(p,"floatingPanel")||hasClass(p,"sliderPanel"))&&p.getAttribute("transient")=="true") break;
		else p=p.parentNode;
	if (p) return retval;
	// otherwise, find and close all transient panels...
	var all=document.all?document.all:document.getElementsByTagName("DIV");
	for (var i=0; i<all.length; i++) {
		 // if it is not a transient panel, or the click was on the button that opened this panel, don't close it.
		if (all[i].getAttribute("transient")!="true" || all[i].button==target) continue;
		// otherwise, if the panel is currently visible, close it by clicking it's button
		if (all[i].style.display!="none") window.onClickNestedSlider({target:all[i].button}) 
	}
	return retval;
};
//}}}

//{{{
// adjust floating panel position based on button position
if (window.adjustSliderPos==undefined) window.adjustSliderPos=function(place,btn,panel) {
	if (hasClass(panel,"floatingPanel")) {
		var left=0;
		var top=btn.offsetHeight; 
		if (place.style.position!="relative") {
			var left=findPosX(btn);
			var top=findPosY(btn)+btn.offsetHeight;
			var p=place; while (p && !hasClass(p,'floatingPanel')) p=p.parentNode;
			if (p) { left-=findPosX(p); top-=findPosY(p); }
		}
		if (findPosX(btn)+panel.offsetWidth > getWindowWidth())  // adjust position to stay inside right window edge
			left-=findPosX(btn)+panel.offsetWidth-getWindowWidth()+15; // add extra 15px 'fudge factor'
		panel.style.left=left+"px"; panel.style.top=top+"px";
	}
}

function getWindowWidth() {
	if(document.width!=undefined)
		return document.width; // moz (FF)
	if(document.documentElement && ( document.documentElement.clientWidth || document.documentElement.clientHeight ) )
		return document.documentElement.clientWidth; // IE6
	if(document.body && ( document.body.clientWidth || document.body.clientHeight ) )
		return document.body.clientWidth; // IE4
	if(window.innerWidth!=undefined)
		return window.innerWidth; // IE - general
	return 0; // unknown
}
//}}}

//{{{
// TW2.1 and earlier:
// hijack Slider animation handler 'stop' handler so overflow is visible after animation has completed
Slider.prototype.coreStop = Slider.prototype.stop;
Slider.prototype.stop = function()
	{ this.coreStop.apply(this,arguments); this.element.style.overflow = "visible"; }

// TW2.2+
// hijack start/stop handlers so overflow style is saved and restored after animation has completed
if (version.major+.1*version.minor+.01*version.revision>=2.2) {
/**
	Animator.prototype.core_startAnimating = Animator.prototype.startAnimating;
	Animator.prototype.startAnimating = function() {
		for(var t=0; t<arguments.length; t++)
			arguments[t].element.save_overflow=arguments[t].element.style.overflow;
		return this.core_startAnimating.apply(this,arguments);
	};
**/
	Morpher.prototype.coreStop = Morpher.prototype.stop;
	Morpher.prototype.stop = function() {
		this.coreStop.apply(this,arguments);
		this.element.style.overflow = this.element.save_overflow||"visible";
	};
}
//}}}

[<img(100%,auto)[outline|http://d.pr/i/Qb5o+]]

!!!On Nietzsche’s account, master-morality and slave-morality differ in that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Slave-morality determines the value of actions based on intention, while master-morality does not.]>
{{green{Yes. (WTP 204)…
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Slave-morality results from a lack of creativity among inferior people, while master-morality has been responsible for great historical achievements.]>
{{red{No... §4
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Participants in a master-morality admire all forms of exploitation as an imperative of creativity.]>
{{red{No... BGE 259
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Forms of slave-morality, like Judeo-Christian and utilitarian ideals, have their origin in altruism, while master-moralities are openly based in hatred for others.]>
{{red{No... GM4
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Master-morality is necessarily beneficial to mankind, while slave-morality can never be so.]>
{{green{Yes. (BGE 62) 1007-1009, 1014
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Nietzsche|https://www.biography.com/.image/t_share/MTE5NTU2MzE2MzMwMTAwMjM1/friedrich-nietzsche-9423452-1-402.jpg]]Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was a German [[philologist|philology]], Classicist, and philosopher who is best known for provocative and aphoristic essays that disturb conventional values. His work is known for perspectivalist and existentialist themes,  emphasizing the historical evolution of meanings and ideals.
----
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[[<< back to Marx|Marx]] ... [[forward to Beauvoir>>|Beauvoir]]

!!!Nietzsche’s writings on morality express admiration for those who “create their own values,” by which he apparently means…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that human beings should act as if they were legislating for all humanity.]>
{{red{No... This, of course, is Kant’s version of “creating your own values,” but in Kant, the norm is autonomy, or the creation of rules (maxims) you would endorse as universal.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that being true to ourselves and our beliefs, no matter what they are, is the only moral rule worth following.]>
{{red{No... Nietzsche does not offer any admiration for people’s *actual* beliefs. Authenticity is not a matter of “being true to” whatever beliefs we happen to have; such beliefs may represent inherited forms of conformity. Rather, authenticity requires inquiry into the roots of one’s attitudes and ideas, and a creative effort of reshaping oneself (transvaluation).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) each person ought to choose values based on what maximizes their own ability to survive within the struggle for existence.]>
{{red{No... This is a Darwinian ideal, and Nietzsche explicitly distances himself from this biological baseline as the arbiter of value.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that the most honest and admirable values are those that spring from self-love rather than those that define the self in opposition to someone else’s nature.]>
{{green{Yes. Note the rhetoric around the “creative deed” of slave morality: the self is conceived in opposition to the “evil enemy” (GM No 4)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the inventors of any value system -- even Judaism and Christianity -- are admirable in some way.]>
{{green{Yes. “Ressentiment” is Nietzsche’s name for a negative stance that defines the self in opposition to an “evil” other.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Nietzsche would respond to two of Mill’s doctrines — equal rights for all people, and sympathetic consideration for all sentient beings — by arguing that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) these are ultimately products of the same universal drive for survival that animates noble morality.]>
{{red{No... They are equally products of the “will to power” -- but the will to power is *not* the same as a drive or instinct to survive, which Nietzsche dismisses as encouraging people to be groveling and submissive rather than assertive and creative.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) they portray exploitation as an evil, though exploitation is in fact an inevitable and positive force of civilization.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) the majority of people embrace such doctrines blindly despite having nothing at all to gain through them.]>
{{red{No... The will to power No. 200-201, 204 “Any attitude of
mind is abandoned, the utility of which can not be conceived.” Still, we could see Nietzsche as suggesting that people have been *insufficiently* interested in questioning exactly what they have to gain; they have embraced the comforts of religious and populist dogma.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) these represent a mistake in humanity’s development, and truly self-aware individuals will purge such ideas from their minds.]>
{{red{No... both principles serve to advance mankind just as much as violence. (Beyond Good and Evil No. 44)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that this broad set of values, including law, respect, and generosity, had no role for the noble people who ruled the earth prior to the emergence of “slave-morality”.]>
{{red{No, not exactly... noble morality includes law, respect, and generosity (as in Aristotle’s self-possessed “magnificence”) among those in power; these doctrines are different. However, if you emphasize “sympathetic consideration for all sentient beings,” this is one element Nietzsche did not associate with the "master morality."
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Nietzsche clearly takes aim at Kantian ethics when he claims… “[W]e no longer want to brood over the moral value of our actions!” Further Nietzschean connections we ought to notice, in connection with Kant, include…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Unlike Kant, who encourages us to imagine our action being a law for all rational agents, Nietzsche admonishes us to consider whether we could will our action, for ourselves, over and over again, eternally.]>
{{green{Yes. 341: eternal return passage
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Unlike Kant, who treats actions as effectively the same when they express the same maxim, Nietzsche denies that actions are ever identical.]>
{{green{Yes. 335
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that we would be wise not to rebel against necessity as such, but to embrace a certain kind of necessity.]>
{{green{Yes. 270: “I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things-in this way I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fitti  [love of fate]: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage any war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away  be my only negation! And all in all,.to sum it up: some day I want to be only a Yes-sayer”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Nietzsche encourages us to give laws to ourselves, rather than having them imposed by outside forces.]>
{{green{Yes. Notice the notion of autonomy at 335 “We, however, want to become who are we —&nbsp;the new, the unique, the incomparable, those who give themselves the law, those who create themselves!" ... On the other hand, Nietzsche certainly doesn't think of laws as timeless or obvious structures, so one might see Nietzsche's invocation of "law" here as quite different from Kant's.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) While Kant argues that we lack integrity when we focus on our own existence and interests, Nietzsche thinks it is admirable to prioritize our own survival.]>
{{red{No... 349: “Nietzsche doesn’t admire a focus on one’s own survival/existence; rather, the will to power transcends one’s own preservation. “the real, fundamental drive of life... aims at extending its power... often enough puts self-preservation into question and sacrifices it.” 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Nietzsche’s writings on morality express admiration for those who “create their own values,” by which he apparently means…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that human beings should act as if they were legislating for all humanity.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that being true to ourselves and our beliefs, no matter what they are, is the only moral rule worth following.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that the inventors of any value system -- even Judaism and Christianity -- are admirable in some way.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that our values should spring from self-love rather than as negative reactions to others’ values.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) each person ought to choose values based on what maximizes their own ability to survive within the struggle for existence.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

Nel Noddings offers a philosophical ethics focused on how we participate in relationships. What points of commonality can we recognize between her account and other moral theories we have studied? Which differences are most noticeable?

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[[<< back to Kohlberg|Kohlberg]] ... [[forward to Dewey>>|Dewey]]

!!!Noddings explicitly or implicitly responds to other moral philosophers we have studied. She would suggest…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Consequentialists are unrealistic in their moral expectations because for each of us, there are certain people that we do not and cannot care about.]>
{{red{No... Careful -- it’s not that there are specific people we can’t care *about*, but rather than we can’t care *for* everyone simultaneously... (319)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Kohlberg’s concern with prioritizing among principles places too exclusive an emphasis on reasoning.]>
{{green{Yes. more excerpts, 1 and 42
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) One who cares, unlike the ideal Kantian agent, is likely to act in a way that is unconcerned with consistency.]>
{{green{Yes. 320 bottom
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Relativists are right to be skeptical of universal moral judgments, but they  focus mistakenly on multiple codes and what judgments those codes support.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 324 -- notice, however, that Noddings is somewhat reluctant to say they are “mistaken”...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) While Kant asks us to act from duty rather than inclination, caring individuals prioritize spontaneity and find no moral value in notions of obligation.]>
{{red{No... “Ethical caring” is the attempt to bring oneself into a caring stance when it is not spontaneously present.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Noddings criticizes the exclusive focus on reason and justification found in much mainstream ethics, and insists on the importance of lived interactions and feeling. Yet, she does not simply reject reason, claiming that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) those who engage in caring must evaluate themselves by evaluating, coolly, whether their actions have actually been good for the cared-for.]>
{{red{No... 325
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) reflecting on the common practices of those who care can help us develop rules for how to conduct ourselves in situations that are alike in relevant respects.]>
{{red{No... 321
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) when we establish agencies and institutions for public benefit, we must rely on taking an impartially reasonably stance toward the beneficiaries of such programs.]>
{{green{Yes. 321-322
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) when we care for someone, we begin with the goal of enhancing their well-being, and choose rationally among means toward that end.]>
{{red{No... 320
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) when we care for another person our actions should be based on reasons that a disinterested (and reasonable) observer would understand.]>
{{green{Yes. 320
}}}
===
}}}

# It is this ethical ideal, this realistic picture of ourselves as one-caring, that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally. 
# Everything depends upon the nature and strength of this ideal, for 
# we shall not have absolute principles to guide us. Indeed, 
# [The] ethics of principle [is] ambiguous and unstable. 
# Wherever there is a principle, there is implied its exception and, 
# too often, principles function to separate us from each other. 
# We may become dangerously self-righteous when we perceive ourselves a holding a precious principle not held by the other. 
# The other may then be devalued and treated "differently" [and 
# Such] treatment is never conducted ethically. Hence, 
# When we must use violence or strategies on the other, we are already diminished ethically.
# Our efforts must, then, be directed to the maintenance of conditions that will permit caring to flourish.

An analysis of the reasoning here would affirm...
## (2) gains support from (1) and (3) as premises, but the argument is enthymematic.
## There is a chain of inference building from (4) to (5) to (6).
## (5) is a premise for which further support is not offered within this passage.
## A reasonable objection to this passage is that (10) is an unsupported assumption.
## (2) is the overall conclusion of the passage.

!!!Noddings’ moral ideal differs from Kant’s in many ways. Unlike Kant, …
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) She grants equal moral considerability to any being that can suffer.]>
{{red{No... No; she’s not interested in an abstract concept of “considerability”; we consider beings insofar as they are able to “receive” our caring.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) She describes morally ideal people as engrossed by particular people and situational details, rather than as impartially applying abstract principles of reason.]>
{{green{Yes. This is one major point of difference.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) She argues that moral judgment is ultimately concerned more with consequences rather than with intentions.]>
{{red{No... No; caring intention is what most matters -- though the caring person does notice what the *actual* effects are, as part of the process of caring.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) She develops a concept of morality that centers not on autonomy but on connectedness.]>
{{green{Yes. This is another essential point of difference.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) She denies that there is any moral imperative that ever overrides our spontaneous inclinations.]>
{{red{No... No -- the effort of natural caring is morally valuable.
}}}
===
}}}

https://www.dropbox.com/s/dogn4jh26n216j9/Noddings_on_judgment_diagram_ordered.png?dl=0

!!!On Noddings account, the caring person…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) needs to draw on the memory of being cared-for.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is ready to extend the caring attitude universally to everyone.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) sometimes engages in a form of caring that is motivated more by concern over one’s ethical self than feelings of concern for the other.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) wants to make the other appreciate and acknowledge the fact that he is cared-for, and thus will help meet his desires even when they may not correspond to what she believes he needs.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) may limit her range of interactions so that she can really care for certain people.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Caring, according to Noddings, is a pattern of engrossment or motivational displacement that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) depends upon having been cared for as a dependent child.]>
{{brown{Yes, but... "The caring attitude, that attitude which expresses our earliest memories of being cared for and our growing store of memories of both caring and being cared for, is universally accessible..." (p. 317) HOWEVER, if you read this phrase as implying having been continuously and/or adequately cared for, it doesn't work. Noddings' claim is only that all people must draw on some experiences of [moments of] caring, and that everyone needs to have had such experiences, especially early in their lives, in order to be capable of engaging in care themselves.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) may not be observed easily by a third person, though it is possible to arrive at some judgments about how effective someone’s caring seems to be.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 321: Noddings does seem to make room for moral judgment of someone’s caring, though it is clearly based on incomplete evidence.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) can take a natural spontaneous form, or an ethical form, which is impartially concerned with what others deserve.]>
{{red{No... Desert is not the important concept here.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) can in some cases become too intense and stifling for the cared-for.]>
{{red{No... That’s not, properly speaking, caring, for Noddings.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) sometimes requires the one-caring to act in ways the cared-for protests or resents.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, although this always involves a sense of conflict (319 bottom)
}}}
===
}}}

Consider the following sequence of claims made by Nel Noddings:

1.  It is this ethical ideal, this realistic picture of ourselves as one-caring, that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally. 
2. Everything depends upon the nature and strength of this ideal, for   
3. we shall not have absolute principles to guide us. Indeed,  
4. [The] ethics of principle [is] ambiguous and unstable.
5. Wherever there is a principle, there is implied its exception and,  
6. too often, principles function to separate us from each other.
7. We may become dangerously self-righteous when we perceive ourselves a holding a precious principle not held by the other.
8. The other may then be devalued and treated "differently" [and    
9. Such] treatment is never conducted ethically. Hence,
10. When we must use violence or strategies on the other, we are already diminished ethically.  
11. Our efforts must, then, be directed to the maintenance of conditions that will permit caring to flourish.

An analysis of the reasoning here would affirm…

+++!!!!!*[1: Language of Father vs. Mother]
|Ethics, the philosophical study of morality, has concentrated for the most part on moral reasoning… This emphasis gives ethics a contemporary, mathematical appearance, but it also moves discussion beyond the sphere of actual human activity and the feeling that pervades such activity. … as if it were governed by the logical necessity characteristic of geometry. It is concentrated on the establishment of principles and that which can be logically derived from them. One might say that ethics has been discussed largely in the language of the father: in principles and propositions, in terms such as justification, fairness, justice. The mother’s voice has been silent. Human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for, which I shall argue form the foundation of ethical response, have not received attention except as outcomes of ethical behavior. … |
===
+++!!!!!*[2: chasm... masculine vs. feminine in each of us]
|I shall strike many contrasts between masculine and feminine approached to ethics and education and, indeed, to living. These are not intended to divide men and women into opposing camps. They are meant, rather, to show how great the chasm is that already divides the masculine and feminine in each of us and to suggest that we enter a dialogue of genuine dialectical nature in order to achieve an ultimate transcendence of the masculine and feminine in moral matters. The reader must keep in mind, then, that I shall use the language of both father and mother; I shall have to argue for the positions I set out expressively. |
===
+++!!!!!*[6: recognition and longing for relatedness]
|It is the recognition of and longing for relatedness that form the foundation of our ethic, and the joy that accompanies fulfillment of our caring enhances our commitment to the ethical ideal that sustains us as one-caring. |
===
+++!!!!!*[42: feminine alternative to Kohlberg’s stage 6]
|This commitment to care and to define oneself in terms of the capacity to care represent a feminine alternative to Kohlberg’s “stage six” morality. At stage six, the moral thinker transcends particular moral principles by appealing to a highest principle—one that allows a rearrangement of the hierarchy in order to give proper place-value to human love, loyalty, and the relief of suffering. But women, as one-caring, are not so much concerned with the rearrangement of priorities among principles; they are concerned, rather, with maintaining and enhancing caring. |
===
+++!!!!!*[43: Abraham’s sacrifice ... from maternal perspective]
|“In obedience to God, Abraham traveled with his son, Isaac... as a sacrifice: “And they came to the place which God had told him of; and Abraham built an altar there, and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the wood. And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to slay his son.” for the mother... this is horrendous. Our relation to our children is not governed first by the ethical but by natural caring. We love not because we are required to love but because our natural relatedness gives natural birth to love. It is this love, this natural caring, that makes the ethical possible. For us then Abraham’s decision is not only ethically unjustified, but it is in basest violation of the supra-ethical—of caring. … Abraham’s obedience fled for protection under the skirts of an unseeable God. Under the gaze of an abstract and untouchable God, he would destroy this touchable child whose real eyes were turned upon him in trust, and love, and fear. I suspect no woman could have written either Genesis or Fear and Trembling, but perhaps I should speak only for myself on that. The one-caring, male or female, does not seek security in abstractions cast either as principles or entities. She remains responsible here and now for this cared-for and this situation and for the forseeable futures projected by herself and the cared-for. |
===
+++!!!!!*[80: Ethical caring requires effort, but is not superior]
|Recognizing that ethical caring requires an effort that is not needed in natural caring does not commit us to a position that elevates ethical caring over natural caring. Kant has identified the ethical with that which is done out of duty and not out of love, and that distinction in itself seems right. But an ethic built on caring strives to maintain the caring attitudes and is thus dependent upon, and not superior to, natural caring. The source of ethical behavior is, then, in twin sentiments—one that feels directly for the other and one that feels for and with that best self, who may accept and sustain the initial feeling rather than reject it. |
===
+++!!!!!*[122: practice, apprenticeship, modeling]
|the child in the process of building an ethical ideal needs practice in caring. Simply talking about or writing about caring is a poor substitute for actual caring. Practice in caring is a form of apprenticeship. ... I have not used the term “practice” lightly. There is a dimension of competence in caring. ... Dialogue and practice are essential in nurturing the ethical ideal. Another crucial matter is the respect for an attribution of motive. ... the one-caring is scrupulous in the way she models her attributions and assessments. She does not look for ulterior motives, although she knows they may upon occasion be present.|
===
+++!!!!!*[316: Ethical caring arises out of natural caring]
|Ethical caring, the relation in which we do meet the other morally, will be described as arising out of natural caring — that relation in which we respond as one-caring out of love or natural inclination.|
===
+++!!!!!*[316: reject ethics of principle]
|It is this ethical ideal, this realistic picture of ourselves as one-caring, that guides us as we strive to meet the other morally. Everything depends upon the nature and strength of this ideal, for we shall not have absolute principles to guide us. Indeed, I shall reject ethics of principle as ambiguous and unstable. Wherever there is a principle, there is implied its exception and, too often, principles function to separate us from each other. We may become dangerously self-righteous when we perceive ourselves a holding a precious principle not held by the other. ... when we must use violence or strategies on the other, we are already diminished ethically. Our efforts must, then , be directed to the maintenance of conditions that will permit caring to flourish.|
===
+++!!!!!*[317: against universalizability]
|Many... insist that any ethical judgment... must be universalizable; that is, ... if under conditions X you are required to do A, then under sufficiently similar conditions, I too am required to do A. I shall reject this emphatically. First, my attention is not on judgment and not on the particular acts we perform but on how we meet the other morally. Second, in recognition of... our insistence on caring for the other... I shall want to preserve the uniqueness of human encounters. ... conditions are rarely “sufficiently similar” for me to declare that you must do what I must do. There is, however, a fundamental universality in our ethic, as there must be to escape relativism. |
===
+++!!!!!*[318: Engrossment]
|At bottom, all caring involves engrossment. The engrossment need not be intense nor need it be pervasive in the life of teh one-caring, but it must occur... as Martin Buber says of love, “it endures, but only in the alternation of actuality and latency.”|
===
+++!!!!!*[318: ethical effort in the absence of natural caring]
|Another problem arises when we consider situations in which we do not naturally care. Responding to my own child crying in the night may require a physical effort, but it does not usually require what might be called an ethical effort. I naturally want to relieve my child’s distress. But receiving the other as he feels and trying to do so are qualitatively different modes. In the first, I am already “with” the other. My motivational energies are flowing toward him and, perhaps, toward his ends. In the second, I may dimly or dramatically perceive a reality that is a repugnant possibility for me. ... I do not “care” for this person. ... If I do something in his behalf — defend his legal rights or confirm a statement he makes — it is because I care about my own ethical self. In caring for my ethical self, I grapple with the question: Must I try to care? When and for whom? |
===
+++!!!!!*[319: caring for everyone not possible]
|I shall reject the notion of universal caring — that is, caring for everyone— on the grounds that it is impossible to actualize and leads us to substitute abstract problem solving and mere talk for genuine caring. ... We can... “care about” everyone... an internal state of readiness to try to care for whoever crosses our path. But this is different from the caring-for to which we refer when we use the word “caring.” |
===

!!!Noddings develops an account of “meeting the other morally,” suggesting that morality involves cultivating an ideal of ourselves as “one-caring.” In developing this ideal, Noddings claims…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we strive to experience a natural and spontaneous feeling of care in relation to everyone, without letting differences of principle get in the way.]>
{{red{No... Though the second half picks up on an important theme, the first half "caring in relation to everyone" is at odds with Noddings’ account of what actually is possible. (316-317)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) we sometimes resort to a second-best form of caring, one that is motivated more by concern for one’s ethical self rather than directly by concern for the other.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we will encounter various complications and conflicts, and in those circumstances we must retreat to a more rational stance of neutrality, in which we weigh advantages and disadvantages.]>
{{red{No... This sounds like some kind of utilitarian appeal; it’s one that Noddings does not make, and in fact actively resists. “Rational-objective mode... is of limited and particular use... we must at the right moments turn it away from the
abstract toward which it tends and back to the concrete” (322)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) we find it necessary to draw on the memory of being cared-for, something that everyone has access to (at least in some form, to some degree)]>
{{green{Yes. Noddings claims that “memories of both caring and being cared for [are] universally accessible,” though clearly she would not deny that we differ in how prominent or readily-accessible those memories and experiences are.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we focus on some relationships rather than others, since caring requires motivational engrossment, and our attention is finite.]>
{{green{Yes. “We can, in a sense that will need elaboration, "care about" everyone; that is, we can maintain an internal state of readiness to try to care for whoever crosses our path. But this is different from the caring-for to which we refer when we use the word "caring." If we are thoughtful persons, we know that the difference is great, and we may even deliberately restrict our contacts so that the caring-for of which we are capable does not deteriorate to mere verbal caring-about.” (319)
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Caring, according to Noddings, is a pattern of engrossment or motivational displacement that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) forms the core of our ethical capacity.]>
{{green{Yes. (or: “our longing for caring... provides thet motivation for us to be moral...”)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) depends upon having been cared for as a dependent child.]>
{{green{Yes. The caring attitude, that attitude which expresses our earliest memories of being cared for and our growing store of memories of both caring and being cared for, is universally accessible... (p. 317)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) can in some cases become too intense and stifling for the cared-for.]>
{{red{No... That’s not, properly speaking, caring, for Noddings.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) sometimes requires the one-caring to act in ways the cared-for protests or resents.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, although this always involves a sense of conflict (319 bottom)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) can take a natural spontaneous form, or an ethical form, which is impartially concerned with what others deserve.]>
{{red{No... Desert is not the important concept here.
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Nussbaum|https://i2.wp.com/www.brainpickings.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/marthanussbaum.jpg?w=480&ssl=1]]Martha Nussbaum (1947–) is an American philosopher with broad expertise in ancient philosophy, participating actively in public intellectual discussions about ethics, quality of life, and social ideals.

How does Nussbaum answer the concern that Aristotle’s ethics is culturally narrow, and that no universal account of virtue is possible? How much does anthropological data support relativism about moral values?

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[[<< back to Aristotle 3|B3 Aristotle (books 7, 8, 10)]] ... [[forward to Kant1>>|Kant1]]

!!!If Nussbaum were to develop an analogue between moral virtue and “virtuosity” in music, she would likely claim…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) musicians from different traditions may have different norms about harmony, rhythm, and expressiveness, etc., and yet they may agree on the “thin” claim that in each of these areas, there are better and worse ways of handling each aspect of musical activity.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Players in one tradition can often appreciate good playing in another tradition and they may recognize ways they could grow from listening well to good music in another tradition.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Good musicianship requires disciplined perception, beginning early in life, and that disciplined perception will always grow out of some specific musical background.]>
{{green{Yes. This need not mean "one neatly-bounded musical tradition" is necessary; simply that there is no "generic" music, and no generic moral customs and attitudes.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) There may always be disagreement over the best examples of musicianship, but those who take music seriously offer reasons for their judgments, and are open to considering reasons against them.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Ultimately, disagreement about musical ideals shows that we believe that some musical traditions are objectively better than others.]>
{{red{No... Those who disagree must take some musical //practices// to be better than others (and likely some //musicians// to be better than others) but nothing about traditions as such is implied.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In arguing that virtue ethics need not be relativist, Nussbaum suggests that people from different cultures can agree that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Ideas about the human good may never be confirmed with certainty, but they can still be&nbsp;gradually improved&nbsp;through experience, reflection, and discussion.]>
{{green{Yes. This is precisely the gist of Nussbaum’s claim about progress in ethics being like progress in science. Does she say that people from different cultures can be expected to agree about all this? Perhaps not directly, but it’s implicit in her stance toward dialogue.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) For each sphere of experience, virtue requires avoiding two extremes and acting according to the mean (even if people differ in how they locate the mean).]>
{{red{No... Aristotle consistently framed each virtue as a mean between extremes, but this idea plays no role in Nussbaum’s reconstruction of his method, which requires simply that there be a distinction between better and worse ways of coping with a given sphere of choice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Some human problems and human capacities are shared across cultures; the good for human life involves handling these well.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Any list of virtues, including Aristotle’s, is provisional and subject to revision.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; recognizing that there have been improvements on past practices within one’s own group is an opportunity to consider how one approach might offer a better resolution than another.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) There are various spheres of human experience, and these are recognized independently of cultural influences.]>
{{red{No... Yes to the first part, but no to the second.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In English, “virtue” is etymologically connected to “virtuosity.” In keeping with how she develops her argument for a cross-cultural perspective on Aristotelian virtues, Nussbaum could make these claims about the relation between musical excellence and cultural traditions:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Good musicianship requires disciplined* (refined) perception, which grows out of specific experiences, opportunities, and habits — ideally beginning early in life.]>
{{green{Yes. This need not mean that one neatly-bounded musical tradition is necessary; simply that there is no "generic" music, and no generic moral customs and attitudes. (* //Disciplined// perception is an apt way of putting it, for an Aristotelian, so long as "discipline" refers to effort and refinement over time with guidance from more experienced practitioners) 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) There are no universally-shared grounds for judging musical quality, so we should think of musical values as subjective and culturally relative.]>
{{red{No... Nussbaum will surely agree that people don’t in fact share universal grounds. Yet her argument is for inquiry and building cross-cultural understanding, which is neither simply subjective nor culturally relative.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) There may not be an uncontroversial definition of music, but players admired as excellent within one tradition can often recognize and appreciate the virtuosity of artists other traditions.]>
{{green{Yes. Though people from different traditions don’t always agree, wise people recognize good examples and wisdom from another tradition.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) We should always expect some disagreement about which musicians to admire most, but those who take music seriously offer reasons for their judgments, and can engage constructively in dialogue about their priorities.]>
{{green{Yes. Reasons for judgments are central; what counts as good (in music as in morals) must always be open to discussion.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) musicians from different traditions generally share the “thin” idea that for a given aspect of music (harmony, rhythm, expressiveness, or dynamics, etc), virtuosity requires handling that aspect in an excellent way.]>
{{green{Yes. “Thin” descriptions of musical virtuosity would be analogous to “thin” descriptions of moral virtue.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!!*[199: The virtues are attracting interest]>The virtues are attracting interest [as] remoteness is now being seen ... as a defect in an approach to ethical questions. ... But many current defenders of ... virtues ... turn towards relativism ... the only appropriate criteria of ethical goodness are local ... A MacIntyre, B Williams, and P Foot ...===
+++!!!!!*[200: Yet virtue ethics may not seem useful to social critics..]>[Supporters of] rational criticism [may assume] ethics of virtue can give them little help ... This is an odd result, as far as Aristotle is concerned. For ... he [defended] a single objective account of the human good, or human flourishing. ... He uses his account... as a basis for ... criticism of local traditions.===
+++!!!!!*[201: The fact that Aristotle believed something does not make it true...]>Now the fact that Aristotle believed something does not make it true ... But it does ... [make it] a plausible candidate for the truth...===
+++!!!!!*[201: The relativist... is impressed by variation in virtues]>The relativist... is impressed by the variety and the apparent non-comparability in the lists of virtues ... megalopsuchos... sounds very .. culture-bound ... ¶ But ... [we should doubt] that he simply described what was admired in his own society.===
+++!!!!!*[202: How Aristotle frame virtues]>What [Arist] does, in each case [when introducing a virtue], is to isolate a sphere of human experience that figures in more or less any human life, and in which more or less any human being will have to make some choices rather than others ... The “thin account” of each virtue [invokes] being stably disposed to act appropriately in that sphere... There may be ... competing specifications ... [ethical theory seeks] at the end, a full or “thick” definition of the virtue. ¶&nbsp;Here are the most important spheres... ¶ What I want to insist on... is the care with which Aristotle articulates his general approach...===
+++!!!!!*[204: The thin... “nominal” definition of thunder is “That noise..."]>The thin... “nominal” definition of thunder is “That noise in the clouds, whatever it is.” ... So the explanatory story citing Zeus’ activities in the clouds is a false account of the very same thing of which the best scientific explanation is a true account. There is just one debate here, with a single subject. So too, Aristotle suggests, with our ethical terms. ... experiences of limit and finitude ... give a concept such as justice its points. the reference of the virtue terms is fixed by spheres of choice, frequently connected with our finitude and limitation, that we encounter in virtue of shared conditions of human existence.===
+++!!!!!*[205: progress in ethics is like progress in scientific understanding]>... progress in ethics [is] like progress in scientific understanding... the correct fuller specification of a virtue... aided by ... mapping ... the grounding experiences. When we understand ... what problems human beings encounter... we will have away of assessing competing responses... ¶ To hold tradition fixed is .. to prevent ethical progress. What human beings want and seek is not conformity with the past, it is the good.===
+++!!!!!*[206: two stages of inquiry]>In the Aristotelian approach it is obviously of the first importance to distinguish two stages of the inquiry: the initial demarcation of the sphere of choice, of the ‘grounding experiences’ that fix the referene of the virtue term; and the ensuing more concrete inquiry into what the appropriate choice, in that sphere, is. ===
+++!!!!!*[207: Obj’n #1] concerns the relationship between singleness of problem]>[Obj’n #1] concerns the relationship between singleness of problem and singleness of solution... Different cultural accounts of good choice within the sphere in question ... are... competing answers to a single general question... Still [this shows only] a single discourse or debate about virtue. ... not ... as Aristotle believes, a single answer. Indeed, it has not even been shown that the discourse we have  set up will have the form of a debate at all—rather than a plurality of culturally specific narratives, each giving the thick definition of a virtue that corresponds to the experience and traditions of a particular group.===
+++!!!!!*[208: Obj'n #2]>[Obj’n #2]... questions the notion of spheres of shared human experience ... anthropological work on the social construction of the emotions [shows] the experience of fear has learned and culturally variant elements. ... death [is] so variously interpreted and understood by humans beings at different times and in different places. [So] the “grounding experience” is an irreducible plurality of experiences, ... deeply infused with  cultural interpretation...===
+++!!!!!*[209: Bodily desire varies with culture and history]>Work like Foucault’s... shows very convincingly that the experience of bodily desire, and of the body itself, has elements that vary with cultural and historical change. The  names that !people call their desires and themselves as subjects of desire, the fabric of belief and discourse into which they integrate their ideas of desiring: all this influences, it is clear, not only their reflection about desire, but also their experience of desire itself. Thus, for example, it is naive to treat our modern debates about homosexuality as continuations of the very same debate about sexual activity that went on in the Greek world. In a very real sense there was no “homosexual experience” in a culture that did not [problematize] certain forms of behaviour.===
+++!!!!!*[210: Obj’n #3] ... charges that the Aristotelian [sees universality in]>[Obj’n #3] ... charges that the Aristotelian [sees universality in] experience that is contingent on ... historical conditions.  ... we could imagine a form of human life that does not contain these experiences ... at all, in any form. Thus the virtue that consists in acting well in that sphere need not be included in an account of the human good. ... the experience may even be a sign of bad human life [or] an adaptation to a bad state of affairs. ... the virtue of generosity ... requires having possessions of one’s own ... the objector [says] generosity, if it really rests upon the experience of private possession, is a dubious candidate [for] non-relative account... | Some objectors of the third kind ... support .. relativism. But [others suggest] that some of the experiences are remediable deficiencies [and] Aristotelian virtue ethics .. limits our social aspirations, encouraging us to regard as permanent and necessary what we might in fact improve... that human life contains more possibilities than are dreamed of in her list of virtues.===
+++!!!!!*[211: Each of these objections is profound.... But we can]>Each of these objections is profound.... But we can still... map out an Aristotelian response...===
+++!!!!!*[211: To the first objector...]>[To] The first objector ... we can make four observations ... First, the Aristotelian ... need not insist, in every case, on a singe answer ... answer might ... be a disjunction. The process of comparative and critical debate will, I imagine, eliminate numerous contenders ... [leaving] a (probably small) plurality of acceptable accounts [which] may or may not be capable of being subsumed under a single account ... If we should succeed in ruling out concepts ... based on a nation of original sin, for example, this would be moral work of enormous significance ... Second ... [given] many concrete specifications ... sets of customs can count as further specifications of a general account ... Sometimes, a particular account gives the only legitimate specification ... for that concrete context... Third, virtuous person ... always ... responsive to ... context ... perception of the particular ... ethical rules should be held open to modification in the light of new circumstances ... Aristotelian particularism is fully compatible with Aristotelian objectivity. ... | | FINALLY, the Aristotelian virtues... remain always open to revision in the light of new circumstances ... flexibility... without sacrificing objectivity. All general accounts are held provisionally as best summaries of correct decisions and as guides to new ones. This flexibility, built into the Aristotelian procedure, will again help the Aristotelian account to answer the questions of the relativist, without relativism.===
+++!!!!!*[216: Certain ways  can still be criticized... as stupid, pernicious, and false.]>The human mind is an active and interpretative instrument... the nature of human world interpretations is holistic and ... the criticism of them must, equally, be holistic. ¶ But these two facts do not imply... that all world interpretations are equally valid and altogether  non-comparable, that... “anything goes.” [Rejecting] ethical truths as correspondence to an altogether uninterrupted reality does not imply that the whole idea of searching for the truth is an old-fashioned error. Certain ways in which people see the world can still be criticized exactly as Aristotle criticized them: as stupid, pernicious, and false. The standards used in such criticisms much come from inside human life.===
+++!!!!!*[216: Relativist fails to show why any is equally good]>[what relativist doesn’t undermine:] certain ways of  conceptualizing death are more in keeping with the totality of our evidence and the totality of our wishes for flourishing life than others; ... certain ways of experiencing appetitive desire are ... more promising than others... Relativists tend [also] to understate the amount of attunement, recognition, and overlap that actually obtains... we do recognize the experiences of people in other cultures as similar to our own.===
+++!!!!!*[217: A traditional society, confronted with new technologies and sciences]>A traditional society, confronted with new technologies and sciences, and the conceptions that go with them, does not in fact simply fail to understand them, or regard them as totally alien incursions upon a hermetically sealed way of life.  Instead, it assesses the new item as a possible contributor to flourishing life, making it comprehensible to itself, and incorporating elements that promise to solve problems of flourishing….  The parties do in fact search for the good, not the way of their ancestors…===

>“…Whoever of you remains, when he sees how we [the law] conduct our trials and manage the city in other ways, has in fact come to an agreement with us to obey our instructions. ...We give two alternatives, either to persuade us or do what we say.”  CIT: Crito 51e, 52a (p.54)
|Socrates argues that he should accept his impending execution, yet strikingly absent from his reasoning is the admission of his guilt; he says he owes it to the city he lives in to respect the outcome of the due process of law. Is respecting the law even when it comes out against the innocent truly just? When obeying the law leads to the death of innocent people, it is not justice. Socrates says that the freedom to try to change the law or to leave the city is enough to validate it, but this won’t necessarily prevent an “unjust” outcome. Socrates might argue that since not everyone can agree on who is innocent, respecting the law is necessary.|<<img bitmore>>@@It's true that Socrates does not succeed in preventing an unjust outcome. Yet to frame an objection that way implies that he could have done something to prevent injustice... If there is injustice in the wrongful conviction, doesn't that fact stand no matter what subsequently happens? <br><br>Much of  his argument is structured around the premise that one cannot correct something that's wrong by adding another wrong to it. Setting aside the question of whether escaping is itself wrong, isn't he right that whether he escapes or not, the injustice of his conviction remains an injustice? If not, why not?@@|

!!!Consider  this sequence of claims in Mill’s fourth chapter: 
>(1) The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. 
>(2) In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. 
>(3) If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. 
>(4) No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. 
>(5) Each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. 
>(6) Happiness has made out its title as&nbsp;one&nbsp;of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.…
Reasonable complaints about this argument include…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Mill rules out the possibility of a person who voluntarily incurs pain, but clearly there are such people.]>
{{red{No... This passage does not make any claim about pain or pleasure. Nothing here bars him from explaining how pain may become associated with happiness or the hope for happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Mill has assumed here that people are motivated to promote the general happiness, simply in virtue of being motivated to promote their own.]>
{{red{No... There’s no claim being made here about individuals' motivation to promote the general happiness. Still, we might wonder whether Mill’s own criteria mean that saying X is “a good to the aggregate” requires evidence that the aggregate (as such) values it. (Meanwhile, it's not clear what evidence for an "aggregate desire" would look like.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The argument indulges in fallacious circular reasoning, since Mill admits that no true proof is possible.]>
{{red{No... This complaint is unreasonably hasty. Every reflective argument involves a resting place beyond which there is no proof other than general agreement; we’ve seen this in Aristotle and Kant as well. A //fallacious// instance of //circular// reasoning is deceptive: it pretends to offer support for a conclusion, but the support turns out to be the conclusion in disguise.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Mill mistakenly treats happiness as the only thing that matters to society, just because it’s the only thing that matters to individuals.]>
{{red{No... In this passage, Mill has made no claim about other things NOT being good. This is just an argument that happiness is A  good. (He explicitly goes on to tackle the other question next.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Being “desirable” is not sufficiently analogous to being visible or audible; what is true of those qualiies may not be true of desirability. 
]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed, many critics have worried about this analogy. "Desirable" in the early part of the argument seems to mean just "able to be desired" but by step (5) it must be synonymous with "good." So, Mill has been accused of the fallacy of //equivocation// — harnessing two different meanings of a term where the argument's form requires the term to have a constant meaning.
}}}
===
}}}

Unit A: Authority and Conscience
Unit B: Aristotle and Virtue Ethics
Unit C: Kantian Principles
Unit D: Happiness and Harm
Unit E: Freedom and Authenticity
Unit F: Development and Difference

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!!!Admed’s text cultivates an appreciation of paradox. Within each paradoxical phenomenon, we find something like a contradictory pair of claims. For example, Ahmed suggests…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The experience of “happiness” is supposed to “happen to us” (beyond our control), and yet happiness is treated as something we choose (within our control)]>
{{green{Yes. Ahmed looks at this paradoxical relation between these two aspects of the concept of happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The promotion of “positive thinking” among cancer patients appears to aim to reduce their burdens, but ends up implying that they are to blame for their suffering (worsening their burden).]>
{{green{Yes. Ahmed cites Audre Lorde’s experience with the rhetoric around “good attitude” for cancer patients.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Feminists, and people who experience racism, draw attention to disturbing phenomena they witness; yet the feminist and/or person of color “is” or “creates” the disturbance.]>
{{green{Yes. This is a phenomenon Ahmed describes toward the end of the article.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) A person who loves you and “only wants your happiness” (apparently respecting you) can pressure you to experience happiness according to their imposed ideals (apparently not respecting you).]>
{{green{Yes. Consider the discussion of characters from Rousseau’s novel Emile.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Feminists have directed critical attention toward the ideal of happiness; yet ultimately, the point of criticizing sexism is to bring about more happiness.]>
{{red{No... This is what someone like Mill might insist about Ahmed. But it’s not her view, nor implicit in her view!
}}}
===
}}}

/***
|<html><a name="Top"/></html>''Name:''|PartTiddlerPlugin|
|''Version:''|1.0.9 (2007-07-14)|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#PartTiddlerPlugin|
|''Author:''|UdoBorkowski (ub [at] abego-software [dot] de)|
|''Licence:''|[[BSD open source license]]|
|''CoreVersion:''|2.1.3|
|''Browser:''|Firefox 1.0.4+; InternetExplorer 6.0|
!Table of Content<html><a name="TOC"/></html>
* <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Description',null, event)">Description, Syntax</a></html>
* <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Applications',null, event)">Applications</a></html>
** <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('LongTiddler',null, event)">Refering to Paragraphs of a Longer Tiddler</a></html>
** <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Citation',null, event)">Citation Index</a></html>
** <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('TableCells',null, event)">Creating "multi-line" Table Cells</a></html>
** <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Tabs',null, event)">Creating Tabs</a></html>
** <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Sliders',null, event)">Using Sliders</a></html>
* <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Revisions',null, event)">Revision History</a></html>
* <html><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Code',null, event)">Code</a></html>
!Description<html><a name="Description"/></html>
With the {{{<part aPartName> ... </part>}}} feature you can structure your tiddler text into separate (named) parts. 
Each part can be referenced as a "normal" tiddler, using the "//tiddlerName//''/''//partName//" syntax (e.g. "About/Features").  E.g. you may create links to the parts (e.g. {{{[[Quotes/BAX95]]}}} or {{{[[Hobbies|AboutMe/Hobbies]]}}}), use it in {{{<<tiddler...>>}}} or {{{<<tabs...>>}}} macros etc.


''Syntax:'' 
|>|''<part'' //partName// [''hidden''] ''>'' //any tiddler content// ''</part>''|
|//partName//|The name of the part. You may reference a part tiddler with the combined tiddler name "//nameOfContainerTidder//''/''//partName//. <<br>>If you use a partName containing spaces you need to quote it (e.g. {{{"Major Overview"}}} or {{{[[Shortcut List]]}}}).|
|''hidden''|When defined the content of the part is not displayed in the container tiddler. But when the part is explicitly referenced (e.g. in a {{{<<tiddler...>>}}} macro or in a link) the part's content is displayed.|
|<html><i>any&nbsp;tiddler&nbsp;content</i></html>|<html>The content of the part.<br>A part can have any content that a "normal" tiddler may have, e.g. you may use all the formattings and macros defined.</html>|
|>|~~Syntax formatting: Keywords in ''bold'', optional parts in [...]. 'or' means that exactly one of the two alternatives must exist.~~|
<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!Applications<html><a name="Applications"/></html>
!!Refering to Paragraphs of a Longer Tiddler<html><a name="LongTiddler"/></html>
Assume you have written a long description in a tiddler and now you want to refer to the content of a certain paragraph in that tiddler (e.g. some definition.) Just wrap the text with a ''part'' block, give it a nice name, create a "pretty link" (like {{{[[Discussion Groups|Introduction/DiscussionGroups]]}}}) and you are done.

Notice this complements the approach to first writing a lot of small tiddlers and combine these tiddlers to one larger tiddler in a second step (e.g. using the {{{<<tiddler...>>}}} macro). Using the ''part'' feature you can first write a "classic" (longer) text that can be read "from top to bottom" and later "reuse" parts of this text for some more "non-linear" reading.

<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!!Citation Index<html><a name="Citation"/></html>
Create a tiddler "Citations" that contains your "citations". 
Wrap every citation with a part and a proper name. 

''Example''
{{{
<part BAX98>Baxter, Ira D. et al: //Clone Detection Using Abstract Syntax Trees.// 
in //Proc. ICSM//, 1998.</part>

<part BEL02>Bellon, Stefan: //Vergleich von Techniken zur Erkennung duplizierten Quellcodes.// 
Thesis, Uni Stuttgart, 2002.</part>

<part DUC99>Ducasse, Stéfane et al: //A Language Independent Approach for Detecting Duplicated Code.// 
in //Proc. ICSM//, 1999.</part>
}}}

You may now "cite" them just by using a pretty link like {{{[[Citations/BAX98]]}}} or even more pretty, like this {{{[[BAX98|Citations/BAX98]]}}}.

<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!!Creating "multi-line" Table Cells<html><a name="TableCells"/></html>
You may have noticed that it is hard to create table cells with "multi-line" content. E.g. if you want to create a bullet list inside a table cell you cannot just write the bullet list
{{{
* Item 1
* Item 2
* Item 3
}}}
into a table cell (i.e. between the | ... | bars) because every bullet item must start in a new line but all cells of a table row must be in one line.

Using the ''part'' feature this problem can be solved. Just create a hidden part that contains the cells content and use a {{{<<tiddler >>}}} macro to include its content in the table's cell.

''Example''
{{{
|!Subject|!Items|
|subject1|<<tiddler ./Cell1>>|
|subject2|<<tiddler ./Cell2>>|

<part Cell1 hidden>
* Item 1
* Item 2
* Item 3
</part>
...
}}}

Notice that inside the {{{<<tiddler ...>>}}} macro you may refer to the "current tiddler" using the ".".

BTW: The same approach can be used to create bullet lists with items that contain more than one line.

<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!!Creating Tabs<html><a name="Tabs"/></html>
The build-in {{{<<tabs ...>>}}} macro requires that you defined an additional tiddler for every tab it displays. When you want to have "nested" tabs you need to define a tiddler for the "main tab" and one for every tab it contains. I.e. the definition of a set of tabs that is visually displayed at one place is distributed across multiple tiddlers.

With the ''part'' feature you can put the complete definition in one tiddler, making it easier to keep an overview and maintain the tab sets.

''Example''
The standard tabs at the sidebar are defined by the following eight tiddlers:
* SideBarTabs
* TabAll
* TabMore
* TabMoreMissing
* TabMoreOrphans
* TabMoreShadowed
* TabTags
* TabTimeline

Instead of these eight tiddlers one could define the following SideBarTabs tiddler that uses the ''part'' feature:
{{{
<<tabs txtMainTab 
    Timeline Timeline SideBarTabs/Timeline 
    All 'All tiddlers' SideBarTabs/All 
    Tags 'All tags' SideBarTabs/Tags 
    More 'More lists' SideBarTabs/More>>
<part Timeline hidden><<timeline>></part>
<part All hidden><<list all>></part>
<part Tags hidden><<allTags>></part>
<part More hidden><<tabs txtMoreTab 
    Missing 'Missing tiddlers' SideBarTabs/Missing 
    Orphans 'Orphaned tiddlers' SideBarTabs/Orphans 
    Shadowed 'Shadowed tiddlers' SideBarTabs/Shadowed>></part>
<part Missing hidden><<list missing>></part>
<part Orphans hidden><<list orphans>></part>
<part Shadowed hidden><<list shadowed>></part>
}}}

Notice that you can easily "overwrite" individual parts in separate tiddlers that have the full name of the part.

E.g. if you don't like the classic timeline tab but only want to see the 100 most recent tiddlers you could create a tiddler "~SideBarTabs/Timeline" with the following content:
{{{
<<forEachTiddler 
		sortBy 'tiddler.modified' descending 
		write '(index < 100) ? "* [["+tiddler.title+"]]\n":""'>>
}}}
<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!!Using Sliders<html><a name="Sliders"/></html>
Very similar to the build-in {{{<<tabs ...>>}}} macro (see above) the {{{<<slider ...>>}}} macro requires that you defined an additional tiddler that holds the content "to be slid". You can avoid creating this extra tiddler by using the ''part'' feature

''Example''
In a tiddler "About" we may use the slider to show some details that are documented in the tiddler's "Details" part.
{{{
...
<<slider chkAboutDetails About/Details details "Click here to see more details">>
<part Details hidden>
To give you a better overview ...
</part>
...
}}}

Notice that putting the content of the slider into the slider's tiddler also has an extra benefit: When you decide you need to edit the content of the slider you can just doubleclick the content, the tiddler opens for editing and you can directly start editing the content (in the part section). In the "old" approach you would doubleclick the tiddler, see that the slider is using tiddler X, have to look for the tiddler X and can finally open it for editing. So using the ''part'' approach results in a much short workflow.

<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!Revision history<html><a name="Revisions"/></html>
* v1.0.9 (2007-07-14)
** Bugfix: Error when using the SideBarTabs example and switching between "More" and "Shadow". Thanks to cmari for reporting the issue.
* v1.0.8 (2007-06-16)
** Speeding up display of tiddlers containing multiple pard definitions. Thanks to Paco Rivière for reporting the issue.
** Support "./partName" syntax inside <<tabs ...>> macro
* v1.0.7 (2007-03-07)
** Bugfix: <<tiddler "./partName">> does not always render correctly after a refresh (e.g. like it happens when using the "Include" plugin). Thanks to Morris Gray for reporting the bug.
* v1.0.6 (2006-11-07)
** Bugfix: cannot edit tiddler when UploadPlugin by Bidix is installed. Thanks to José Luis González Castro for reporting the bug.
* v1.0.5 (2006-03-02)
** Bugfix: Example with multi-line table cells does not work in IE6. Thanks to Paulo Soares for reporting the bug.
* v1.0.4 (2006-02-28)
** Bugfix: Shadow tiddlers cannot be edited (in TW 2.0.6). Thanks to Torsten Vanek for reporting the bug.
* v1.0.3 (2006-02-26)
** Adapt code to newly introduced Tiddler.prototype.isReadOnly() function (in TW 2.0.6). Thanks to Paulo Soares for reporting the problem.
* v1.0.2 (2006-02-05)
** Also allow other macros than the "tiddler" macro use the "." in the part reference (to refer to "this" tiddler)
* v1.0.1 (2006-01-27)
** Added Table of Content for plugin documentation. Thanks to RichCarrillo for suggesting.
** Bugfix: newReminder plugin does not work when PartTiddler is installed. Thanks to PauloSoares for reporting.
* v1.0.0 (2006-01-25)
** initial version
<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!Code<html><a name="Code"/></html>
<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="window.scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>
***/
//{{{
//============================================================================
//                           PartTiddlerPlugin

// Ensure that the PartTiddler Plugin is only installed once.
//
if (!version.extensions.PartTiddlerPlugin) {



version.extensions.PartTiddlerPlugin = {
    major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 9,
    date: new Date(2007, 6, 14), 
    type: 'plugin',
    source: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#PartTiddlerPlugin"
};

if (!window.abego) window.abego = {};
if (version.major < 2) alertAndThrow("PartTiddlerPlugin requires TiddlyWiki 2.0 or newer.");

//============================================================================
// Common Helpers

// Looks for the next newline, starting at the index-th char of text. 
//
// If there are only whitespaces between index and the newline 
// the index behind the newline is returned, 
// otherwise (or when no newline is found) index is returned.
//
var skipEmptyEndOfLine = function(text, index) {
	var re = /(\n|[^\s])/g;
	re.lastIndex = index;
	var result = re.exec(text);
	return (result && text.charAt(result.index) == '\n') 
			? result.index+1
			: index;
}


//============================================================================
// Constants

var partEndOrStartTagRE = /(<\/part>)|(<part(?:\s+)((?:[^>])+)>)/mg;
var partEndTagREString = "<\\/part>";
var partEndTagString = "</part>";

//============================================================================
// Plugin Specific Helpers

// Parse the parameters inside a <part ...> tag and return the result.
//
// @return [may be null] {partName: ..., isHidden: ...}
//
var parseStartTagParams = function(paramText) {
	var params = paramText.readMacroParams();
	if (params.length == 0 || params[0].length == 0) return null;
	
	var name = params[0];
	var paramsIndex = 1;
	var hidden = false;
	if (paramsIndex < params.length) {
		hidden = params[paramsIndex] == "hidden";
		paramsIndex++;
	}
	
	return {
		partName: name, 
		isHidden: hidden
	};
}

// Returns the match to the next (end or start) part tag in the text, 
// starting the search at startIndex.
// 
// When no such tag is found null is returned, otherwise a "Match" is returned:
// [0]: full match
// [1]: matched "end" tag (or null when no end tag match)
// [2]: matched "start" tag (or null when no start tag match)
// [3]: content of start tag (or null if no start tag match)
//
var findNextPartEndOrStartTagMatch = function(text, startIndex) {
	var re = new RegExp(partEndOrStartTagRE);
	re.lastIndex = startIndex;
	var match = re.exec(text);
	return match;
}

//============================================================================
// Formatter

// Process the <part ...> ... </part> starting at (w.source, w.matchStart) for formatting.
//
// @return true if a complete part section (including the end tag) could be processed, false otherwise.
//
var handlePartSection = function(w) {
	var tagMatch = findNextPartEndOrStartTagMatch(w.source, w.matchStart);
	if (!tagMatch) return false;
	if (tagMatch.index != w.matchStart || !tagMatch[2]) return false;

	// Parse the start tag parameters
	var arguments = parseStartTagParams(tagMatch[3]);
	if (!arguments) return false;
	
	// Continue processing
	var startTagEndIndex = skipEmptyEndOfLine(w.source, tagMatch.index + tagMatch[0].length);
	var endMatch = findNextPartEndOrStartTagMatch(w.source, startTagEndIndex);
	if (endMatch && endMatch[1]) {
		if (!arguments.isHidden) {
			w.nextMatch = startTagEndIndex;
			w.subWikify(w.output,partEndTagREString);
		}
		w.nextMatch = skipEmptyEndOfLine(w.source, endMatch.index + endMatch[0].length);
		
		return true;
	}
	return false;
}

config.formatters.push( {
    name: "part",
    match: "<part\\s+[^>]+>",
	
	handler: function(w) {
		if (!handlePartSection(w)) {
			w.outputText(w.output,w.matchStart,w.matchStart+w.matchLength);
		}
	}
} )

//============================================================================
// Extend "fetchTiddler" functionality to also recognize "part"s of tiddlers 
// as tiddlers.

var currentParent = null; // used for the "." parent (e.g. in the "tiddler" macro)

// Return the match to the first <part ...> tag of the text that has the
// requrest partName.
//
// @return [may be null]
//
var findPartStartTagByName = function(text, partName) {
	var i = 0;
	
	while (true) {
		var tagMatch = findNextPartEndOrStartTagMatch(text, i);
		if (!tagMatch) return null;

		if (tagMatch[2]) {
			// Is start tag
	
			// Check the name
			var arguments = parseStartTagParams(tagMatch[3]);
			if (arguments && arguments.partName == partName) {
				return tagMatch;
			}
		}
		i = tagMatch.index+tagMatch[0].length;
	}
}

// Return the part "partName" of the given parentTiddler as a "readOnly" Tiddler 
// object, using fullName as the Tiddler's title. 
//
// All remaining properties of the new Tiddler (tags etc.) are inherited from 
// the parentTiddler.
// 
// @return [may be null]
//
var getPart = function(parentTiddler, partName, fullName) {
	var text = parentTiddler.text;
	var startTag = findPartStartTagByName(text, partName);
	if (!startTag) return null;
	
	var endIndexOfStartTag = skipEmptyEndOfLine(text, startTag.index+startTag[0].length);
	var indexOfEndTag = text.indexOf(partEndTagString, endIndexOfStartTag);

	if (indexOfEndTag >= 0) {
		var partTiddlerText = text.substring(endIndexOfStartTag,indexOfEndTag);
		var partTiddler = new Tiddler();
		partTiddler.set(
						fullName,
						partTiddlerText,
						parentTiddler.modifier,
						parentTiddler.modified,
						parentTiddler.tags,
						parentTiddler.created);
		partTiddler.abegoIsPartTiddler = true;
		return partTiddler;
	}
	
	return null;
}

// Hijack the store.fetchTiddler to recognize the "part" addresses.
//
var hijackFetchTiddler = function() {
	var oldFetchTiddler = store.fetchTiddler ;
	store.fetchTiddler = function(title) {
		var result = oldFetchTiddler.apply(this, arguments);
		if (!result && title) {
			var i = title.lastIndexOf('/');
			if (i > 0) {
				var parentName = title.substring(0, i);
				var partName = title.substring(i+1);
				var parent = (parentName == ".") 
						? store.resolveTiddler(currentParent)
						: oldFetchTiddler.apply(this, [parentName]);
				if (parent) {
					return getPart(parent, partName, parent.title+"/"+partName);
				}
			}
		}
		return result;	
	};
};

// for debugging the plugin is not loaded through the systemConfig mechanism but via a script tag. 
// At that point in the "store" is not yet defined. In that case hijackFetchTiddler through the restart function.
// Otherwise hijack now.
if (!store) {
	var oldRestartFunc = restart;
	window.restart = function() {
		hijackFetchTiddler();
		oldRestartFunc.apply(this,arguments);
	};
} else
	hijackFetchTiddler();




// The user must not edit a readOnly/partTiddler
//

config.commands.editTiddler.oldIsReadOnlyFunction = Tiddler.prototype.isReadOnly;

Tiddler.prototype.isReadOnly = function() {
	// Tiddler.isReadOnly was introduced with TW 2.0.6.
	// For older version we explicitly check the global readOnly flag
	if (config.commands.editTiddler.oldIsReadOnlyFunction) {
		if (config.commands.editTiddler.oldIsReadOnlyFunction.apply(this, arguments)) return true;
	} else {
		if (readOnly) return true;
	}

	return this.abegoIsPartTiddler;
}

config.commands.editTiddler.handler = function(event,src,title)
{
	var t = store.getTiddler(title);
	// Edit the tiddler if it either is not a tiddler (but a shadowTiddler)
	// or the tiddler is not readOnly
	if(!t || !t.abegoIsPartTiddler)
		{
		clearMessage();
		story.displayTiddler(null,title,DEFAULT_EDIT_TEMPLATE);
		story.focusTiddler(title,"text");
		return false;
		}
}

// To allow the "./partName" syntax in macros we need to hijack 
// the invokeMacro to define the "currentParent" while it is running.
// 
var oldInvokeMacro = window.invokeMacro;
function myInvokeMacro(place,macro,params,wikifier,tiddler) {
	var oldCurrentParent = currentParent;
	if (tiddler) currentParent = tiddler;
	try {
		oldInvokeMacro.apply(this, arguments);
	} finally {
		currentParent = oldCurrentParent;
	}
}
window.invokeMacro = myInvokeMacro;

// To correctly support the "./partName" syntax while refreshing we need to hijack 
// the config.refreshers.tiddlers to define the "currentParent" while it is running.
// 
(function() {
	var oldTiddlerRefresher= config.refreshers.tiddler;
	config.refreshers.tiddler = function(e,changeList) {
		var oldCurrentParent = currentParent;
		try {
			currentParent = e.getAttribute("tiddler");
			return oldTiddlerRefresher.apply(this,arguments);
		} finally {
			currentParent = oldCurrentParent;
		}
	};
})();

// Support "./partName" syntax inside <<tabs ...>> macro
(function() {
	var extendRelativeNames = function(e, title) {
		var nodes = e.getElementsByTagName("a");
		for(var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++) {
			var node = nodes[i];
			var s = node.getAttribute("content");
			if (s && s.indexOf("./") == 0)
				node.setAttribute("content",title+s.substr(1));
		}
	};
	var oldHandler = config.macros.tabs.handler;
	config.macros.tabs.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
		var result = oldHandler.apply(this,arguments);
		if (tiddler)
			extendRelativeNames(place, tiddler.title);
		return result;
	};
})();

// Scroll the anchor anchorName in the viewer of the given tiddler visible.
// When no tiddler is defined use the tiddler of the target given event is used.
window.scrollAnchorVisible = function(anchorName, tiddler, evt) {
	var tiddlerElem = null;
	if (tiddler) {
		tiddlerElem = document.getElementById(story.idPrefix + tiddler);
	}
	if (!tiddlerElem && evt) {
		var target = resolveTarget(evt);
		tiddlerElem = story.findContainingTiddler(target);
	}
	if (!tiddlerElem) return;

	var children = tiddlerElem.getElementsByTagName("a");
	for (var i = 0; i < children.length; i++) {
		var child = children[i];
		var name = child.getAttribute("name");
		if (name == anchorName) {
			var y = findPosY(child);
			window.scrollTo(0,y);
			return;
		}
	}
}

} // of "install only once"
//}}}

/***
<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>

!Licence and Copyright
Copyright (c) abego Software ~GmbH, 2006 ([[www.abego-software.de|http://www.abego-software.de]])

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
materials provided with the distribution.

Neither the name of abego Software nor the names of its contributors may be
used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
prior written permission.

THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT
SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.

<html><sub><a href="javascript:;" onclick="scrollAnchorVisible('Top',null, event)">[Top]</sub></a></html>
***/

!!!In arguing that virtue ethics need not be relativist, Nussbaum suggests that people from different cultures can agree that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Ideas about the human good may never be confirmed with certainty, but they can still be&nbsp;gradually improved&nbsp;through experience, reflection, and discussion.]>
{{green{Yes. This is precisely the gist of Nussbaum’s claim about progress in ethics being like progress in science. Does she say that people from different cultures can be expected to agree about all this? Perhaps not directly, but it’s implicit in her stance toward dialogue.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) For each sphere of experience, virtue requires avoiding two extremes and acting according to the mean (even if people differ in how they locate the mean).]>
{{red{No... Aristotle consistently framed each virtue as a mean between extremes, but this idea plays no role in Nussbaum’s reconstruction of his method, which requires simply that there be a distinction between better and worse ways of coping with a given sphere of choice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Some human problems and human capacities are shared across cultures; the good for human life involves handling these well.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Any list of virtues, including Aristotle’s, is provisional and subject to revision.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; recognizing that there have been improvements on past practices within one’s own group is an opportunity to consider how one approach might offer a better resolution than another.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) There are various spheres of human experience, and these are recognized independently of cultural influences.]>
{{red{No... Yes to the first part, but no to the second -- Nussbaum would deny that we recognize these same spheres the same way, independently of culture. (Perhaps, however, she expects everyone to recognize *some* spheres, but the phrasing here suggests that we recognize the same set of "these" various spheres.)
}}}
===
}}}

The Value of Friendship
>“[Friendship] is most necessary for our life…” (Book 8, Chapter 1, 1155a5) 
|Aristotelian friendship seems paradoxical in that complete friendship is among only those of complete virtue, and so one must ask what more does someone with complete virtue need. Aristotle asserts that friendship is necessary and claims that friends provide a medium through which to display beneficence, but beneficence among friends seems to be in practice the same as charity for those deemed deserving(generosity or magnificence). Friends seem to be validation and indication of virtue, though not a building block of virtue. One could look to magnanimity and say that a completely virtuous individual should already have proper self validation and conclude that complete friendship is practically worthless whereas qualified friendship is the only valuable friendship due to some benefit.(120 words)|@@@@|

Stoic epistemology involves minimizing the effects of perspective bias. Though we cannot help how things //appear// to us, we can become better and better at counterbalancing misleading aspects of those appearances, using both past experiences and reason to "put things into perspective"...
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "perspective">>

Discussion of applying to grad school at 4:15
Welcome for majors at 5pm -- free pizza!

Wesleyan's Philosophy Department expects introductory courses to familiarize all students with vocabulary and skills that mark philosophy as a methodical discipline. See [[Definitions overview]] and [[argument analysis exercise|analysis exercise]]...

~PHIL212 introduces various philosophical skills and methods alongside the subject-matter of ideas about ethics.
| !topic | ! connected class sessions |
|[[mapping the path|dialogue map of the Euthyphro]] of a dialogue|Euthyphro|
|recognizing dilemmas|Euthyphro, King|
|analyzing overall argument structure|Crito|
|noticing the rhetorical effect of metaphors|Epictetus|
|reading a text with attention to its audience|King|
|detailed inference-analysis and diagramming|Aristotle1|
|making friendly amendments within a theory|Aristotle2|
|distilling an extended argument, paragraph by paragraph|Kant1|
|diagnosis of [[fallacies|fallacy]]|Mill2|
|thinking systematically about [[dualisms|dualism]]|Rawles, Plumwood|

Name: Elise Springer
Code: PS200-1788-9379

!!!Consider the following pivotal passage:

>But if the god-beloved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, and the pious were loved because it was pious, then the god-beloved would be loved because it was god-beloved, and if the god-beloved was god-beloved because it was loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was loved by the gods; but now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is of a nature to be loved because it is loved, the other is loved because it is of a nature to be loved. <br><br>[11a of the Euthyphro (Stephanus pagination in margin)]
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Here is the conclusion to the elenchus (cross-examination) of Euthyphro’s hypothesis at 9e (... “the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.”)]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) In the last phrase, “the one” and “the other” refer (respectively) to “the god-beloved” and “the pious.”]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The underlined phrases indicates two claims that are taken to follow from (to be consequences of) Euthyphro’s prior claims.]>
{{green{Yes. But do you see *why* they follow?
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) This passage helps illustrate why it is especially difficult for a polytheist (one who believes in multiple gods) to define piety clearly.]>
{{red{No... Note: The polytheism issue disappears after the very first round of discussion. From there on, they limit their attention to issues on which the gods are in agreement (so there might as well be just one god).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Euthyphro could have avoided this particular line of refutation if he had denied (at 10d) that the pious things are loved by the gods because  of their pious quality.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, Socrates is relying on Euthyphro’s commitment (10d) to  saying the gods’ love is BECAUSE of having a quality (piety) worth loving. If Euthyphro had denied that, then Euthyphro would be stuck with a position where the gods’ love lacks a ground or reason, and hence seems arbitrary. One reason we study the Euthyphro is that analogous difficulties appear with other values (what’s just, beautiful, lovable, etc.)
}}}
===
}}}

[>img(20%,auto)[Plato|https://media1.britannica.com/eb-media/88/149188-004-E9F3D5B9.jpg]]Plato (ca 428 BCE – 328 BCE) founded the Academy in Athens, having been a student of Socrates. He was the first philosopher in the European tradition to write extended philosophical texts that have been preserved well into modern times (Socrates himself had practiced philosophy only in direct verbal discussion, not in writing). Plato's texts usually took the form of dialogues, generally revolving around the character of Socrates in a central role, and often featuring both [[irony]] and eloquence. 
>[T]he European philosophical tradition ... consists of a series of footnotes to Plato. [A. N. Whitehead]
Scholars often group Plato's dialogues into three phases: Early dialogues (such as [[Euthyphro]] and [[Crito]] seem to reflect Socrates' own commitments in an embellished but fairly accurate portrayal. Middle dialogues continue to portray Socrates as a figure of wisdom, while in fact reflecting arguments and concerns that are more specifically Plato's own developments. The late dialogues are most complex, sometimes portraying the Socratic character in dialogue with other figures with potentially superior or equally coherent arguments.

[>img(20%,auto)[Plumwood|http://www.azquotes.com/public/pictures/authors/35/a5/35a5c58c0673cae8d8d5442921dc05dd/556eccfa58b2c_val_plumwood.jpg]]Val Plumwood (1939-2008) was an Australian philosopher and activist who articulated an ecofeminist and [[animist|animism]] critique of humans' "hyper-separation" from nature.

<<tiddler HideTiddlerTags>>
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Plumwood">>

[[<< back to Beauvoir|Beauvoir]] ... [[forward to Kohlberg>>|Kohlberg]]

!!!Plumwood calls for a re-imagining of our ourselves and our world. Her view can be compared and contrasted with others in various ways, such as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Like Mill, Plumwood notes that when a privileged class of people confines their interest to their own narrow group, the resulting stance is not just harmful to others, but ultimately limiting and harmful to their own wellbeing.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, this is roughly the point at p. 36.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b)  Like Beauvoir, Plumwood values our ability to recognize that our agency is bound up with the agency of others.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; unlike Beauvoir, Plumwood encourages us to recognize agency as suffusing the world, not restricted to particular species or life forms.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Like Epictetus, Plumwood suggests that while we cannot simply change the external world by an act of will, we can voluntarily transform our perspective and ‘renarrativize’ our lives.]>
{{red{No... There is no suggestion, in Plumwood, that we must distinguishing between the “external” world (beyond our control) and the “internal” project of shaping our own attitudes and intentions (what is “up to us”).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Plumwood appeals to a Kantian ideal of universalizability and respect, but unlike Kant, she extends these ideal to our interaction with all sentient beings. ]>
{{red{No... This is the stance of some animal rights theorists, but it still depends upon a line between sentient beings and “mere things.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e)  Like Marx, Plumwood portrays humans as uniquely able to engage in creative agency; through this agency we can transform our relationship to nature. ]>
{{red{No... Creativity is not uniquely human on her view.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Plumwood calls for a re-imagining of our ourselves and our world. Her view can be compared and contrasted with others in various ways, such as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Plumwood appeals to a Kantian ideal of universalizability and respect, but unlike Kant, she extends these ideal to our interaction with all sentient beings. ]>
{{red{No... This is the stance of some animal rights theorists, but it still depends upon a line between sentient beings and “mere things.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Like Marx, Plumwood portrays humans as uniquely able to engage in creative agency; through this agency we can transform our relationship to nature. ]>
{{red{No... Creativity is not uniquely human on her view.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Like Beauvoir, Plumwood values our ability to recognize that our agency is bound up with the agency of others.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; unlike Beauvoir, Plumwood encourages us to recognize agency as suffusing the world, not restricted to particular species or life forms.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Like Mill, Plumwood notes that when a privileged class of people confines their interest to their own narrow group, the resulting stance is not just harmful to others, but ultimately limiting and harmful to their own wellbeing.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, this is roughly the point at p. 36.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Like Epictetus, Plumwood admits that the external world cannot be changed by an act of will, but she recommends voluntarily transforming our inner perspective to ‘renarrativize’ our experience.]>
{{red{No... There is no suggestion, in Plumwood, that we must distinguishing between the “external” world (beyond our control) and the “internal” project of shaping our own attitudes and intentions (what is “up to us”).
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In “Nature in the Active Voice,” Plumwood criticizes “reductionist materialism,” about which she claims or implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Reductionist materialism should be replaced by an animist materialism that portrays all beings in the natural world as subjects with sentience, reason and rights. ]>
{{red{No... While sentience, like agency, may pervade Plumwood’s portrayal of nature, she does not suggest that reason and rights are appropriately attributed to all beings in nature.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) By asserting that the material world is inanimate, reductionist materialism amounts to affirming only one half of the older Platonic dualism between matter and spirit.]>
{{green{Yes. The hazards of imprudence are just ONE problem, but as far as it goes, this claim is true. Such attitudes ARE dangerous (as well as unjust) because they lead us to disregard long-term human interests (as well as the interests of non-humans).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Such a view is embedded in the idea of scientific knowledge and reason, and hence scientific reason stands in tension with ecological connectedness.The reduction of non-human others to inert matter — in contrast to the humans who frame themselves as knowers and choosers — facilitates exploitation of the environment.]>
{{red{No... Plumwood explicitly treats science and reason as //not// inevitably committed to reductive materialism; she presents science and reason as compatible with connectedness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) A parallel can be drawn between human-centeredness and male-centeredness, insofar as bot hof these worldviews serve the interests of a single more privileged group while neglecting the interests of a devalued group.]>
{{red{No... Plumwood does draw such a parallel, but she denies that the human-centered (or male-centered) stance is in fact beneficial to those who are “on top” in such hierarchies.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) The reduction of non-human others to inert matter — in contrast to the humans who frame themselves as knowers and choosers — facilitates exploitation of the environment.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Val Plumwood, like existentialists, is interested in creativity and agency. About these, she suggests…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) We misunderstand our own agency insofar as we fail to recognize agency in other beings, including in non-human nature.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 36: When we hyper-separate ourselves from nature and reduce it conceptually, we not only lose the ability to empathize (and to see the nonhuman sphere in ethical terms) but also get a false sense of our own character and location that includes an illusory sense of agency and autonomy.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Our failure to recognize agency in nature is dangerous to human well-being, leading us to act imprudently.]>
{{green{Yes. The hazards of imprudence are just ONE problem, but as far as it goes, this claim is true. Such attitudes ARE dangerous (as well as unjust) because they lead us to disregard long-term human interests (as well as the interests of non-humans).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) In order to re-animate the world more creatively, we need more than philosophical arguments; we need to engage in metaphor, poetry, and literature that shifts our perspective on experience.]>
{{green{Yes. Plumwood does not claim explicitly that philosophical argument is not enough, but it is implied by her concern with poetry, literature, and forms of writing that change our culture.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Creationist thinking, just like reductionist scientific views, depicts the stuff of nature as inert, incapable of action, and lacking a point of view.]>
{{green{Yes. 41
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) It would be an anthropomorphic mistake to say that animals themselves are literally “creative,” but such metaphors about nature may help us think, and live, in more sustainable ways.]>
{{red{No... The charge of anthropomorphism is itself part of the problem, she argues. 
}}}
===
}}}

The Need for a Thorough Rethink
Environmental Philosophy
Nuclear Power
Reductionism and Human/Nature [[Dualism|dualism]]
Science Consolidates the Empire
Creationism
Thinking Differently
The Role of Writing

!!!Val Plumwood argues for a position she describes as an “enriched materialism” and as a “philosophical animism,” according to which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) human beings, just like everything else in nature, are nothing more than material substances that react in lawlike ways to the forces around them.]>
{{red{No... no; this would be an extreme form of reductive materialism, which she rejects just as much as dualism (or, presumably, mentalistic idealism).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) “Shallow” environmentalism, which focuses on the sustainability of human practices, does not help us think deeply enough, even about the practices (such as nuclear power) that involve clear threats to human interests.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 37; this is one way of putting the point of that whole section on Nuclear Power.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we should celebrate imagination and metaphor rather than science and reason, since science and reason objectify nature.]>
{{red{No... On p 40 Plumwood explicitly claims that a better kind of science and reason is possible. See 40 and 46 for some distance from idealizing the “imaginary” and “[just] metaphorical.” In other words, Plumwood is wary of the very dichotomy presupposed in this question.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) When reductive materialist philosophers notice that it’s sometimes useful to speak of non-human phenomena “as if” they had mind and purpose (“Lightning seeks the ground” or “Trees prepare for years of drought...”), they should not insist that such talk is “just a metaphor.”]>
{{green{Yes. p. 40, discussion of Dennett’s “intentional stance” (though the illustrations are my own)... See also 46-47 about how the complaint of “anthropomorphism” begs the question about what’s essentially or properly human...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) we should resist creationist patterns of thought, as they depict nature itself as devoid of agency, incapable of developing or growing without the intervention of a divine will.]>
{{green{Yes. 41
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kohlberg’s theory of moral development is structured around pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional levels. Post-conventional reasoning, on this view…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) includes two stages, the first of which includes some relativist elements.]>
{{green{Yes. Stage 5 is focused on procedures for coping (fairly) with different values, while Stage 6 involves a more articulate conscience based on “self-chosen... universal principles”.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is the product of intelligence rather than experience, and hence is reached by about the same percentage of the population across cultural contexts.]>
{{red{No... Kohlberg does find his framework *confirmed* by the presence of at least some stage-6 reasoners in each cultural sample, but he never claims that intelligence (independently of environment) is sufficient to orient any person to moral development.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) requires questioning the conventions of one’s own culture, and ultimately accepting that each culture’s moral perspective is equally valid.]>
{{red{No... It’s true that post-conventional thinking requires some willingness to question one’s own culture. This does not lead, however, to anything like a relativist stance toward different views.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) is the product of intelligence rather than experience, and hence is reached by about the same percentage of the population across cultural contexts.]>
{{red{No... Kohlberg does find his framework *confirmed* by the presence of at least some stage-6 reasoners in each cultural sample, but he never claims that intelligence (independently of environment) is sufficient to orient any person to moral development.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) brings any two post-conventional moral reasoners to reach the same conclusion about a moral dilemma, because both use their reason, which is universal.]>
{{red{No... Sharing a LEVEL (or stage) of moral reasoning does not guarantee sharing a conclusion; the contents of people’s responses may still differ while the style matures. Kohlberg does emphasize some degree of “convergence” in post-conventional reasoning, because it always involves some kind of universalizing concept, but this convergence is far from guaranteeing consensus about moral problems.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kate Rawles contrasts animal conservationist views against moral theories that emphasize animal welfare, including Peter Singer’s and Tom Regan’s. About these, she would say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Singer’s view is a non-“speciesist” extension of utilitarianism: the point of morality is to promote wellbeing and prevent suffering, and no sentient being is unworthy of having its interests factored into the process of moral judgment.]>
{{green{Yes. 146-147
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Regan’s view reinforces the Kantian dichotomy between beings with dignity (intrinsic value) and beings with a price (market value), that it is still fine to treat many parts of nature as mere means to our ends.]>
{{green{Yes. 149. Kant is not mentioned, but this is precisely the dichotomy we should recognize from Kant: “We can understand this thinking, because it is often applied in the human context. This 'no trespass' view of morality divides sharply between the morally sacrosanct and those who are fair game, and lends great importance to the distinction between beings which have moral significance and those which do not.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Both Singer and Regan have used individualist and human-centered moral theories as their starting-point, and have argued for covering non-human animals within the same framework.]>
{{green{Yes. 147-150 on “extensionism” and individualism
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) By demanding that we transcend our attachments and view all interests impartially, Singer is asking us to ignore the significance of our own embodied participation in human life and committed relationships.]>
{{green{Yes. 148
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Tom Regan argues that since some non-human animals also have lives and experiences that matter to them, those animals must be respected as ends in themselves, not just used as mere means.]>
{{green{Yes. 148-149
}}}
===
}}}

!!!!Relatively recent challenge for moral theory: [>img(40%,auto)[animals|https://www.themangonews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/collage-5-721x483.jpg]]
!!!!How should we approach and evaluate our interactions with (and impact on)...
!!!non-human animals and the environment?

Rawles distinguishes two broad ways that non-human beings might take on moral significance: animal welfare approaches, and conservationist approaches...

<<forEachTiddler
    where
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    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged with \"Rawles\"//"'
>>
[<img[Rawles|http://d.pr/i/OPFR+]]
[[<< back to Mill3|Mill3]] ... [[forward to Marx>>|Marx]]

!!!In comparing conservationist views against animal welfarist views like Singer’s and Regan’s, Rawles would say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Both Singer and Regan take an “extensionist” approach: human-centered moral theories are amended to cover non-human animals within the same framework.]>
{{green{Yes. 147-150 on “extensionism” and individualism
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Singer seeks a non-“speciesist” extension of utilitarianism: to promote well-being and minimize suffering, we should factor in the interests of every sentient being.]>
{{green{Yes. 146-147
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Though Regan expands the Kantian category of beings with dignity (intrinsic value), he still treats much of nature as having only a price (market value).]>
{{green{Yes. 149. Kant is not mentioned, but this is precisely the dichotomy we should recognize from Kant: “We can understand this thinking, because it is often applied in the human context. This 'no trespass' view of morality divides sharply between the morally sacrosanct and those who are fair game, and lends great importance to the distinction between beings which have moral significance and those which do not.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Tom Regan argues that since some non-human animals also have lives and experiences that matter to them, those animals must be respected as ends in themselves, not just used as mere means.]>
{{green{Yes. 148-149
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) By demanding that we transcend our attachments and choose impartially, Singer is asking us to ignore the significance of our own lives and relationships.]>
{{green{Yes. 148
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In discussing our ethical relation to non-human individuals and species, Kate Rawles is critical of various trends in moral philosophy, including…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) the commitment to finding a single unifying kind of moral value that can be applied to the full range of moral problems.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, see p. 152
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) a “no-trespass” approach to morality, which holds that if a being has moral status, it must not be “used” or interefered with.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 148
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) a preoccupation with individuals and their traits, without regard for how those traits emerge within cultural and ecological situations.]>
{{green{Yes. See p. 150
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the idealization of entirely impartial moral choice, where special relationships and bonds are attacked as distortions of our moral perspective.]>
{{green{Yes. 147-148
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) sentimental concern for individual animals, which is contrary to a scientific focus on species.]>
{{red{No... 142: Note that Rawles does entertain the conservationist disdain for sentimentalism, speaking of a “strong temptation to go along with this.” But the next three paragraphs make clear that she resists the view summarized at the top of the page.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Rawles distinguishes conservationist and animal-welfare perspectives on our moral stance toward the non-human world, arguing or implying along the way…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Those who oppose population-culling measures are swayed by sentimental or emotional reasoning, and conservation biologists are right to resist such arguments because they are unscientific.]>
{{red{No... Rawles argues against the contempt for emotion that some conservationists associate with a scientific attitude.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Those who take an animal-welfare stance tend to advocate a “no-trespass” stance on which all animals have rights on which we should not infringe.]>
{{red{No... No -- importantly, animal-welfare thinkers tend to focus on a narrow subset of animals. (Also, many do not take the rights-based approach, but rather emphasize welfare, which can be balanced against other moral concerns.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) It is misguided to seek some single criterion that would delineate the difference between species that deserve moral consideration and species which do not.]>
{{green{Yes. This is central to Rawles’ argument: no single criterion distinguishes “morally worthy” species from those that do not deserve moral consideration. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) It follows from a conservationist perspective that we need not have any moral concern over individual animal experiences.]>
{{red{No... This is difficult: Rawles does acknowledge that some conservationists want to cull in a “humane” way, and this does imply some such concern. Still, such concern is difficult to reconcile with their basic premises. On the other hand, there certainly is room for *derivative* interest in individuals, such as the fate of a single matriarchal elephant on whom a population depends...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) A suitable solution to moral problems about the non-human world can generally be found by allowing conservationists and animal-welfare organizations to engage in a “division of labor,” each taking care of their complementary concerns.]>
{{red{No... Rawles points to some cases of complementary or dovetailing concerns, but warns against thinking that there is a “formula” in cases of conflict. She does encourage dialogue and compromise between these two camps, but without conceding that they have neatly separate areas of expertise.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In discussing animal welfarist views (such as Singer’s and Regan’s), Rawles points out…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Tom Regan’s argument begins with the concept of respect (respect for beings who are ends in themselves, not to be used as mere means) and extends it to many non-human animals.]>
{{green{Yes. 148-149
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) By demanding that we transcend our attachments and act impartially, Singer is asking us to ignore the significance of our own embodied lives and relationships.]>
{{green{Yes. 148
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Though Regan expands the Kantian category of beings with dignity (intrinsic value), he still treats much of nature as having only a price (market value).]>
{{green{Yes. 149. Kant is not mentioned, but this is precisely the dichotomy we should recognize from Kant: “We can understand this thinking, because it is often applied in the human context. This 'no trespass' view of morality divides sharply between the morally sacrosanct and those who are fair game, and lends great importance to the distinction between beings which have moral significance and those which do not.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Singer seeks a non-“speciesist” extension of utilitarianism: to promote well-being and minimize suffering, he urges us to factor in the interests of all sentient beings.]>
{{green{Yes. 146-147
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Both Singer and Regan take an “extensionist” approach: human-centered moral theories are amended to cover non-human animals within the same framework.]>
{{green{Yes. 147-150 on “extensionism” and individualism
}}}
===
}}}

/%
|Name|ToggleReadOnly|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#ToggleReadOnly|
|Version|0.0.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
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/***
|Macro|redirect (alias)|
|Author|[[Clint Checketts]] and Paul Petterson|
|Version|1.1 Jan 26, 2006|
|Location|http://checkettsweb.com/styles/themes.htm#RedirectMacro|
|Description|This macro tells TW to find all instances of a word and makes it point to a different link.  For example, whenever I put the word 'Clint' in a tiddler I want TiddlyWiki to turn it into a link that points to a tiddler titled 'Clint Checketts' Or the word 'TW' could point to a tiddler called 'TiddlyWiki' It even matches clint (which is lowercase) [[Clint]] leet lEEt LEET|
|Usage|{{{<<redirect TW TiddlyWiki>>}}}   |
|Example|<<redirect TW "TiddlyWiki">>  <<redirect Clint "Clint Checketts">> (Nothing should appear, its just setting it all up)<<redirectExact lEEt Elite>>|

!Revisions
1.1- Fixed tiddler refresh so a tiddler declaring a redirect will also render the redirect
1.0- Updated to work with TiddlyWiki 2.0 (thanks to Udo Borkowski)
0.9- Original release October 2005

!Code
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.redirectExact = {major: 1, minor: 2, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,10,24)};
config.macros.redirectExact = {label: "Pickles Rock!"};
config.macros.redirectExact.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler){
	config.macros.redirect.handler(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler);
}

version.extensions.redirect = {major: 1, minor: 2, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,10,24)};
config.macros.redirect = {label: "Pickles Rock!"};

config.macros.redirect.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler){

var redirectExists = false
// Check to see if the wikifier exists
for (var i=0;i<config.formatters.length;i++)
	if (config.formatters[i].name == "redirect"+params[0])
		redirectExists = true;

//If it doesn't exist, add it!
if (!redirectExists){
	for( var i=0; i<config.formatters.length; i++ )
		if ( config.formatters[i].name=='wikiLink') break ;

	if ( i >= config.formatters.length ) {
		var e = "Can't find formatter for wikiLink!" ;
		displayMessage( e ) ;
		throw( e ) ;
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var pattern;
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	config.formatters.splice( i, 0, {
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		match: "(?:\\b)(?:\\[\\[)?"+pattern+"(?:\\]\\])?(?:\\b)",
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			w.outputText(link,w.matchStart,w.nextMatch);
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	formatter = new Formatter(config.formatters); //update the tiddler
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} // End if
}
//}}}

!!!Socrates rejects Crito’s plan for his escape. In arguing against it, Socrates claims or implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) one should sooner die than commit an injustice.]>
{{green{Yes. He does argue just this.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) he believes that the verdict upon him was just, because the citizens who convicted him were following their conscience.]>
{{red{No... Nonsense on stilts.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) because Athens is a democracy, the preferences of the majority outweigh his own preferences.]>
{{red{No... Poppycock. He has no respect for “majority preference” in itself, and his own preferences haven’t been overridden. His own preference is to act justly, and acting justly requires following a legal process that in fact is affected by the majority vote of a jury. But Socrates never grants that their mere *opinion* has any force at all.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) he has, by living as a citizen in Athens, implicitly agreed that if he cannot persuade the jury, he must abide by its penalty.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, the existence of a “fair agreement” -- what we might call a commitment to abide by due process as a citizen -- is one of Socrates’ central premises.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) if he had been sentenced to sit in the public square and denounce his prior actions, he would have complied with the sentence.]>
{{red{No... This is tricky. His commitment to obedience seems to be limited to the body, not to allowing his own speech or actions to be the vehicle of outright misrepresentation or injustice.
}}}
===
}}}

David Wong, "Relativism"

!! i Introduction: Responses to Moral Conflicts
!!!Two types of relativism:
;Meta-ethical relativism
:truths about moral claims are themselves relative to cultural and historical factors.
;Normative relativism
:it is (always or sometimes) wrong to pass judgment on others who have different values because their values are as valid as one’s own.
; //cf// Universalism:
: in any moral conflict, both sides cannot be equally right, and there is only one truth about the matter at issue.

!! ii Meta-ethical relativism
;Claim 1: Human custom determines what is fine and ugly, just and unjust.
:Objection 1 (Obj1): Human custom may influence what people //think// is fine and just. Custom cannot be shown to determine what //is// fine and just.
::Ex: Customs sometimes change under the pressure of moral criticism.
;Claim 2: Customary ethical beliefs in any given society are functionally necessary for that society, thus making some beliefs true only for some societies (the functional argument).
:Obj 2: Moral beliefs are not justified on the grounds that they are necessary for a society’s existence.
::Ex: Showing that certain beliefs are necessary for a fascist society is not to justify those beliefs.
;Claim 3: There is such a wide variation of beliefs in human history and culture. Therefore relativism must be true (the diversity argument).
:Obj 3: Diversity in belief does not disprove the possibility of a unique truth, as it may be caused by…:
::i. varying degrees of wisdom, or
::ii. people’s limited but distorted perspectives on the truth.
;Claim 4: Moral judgments cannot be judgments about facts in the world. Two variations:
:i. Moral judgments simply express our subjective reactions to facts or happenings.
:ii. Moral judgments purport to report objective matters of fact, but there are no such matters of fact.
::Common Premise: Science demonstrates a convergence of ideas, while moral debates do not converge in such a manner, which therefore suggests that the former can succeed in reporting facts about the world while the latter cannot.
:Obj 4: It is possible to account for the fact that moral disputes resist resolution by claiming that…
::i. Moral judgments depend on understanding human nature and human affairs, which are extremely complex.
::ii. The subject matter of ethics is such that people care intensely about having their views embraced by others. Such intense interest may becloud judgment.
::iii. Different beliefs may not reflect a difference in values but simply the fact that these values have to be implemented differently, given the varying conditions of societies.
;Claim 5: The relativist argument is best conducted by pointing to particular kinds of differences in moral belief, and then claiming that these particular differences are best explained under a theory that denies the existence of a single true morality (demonstrating that the universalist position cannot sufficiently explain the particular differences in question).
: Ex: Modern Western conception of the individual vs. Confucianism: both validly place a different value at the center of an ethical ideal. There is no single justifiable way of ordering these values.
;Claim 6: Morality serves two universal human needs: it regulates
:1) interpersonal conflicts of interest
: 2) intrapersonal conflicts of interest. An adequate morality forms rules for conduct and ideals for persons that are able to deal with these needs. The complexity of human nature allows for different values to be prized and different ways of ordering the values.

!! iii Normative relativism
Claim 1: No one should ever pass judgment on others with different values.
Obj 1: Two problems:
i. An ethic of non-judgmental tolerance would self-destruct when used to condemn the intolerant.
ii. WWII made people realize that it is sometimes necessary to pass judgment at least some of the time. That war, many realized, was a war against

Claim 2: Even if there are different values that are as justified as our own from some neutral perspective,
we still are entitled to call bad or evil or monstrous what contradicts our most important values.

Claim 3: What we are entitled to do in light of such judgments is still unclear, although it seems to
depend on what other values of ours are at stake.
Ex: Consider those who think abortion is wrong. Two groups place greater value on different goods:
1) Some want to prohibit abortion, and they seem undisturbed that the moral status of the fetus is greatly debated. They place greater value on human life.
2) Others oppose legal prohibitions of abortion because they recognize that human reason seems unable to resolve the question of the moral status of the fetus. They place greater value on humility and recognition of the limits of human reason.
Each position has some force, and normative relativity offers no simple solution to the dilemma. However, this form of normative relativity may be the beginning of reflections that involves on the one hand an effort to reach an understanding with those who have substantially different values, and on the other the effort to stay true to one’s own values.
Ex: Some of those who believe abortion is the taking of a life with moral status oppose it by placing their efforts towards attempting to lessen the perceived need for abortion, by helping organizations that help unwed mothers, for example. Wong finds this example a balance of personal convictions and recognition of other perspectives.

Claim 4: The relativistic position lacks strong convictions, with a tendency towards nihilism because:
i. In the extreme version of relativism, everything is permitted, and
ii. One’s commitment to act on one’s values is dependent upon knowing that one’s morality is the only true one.
Obj 4: Values I may see as important and part of what makes life most meaningful to me may not have
to be values that all reasonable persons would accept or recognize to be true.

Questions:
1) How are meta-ethical and normative relativism related? Does normative relativism have to assume that meta-ethical relativism is true?
2) How does Wong reject Obj3ii from discounting meta-ethical relativism? If it were claimed that everyone has only a limited perspective of the truth, is not universalism still just as valid of a position to hold as the relative position is?
3) Does Wong characterize the Western conception of the individual correctly? Is it possible to claim that the Western focus on individual rights is a way of ordering society that is believed to best promote and sustain the common good?
4) Claim 6 argues that there are several adequate ways of meeting the needs of regulating conflicts of interests—Wong uses the term “adequate moralities”. Can this argument clear the combination of objections, Obj3i, Obj3ii, and Obj4iii? It seems like moral fallibilism is still a tenable position to hold in response to Wong’s considerations, a position that claims that objectively true moral standards exist, but that these standards cannot be reliably or conclusively determined by humans.

/%
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|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#ReplaceDoubleClick|
|Version|2.0.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
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Usage:
	in tiddler content:
		<<tiddler ReplaceDoubleClick>> or
		<<tiddler ReplaceDoubleClick with: key trigger>>
	in ViewTemplate:
		<span macro="tiddler ReplaceDoubleClick"></span> or
		<span macro="tiddler ReplaceDoubleClick with: key trigger"></span>
where: 
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* if no key parameter (or "none") is specified, then the double-click action is **disabled** for that tiddler.
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Revision History:
2.0.0 renamed from ShiftClickToEdit and merged with DoubleClickDisable and added support specifiying alternative key+click combination

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</script>

Opening questions for Fall 2014 semester (pre-midterm)
[[opening question sampler]]

Unit A— Authority and Conscience:
Euthyphro: [[An acceptable definition of piety...]] • Crito: [[Socrates' fair agreement with Athens...]]
[[Epictetus' apparently contrary advice...]] • [[King would comment on Ferguson case...]] 

Unit B—Aristotelian Virtue
Aristotle1: [[analysis steps for young person argument]] • Aristotle2: [[In contrast to Judeo-Christian tradition, Aristotle...]]
Aristotle3: [[Friendship, without full virtue...]] • [[Nussbaum and cross-cultural excellence...]] 

Unit C—Principle and Duty
Kant1: [[A rational being...]] • Kant2: [[Acting out of good will...]]
Kant3: [[Humans belong both to intelligible and temporal world, so...]] • [[Korsgaard supports her view with Kantian claims...]]  

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "fa14oq">>

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A young man seeks Sartre out for moral advice:
>As an example [consider] the case of a pupil of mine, who sought me out in the following circumstances. His father was quarrelling with his mother and was also inclined to be a “collaborator”; his elder brother had been killed in the German offensive of 1940 and this young man, with a sentiment somewhat primitive but generous, burned to avenge him. His mother was living alone with him, deeply afflicted by the semi-treason of his father and by the death of her eldest son, and her one consolation was in this young man. But he, at this moment, had the choice between going to England to join the Free French Forces or of staying near his mother and helping her to live. He fully realised that this woman lived only for him and that his disappearance – or perhaps his death – would plunge her into despair. He also realised that, concretely and in fact, every action he performed on his mother’s behalf would be sure of effect in the sense of aiding her to live, whereas anything he did in order to go and fight would be an ambiguous action which might vanish like water into sand and serve no purpose. For instance, to set out for England he would have to wait indefinitely in a Spanish camp on the way through Spain; or, on arriving in England or in Algiers he might be put into an office to fill up forms. Consequently, he found himself confronted by two very different modes of action; the one concrete, immediate, but directed towards only one individual; and the other an action addressed to an end infinitely greater, a national collectivity, but for that very reason ambiguous – and it might be frustrated on the way. At the same time, he was hesitating between two kinds of morality; on the one side the morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but of more debatable validity. He had to choose between those two. What could help him to choose? Could the Christian doctrine? No. Christian doctrine says: Act with charity, love your neighbour, deny yourself for others, choose the way which is hardest, and so forth. But which is the harder road? To whom does one owe the more brotherly love, the patriot or the mother? Which is the more useful aim, the general one of fighting in and for the whole community, or the precise aim of helping one particular person to live? Who can give an answer to that a priori? No one. Nor is it given in any ethical scripture. The Kantian ethic says, Never regard another as a means, but always as an end. Very well; if I remain with my mother, I shall be regarding her as the end and not as a means: but by the same token I am in danger of treating as means those who are fighting on my behalf; and the converse is also true, that if I go to the aid of the combatants I shall be treating them as the end at the risk of treating my mother as a means. <br>@@From Jean-Paul Sartre “Existentialism is a Humanism”@@ <br>    @@  (p. 344-355 in Kaufman, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre)@@

+++!!!!*[Does moral theory help?]>
* ''Kantian'' theory doesn't illuminate what his real maxim would be, or whether a more important duty lies on the unchosen side.
* ''Utilitarian'' theory can't show how to balance far-ranging but uncertain goods against local and certain ones.
* ''Virtue'' ethics cannot specify whether courage or generous care-taking is more important in this case.
===
+++!!!!*[Can Sartre's advice help?]>
Sartre's advice cannot free the young man from the burden of ambiguity: 
* If he follows Sartre's advice, he cannot pretend that it is Sartre, and not he himself, who chose the life either of struggle or of caring.
* If he seeks advice from someone who will encourage him to struggle against the occupation, then he must admit that he himself sought //that// kind of advice.
===
+++!!!!*[Does reflection on identity help?]>
Could his choice be settled by thoughts such as... ?
* I am a Jew / a Frenchman / my mother's only child.
* I am a soldier / a philosopher / a doctor.
* I am a coward / a patriot / a woman.
These considerations may illustrate ''//facticity//'' (up until now)...
{{indent{but no normative interpretation (essence) is settled.}}}
===
+++!!!!*[Choice as representative]>
Choices can only be measured by their ''authenticity'':
* Is this really the way one wills that choices be made?
* Would I bring it about that human beings act //this// way?
Choice does not put an end to freedom, but it gives shape to humanity, //discloses// the being of humanity.
Note that a ''choice'', just like a person, ''exists before its essence'' becomes clear... One chooses without knowing the real //meaning// of the choice. (consider Anna Karenina)
===
The result: anguish, forlornness.

!!!Emerson’s reflections in "Self-Reliance" suggest...
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Truth, and therefore virtue, is a matter of subjective perception; however, we must act as if our truth were everybody’s truth.]>
{{green{Yes. Important here is that Emerson focuses on perception (as opposed to accepted opinion), and his claim is not simply that whatever strikes us as true //is// true for others, but rather that it is “genius” to expect your convictions to become evident to others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) For society to progress, we must stop worshiping the past and relpace conformity with creativity.]>
{{red{No... Social progress is one of the preoccupations Emerson discourages.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) One cannot learn from others’ ideas, as all insight comes from intuition.]>
{{red{No... Emerson is ambivalent about learning from others insofar as we may idolize the teacher or genius of another; but there is no refusal to learn from others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Acts done of out of self-reliance manifest divinity.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) We should avoid affirming principles and creeds, since preoccupation with consistency only hinders our ability to live fully in the present.]>
{{red{No... Emerson recommends against worrying about consistency over time (with a past self), but not about affirming principles and creeds in the moment.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Concerning Jesus’ famous Sermon on the Mount (“Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth”), Nietzsche would comment…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) When we imagine ourselves destined to re-enact the current moment for all eternity, we will reject such fantasies of eventual reward.]>
{{green{Yes. Gay Science, 341: “What if one day or one night a demon slinked after you... “... you will have to live once more and countless times more...” Indeed, his “myth of eternal return” is designed to startle readers out of faith that their self-repression will be rewarded.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) In embracing this view, people deny the positive role of exploitation throughout civilization, and mask their own will to power.]>
{{green{Yes. Beyond Good & Evil, No. 259: 
“On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this mater; people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which ”the exploiting character”is to be absent: — that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Such slavish notions were cleverly invented and disseminated by the noble “master” class, to facilitate the exploitation of the weak.]>
{{red{No... This suggestion conflates Nietzsche’s concepts (noble vs weak) with Marx’s view that ideology always serves the purposes of (economic) exploitation. Nietzsche claims that the meek “slave” morality is the invention of a priestly class, a creative form of their own will to power. Nietzsche’s “noble” or “master” class is depicted as too straightforward and honest to have recourse to such convoluted psychological tactics.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Insofar as this idea represents a creative innovation in values, it is to be admired.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, priests are admired for this “transvaluation of values”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) In practice, this view is bound up with resentment toward those who rule the earth in the present — those “evil” ones who reject meekness.]>
{{green{Yes. Genealogy of Morals, No 4: 
“revolt of the slaves... begins in the very principle of resentment... — a resentment experienced by creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge.”
}}}
===
}}}

>"If someone's state [of character] would make him feel disgrace if he were to do a disgraceful action, and because of this he thinks he is decent, that is absurd. For shame is concerned with what is voluntary, and the decent person will never willingly do base actions."  CIT: Book IV, 1128b, 26 
|After outlining intermediate states and deeming them virtuous, Aristotle lays out his concept of shame; he rejects the notion that a virtuous person could take part in action that would cause "a fear of disrepute." With this claim, he implicitly dismisses the possibility that a human at a specific moment could act in a certain way and later -- after significant experience of learning -- come to disapprove of this action. His denial of the occasion for retrospect is troubling to the theorist who values the evolution of habits based on experiences. Aristotle might respond that a truly virtuous person needs only the period of youth (when "shame is suitable") to gather from experiences the morality on which to base future actions. (120 words)|

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PHIL 212 at Wesleyan University   • • • • • <<toggleSideBar "Show contents" "Reveal Right-hand menu" hide>>

Introduction to Ethics

[>img(20%,auto)[Socrates bust|https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a4/Socrates_Louvre.jpg]]Socrates (ca 469BCE – 399BCE) was a philosopher in Athens, but his own ideas and concerns are preserved only through others' writings, as he conducted philosophy only through verbal discussion. Though most of Plato's dialogues involve the character of Socrates, only in the very early dialogues do we find anything like a realistic presentation of the historical Socrates, who was Plato's teacher. In his later work, Plato took more and more liberty in having Socrates' voice present ideas that were distinctively Plato's own. In addition to Plato himself, the school of [[Stoic]] philosophers, including [[Epictetus]], often invoke Socrates as a kind of icon of wisdom.

!!!Socrates claims, in his dialogue with Crito, that he has entered into a fair agreement with the city of Athens. According to Socrates, this agreement, or “contract”…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) is fair partly because it has allowed Socrates a voice in creating and challenging specific laws, and has given him a chance to offer arguments to a jury.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. HOWEVER, you could argue that the role of creating specific laws -- or the role of a jury -- are not explicitly thematized, making this claim not entirely supported by the text. (I'll accept either response.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) demands that he suffer — in silence — whenever the state commands him to do something he believes is wrong.]>
{{red{No... The context clearly specifies an “either - or” here: he must persuade the city or suffer in silence...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) has been binding on him ever since birth, since the role of the state is like the role of parents.]>
{{red{No... Socrates clearly appeals to his voluntary choices as an adult, in explaining why the contract is binding on him. Still, the question of the relation between children and the state is an interesting one. (The appeal to the state as parent-like has a rhetorical role in convincing Crito, but does not seem as central in Socrates’ own reasoning.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) would require him to obey the law even if obedience involved committing unjust acts.]>
{{green{Yes. Probably not, but controversial. (I'll accept either response.) The text is not clear enough on this matter. Note that Socrates says he may be commanded into war and risk being “wounded or killed,” but he does not explicitly discuss whether obedience would involve actively doing whatever the state says, as opposed to “suffering the consequences” imposed by the state on those who do not carry out the acts it commands. It's more consistent with Socrates' overall view to claim that no person can reasonably enter into a contract that he/she understands as potentially requiring wrongdoing. At most, the contract might specify penalties for passive resistance.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) requires him to accept the opinion of the majority, because the majority make the laws.]>
{{red{No... Poppycock. He has no respect for “majority opinion” in itself, and his own beliefs have not been overriden. Acting justly requires following a legal process that in fact is affected by the majority vote of a jury. But Socrates never grants that their mere *opinion* should be accepted.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Based on evidence from the Crito dialogue, we can say that Socrates endorses the following ideas about acting rightly…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) A person benefits more from acting rightly than from acting wrongly.]>
{{green{Yes. 48b: the most important thing is not life, but the good life... [which is the same ] the beautiful life, and the just life... 49b: wrongdoing is in every way harmful and shameful to the wrongdoer... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) One must conform to any just agreements one has made.]>
{{green{Yes. 49e: when one has come to an agreement that is just with someone, ... one should fulfill it.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) He must ultimately accept the beliefs that have been officially endorsed by the democratic majority.]>
{{red{No... 44c: Why should we care so much for what the majority think?  and 47a: one must not value all the opinions of men, but some and not others... [only] the good opinions ... of the wise.  50c does speak of “respecting the judgments” of the city, but that need not mean agreeing with the beliefs of the majority.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) It is always right to follow the laws of the state, regardless of whether one has any say in those laws.]>
{{red{No... 52a: “Yet we only propose things, we do not issue savage commands to do whatever we order; we give two alternatives, either to persuade us or to do what we say. ...” This matter does seem pivotal to Socrates’ sense that his agreement with the city was a *just* one...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) It is not right for people to cause harm in retaliation for the harms inflicted on them.]>
{{green{Yes. 49c: One should never do wrong in return, nor injure any man, whatever injury one has suffered at his hands.
}}}
===
}}}

>The position of  Lawrence and Matsuda can be clarified and elaborated using ''J. L. Austin’s distinction'' between perlocutionary effects and illocutionary force. The ''perlocutionary effects'' of an utterance consist of its causal effects on the hearer: infuriariting her, persuading her, frightening her, and so on. The ''illocutionary force'' of an utterance consists of the kind of speech act one is performing in making the utterance: ''advising, warning, stating, claiming, arguing,'' and so on. Lawrence and Matsuda are ... are suggesting that hate speech can inflict a wrong in virtue of its illocutionary acts, the very speech acts performed in the utterances of such speech. <br> ... it is the wrong of ''treating a person as having inferior moral standing.'' (Altman, 309)

>It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely. ... [Yet] many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake — the ''mistake of taking //as straightforward statements of fact//'' ''utterances which are'' either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) ''nonsensical or'' else ''intended as something quite different''. (Austin, //How To Do Things With Words//, p. 2)

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Our in-class discussion-opening questions will appear here after being discussed in class. Click on a tab to see the question; within each question, you may click on each response to test your understanding of the text.  
(//See also [[parallel questions chart]] for exam study.//)
+++!![Unit A:]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "sp19a">>===
+++!![Unit B:]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "sp19b">>===
+++!![Unit C:]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "sp19c">>===
+++!![Unit D:]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "sp19d">>===
+++!![Unit E:]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "sp19e">>===
+++!![Unit F:]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "sp19f">>===
/%
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%/

True Friendship
>“This raises a puzzle: Do friends really wish their friend to have the greatest good…If, then, we have been right to say that one friend wishes good things to the other for the sake of the other himself, the other must remain whatever sort of being he is” (Book VIII, Chapter 7, 1159a10).
|Aristotle argues that true friendship is one of the most important things in a person’s life. Without friends, one would not have anyone to share their pleasures or pains with and thus would lead a lonely and unfulfilling life even if they were a virtuous person. We wish for our true friends “good things”, but with these wishes, we do not want them to become different people. If a friend does not stick with you when you achieve the “greatest good”, are they really your friend? If you receive the good thing that you want, and it manages to change you for the better, is it not your friends’ duty to appreciate your growth and development as a person?(119 words)|@@@@|

!!!King’s stance in “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” echoes a few Socratic and stoic themes. For example…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Like Socrates, King argues that accepting legal penalties (despite being at odds with the majority that persecutes him) is part of showing an ultimate respect for law.]>
{{green{Yes. This is a crucial similarity.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) King, like Socrates in the Crito, relies on a distinction between the earthly realm of the body and the timeless realm of the soul.]>
{{red{No... Though some religious thinkers invoke a dramatic distinction between earthly matters and spiritual ones, King specifically calls this dualism a false and non-Biblical attitude.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Like Socrates, King carefully addresses a specific audience, taking a hopeful stance toward them despite evidence that they resist taking his concerns seriously.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Like Epictetus, King believes that a person should focus on what is “up to them” and cannot really by harmed by externals.]>
{{red{No... This is a point of difference: King argues that segregation (something “external”) is able to “distort” and “damage” people. Also, if “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice anywhere,” then a person can’t be confident (as Socrates and Epictetus seemed to be) that their own soul is unaffected by unjust social conditions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Like Epictetus, King is committed to a process of reflection and discussion that allows him to persist conscientiously in the face of scorn and threats of violence.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

A philosophical school (including Zeno of Citium, [[Epictetus]], and Marcus Aurelius) emphasizing the faculty of choice as the core of a person or self.
----
For the Stoics, wisdom means not just knowledge but a commitment to self-cultivation, which involves developing one's faculty of choice and rejecting the craving for "external" goods which are not under one's control. Although Stoics appeal to reason, their conception of reason is not a priori, but informed by experience. See [[Perspective bias]].
Many interesting comparisons and contrasts can be drawn with Buddhist thought and with [[Kantian]] philosophy.

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.viewer th, .viewer td, .viewer tr,.viewer caption,.twtable th, .twtable td, .twtable tr,.twtable caption {padding-left:6px; padding-right: 6px; border: 1px black;}
.viewer th, .viewer thead td, .twtable th, .twtable thead td {color: #030; background: #db7; }
.viewer tr.oddRow { background-color: #ffe; }
.viewer tr.evenRow { background-color: #eed; }

.editor input, .editor textarea {display:block; width:100%; height: 100%; font:inherit;}

div[tags~="epigraphs"].viewer { border-top: 1px solid ColorT3; border-left: 1px solid ColorT3; padding: 1em 2em 0em 2em; margin-right: 1em; background-image: url('espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/quote.gif'); background-repeat: no-repeat; }


[[StyleSheetShortcuts]]

a {color:inherit} 
#header {background-image: none;}
.header {background-image: none; font-family:Trebuchet MS,Optima; }
.headerShadow {color:#775; padding: 1em .2em .8em .8em;}
.headerShadow a {color:#775; text-decoration:none; border:none; }
.headerForeground {padding: 1em .2em .8em .8em;}
.siteTitle {font-size:1.6em; }
.siteSubtitle .button {font-size: .6em; border:none;}
body {background-image: none; font-size:1em; font-family:trebuchet; margin:0; padding:0;}
#mainMenu {background: #d3bb7d; color: #d3bb7d; width: 1em;text-align: right;line-height: 1.3em;padding: 1em 0.2em 0.5em 0.5em;font-size: .25em;}
#mainMenu blockquote {line-height: 1em;padding: 0.1em;margin: .2em;}
#displayArea {margin: 0em 15em 0em 1em;padding: 1em;}
#sidebar a {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
#sidebar a:hover {color:white;}
#sidebarOptions {padding-top: 0.3em;line-height: 1.5em;}
#sidebarOptions a {margin: .1em 0.2em;padding: 0.2em 0.1em;border: none; display: inline;line-height: 1.3em;}
#sidebarOptions input {margin: 0.2em 0.1em;}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {margin-left: 1em;padding: 0.5em;font-size: .85em;}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a {font-weight: bold;display: inline;padding: 0;}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel input {margin: 0 0 .3em 0;}
#sidebarTabs .tab {background-color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
#sidebarTabs .tab:hover {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected {z-index:1;background-color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; padding-bottom:0;}
#sidebarTabs .tabUnselected:hover {color: #000; background-color: #fff;}
#sidebarTabs .tabContents {z-index:2;padding-left: 2em; text-indent: -1em; }
#sidebarTabs .tabContents a {font-weight: normal;}
.tab {margin:0em 0em 0em .5em; padding:2px; border-bottom: none; background-color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
.tabContents {border: none; background: [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
.subtitle {font-size: .9em;}
.toolbar a {padding: 1px; border:none; font-size:.8em;}
.tiddler {padding: 2px 10px 7px 8px; font-size: 9pt; border:none; }
.title {border-top: 1px [[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; border-left: 1px [[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]];}
.tiddler.selected {padding: 1px 9px 6px 7px; background-color: #ffd; border: 1px solid; border-color: #ccc; }
.selected .title {color: #030; border-top: 1px [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-left: 1px [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
ul {margin-top: .4em; margin-bottom: .4em; }
h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {margin-top:.4em; margin-bottom: 3px; text-indent: -1em; border:none; }
h2 .button, h3 .button, h4 .button {text-decoration: none; color: inherit;}
.viewer {padding-left: 1.5em;}
.viewer .tab {color:black; }
.viewer .tabSelected {background-color:#ddb;}
.viewer .tabContents {background: #eec;}
.viewer table, table.twtable {border: 1px black; ; padding: .4em; margin:.4em .4em;}
.viewer th, .viewer td, .viewer tr,.viewer caption,.twtable th, .twtable td, .twtable tr,.twtable caption {padding:.6em; v-align:top; margin:0px 5px 0px 5px; vertical-align:top; }
.viewer tr.oddCol { background-color: transparent; }
.viewer tr.evenColumn { background-color: #ffd; }
.viewer a {border-bottom:1px dotted #1b6; font-weight: normal; color: #888; }
.viewer a:hover {background: [[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; color: black; }
.viewer .button {border: none; border-bottom:1px solid #3d9; color: normal;}
.viewer h2 a, .viewer h3 a, .viewer h4 a {color: #158; font-weight: bold; padding: 4px; border-top: 1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-left:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-bottom: none;}
.viewer h2 a {color: #047; font-weight: bold; padding: 4px; border-top: 2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-left:2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-bottom: none;}
.viewer h2, .viewer h3, .viewer h4, {color: #409; text-decoration: none; border: none; margin-top:2px; border-top: 1px #185;}
.viewer h2, .viewer h3 {border:none; margin-top:.8em; color: normal; padding-left:-1.5em; border-top: 1px #185;}
.viewer blockquote {background-color: white; filter:alpha(opacity=70);opacity:0.7;background-image: url('http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/quotesm.png'); background-repeat: no-repeat; line-height:1.2em; padding: .8em 1.3em .8em 40px; margin:2px; border:2px dotted #888; font-family:Bookman,Georgia,Times;}
.marked {background:transparent; color:#195 !important; font-family: Chalkboard,Optima,Comic Sans MS,Trebuchet MS; font-style:italic; font-size: 85%; line-height: 90%;}
.marked a { color:#074;}

.viewer img {padding: 3px; float:right;}
.editor input, .editor textarea {display:block; width:100%; height: 100%; font:inherit;}

div[tags~="commentary"].viewer { border-top: 1px solid ColorT3; border-left: 1px solid ColorT3; padding: 1em 2em 0em 2em; margin-right: 1em; background-image: url('espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/quote.gif'); background-repeat: no-repeat; }

body div#toolTip {background:#221;}

.floatingPanel { position:absolute;z-index:1000;filter:alpha(opacity=75);opacity:0.75;width:240px;background:#221;border:2px double #ffd;text-align:left;padding:5px;min-height:1em;-moz-border-radius:4px; color: #fff; font-family: Chalkboard,Optima,Comic Sans MS,Trebuchet MS; }

.floatingPanel p { margin:0;padding:2px;color:#fff;font:11px/12px; font-family:  Chalkboard,Optima,Comic Sans MS; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic; word-break:normal;display:block;overflow:hidden;}

div.tc-tagged-excludeLists {
background-color: #911;
}

/*{{{*/
body {background:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}

a {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
a:hover {background-color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}
a img {border:0;}

h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 {color:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryDark]]; background:transparent;}
h1 {border-bottom:2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}
h2,h3 {border-bottom:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}

.button {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::Background]];}
.button:hover {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; border-color:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryMid]];}
.button:active {color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryMid]]; border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::SecondaryDark]];}

.header {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
.headerShadow {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}
.headerShadow a {font-weight:normal; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}
.headerForeground {color:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}
.headerForeground a {font-weight:normal; color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]];}

.tabSelected{color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]];
	background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]];
	border-left:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];
	border-top:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];
	border-right:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];
}
.tabUnselected {color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
.tabContents {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}
.tabContents .button {border:0;}

#sidebar {}
#sidebarOptions input {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]];}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a {border:none;color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:hover {color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
#sidebarOptions .sliderPanel a:active {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]]; background:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}

.wizard {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]]; border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
.wizard h1 {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; border:none;}
.wizard h2 {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; border:none;}
.wizardStep {background:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];
	border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
.wizardStep.wizardStepDone {background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}
.wizardFooter {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]];}
.wizardFooter .status {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}
.wizard .button {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; border: 1px solid;
	border-color:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryPale]] [[ColorPalette::SecondaryDark]] [[ColorPalette::SecondaryDark]] [[ColorPalette::SecondaryPale]];}
.wizard .button:hover {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; background:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}
.wizard .button:active {color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; background:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; border: 1px solid;
	border-color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]] [[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]] [[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]] [[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]];}

#messageArea {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::SecondaryMid]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}
#messageArea .button {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryPale]]; border:none;}

.popupTiddler {background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; border:2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}

.popup {background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]]; border-left:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-top:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border-right:2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]]; border-bottom:2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}
.popup hr {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]]; border-bottom:1px;}
.popup li.disabled {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
.popup li a, .popup li a:visited {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; border: none;}
.popup li a:hover {background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; border: none;}
.popup li a:active {background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryPale]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; border: none;}
.popupHighlight {background:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}
.listBreak div {border-bottom:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}

.tiddler .defaultCommand {font-weight:bold;}

.shadow .title {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}

.title {color:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryDark]];}
.subtitle {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}

.toolbar {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
.toolbar a {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}
.selected .toolbar a {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
.selected .toolbar a:hover {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}

.tagging, .tagged {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]]; background-color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryPale]];}
.selected .tagging, .selected .tagged {background-color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]]; border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
.tagging .listTitle, .tagged .listTitle {color:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]];}
.tagging .button, .tagged .button {border:none;}

.footer {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}
.selected .footer {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}

.sparkline {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryPale]]; border:0;}
.sparktick {background:[[ColorPalette::PrimaryDark]];}

.error, .errorButton {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; background:[[ColorPalette::Error]];}
.warning {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryPale]];}
.lowlight {background:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryLight]];}

.zoomer {background:none; color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]]; border:3px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}

.imageLink, #displayArea .imageLink {background:transparent;}

.annotation {background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; border:2px solid [[ColorPalette::SecondaryMid]];}

.viewer .listTitle {list-style-type:none; margin-left:-2em;}
.viewer .button {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::SecondaryMid]];}
.viewer blockquote {border-left:3px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}

.viewer table, table.twtable {border:2px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}
.viewer th, .viewer thead td, .twtable th, .twtable thead td {background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryMid]]; border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}
.viewer td, .viewer tr, .twtable td, .twtable tr {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}

.viewer pre {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryPale]];}
.viewer code {color:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryDark]];}
.viewer hr {border:0; border-top:dashed 1px [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]]; color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}

.highlight, .marked {background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]];}

.editor input {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]];}
.editor textarea {border:1px solid [[ColorPalette::PrimaryMid]]; width:100%;}
.editorFooter {color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}

#backstageArea {background:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; color:[[ColorPalette::TertiaryMid]];}
#backstageArea a {background:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; border:none;}
#backstageArea a:hover {background:[[ColorPalette::SecondaryLight]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; }
#backstageArea a.backstageSelTab {background:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}
#backstageButton a {background:none; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; border:none;}
#backstageButton a:hover {background:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; border:none;}
#backstagePanel {background:[[ColorPalette::Background]]; border-color: [[ColorPalette::Background]] [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]] [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]] [[ColorPalette::TertiaryDark]];}
.backstagePanelFooter .button {border:none; color:[[ColorPalette::Background]];}
.backstagePanelFooter .button:hover {color:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]];}
#backstageCloak {background:[[ColorPalette::Foreground]]; opacity:0.6; filter:'alpha(opacity:60)';}
/*}}}*/

/***
|Name|StyleSheetShortcuts|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#StyleSheetShortcuts|
|Version||
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <<br>>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|CSS|
|Requires||
|Overrides||
|Description|CSS classes for common formatting styles|
***/

/***
These 'style tweaks' can be easily included in other stylesheet tiddler so they can share a baseline look-and-feel that can then be customized to create a wide variety of 'flavors'.
***/
/*{{{*/

/* text alignments */
.left
	{ display:block;text-align:left; }
.floatleft
	{ float:left; }
.right	
	{ display:block;text-align:right; }
.floatright
	{ float:right; }
.clear
	{ clear:both; }
.center
	{ display:block;text-align:center; }
.wrap
	{ white-space:normal }
.nowrap
	{ white-space:nowrap }

/* font sizes */
.big
	{ font-size:14pt;line-height:120% }
.medium
	{ font-size:12pt;line-height:120% }
.normal
	{ font-size:9pt;line-height:120% }
.small
	{ font-size:8pt;line-height:120% }
.fine
	{ font-size:7pt;line-height:120% }
.tiny
	{ font-size:6pt;line-height:120% }
.larger
	{ font-size:120%; }
.smaller
	{ font-size:80%; }

/* font styles */
.bold
	{ font-weight:bold; }
.italics
	{ font-style:italics; }
.underline
	{ text-decoration:underline; }

/* borderless tables */
.borderless, .borderless table, .borderless td, .borderless tr, .borderless th, .borderless tbody
	{ border:0 !important; margin:0 !important; padding:0 !important; }

/* thumbnail images (fixed-sized scaled images) */
.thumbnail img { height:5em !important; }

/* grouped content */
.outline
	{ display:block; padding:1em; -moz-border-radius:1em; border:1px solid; }
.menubox
	{ display:block; padding:1em; -moz-border-radius:1em; border:1px solid; background:#fff; color:#000; }
.menubox a, .menubox .button, .menubox .tiddlyLinkExisting, .menubox .tiddlyLinkNonExisting
	{ color:#009 !important; }
.groupbox
	{ display:block; padding:1em; font-family: Times; -moz-border-radius:1em; border:1px solid; background:#ffe; color:#000; }
.groupbox a, .groupbox .button, .groupbox .tiddlyLinkExisting, .groupbox .tiddlyLinkNonExisting
	{ color:#009 !important; }
.groupbox code
	{ color:#333 !important; }
.indent
	{ margin:0;padding:0 ;border:0; margin-left: 3em;}
.borderleft
	{ margin:0;padding:0;border:0;margin-left:1em; border-left:1px dotted; padding-left:.5em; }
.borderright
	{ margin:0;padding:0;border:0;margin-right:1em; border-right:1px dotted; padding-right:.5em; }
.borderbottom
	{ margin:0;padding:1px 0;border:0;border-bottom:1px dotted; margin-bottom:1px; padding-bottom:1px; }
.bordertop
	{ margin:0;padding:0;border:0;border-top:1px dotted; margin-top:1px; padding-top:1px; }

/* compact form */
.smallform
	{ white-space:nowrap; }
.smallform input, .smallform textarea, .smallform button, .smallform checkbox, .smallform radio, .smallform select
	{ font-size:8pt; }

/* colors */
.green { color:#090 !important }
.red { color:#e44 !important }
.blue { color:#44e !important }

/*}}}*/

!!!MIDTERM REVIEW SESSION: Sunday evening 7-9 with Chris Bryan and Alea Laidlaw (TAs). See their email for details.
!! Possible essay prompts available.
!! Come discuss likely alternative questions for multi-choices section.

Each semester's TAs may choose to lead discussion on a related theme (and reading) of their choice.
For Spring 2019, TA choice readings include:
[[McMahan|Just war case study…]] (chosen by Chris Bryan)
[[Kimmerer|Kimmerer's ethics of reciprocity…]] (chosen by Alea Laidlaw)

Monday focus: Alea Laidlaw (alaidlaw@wes)
Wednesday focus: Chris Bryan (cbryan@wes)

/***
|Name|TabEditPlugin|
|Created by|SaqImtiaz|
|Location|http://tw.lewcid.org/#TabEditPlugin|
|Version|0.32|
|Requires|~TW2.x|

!Description
Makes editing of tabs easier.

!Usage
*Double click a tab to edit the source tiddler
*Double click outside the tabset to edit the containing tiddler. 

!Demo
TestTabs

!History
*28-04-06, v0.32 - fixed previous bug fix!
*27-04-06, v0.31 - fixed conflicts with tabs created using PartTiddler.
*26-04-06, v0.30 - first public release

***/

//{{{

//tab on double click event handler
Story.prototype.onTabDblClick = function(e){
        if (!e) var e = window.event;
        var theTarget = resolveTarget(e);
        var title= this.getAttribute("source");
        if ((version.extensions.PartTiddlerPlugin)&&(title.indexOf("/")!=-1))
                 {if (!oldFetchTiddler.call(this, [title]))
                              {return false;}}   
        story.displayTiddler(theTarget,title,2,false,null)
        e.cancelBubble = true;
        if (e.stopPropagation) e.stopPropagation();
        return false;
        }

config.macros.tabs.switchTab = function(tabset,tab)
{
	var cookie = tabset.getAttribute("cookie");
	var theTab = null
	var nodes = tabset.childNodes;
	for(var t=0; t<nodes.length; t++)
		if(nodes[t].getAttribute && nodes[t].getAttribute("tab") == tab)
			{
			theTab = nodes[t];
			theTab.className = "tab tabSelected";
			}
		else
			nodes[t].className = "tab tabUnselected"
	if(theTab)
		{
		if(tabset.nextSibling && tabset.nextSibling.className == "tabContents")
			tabset.parentNode.removeChild(tabset.nextSibling);
		var tabContent = createTiddlyElement(null,"div",null,"tabContents",null);
		tabset.parentNode.insertBefore(tabContent,tabset.nextSibling);
		var contentTitle = theTab.getAttribute("content");

                //set source attribute equal to title of tiddler displayed in tab
		tabContent.setAttribute("source",contentTitle);
		//add dbl click event
		tabContent.ondblclick = story.onTabDblClick;

		wikify(store.getTiddlerText(contentTitle),tabContent,null,store.getTiddler(contentTitle));
		if(cookie)
			{
			config.options[cookie] = tab;
			saveOptionCookie(cookie);
			}
		}
}

//}}}

Note: This tab handles editing functions only, and does not offer links to content. 
<<permaview>> • <<newTiddler>> • <<saveChanges>> • <<tiddler TspotSidebar>> • <<slider chkSliderOptionsPanel OptionsPanel "options »" "Change TiddlyWiki advanced options">> 
<<tabs txtMoreTab "tags" "Tiddlers by tag" TabTags "abs" "Missing tiddlers" TabMoreMissing "orph" "Orphaned tiddlers" TabMoreOrphans "shad" "Shadowed tiddlers" TabMoreShadowed>>

<<allTagsExcept systemConfig excludeSearch excludeLists systemTiddlers systemConfigDisable pending plugins script>>

config.macros.tagsTree = {
	expand : "+",
	collapse : "–",
	depth : 6,
	level : 1,
	sortField : "",	
	labelField : "",
	styles : ["h1","h2","h3","h4","h5","h6"],
	trees : {}
}

config.macros.tagsTree.handler = function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler)
{
	var root = params[0] ? params[0] : (tiddler ? tiddler.title : null);
	var excludeTag = params[1] ? params[1] : "excludeTagsTree";
	var level = params[2] ? params[2] : config.macros.tagsTree.level;
	var depth = params[3] ? params[3] : config.macros.tagsTree.depth;
	var sortField = params[4] ? params[4] : config.macros.tagsTree.sortField;
	var labelField = params[5] ? params[5] : config.macros.tagsTree.labelField;
	var showButtons = (level>0);
	var id = config.macros.tagsTree.getId(place);
	if (config.macros.tagsTree.trees[id]==undefined) config.macros.tagsTree.trees[id]={};
	config.macros.tagsTree.createSubTree(place,id,root,excludeTag,[],level>0 ? level : 1,depth, sortField, labelField,showButtons);
}

config.macros.tagsTree.createSubTree = function(place, id, root, excludeTag, ancestors, level, depth, sortField, labelField,showButtons){
	var childNodes = root ? this.getChildNodes(root, ancestors) : this.getRootTags(excludeTag);
	var isOpen = (level>0) || (!showButtons);
	if (root && this.trees[id][root]!=undefined) isOpen = this.trees[id][root]; 
	if (root && ancestors.length) {
		var t = store.getTiddler(root);
		if (childNodes.length && depth>0) {
			var wrapper = createTiddlyElement(place , this.styles[Math.min(Math.max(ancestors.length,1),6)-1],null,"branch");
			if (showButtons) {
				b = createTiddlyButton(wrapper, isOpen ? config.macros.tagsTree.collapse : config.macros.tagsTree.expand, null, config.macros.tagsTree.onClick);
				b.setAttribute("treeId",id);
				b.setAttribute("tiddler",root);					
			}
			createTiddlyText(createTiddlyLink(wrapper, root),t&&labelField ? t.fields[labelField] ? t.fields[labelField] : root : root);
		}
		else 
			createTiddlyText(createTiddlyLink(place, root,false,"leaf"),t&&labelField ? t.fields[labelField] ? t.fields[labelField] : root : root);
	}
	if (childNodes.length && depth) {
		var d = createTiddlyElement(place,"div",null,"subtree");
		d.style.display= isOpen ? "block" : "none";
		if (sortField)
			childNodes.sort(function(a, b){
				var fa=a.fields[sortField];
				var fb=b.fields[sortField];
				return (fa==undefined && fb==undefined) ? a.title < b.title ? -1 : a.title > b.title ? 1 : 0 : (fa==undefined && fb!=undefined) ? 1 :(fa!=undefined && fb==undefined) ? -1 : fa < fb ? -1 : fa > fb ? 1 : 0;
			})
		for (var cpt=0; cpt<childNodes.length; cpt++)
			this.createSubTree(d, id, childNodes[cpt].title, excludeTag, ancestors.concat(root), level-1, depth-1, sortField, labelField, showButtons);	
	}	
}

config.macros.tagsTree.onClick = function(e){
	var id = this.getAttribute("treeId");
	var tiddler = this.getAttribute("tiddler");	
	var n = this.parentNode.nextSibling;
	var isOpen = n.style.display != "none";
	if(config.options.chkAnimate && anim && typeof Slider == "function")
		anim.startAnimating(new Slider(n,!isOpen,null,"none"));
	else
		n.style.display = isOpen ? "none" : "block";
	this.firstChild.nodeValue = isOpen ? config.macros.tagsTree.expand : config.macros.tagsTree.collapse;
	config.macros.tagsTree.trees[id][tiddler]=!isOpen;
	return false;
}

config.macros.tagsTree.getChildNodes = function(root ,ancestors){
	var childs = store.getTaggedTiddlers(root);
	var result = new Array();
	for (var cpt=0; cpt<childs.length; cpt++)
		if (childs[cpt].title!=root && ancestors.indexOf(childs[cpt].title)==-1) result.push(childs[cpt]);
	return result;
}

config.macros.tagsTree.getRootTags = function(excludeTag){
	var tags = store.getTags(excludeTag);
	tags.sort(function(a,b) {return a[0].toLowerCase() < b[0].toLowerCase() ? -1 : (a[0].toLowerCase() == b[0].toLowerCase() ? 0 : +1);});
	var result = new Array();
	for (var cpt=0; cpt<tags.length; cpt++) {
		var t = store.getTiddler(tags[cpt][0]);
		if (!t || t.tags.length==0) result.push(t ? t : {title:tags[cpt][0],fields:{}});
	}
	return result;
}

config.macros.tagsTree.getId = function(element){
	while (!element.id && element.parentNode) element=element.parentNode;
	return element.id ? element.id : "<html>";
}

config.shadowTiddlers.TagsTreeStyleSheet = "/*{{{*/\n";
config.shadowTiddlers.TagsTreeStyleSheet +=".leaf, .subtree {display:block; margin-left : 0.5em}\n";
config.shadowTiddlers.TagsTreeStyleSheet +=".subtree {margin-bottom:0.5em}\n";
config.shadowTiddlers.TagsTreeStyleSheet +="#mainMenu {text-align:left}\n";
config.shadowTiddlers.TagsTreeStyleSheet +=".branch .button {border:1px solid #DDD; color:#AAA;font-size:9px;padding:0 2px;margin-right:0.3em;vertical-align:middle;text-align:center;}\n";
config.shadowTiddlers.TagsTreeStyleSheet +="/*}}}*/";

store.addNotification("TagsTreeStyleSheet", refreshStyles); 

config.shadowTiddlers.MainMenu="<<tagsTree>>"

config.shadowTiddlers.PageTemplate = config.shadowTiddlers.PageTemplate.replace(/id='mainMenu' refresh='content' /,"id='mainMenu' refresh='content' force='true' ")

!!!Korsgaard reminds us that Kant’s Categorical Imperative is formulated in three different ways, and she argues…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) the Formulation of Universalizability (“Act only on that maxim such that you can also will it to be a universal law of nature”) is the most formal, and therefore the most morally rigorous, of Kant’s ways of expressing the Categorical Imperative.]>
{{red{No... This formula is indeed the most “formal” -- but that’s why it allows for the “loophole” of a deceptive or coercise maxim (one that can be universalized only because its “victims” are already counting on victimizing us). 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends” formula represents an attractive ideal of human relations, though we should develop a non-ideal theory to handle some real-world cases of evil.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed, this is Korsgaard’s main project (134-135)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that the Formula of Universalizability (Kant’s first formulation) permits some actions that would not be permissible according to the Formula of Humanity.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the central premise of Korsgaard's argument that there is a version of Kantian theory that would allow some lies.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that regardless of whether Kant's three formulations are equivalent (whichever way we formulate Kant’s Categorical Imperative*), we should recognize that those who lie are morally responsible for any bad consequences of that lie.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; Korsgaard thinks the formulations pull apart, but she still endorses this Kantian line about consequences, for example on p. 143: 
>"... [T]he liar tries to take the consequences out of the hands of others; he, and not they, will determine what form their contributions to destiny will take. By refusing to share with others the determination of events, the liar takes the world into his own hands, and makes the events his own. The results, good or bad, are imputable to him, at least in his own conscience. It does not follow from //this//, of course, that this is a risk one will never want to take.
*"OK" score for not circling this response, given that some of Korsgaard's discussion of the Universal Law formula does seem to imply that //according to that formula// each of us is "off the hook," morally speaking, whenever we deceive those who are trying to deceive us, etc. In fact, however, the only reason to retreat to such a technical rationale is to thwart evil results, and those who turn their moral agency to this purpose must be judged by their success.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the Formula of Humanity implies that we have a perfect duty to prevent evil, and hence to lie if doing so is necessary to prevent evil.]>
{{red{No... Preventing evil is not the kind of thing we can have a duty to accomplish; also the Formula of Humanity is the stricter one, which does not justify treating even one person as an obstacle or means.
}}}
===
}}}

/***
|''Name:''|TiddlerAliasPlugin|
|''Version:''|1.0.0 BETA 3 (2006-09-23)|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/Beta.html#TiddlerAliasPlugin|
|''Author:''|UdoBorkowski (ub [at] abego-software [dot] de)|
|''Licence:''|[[BSD open source license (abego Software)|http://www.abego-software.de/legal/apl-v10.html]]|
|''Copyright:''|&copy; 2006 [[abego Software|http://www.abego-software.de]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.1.0|
|''Browser:''|Firefox 1.5.0.7 or better; InternetExplorer 6.0|
!Description

Reference a tiddler through an alias (or even through many aliases). E.g. a tiddler "William Shakespeare" may also be referenced as {{{[[Shaxper]]}}}.

When editing a tiddler you may enter alternative names for the tiddler in the "Alias" field (below the tags field), similar to the way you enter tags. You may even specify multiple alias names, separated by spaces. Alias names containing spaces must be written as {{{[[...]]}}}

Also this plugin implements the "Auto Non-Space Alias" feature: for tiddlers with titles containing whitespaces an alias is automatically created that has every whitespace replaced by a dash ("-"). E.g. a tiddler called [[Tiddler with no alias defined]] can also be referenced by [[Tiddler-with-no-alias-defined]].

!Revision history
* v1.0.0 Beta 3 (2006-09-23)
** Support "Auto Non-Space Alias" feature: For tiddler with titles containing whitespaces an alias is automatically created that has every whitespace replaced by a dash ("-")
* v1.0.0 Beta 2 (2006-09-22)
** Bugfix: Tiddler is displayed more than once when opened both through title and alias (Thanks to KenGirard for reporting)
* v1.0.0 Beta 1 (2006-09-21)
** Beta 1 release
!Code
***/
//{{{
	
//============================================================================
//============================================================================
//		   TiddlerAliasPlugin
//============================================================================
//============================================================================

// Only install once
if (!version.extensions.TiddlerAliasPlugin) {

version.extensions.TiddlerAliasPlugin = {
	major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, beta: 3,
	date: new Date(2006,8,23), 
	source: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/Beta.html#TiddlerAliasPlugin",
	licence: "[[BSD open source license (abego Software)|http://www.abego-software.de/legal/apl-v10.html]]",
	copyright: "Copyright (c) abego Software GmbH, 2005-2006 (www.abego-software.de)"
};

(function() {

window.abegoTiddlerAlias = {
	lingo:  {
		aliasPrompt: "Type alias names (i.e. alternative names for this tiddler) separated with spaces, [[use double square brackets]] if necessary"
	}, 
	
	editTemplateExtension: "<div class='editor' macro='edit alias'></div><div class='editorFooter'><span macro='message abegoTiddlerAlias.lingo.aliasPrompt'></span></div>"
};

var oldFetchTiddler;
var oldSaveTiddler;
var oldDisplayTiddler;

var fWithAutoNonSpaceAlias = true;

function withAutoNonSpaceAlias() {
	return fWithAutoNonSpaceAlias;
}

function addNonSpaceAlias(map, title) {
	var s = title.replace(/\s/g,"-");
	if (s != title)
		map[s] = title;
}

function calcAliases() {
	var result = {};
	store.forEachTiddler(function(title,tiddler) {
		var s = store.getValue(tiddler,"alias");
		if (s) {
			var p = s.parseParams("list",null,false,true);
			for(var i=1; i<p.length; i++)
				result[p[i].value] = title;
		}
		if (withAutoNonSpaceAlias())
			addNonSpaceAlias(result,title);
	});
	return result;
}

// Returns a map that maps an alias name to the title of the tiddler
abegoTiddlerAlias.getAliases = function() {
	if (!store.aliases)
		store.aliases = calcAliases();
	return store.aliases;
}

// Returns the title of the tiddler for the given alias.
// When no such alias is defined but a tiddler with that name exists the alias is returned.
// Otherwise null is returned.
abegoTiddlerAlias.getAliasTitle = function(alias) {
	var t = abegoTiddlerAlias.getAliases()[alias];
	return t ? t : (store.fetchTiddler(alias) ? alias : null)
}

function hasEditTemplateExtension(s) {
	return s.indexOf(abegoTiddlerAlias.editTemplateExtension) >= 0;
}

function addEditTemplateExtension(s) {
	if (s && !hasEditTemplateExtension(s)) {
		var i = s.lastIndexOf("</div>");
		if (i >= 0)
			return s.slice(0,i+6)+"\n"+abegoTiddlerAlias.editTemplateExtension+s.slice(i+6);
	}
	return null;
}

function hijackFetchTiddler() {
	oldFetchTiddler = store.fetchTiddler;

	store.fetchTiddler = function(title) {
		var result = oldFetchTiddler.apply(this, arguments);
		if (!result && title) {
			title = abegoTiddlerAlias.getAliases()[title];
			if (title)
				result = oldFetchTiddler.apply(this, [title])
		}
		return result;	
	};
}

function hijackSaveTiddler() {
	oldSaveTiddler = TiddlyWiki.prototype.saveTiddler;
	TiddlyWiki.prototype.saveTiddler = function() {
		var result = oldSaveTiddler.apply(this, arguments);
		delete store.aliases;				
		return result;	
	}
}


function hijackDisplayTiddler() {
	oldDisplayTiddler = Story.prototype.displayTiddler;
	Story.prototype.displayTiddler = function(srcElement,title,template,animate,slowly) {
		// Ensure that a tiddler is always opened with its "original" title (not an alias)
		var tiddler = store.fetchTiddler(title);
		if (tiddler) 
			title = tiddler.title;
		return oldDisplayTiddler.apply(this, [srcElement,title,template,animate,slowly]);
	}
}
	

function modifyEditTemplate() {
	// The shadow tiddler
	var s = addEditTemplateExtension(config.shadowTiddlers["EditTemplate"]);
	if (s) 
		config.shadowTiddlers["EditTemplate"] = s;
	
	// The "real" tiddler (if defined)
	var t = store.getTiddler("EditTemplate");
    if (t && !hasEditTemplateExtension(t.text))
          t.set(null,addEditTemplateExtension(t.text));		
}

// Requires store is defined.
function doHijacking() {
	hijackFetchTiddler();
	hijackSaveTiddler();
	hijackDisplayTiddler();
	modifyEditTemplate();
}

// for debugging the plugin is not loaded through the systemConfig mechanism but via a script tag. 
// At that point in the "store" is not yet defined. In that case hijackFetchTiddler through the restart function.
// Otherwise hijack now.
if (!store) {
	var oldRestartFunc = restart;
	window.restart = function() {
		doHijacking();
		oldRestartFunc.apply(this,arguments);
	};
} else
	doHijacking();

// To support the access through the "message" macro
config.abegoTiddlerAlias = abegoTiddlerAlias;
})();
} // of "install only once"


/***
!Licence and Copyright
Copyright (c) abego Software ~GmbH, 2005 ([[www.abego-software.de|http://www.abego-software.de]])

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer.

Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this
list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
materials provided with the distribution.

Neither the name of abego Software nor the names of its contributors may be
used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
prior written permission.

THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT
SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
DAMAGE.
***/

//}}}

//{{{
// based on Sweet Titles (c) Creative Commons 2005
// http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/
// Author: Dustin Diaz | http://www.dustindiaz.com
// Adapted to TW for tiddler previews by Saq Imtiaz
config.linkPreview ={
      tiddlyLinkPreview : true,
      externalLinkPreview : false,
      customTiddlerPreview : true
}

if (config.linkPreview.customTiddlerPreview)
    {
    Tiddler.prototype.getSubtitle = function()
        {
        return (this.text.length>0 ? this.text.substr(0,110) : "(no text)");
        }
    }

if (config.linkPreview.tiddlyLinkPreview)
    {
    old_tiddlerPreview_createTiddlyButton=createTiddlyButton;
    window.createTiddlyButton = function (theParent,theText,theTooltip,theAction,theClass,theId,theAccessKey)
        {
        var theButton =  old_tiddlerPreview_createTiddlyButton.apply(this,arguments);
        if (theButton.className.indexOf('tiddlyLink')!=-1)
            {
            theButton = setLinkPreview(theButton);
            }
        return theButton;
        }
    }

function setLinkPreview (theButton)
{
     theButton.setAttribute("tip",theButton.getAttribute("title"));
     addEvent(theButton,'mouseover',sweetTitles.tipOver);
     addEvent(theButton,'mouseout',sweetTitles.tipOut);
     theButton.setAttribute("title","");
     return theButton;
}

if (config.linkPreview.externalLinkPreview)
    {
    old_tiddlerPreview_createExternalLink=createExternalLink;
    window.createExternalLink =  function(place,url)
        {
	    var theLink = old_tiddlerPreview_createExternalLink(place,url);
        theLink = setLinkPreview(theLink);
	    return(theLink);
        }
    }

window.old_lewcid_pt_restart = restart;
restart = function()
{
 window.old_lewcid_pt_restart();
 sweetTitles.init();
};

window.refreshTiddlyLink = function(e,title)
{
	var i = getTiddlyLinkInfo(title,e.className);
	e.className = i.classes;
        if (!e.getAttribute('tip'))
	      e.title = i.subTitle;
}

setStylesheet("body div#toolTip { position:absolute;z-index:1000;width:220px;background:#000;border:2px double #fff;text-align:left;padding:5px;min-height:1em;-moz-border-radius:5px; }\n body div#toolTip p { margin:0;padding:2px;color:#fff;font:11px/12px  verdana,arial,sans-serif; font-weight:bold;  word-break:normal;display:block;overflow:hidden;}","linkPreviewStyles");

var sweetTitles = { 
	xCord : 0,								// @Number: x pixel value of current cursor position
	yCord : 0,								// @Number: y pixel value of current cursor position
	tipElements : ['a','abbr','acronym'],	// @Array: Allowable elements that can have the toolTip
	obj : Object,							// @Element: That of which you're hovering over
	tip : Object,							// @Element: The actual toolTip itself
	active : 0,								// @Number: 0: Not Active || 1: Active
	init : function() {
        this.tip = createTiddlyElement(document.getElementsByTagName('body')[0],"div","toolTip");
		this.tip.style.top = '0';
		this.tip.style.visibility = 'hidden';
	},
	updateXY : function(e) {
        var theTarget = resolveTarget(e);
	    sweetTitles.xCord = findPosX(theTarget);
	    sweetTitles.yCord = findPosY(theTarget);
	},
	tipOut: function() {
		if ( window.tID ) {
			clearTimeout(tID);
		}
		if ( window.opacityID ) {
			clearTimeout(opacityID);
		}
		sweetTitles.tip.style.visibility = 'hidden';
	},
	tipOver : function(e) {
		sweetTitles.obj = this;
		tID = window.setTimeout("sweetTitles.tipShow()",500);
		sweetTitles.updateXY(e);
	},
	tipShow : function() {		
		var scrX = Number(this.xCord);
		var scrY = Number(this.yCord);
		var tp = parseInt(scrY+15);
		var lt = parseInt(scrX+10);
		var anch = this.obj;
		this.tip.innerHTML = "<p>"+anch.getAttribute('tip')+"<em></em></p>";
        this.tip.style.left = ( parseInt(findWindowWidth()+findScrollX()) < parseInt(this.tip.offsetWidth+lt) )?  parseInt(lt-(this.tip.offsetWidth))+'px' : this.tip.style.left = lt+'px';
        this.tip.style.top =  ( parseInt(findWindowHeight()+findScrollY()) < parseInt(this.tip.offsetHeight+tp) ) ? parseInt(tp-(this.tip.offsetHeight+15))+'px': this.tip.style.top = tp+5+'px';
		this.tip.style.visibility = 'visible';
		this.tip.style.opacity = '.1';
		this.tipFade(10);
	},
	tipFade: function(opac) {
		var passed = parseInt(opac);
		var newOpac = parseInt(passed+10);
		if ( newOpac < 80 ) {
			this.tip.style.opacity = '.'+newOpac;
			this.tip.style.filter = "alpha(opacity:"+newOpac+")";
			opacityID = window.setTimeout("sweetTitles.tipFade('"+newOpac+"')",20);
		}
		else { 
			this.tip.style.opacity = '.80';
			this.tip.style.filter = "alpha(opacity:80)";
		}
	}
};
//}}}

/***

|Name|ToggleSideBarMacro|
|Created by|SaqImtiaz|
|Location|http://tw.lewcid.org/#ToggleSideBarMacro|
|Version|1.0|
|Requires|~TW2.x|
!Description:
Provides a button for toggling visibility of the SideBar. You can choose whether the SideBar should initially be hidden or displayed.

!Demo
<<toggleSideBar "Toggle Sidebar">>

!Usage:
{{{<<toggleSideBar>>}}} <<toggleSideBar>>
additional options:
{{{<<toggleSideBar label tooltip show/hide>>}}} where:
label = custom label for the button,
tooltip = custom tooltip for the button,
show/hide = use one or the other, determines whether the sidebar is shown at first or not.
(default is to show the sidebar)

You can add it to your tiddler toolbar, your MainMenu, or where you like really.
If you are using a horizontal MainMenu and want the button to be right aligned, put the following in your StyleSheet:
{{{ .HideSideBarButton {float:right;} }}}

!History
*23-07-06: version 1.0: completely rewritten, now works with custom stylesheets too, and easier to customize start behaviour. 
*20-07-06: version 0.11
*27-04-06: version 0.1: working.

!Code
***/
//{{{
config.macros.toggleSideBar={};

config.macros.toggleSideBar.settings={
         styleHide :  "#sidebar { display: none;}\n"+"#contentWrapper #displayArea { margin-right: 1em;}\n"+"",
         styleShow : " ",
         arrow1: "«",
         arrow2: "»"
};

config.macros.toggleSideBar.handler=function (place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler)
{
          var tooltip= params[1]||'toggle sidebar';
          var mode = (params[2] && params[2]=="hide")? "hide":"show";
          var arrow = (mode == "hide")? this.settings.arrow1:this.settings.arrow2;
          var label= (params[0]&&params[0]!='.')?params[0]+" "+arrow:arrow;
          var theBtn = createTiddlyButton(place,label,tooltip,this.onToggleSideBar,"button HideSideBarButton");
          if (mode == "hide")
             { 
             (document.getElementById("sidebar")).setAttribute("toggle","hide");
              setStylesheet(this.settings.styleHide,"ToggleSideBarStyles");
             }
};

config.macros.toggleSideBar.onToggleSideBar = function(){
          var sidebar = document.getElementById("sidebar");
          var settings = config.macros.toggleSideBar.settings;
          if (sidebar.getAttribute("toggle")=='hide')
             {
              setStylesheet(settings.styleShow,"ToggleSideBarStyles");
              sidebar.setAttribute("toggle","show");
              this.firstChild.data= (this.firstChild.data).replace(settings.arrow1,settings.arrow2);
              }
          else
              {    
               setStylesheet(settings.styleHide,"ToggleSideBarStyles");
               sidebar.setAttribute("toggle","hide");
               this.firstChild.data= (this.firstChild.data).replace(settings.arrow2,settings.arrow1);
              }

     return false;
}

setStylesheet(".HideSideBarButton .button {font-weight:bold; padding: 0 5px;}\n","ToggleSideBarButtonStyles");

//}}}

/***
Contains the stuff you need to use Tiddlyspot
Note you must also have UploadPlugin installed
***/
//{{{

// edit this if you are migrating sites or retrofitting an existing TW
config.tiddlyspotSiteId = 'ethics';

// make it so you can by default see edit controls via http
config.options.chkHttpReadOnly = true;
window.readOnly = true; // make sure of it (for tw 2.2)

// disable autosave in d3
if (window.location.protocol != "file:")
	config.options.chkGTDLazyAutoSave = false;

// tweak shadow tiddlers to add upload button, password entry box etc
with (config.shadowTiddlers) {
	SiteUrl = 'http://'+config.tiddlyspotSiteId+'.tiddlyspot.com';
	SideBarOptions = SideBarOptions.replace(/(<<saveChanges>>)/,"$1<<tiddler TspotSidebar>>");
	OptionsPanel = OptionsPanel.replace(/^/,"<<tiddler TspotOptions>>");
	DefaultTiddlers = DefaultTiddlers.replace(/^/,"[[WelcomeToTiddlyspot]] ");
	MainMenu = MainMenu.replace(/^/,"[[WelcomeToTiddlyspot]] ");
}

// create some shadow tiddler content
merge(config.shadowTiddlers,{

'WelcomeToTiddlyspot':[
 "This document is a ~TiddlyWiki from tiddlyspot.com.  A ~TiddlyWiki is an electronic notebook that is great for managing todo lists, personal information, and all sorts of things.",
 "",
 "@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //What now?// &nbsp;&nbsp;@@ Before you can save any changes, you need to enter your password in the form below.  Then configure privacy and other site settings at your [[control panel|http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/controlpanel]] (your control panel username is //" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + "//).",
 "<<tiddler TspotControls>>",
 "See also GettingStarted.",
 "",
 "@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Working online// &nbsp;&nbsp;@@ You can edit this ~TiddlyWiki right now, and save your changes using the \"save to web\" button in the column on the right.",
 "",
 "@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Working offline// &nbsp;&nbsp;@@ A fully functioning copy of this ~TiddlyWiki can be saved onto your hard drive or USB stick.  You can make changes and save them locally without being connected to the Internet.  When you're ready to sync up again, just click \"upload\" and your ~TiddlyWiki will be saved back to tiddlyspot.com.",
 "",
 "@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Help!// &nbsp;&nbsp;@@ Find out more about ~TiddlyWiki at [[TiddlyWiki.com|http://tiddlywiki.com]].  Also visit [[TiddlyWiki Guides|http://tiddlywikiguides.org]] for documentation on learning and using ~TiddlyWiki. New users are especially welcome on the [[TiddlyWiki mailing list|http://groups.google.com/group/TiddlyWiki]], which is an excellent place to ask questions and get help.  If you have a tiddlyspot related problem email [[tiddlyspot support|mailto:support@tiddlyspot.com]].",
 "",
 "@@font-weight:bold;font-size:1.3em;color:#444; //Enjoy :)// &nbsp;&nbsp;@@ We hope you like using your tiddlyspot.com site.  Please email [[feedback@tiddlyspot.com|mailto:feedback@tiddlyspot.com]] with any comments or suggestions."
].join("\n"),

'TspotControls':[
 "| tiddlyspot password:|<<option pasUploadPassword>>|",
 "| site management:|<<upload http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi index.html . .  " + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ">>//(requires tiddlyspot password)//<<br>>[[control panel|http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/controlpanel]], [[download (go offline)|http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/download]]|",
 "| links:|[[tiddlyspot.com|http://tiddlyspot.com/]], [[FAQs|http://faq.tiddlyspot.com/]], [[announcements|http://announce.tiddlyspot.com/]], [[blog|http://tiddlyspot.com/blog/]], email [[support|mailto:support@tiddlyspot.com]] & [[feedback|mailto:feedback@tiddlyspot.com]], [[donate|http://tiddlyspot.com/?page=donate]]|"
].join("\n"),

'TspotSidebar':[
 "<<upload http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi index.html . .  " + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ">><html><a href='http://" + config.tiddlyspotSiteId + ".tiddlyspot.com/download' class='button'>download</a></html>"
].join("\n"),

'TspotOptions':[
 "tiddlyspot password:",
 "<<option pasUploadPassword>>",
 ""
].join("\n")

});
//}}}

<<upload http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi index.html . .  ethics>> • <html><a href='http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/download' class='button'>download</a></html>

!!!The Crito is sometimes seen as an argument that all citizens must be completely obedient to state power, yet this interpretation can be countered with other considerations, such as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that Athens was a democracy in which individual rights, including the right to participate in civil disobedience, were protected.]>
{{red{No... Athens had nothing like the “bill of rights” or the precedent for civil disobedience that is familiar to contemporary citizens of the US.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that Socrates believes he has had a fair opportunity to try to persuade the city of the wrongness of its action.]>
{{green{Yes. Clearly, of course, Socrates thinks the jury was too easily persuaded of his guilt. However, he accepts that he had a procedurally fair opportunity to make his case.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that Socrates will submit to a physical penalties, but apparently resists attempts to control his ideas and his speech.]>
{{green{Yes. Socrates, notoriously, insists on speaking his mind in all matters. There seems to be a mind/body dualism at work here, where Socrates agrees that Athens may impose consequences on his body, but cannot exercise control over his mind or his speech.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that Socrates obeys his sentence only because he thinks the verdict upon him was correct.]>
{{red{No... This is vitally important: Socrates never agrees that the verdict is *accurate*; he simply agrees that he is bound to comply with the legal process, including the sentence attached to the verdict. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that Socrates emphasizes his own history of continuous consent to the laws of Athens.]>
{{green{Yes. His argument, in many places, focuses on his own implicit contract with Athens; he is not arguing (except perhaps toward the end, in the voice of “the Laws”) for obedience on the part of those who do not see themselves as having entered into a sustained and voluntary agreement.
}}}
===
}}}

The theme for Unit A is "Authority & Conscience"
Session Links: [[Euthyphro]] • [[Crito]]  •   [[Epictetus]] • [[King]]

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "UnitA">>

The readings in Unit A offer footholds for lots of further projects, many of which were barely touched on in class:
* Exploring many more complex responses to the Euthyphro problem
* Considering not just Socrates' reasoning in Crito, but bits of critical perspective offered by Plato
* How do Stoic ideals work with, or against, other political and moral ideals?
* How are citizenship and humanity not just racialized but also gendered, by MLK, Malcolm X, and others?
* Do norms of civil disobedience implicitly legitimize the state, especially from the perspective of indigenous people and/or those whose presence can be traced to kidnapping and enslavement?

This Unit, Authority and Conscience, devotes attention to three texts in the Platonic and Stoic tradition, and puts them in dialogue with Martin Luther King Jr's Letter from Birmingham Jail. Each text explores a different tool for finding one's way in a world full of competing ideas and claims:
|!Euthyphro|elenchus, reasoned dialogue, holding beliefs up to the ideal of coherence|
|!Crito|integrity, holding action up to the standard of following through on commitments|
|!Epictetus|ataraxia, focusing attention on one's own sphere of agency|
|!King|[[non-violence]], engaging in social action and dialogue to cultivate and stimulate conscience|

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "UnitB">> 
<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagging")||hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>

[[Aristotle1]] • [[Aristotle2]] • [[Aristotle3|Arist3]]  [[Nussbaum]]

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "UnitB">>

[[Kant1]] • [[Kant2]]
[[Kant3]] • [[Korsgaard]]

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "UnitC">>

!!!Theme: Utilitarian Concerns
[[Mill1]] • [[Mill2]] • [[Mill3]] • [[Rawles]]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "UnitD">>

!!!Theme: Ideology, Creativity & Freedom
[[Marx]] • [[Nietzsche]] • [[Beauvoir]] • [[Plumwood]]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "unitE">> 
<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagging")||hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>

!!!Theme: Development, Care, and Growth
[[Kohlberg]] • [[Noddings]] • [[euthanasia discussion]] • [[Dewey]]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "unitF">> 
<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagging")||hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>

| !date | !user | !location | !storeUrl | !uploadDir | !toFilename | !backupdir | !origin |
| 13/05/2019 18:10:58 | ESpringer | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 13/05/2019 22:02:19 | ESpringer | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#%5B%5Bfinal%20parallel%20questions%20chart%20Spring%202019%5D%5D]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 17/05/2019 17:06:09 | ESpringer | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#%5B%5Bfinal%20parallel%20questions%20chart%20Spring%202019%5D%5D]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 22/12/2019 20:21:37 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#definition]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 22/12/2019 20:22:16 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#definition]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 22/12/2019 20:23:52 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#definition]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |
| 30/12/2019 12:38:10 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#happiness]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 30/12/2019 12:41:43 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#happiness]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 30/12/2019 12:43:30 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#happiness]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . | ok |
| 30/12/2019 12:46:50 | YourName | [[/|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/#happiness]] | [[store.cgi|http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/store.cgi]] | . | [[index.html | http://ethics.tiddlyspot.com/index.html]] | . |

/***
|''Name:''|PasswordOptionPlugin|
|''Description:''|Extends TiddlyWiki options with non encrypted password option.|
|''Version:''|1.0.2|
|''Date:''|Apr 19, 2007|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#PasswordOptionPlugin|
|''Author:''|BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info)|
|''License:''|[[BSD open source license|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#%5B%5BBSD%20open%20source%20license%5D%5D ]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.2.0 (Beta 5)|
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.PasswordOptionPlugin = {
	major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 2, 
	date: new Date("Apr 19, 2007"),
	source: 'http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#PasswordOptionPlugin',
	author: 'BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info',
	license: '[[BSD open source license|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#%5B%5BBSD%20open%20source%20license%5D%5D]]',
	coreVersion: '2.2.0 (Beta 5)'
};

config.macros.option.passwordCheckboxLabel = "Save this password on this computer";
config.macros.option.passwordInputType = "password"; // password | text
setStylesheet(".pasOptionInput {width: 11em;}\n","passwordInputTypeStyle");

merge(config.macros.option.types, {
	'pas': {
		elementType: "input",
		valueField: "value",
		eventName: "onkeyup",
		className: "pasOptionInput",
		typeValue: config.macros.option.passwordInputType,
		create: function(place,type,opt,className,desc) {
			// password field
			config.macros.option.genericCreate(place,'pas',opt,className,desc);
			// checkbox linked with this password "save this password on this computer"
			config.macros.option.genericCreate(place,'chk','chk'+opt,className,desc);			
			// text savePasswordCheckboxLabel
			place.appendChild(document.createTextNode(config.macros.option.passwordCheckboxLabel));
		},
		onChange: config.macros.option.genericOnChange
	}
});

merge(config.optionHandlers['chk'], {
	get: function(name) {
		// is there an option linked with this chk ?
		var opt = name.substr(3);
		if (config.options[opt]) 
			saveOptionCookie(opt);
		return config.options[name] ? "true" : "false";
	}
});

merge(config.optionHandlers, {
	'pas': {
 		get: function(name) {
			if (config.options["chk"+name]) {
				return encodeCookie(config.options[name].toString());
			} else {
				return "";
			}
		},
		set: function(name,value) {config.options[name] = decodeCookie(value);}
	}
});

// need to reload options to load passwordOptions
loadOptionsCookie();

/*
if (!config.options['pasPassword'])
	config.options['pasPassword'] = '';

merge(config.optionsDesc,{
		pasPassword: "Test password"
	});
*/
//}}}

/***
|''Name:''|UploadPlugin|
|''Description:''|Save to web a TiddlyWiki|
|''Version:''|4.1.0|
|''Date:''|May 5, 2007|
|''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#UploadPlugin|
|''Documentation:''|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#UploadPluginDoc|
|''Author:''|BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info)|
|''License:''|[[BSD open source license|http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#%5B%5BBSD%20open%20source%20license%5D%5D ]]|
|''~CoreVersion:''|2.2.0 (#3125)|
|''Requires:''|PasswordOptionPlugin|
***/
//{{{
version.extensions.UploadPlugin = {
	major: 4, minor: 1, revision: 0,
	date: new Date("May 5, 2007"),
	source: 'http://tiddlywiki.bidix.info/#UploadPlugin',
	author: 'BidiX (BidiX (at) bidix (dot) info',
	coreVersion: '2.2.0 (#3125)'
};

//
// Environment
//

if (!window.bidix) window.bidix = {}; // bidix namespace
bidix.debugMode = false;	// true to activate both in Plugin and UploadService
	
//
// Upload Macro
//

config.macros.upload = {
// default values
	defaultBackupDir: '',	//no backup
	defaultStoreScript: "store.php",
	defaultToFilename: "index.html",
	defaultUploadDir: ".",
	authenticateUser: true	// UploadService Authenticate User
};
	
config.macros.upload.label = {
	promptOption: "Save and Upload this TiddlyWiki with UploadOptions",
	promptParamMacro: "Save and Upload this TiddlyWiki in %0",
	saveLabel: "save to web", 
	saveToDisk: "save to disk",
	uploadLabel: "upload"	
};

config.macros.upload.messages = {
	noStoreUrl: "No store URL in parmeters or options",
	usernameOrPasswordMissing: "Username or password missing"
};

config.macros.upload.handler = function(place,macroName,params) {
	if (readOnly)
		return;
	var label;
	if (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "http") 
		label = this.label.saveLabel;
	else
		label = this.label.uploadLabel;
	var prompt;
	if (params[0]) {
		prompt = this.label.promptParamMacro.toString().format([this.destFile(params[0], 
			(params[1] ? params[1]:bidix.basename(window.location.toString())), params[3])]);
	} else {
		prompt = this.label.promptOption;
	}
	createTiddlyButton(place, label, prompt, function() {config.macros.upload.action(params);}, null, null, this.accessKey);
};

config.macros.upload.action = function(params)
{
		// for missing macro parameter set value from options
		var storeUrl = params[0] ? params[0] : config.options.txtUploadStoreUrl;
		var toFilename = params[1] ? params[1] : config.options.txtUploadFilename;
		var backupDir = params[2] ? params[2] : config.options.txtUploadBackupDir;
		var uploadDir = params[3] ? params[3] : config.options.txtUploadDir;
		var username = params[4] ? params[4] : config.options.txtUploadUserName;
		var password = config.options.pasUploadPassword; // for security reason no password as macro parameter	
		// for still missing parameter set default value
		if ((!storeUrl) && (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "http")) 
			storeUrl = bidix.dirname(document.location.toString())+'/'+config.macros.upload.defaultStoreScript;
		if (storeUrl.substr(0,4) != "http")
			storeUrl = bidix.dirname(document.location.toString()) +'/'+ storeUrl;
		if (!toFilename)
			toFilename = bidix.basename(window.location.toString());
		if (!toFilename)
			toFilename = config.macros.upload.defaultToFilename;
		if (!uploadDir)
			uploadDir = config.macros.upload.defaultUploadDir;
		if (!backupDir)
			backupDir = config.macros.upload.defaultBackupDir;
		// report error if still missing
		if (!storeUrl) {
			alert(config.macros.upload.messages.noStoreUrl);
			clearMessage();
			return false;
		}
		if (config.macros.upload.authenticateUser && (!username || !password)) {
			alert(config.macros.upload.messages.usernameOrPasswordMissing);
			clearMessage();
			return false;
		}
		bidix.upload.uploadChanges(false,null,storeUrl, toFilename, uploadDir, backupDir, username, password); 
		return false; 
};

config.macros.upload.destFile = function(storeUrl, toFilename, uploadDir) 
{
	if (!storeUrl)
		return null;
		var dest = bidix.dirname(storeUrl);
		if (uploadDir && uploadDir != '.')
			dest = dest + '/' + uploadDir;
		dest = dest + '/' + toFilename;
	return dest;
};

//
// uploadOptions Macro
//

config.macros.uploadOptions = {
	handler: function(place,macroName,params) {
		var wizard = new Wizard();
		wizard.createWizard(place,this.wizardTitle);
		wizard.addStep(this.step1Title,this.step1Html);
		var markList = wizard.getElement("markList");
		var listWrapper = document.createElement("div");
		markList.parentNode.insertBefore(listWrapper,markList);
		wizard.setValue("listWrapper",listWrapper);
		this.refreshOptions(listWrapper,false);
		var uploadCaption;
		if (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "http") 
			uploadCaption = config.macros.upload.label.saveLabel;
		else
			uploadCaption = config.macros.upload.label.uploadLabel;
		
		wizard.setButtons([
				{caption: uploadCaption, tooltip: config.macros.upload.label.promptOption, 
					onClick: config.macros.upload.action},
				{caption: this.cancelButton, tooltip: this.cancelButtonPrompt, onClick: this.onCancel}
				
			]);
	},
	refreshOptions: function(listWrapper) {
		var uploadOpts = [
			"txtUploadUserName",
			"pasUploadPassword",
			"txtUploadStoreUrl",
			"txtUploadDir",
			"txtUploadFilename",
			"txtUploadBackupDir",
			"chkUploadLog",
			"txtUploadLogMaxLine",
			]
		var opts = [];
		for(i=0; i<uploadOpts.length; i++) {
			var opt = {};
			opts.push()
			opt.option = "";
			n = uploadOpts[i];
			opt.name = n;
			opt.lowlight = !config.optionsDesc[n];
			opt.description = opt.lowlight ? this.unknownDescription : config.optionsDesc[n];
			opts.push(opt);
		}
		var listview = ListView.create(listWrapper,opts,this.listViewTemplate);
		for(n=0; n<opts.length; n++) {
			var type = opts[n].name.substr(0,3);
			var h = config.macros.option.types[type];
			if (h && h.create) {
				h.create(opts[n].colElements['option'],type,opts[n].name,opts[n].name,"no");
			}
		}
		
	},
	onCancel: function(e)
	{
		backstage.switchTab(null);
		return false;
	},
	
	wizardTitle: "Upload with options",
	step1Title: "These options are saved in cookies in your browser",
	step1Html: "<input type='hidden' name='markList'></input><br>",
	cancelButton: "Cancel",
	cancelButtonPrompt: "Cancel prompt",
	listViewTemplate: {
		columns: [
			{name: 'Description', field: 'description', title: "Description", type: 'WikiText'},
			{name: 'Option', field: 'option', title: "Option", type: 'String'},
			{name: 'Name', field: 'name', title: "Name", type: 'String'}
			],
		rowClasses: [
			{className: 'lowlight', field: 'lowlight'} 
			]}
}

//
// upload functions
//

if (!bidix.upload) bidix.upload = {};

if (!bidix.upload.messages) bidix.upload.messages = {
	//from saving
	invalidFileError: "The original file '%0' does not appear to be a valid TiddlyWiki",
	backupSaved: "Backup saved",
	backupFailed: "Failed to upload backup file",
	rssSaved: "RSS feed uploaded",
	rssFailed: "Failed to upload RSS feed file",
	emptySaved: "Empty template uploaded",
	emptyFailed: "Failed to upload empty template file",
	mainSaved: "Main TiddlyWiki file uploaded",
	mainFailed: "Failed to upload main TiddlyWiki file. Your changes have not been saved",
	//specific upload
	loadOriginalHttpPostError: "Can't get original file",
	aboutToSaveOnHttpPost: 'About to upload on %0 ...',
	storePhpNotFound: "The store script '%0' was not found."
};

bidix.upload.uploadChanges = function(onlyIfDirty,tiddlers,storeUrl,toFilename,uploadDir,backupDir,username,password)
{
	var callback = function(status,uploadParams,original,url,xhr) {
		if (!status) {
			displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.loadOriginalHttpPostError);
			return;
		}
		if (bidix.debugMode) 
			alert(original.substr(0,500)+"\n...");
		// Locate the storeArea div's 
		var posDiv = locateStoreArea(original);
		if((posDiv[0] == -1) || (posDiv[1] == -1)) {
			alert(config.messages.invalidFileError.format([localPath]));
			return;
		}
		bidix.upload.uploadRss(uploadParams,original,posDiv);
	};
	
	if(onlyIfDirty && !store.isDirty())
		return;
	clearMessage();
	// save on localdisk ?
	if (document.location.toString().substr(0,4) == "file") {
		var path = document.location.toString();
		var localPath = getLocalPath(path);
		saveChanges();
	}
	// get original
	var uploadParams = Array(storeUrl,toFilename,uploadDir,backupDir,username,password);
	var originalPath = document.location.toString();
	// If url is a directory : add index.html
	if (originalPath.charAt(originalPath.length-1) == "/")
		originalPath = originalPath + "index.html";
	var dest = config.macros.upload.destFile(storeUrl,toFilename,uploadDir);
	var log = new bidix.UploadLog();
	log.startUpload(storeUrl, dest, uploadDir,  backupDir);
	displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.aboutToSaveOnHttpPost.format([dest]));
	if (bidix.debugMode) 
		alert("about to execute Http - GET on "+originalPath);
	var r = doHttp("GET",originalPath,null,null,null,null,callback,uploadParams,null);
	if (typeof r == "string")
		displayMessage(r);
	return r;
};

bidix.upload.uploadRss = function(uploadParams,original,posDiv) 
{
	var callback = function(status,params,responseText,url,xhr) {
		if(status) {
			var destfile = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("destfile:")+9,responseText.indexOf("\n", responseText.indexOf("destfile:")));
			displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.rssSaved,bidix.dirname(url)+'/'+destfile);
			bidix.upload.uploadMain(params[0],params[1],params[2]);
		} else {
			displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.rssFailed);			
		}
	};
	// do uploadRss
	if(config.options.chkGenerateAnRssFeed) {
		var rssPath = uploadParams[1].substr(0,uploadParams[1].lastIndexOf(".")) + ".xml";
		var rssUploadParams = Array(uploadParams[0],rssPath,uploadParams[2],'',uploadParams[4],uploadParams[5]);
		bidix.upload.httpUpload(rssUploadParams,convertUnicodeToUTF8(generateRss()),callback,Array(uploadParams,original,posDiv));
	} else {
		bidix.upload.uploadMain(uploadParams,original,posDiv);
	}
};

bidix.upload.uploadMain = function(uploadParams,original,posDiv) 
{
	var callback = function(status,params,responseText,url,xhr) {
		var log = new bidix.UploadLog();
		if(status) {
			// if backupDir specified
			if ((params[3]) && (responseText.indexOf("backupfile:") > -1))  {
				var backupfile = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("backupfile:")+11,responseText.indexOf("\n", responseText.indexOf("backupfile:")));
				displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.backupSaved,bidix.dirname(url)+'/'+backupfile);
			}
			var destfile = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("destfile:")+9,responseText.indexOf("\n", responseText.indexOf("destfile:")));
			displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.mainSaved,bidix.dirname(url)+'/'+destfile);
			store.setDirty(false);
			log.endUpload("ok");
		} else {
			alert(bidix.upload.messages.mainFailed);
			displayMessage(bidix.upload.messages.mainFailed);
			log.endUpload("failed");			
		}
	};
	// do uploadMain
	var revised = bidix.upload.updateOriginal(original,posDiv);
	bidix.upload.httpUpload(uploadParams,revised,callback,uploadParams);
};

bidix.upload.httpUpload = function(uploadParams,data,callback,params)
{
	var localCallback = function(status,params,responseText,url,xhr) {
		url = (url.indexOf("nocache=") < 0 ? url : url.substring(0,url.indexOf("nocache=")-1));
		if (xhr.status == httpStatus.NotFound)
			alert(bidix.upload.messages.storePhpNotFound.format([url]));
		if ((bidix.debugMode) || (responseText.indexOf("Debug mode") >= 0 )) {
			alert(responseText);
			if (responseText.indexOf("Debug mode") >= 0 )
				responseText = responseText.substring(responseText.indexOf("\n\n")+2);
		} else if (responseText.charAt(0) != '0') 
			alert(responseText);
		if (responseText.charAt(0) != '0')
			status = null;
		callback(status,params,responseText,url,xhr);
	};
	// do httpUpload
	var boundary = "---------------------------"+"AaB03x";	
	var uploadFormName = "UploadPlugin";
	// compose headers data
	var sheader = "";
	sheader += "--" + boundary + "\r\nContent-disposition: form-data; name=\"";
	sheader += uploadFormName +"\"\r\n\r\n";
	sheader += "backupDir="+uploadParams[3] +
				";user=" + uploadParams[4] +
				";password=" + uploadParams[5] +
				";uploaddir=" + uploadParams[2];
	if (bidix.debugMode)
		sheader += ";debug=1";
	sheader += ";;\r\n"; 
	sheader += "\r\n" + "--" + boundary + "\r\n";
	sheader += "Content-disposition: form-data; name=\"userfile\"; filename=\""+uploadParams[1]+"\"\r\n";
	sheader += "Content-Type: text/html;charset=UTF-8" + "\r\n";
	sheader += "Content-Length: " + data.length + "\r\n\r\n";
	// compose trailer data
	var strailer = new String();
	strailer = "\r\n--" + boundary + "--\r\n";
	data = sheader + data + strailer;
	if (bidix.debugMode) alert("about to execute Http - POST on "+uploadParams[0]+"\n with \n"+data.substr(0,500)+ " ... ");
	var r = doHttp("POST",uploadParams[0],data,"multipart/form-data; boundary="+boundary,uploadParams[4],uploadParams[5],localCallback,params,null);
	if (typeof r == "string")
		displayMessage(r);
	return r;
};

// same as Saving's updateOriginal but without convertUnicodeToUTF8 calls
bidix.upload.updateOriginal = function(original, posDiv)
{
	if (!posDiv)
		posDiv = locateStoreArea(original);
	if((posDiv[0] == -1) || (posDiv[1] == -1)) {
		alert(config.messages.invalidFileError.format([localPath]));
		return;
	}
	var revised = original.substr(0,posDiv[0] + startSaveArea.length) + "\n" +
				store.allTiddlersAsHtml() + "\n" +
				original.substr(posDiv[1]);
	var newSiteTitle = getPageTitle().htmlEncode();
	revised = revised.replaceChunk("<title"+">","</title"+">"," " + newSiteTitle + " ");
	revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"PRE-HEAD","MarkupPreHead");
	revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"POST-HEAD","MarkupPostHead");
	revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"PRE-BODY","MarkupPreBody");
	revised = updateMarkupBlock(revised,"POST-SCRIPT","MarkupPostBody");
	return revised;
};

//
// UploadLog
// 
// config.options.chkUploadLog :
//		false : no logging
//		true : logging
// config.options.txtUploadLogMaxLine :
//		-1 : no limit
//      0 :  no Log lines but UploadLog is still in place
//		n :  the last n lines are only kept
//		NaN : no limit (-1)

bidix.UploadLog = function() {
	if (!config.options.chkUploadLog) 
		return; // this.tiddler = null
	this.tiddler = store.getTiddler("UploadLog");
	if (!this.tiddler) {
		this.tiddler = new Tiddler();
		this.tiddler.title = "UploadLog";
		this.tiddler.text = "| !date | !user | !location | !storeUrl | !uploadDir | !toFilename | !backupdir | !origin |";
		this.tiddler.created = new Date();
		this.tiddler.modifier = config.options.txtUserName;
		this.tiddler.modified = new Date();
		store.addTiddler(this.tiddler);
	}
	return this;
};

bidix.UploadLog.prototype.addText = function(text) {
	if (!this.tiddler)
		return;
	// retrieve maxLine when we need it
	var maxLine = parseInt(config.options.txtUploadLogMaxLine,10);
	if (isNaN(maxLine))
		maxLine = -1;
	// add text
	if (maxLine != 0) 
		this.tiddler.text = this.tiddler.text + text;
	// Trunck to maxLine
	if (maxLine >= 0) {
		var textArray = this.tiddler.text.split('\n');
		if (textArray.length > maxLine + 1)
			textArray.splice(1,textArray.length-1-maxLine);
			this.tiddler.text = textArray.join('\n');		
	}
	// update tiddler fields
	this.tiddler.modifier = config.options.txtUserName;
	this.tiddler.modified = new Date();
	store.addTiddler(this.tiddler);
	// refresh and notifiy for immediate update
	story.refreshTiddler(this.tiddler.title);
	store.notify(this.tiddler.title, true);
};

bidix.UploadLog.prototype.startUpload = function(storeUrl, toFilename, uploadDir,  backupDir) {
	if (!this.tiddler)
		return;
	var now = new Date();
	var text = "\n| ";
	var filename = bidix.basename(document.location.toString());
	if (!filename) filename = '/';
	text += now.formatString("0DD/0MM/YYYY 0hh:0mm:0ss") +" | ";
	text += config.options.txtUserName + " | ";
	text += "[["+filename+"|"+location + "]] |";
	text += " [[" + bidix.basename(storeUrl) + "|" + storeUrl + "]] | ";
	text += uploadDir + " | ";
	text += "[[" + bidix.basename(toFilename) + " | " +toFilename + "]] | ";
	text += backupDir + " |";
	this.addText(text);
};

bidix.UploadLog.prototype.endUpload = function(status) {
	if (!this.tiddler)
		return;
	this.addText(" "+status+" |");
};

//
// Utilities
// 

bidix.checkPlugin = function(plugin, major, minor, revision) {
	var ext = version.extensions[plugin];
	if (!
		(ext  && 
			((ext.major > major) || 
			((ext.major == major) && (ext.minor > minor))  ||
			((ext.major == major) && (ext.minor == minor) && (ext.revision >= revision))))) {
			// write error in PluginManager
			if (pluginInfo)
				pluginInfo.log.push("Requires " + plugin + " " + major + "." + minor + "." + revision);
			eval(plugin); // generate an error : "Error: ReferenceError: xxxx is not defined"
	}
};

bidix.dirname = function(filePath) {
	if (!filePath) 
		return;
	var lastpos;
	if ((lastpos = filePath.lastIndexOf("/")) != -1) {
		return filePath.substring(0, lastpos);
	} else {
		return filePath.substring(0, filePath.lastIndexOf("\\"));
	}
};

bidix.basename = function(filePath) {
	if (!filePath) 
		return;
	var lastpos;
	if ((lastpos = filePath.lastIndexOf("#")) != -1) 
		filePath = filePath.substring(0, lastpos);
	if ((lastpos = filePath.lastIndexOf("/")) != -1) {
		return filePath.substring(lastpos + 1);
	} else
		return filePath.substring(filePath.lastIndexOf("\\")+1);
};

bidix.initOption = function(name,value) {
	if (!config.options[name])
		config.options[name] = value;
};

//
// Initializations
//

// require PasswordOptionPlugin 1.0.1 or better
bidix.checkPlugin("PasswordOptionPlugin", 1, 0, 1);

// styleSheet
setStylesheet('.txtUploadStoreUrl, .txtUploadBackupDir, .txtUploadDir {width: 22em;}',"uploadPluginStyles");

//optionsDesc
merge(config.optionsDesc,{
	txtUploadStoreUrl: "Url of the UploadService script (default: store.php)",
	txtUploadFilename: "Filename of the uploaded file (default: in index.html)",
	txtUploadDir: "Relative Directory where to store the file (default: . (downloadService directory))",
	txtUploadBackupDir: "Relative Directory where to backup the file. If empty no backup. (default: ''(empty))",
	txtUploadUserName: "Upload Username",
	pasUploadPassword: "Upload Password",
	chkUploadLog: "do Logging in UploadLog (default: true)",
	txtUploadLogMaxLine: "Maximum of lines in UploadLog (default: 10)"
});

// Options Initializations
bidix.initOption('txtUploadStoreUrl','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadFilename','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadDir','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadBackupDir','');
bidix.initOption('txtUploadUserName','');
bidix.initOption('pasUploadPassword','');
bidix.initOption('chkUploadLog',true);
bidix.initOption('txtUploadLogMaxLine','10');


/* don't want this for tiddlyspot sites

// Backstage
merge(config.tasks,{
	uploadOptions: {text: "upload", tooltip: "Change UploadOptions and Upload", content: '<<uploadOptions>>'}
});
config.backstageTasks.push("uploadOptions");

*/


//}}}

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!!!Nussbaum contends that today’s Aristotelian can defend a non-relative account of virtues because…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) while Aristotle’s own discussion of the virtues was deeply influenced by his context, Aristotle’s framework provides a tool for reflection and criticism which leads us to avoid relativism.]>
{{green{Yes. This is Nussbaum’s central point: the theoretical structure of Aristotle can be retained even while resisting many of his substantive claims about what character traits are best.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Aristotle does not find good words with which to articulate certain virtues, which demonstrates that Aristotle was trying to go beyond merely articulating the norms of his culture.]>
{{green{Yes. This is indeed a point that Nussbaum emphasizes in her argument that Aristotle is not simply trying to capture the existing moral priorities of his culture.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Marx, for example, was wrong to think that a crucial component of our form of life (such as handling of private property) could be eliminated from human life entirely.]>
{{red{No... Marx was not simply wrong about this, on Nussbaum’s view; the existence of private property could be radically diminished (perhaps absent!) in some alternative society. However, Nussbaum is concerned that *eliminating* such a sphere may also involve removing something vital about human choices. We might also say, along roughly Nussbaum’s lines, that even if a culture lacks “money” or “private capital” it is unlikely to lack *any* domain within which we can recognize something like a virtue of generosity (Time, attention, resources of some kind presumably remain, unless the social order has entirely removed all room for choice).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) although Aristotle defends particularism, on which suffecient rules can never be spelled out, this particularism is not in tension with moral objectivity; the truth about something often requires taking particular details into account.]>
{{green{Yes. Particularism is the view that moral response should depend upon local and contextual factors. Some people speak of  this as kind of “relativity” but only in the sense that, say, the time of an eclipse is objectively “relative” to a person’s location (and not a matter of subjective or perspectival debate). We can still say (according to particularists) that GIVEN a certain situation (place, time, surrounding social setting) one response is objectively better than others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) everyone agrees on the spheres of experience; the only cultural disagreement comes in the ensuing inquiry about which specific virtues represent the ideal in relation to these spheres of experience.]>
{{red{No... Nussbaum admits that there may be some debate about how to enumerate and describe the various spheres of virtue. 
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[Aristotle's virtues|https://www.dropbox.com/s/tl17728nlotgjfh/Arist_Virt_Vice_List_Bartlett_Nussbaum%2000002.png?raw=1]]

[img(100%,auto)[Aristotle's virtues|https://www.dropbox.com/s/c7znyfe4hxw47k1/Arist_Virt_Vice_List_Bartlett_Nussbaum%2000001.png?raw=1]]

!!!Virtues, according to Mill…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) are habits that a utilitarian necessarily endorses because of their positive effect on general happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. yes; if they did not promote happiness, they would not count as virtues.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) lead reliably to happiness on the part of individuals who cultivate them.]>
{{red{No... Mill does think that it’s hard to achieve happiness without “enlarged sentiments” that involve interests beyond the self, but virtue is neither logically necessary nor reliably sufficient for individual happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) are not originally or naturally a part of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. They can become a part of happiness only through association.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) become valuable to a person in just the way that money or fame may be — through association with achieving happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed, though they have moral value, unlike those things.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) could lead you, on a particular occasion, to act in a way that causes considerable suffering to yourself.]>
{{green{Yes. Virtues are among the habitual patterns of will that may persist even when acting on them -- in a particular case -- does not promise dividual happiness overall (though acting on the virtue, as such, may still be part of a person’s conception of happiness).
}}}
===
}}}

What is patriotic?
>"Not one of our laws raises any obstacle or forbids him, if he is not satisfied with the city, if one of you...wants to go anywhere else." (54)
|Socrates argues that if he was indeed displeased with Athen's definition of justice, nothing legally prevented him from leaving. But is it just to pick up and leave your home and loved ones when your home's idea of justice is corrupt? Aren't those who abandon corruption when they see it rather than fixing it doing wrong to their home? Civil rights movements all over the world and through time would not have taken place if people didn't love their homes enough to fight for change instead of leaving. What is patriotism really then?|<<img direction>>@@The concern here is of course an important one. I'm actually uncertain, however, where you're going with this line of thought. For it seems to be offered in a tone of objection to Socrates... Yet at this place in the text he's just explaining that the Laws have given him a choice, and that he made the choice to stay. It seems you're arguing that staying and trying to make change in one's home community is the reasonable choice to make -- and that is exactly what Socrates made...<br><br>If you're backing up Socrates' position, then I'd still encourage you to raise a critical question that raises difficulty for the central line of argument in the text.<br><br>If you took yourself to be making an objection to Socrates' approach (that he himself failed to "fight for change" in some way?), then the next step would be to make room to consider Socrates' likely reply. How might he field this objection? We should note, for example, that in the text he emphasizes that he did take responsibility for trying to convince Athens -- indeed, he bent over backwards to try to persuade them, to the point of risking and losing his life. This is rather different from the sort of thing we'd call "abandoning" a community... <br><br>Language notes: note placement of apostrophe outside of Athens' name@@|

!! Elie Wiesel Prize in Ethics
>The Elie Wiesel Prize in Ethics Essay Contest is an annual competition designed to challenge college students to analyze the urgent ethical issues confronting them in today's complex world. Students are encouraged to write thought-provoking personal essays that raise questions, single out issues and are rational arguments for ethical action.
!!!Suggested Topics:
* Articulate with clarity an ethical issue that you have encountered and analyze what it has taught you about ethics and yourself.
* Reflect on the relationship between religion and ethics in today's world, making sure to draw on your own life as a guide.     
* What does your own experience tell you about the relationship between politics and ethics and, in particular, what could be done to make politics more ethical?
Deadline for entries: December each year. 
[[Elie Wiesel Prize website|http://www.eliewieselfoundation.org/2011information.aspx]]

<script>
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!!!Wisdom, according to Epictetus, involves…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) refraining from participation in athletics and politics and anything else where winners are superficially honored.]>
{{red{No, or at least not clearly so... Although one must not *aim* for the superficial honors, Epictetus clearly indicates that one could choose those activities, and take an interest in participating in them in wise ways. Still, Epictetus does warn that the pursuit of wisdom (that is, philosophy) may not be compatible with devoting attention to other tasks.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) scorning others’ emotions, and avoiding intimacy and family ties.]>
{{red{No... Epictetus does counsel against living by one’s own emotions, but scorn for others is also a problem. It’s a mistake to be so attached to others that your happiness becomes “up to them,” but neither intimacy nor family ties are ruled out. Indeed, family bonds and responsibilities are explicitly part of the lives Epictetus depicts as admirable.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) cultivating a reputation for philosophical wisdom and extreme self-discipline.]>
{{red{No... Although Epictetus does at times seem to draw attention to reputation (especially in motivating beginners), reputation belongs to the class of things not in our control. Ultimately, students should not be concerned one way or the other about it.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) believing that no behavior is better or worse than any other.]>
{{red{No... It is unwise to *judge* others’ actions once they have occurred, and it is ultimately unwise to blame people (including oneself) for errors. Yet neither of these entails that there is no difference between better and worse actions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) achieving a neutral and impartial perspective as far as possible concerning all that is not within our control.]>
{{green{Yes. Attention to what is “up to us,” and focusing our efforts and desires to this domain, is central to Epictetus’ view.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Wong emphasizes a carefully-formulated version of metaethical relativism, which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) involves understanding that morality’s functions are served in every culture, but in different ways.]>
{{red{No... 443
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) requires admitting that some other culture may have core beliefs that are in tension with ours, but which serve morality’s function equally well.]>
{{green{Yes. 443
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is in fact itself a culturally-conditioned value that flows from the liberal tradition of tolerance.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) may be compatible with cultural intervention such as colonization, but only if there is a net benefit to those who are colonized or interfered-with.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) does not itself entail any normative conclusions about how to treat disagreements.]>
{{green{Yes. 448
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!!*[442: Defining meta-ethical relativism, normative relativism, universalism]
|[The doctrine] that moral truth and justifiability, if there are any such things, are in some way relative to factors that are culturally and historically contingent... is meta-ethical relativism, because it is about the relativity of moral truth and justifiability. Another kind of moral relativism, also a common response to deep moral conflict, is a doctrine about how one ought to act toward those who accept values very different from one’s own. This normative moral relativism holds ''{{medium green{that it is wrong to pass judgment}}}'' on others who have substantially different values, or to try to make them conform to ones values, for the reason that their values are as valid as one’s own. Another common response... is the universalist or absolutist position that... there can be only one truth about the matter...|
===
+++!!!!!*[443: Protagoras’ argument for relativism]
|Plato attributes to the first great Sophist, Protagoras, the argument that human custom determines what is fine and ugly, just and unjust. ... the Greeks, through trade, travel, and war, were fully aware of wide variation in customs, and so the argument concludes with the relativity of morality. The question with this argument, however, is whether we can accept that {{medium{custom}}} determines in a strong sense what is fine and ugly, just and unjust. It {{medium{may influence what people think}}} is fine and just. But it is quite {{medium{another thing for custom to determine what //is// fine and just}}}. Customs sometimes change under the pressure of moral criticism, and the argument sees to rely on a premise that contradicts this phenomenon. ... The simple fact of diversity in belief is not disproof of the possibility that there are some beliefs better to have than the others because they are truer or more justified... Diversity in belief, after all, may result from varying degrees of wisdom. Or it may be that different people have their own limited perspectives of the truth, each perspective being distorted in its own way.|
===
+++!!!!!*[443: The functional argument, more on arguments from diversity]
|de Montaigne [and] anthropologists of the twentieth century... emphasize the importance of studying societies as organic whole of which the parts are functionally interdependent. The problem with the functional argument, however, is that moral beliefs are not justified merely on the grounds that they are necessary for a society’s existence in anything like its present form. Even if a society’s institutions and practices crucially depend on the acceptance of certain beliefs, the justifiability of those beliefs depends on the moral acceptability of the institutions and practices. To show that certain beliefs are necessary for maintaining a fascist society, for instance, is not to justify those beliefs. ... |
===
+++!!!!!*[444: Failure to converge and potential explanations for it]
|It is hard to deny that there is a significant difference in the degree of convergence of belief in ethics and in science. Yet there are possible explanations for that difference that are compatible with claiming that moral judgements are ultimately about facts in the world. These explanations might stress, for instance, the special difficulties of acquiring knowledge of subjects that pertain to moral knowledge... And understanding of human nature and human affairs is necessary... [but] enormously difficult and complex... people have the most intense practical interest in what is established as truth about [ethics[ ad surely this interest engenders the passions that becloud judgment. Universalists could point out that many apparently exotic moral beliefs presuppose certain religious and metaphysical beliefs, and that these beliefs, rather than any difference in fundamental values, explain the apparent strangeness.... Finally, some of the striking differences... may ... be rooted in ... the fact that these values may have be implemented in different ways given the varying conditions that obtain across societies. ... The difference in accepted marriage practice may come down to that difference in the proportion of women to men.|
===
+++!!!!!*[445: Contrasting moral priorities]
|Moralities centered on [Confucian] values would seem to differ significantly from ones centered on individual rights to liberty and to other goods [based on commitment to] moral worth independently attributed to each individual. By contrast a theme frequently found in ethics of the common good is that individuals find their realization as human beings in promoting and sustaining the common good. ... If the contrast between the two types of morality is real, it raises the question of whether one or the other type is truer or more justified than the other. The argument for a relativistic answer may start with the claim that each type focuses on a good that may reasonably occupy the centre of an ethical ideal for human life. On the one hand, there is the good of belonging to and contributing to a community; on the other, there is the good of respect for the individual apart from any potential contribution to community. It would be surprising... if there were just one justifiable way of setting a priority with respect to the two goods.|
===
+++!!!!!*[446: Morality meets practical need; multiple approaches may serve equally well.]
|Morality serves two universal human needs. It regulates conflicts of interest between people, and it regulates conflicts of interest within the individual born of different desires and drives that cannot all be satisfied at the same time. Ways of dealing with those two kinds of conflict develop in anything recognizable as human society. ... Now in order to perform its practical functions adequately, it maybe that a morality will have to possess certain general features. A relatively enduring and stable system for the resolution of conflict between people, for instance, will not permit the torture of persons at whim. But given this picture... it would not be surprising if significantly different moralities were to perform the practical functions equally well... the complexity of our nature makes it possible for us to prize a variety of goods and to order them in different ways, and this opens the ways for a substantial relativism to be true. |
===
+++!!!!!*[446: some moralities might be false]
|The picture sketched above... holds that there is no single true morality, yet does not deny that some moralities might be false and inadequate for the functions they all must perform. ... relativists could also recognize that adequate moralities must promote the production of persons capable of considering the interests of others. ... would have to prescribe and promote the sorts of upbringing and continuing interpersonal relationships that produce such persons.|
===
+++!!!!!*[447: The “straw-man” version of normative relativism]
|The most extreme possible position for the normative relativist is that no-one should ever pass judgement on others with substantially different value, or try to make them conform to one’s own values. Such a definition of normative relativism is usually given by its opponents... It requires self-condemnation by those who act according to it. If I pass judgement on those who pass judgement, I must condemn myself. |
===
+++!!!!!*[447: normative relativism: resisting arrogant imperialism]
|normative relativism is not just a philosophical doctrine but a stance adopted toward morally troubling situation. ... Many anthropologists eventually reacted against the imperialism of their governments and to its rationalization... they came to see the peoples they studied as intelligent men and women whose lives had meaning and integrity. And this led to questioning the basis for implicit judgements of the inferiority of their ways of life, especially after the spectacle of the civilized nations in brutal struggle with one another in the First World War.|
===
+++!!!!!*[448: evil and the necessity of passing judgment at least sometimes]
|The inadequacy of the simple versions [of relativism] is illustrated by the swing in anthropology on the question of normative relativism after the Second World War. That war, many realized, was a battle against enormous evil. Such a realization brought vividly to the forefront the necessity of passing judgement at least sometimes and of acting on one’s judgement.|
===
+++!!!!!*[448: passing judgment, liberal reluctance to act on such judgment.]
|A more reasonable version of normative relativism would have to permit us to pass judgement on others with substantially different values. Even if these different values are as justified as our own from some neutral perspective, we still are entitled to call bad or evil or monstrous what contradicts our most important values. What we are entitled to do in the light of such judgements, however, is another matter. Many of us who are likely to read this book would be reluctant to intervene in the affairs of others who have values substantially different from ours ... when we think that we have no more of an objective case for our moral outlook than the others have for theirs. The source of this reluctance is a feature of our morality. A liberal, contractualist outlook [makes us] want to act toward others in such a way that our actions could be seen as justified by them...|
===
+++!!!!!*[448: Abortion and willingness to enforce moral view]
|Consider the position of those who believe that abortion is morally wrong because it is the taking of life that has moral status. Within this group some seem undisturbed by the fact that there is deep disagreement over the moral status of the fetus. They wish to prohibit abortion. But others in this group, while holding that abortion is wrong, admit that reasonable persons could disagree with them and that human reason seems unable to resolve the question. For this reason they oppose legal prohibitions of abortion.|
===
+++!!!!!*[449: belief in unique truth of a moral code neither nec. nor suffic. for commitment.]
|another reason for [relativism’s] bad name is the assumption that one's moral confidence, one's commitment to act on one's values, is somehow dependent on maintaining the belief that one's morality is the only true or the most justified one. But surely some reflection will reveal that such a belief alone would not guarantee a commitment to act. The commitment to act involves a conception of what one's morality means to the self, whether it be the only true one or not... The belief that our morality is the only true or most justified one does not automatically create this kind of importance, nor is it a necessary condition for this kind of importance, because the values I may see as important and part of what makes life most meaningful to me may not have to be values that all reasonable persons would accept or recognize to be true.|
===

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        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items available//"'
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/***
|Author:|Simon Baird|
|URL:|http://linktomemacro.tiddlyspot.com/|
(Almost) as posted by BradleyMeck on the mailing list, 21-Oct-2006. To use put this somewhere in your ViewTemplate:
{{{<div style="font-size:150%">(<span macro="wordCount"></span> words)</div>}}}
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merge(config.macros,{
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//}}}

You may want to consult the [[philosophy guidelines at the writing center|http://www.wesleyan.edu/writing/workshop/departments/philosophy.html]], and the following list of common errors compiled by [[Elise Springer]].

//The following points are from my key to a list of about 200 errors occur commonly enough that I've developed quick explanatory codes. Please be sure to check with a writing tutor, or with me, if any of these are not clear to you. (These aren't the only things that matter, but understanding these may be a good way to remind yourself of things to watch out for.)//

|!Common problems that directly affect philosophical or scholarly value:|
|@ —Your reader wants to see some indication of a ''citation'' close by. Where can this be found?|
|BI — ''Bibliography'' is incomplete/incorrect (lacking sources, lacking complete information, or badly formatted). See [[MLA's online guide|http://www.lib.usm.edu/research/guides/mla.html]].|
|BN —"Backup" is needed: you have a claim that shouldn't appear without some ''defense or argument''.|
|CH — ''Charity'': your criticism may be plausible, but you should put effort into seeing whether better sense can be made of the text.|
|CN — ''Citation'' needed: any direct quote, as well as any paraphrase of a relatively obscure or surprising idea from a text, needs to be accompanied by a citation, as in {{{(Kant, 424)}}} or {{{(Plato, 12a)}}}|
|CX— ''Connection''? It's not clear why you present these ideas as logically related. If you believe they are, please spell out why.|
|IQ— ''Include quotation'' or clearly referenced paraphrase. Your critical response will achieve better focus by examining specific passages.|
|LS —What a ''long sentence''! Your reader might be better served by breaking this up into shorter focused claims.|
|OS— ''Oversimplification'': While there may be a problem, you seem to offer too hasty a summary of the position you’re criticizing.|
|PB — ''Paragraph break'' is needed: focus each paragraph on a topic sentence and give the reader a breather between topics.|
|PL —Here you settle for leading the reader through the "''plot''" of the text. Where are we going, and why?|
|TT —There's a ''thesis topic'' here, but not a thesis problem or a thesis claim. YOUR contribution to our thinking through this topis is...?|
|XD — Accusing someone of a ''contradiction'' is very serious business. Make sure you specify exactly what claim seems to be both affirmed and denied.|

|!Surface problems that mar the quality of your work and distract the reader|
|BY — Correct use of ''"By"'' at the beginning of a sentence/clause is tricky. See a reference work on participle clauses.|
|DA — ''Dangler'': The subordinate clause or modifier should "belong to" the subject of the sentence. [[Learn how to fix|http://owl.english.purdue.edu/handouts/grammar/g_dangmod.html]].|
|DF — A ''differs from'' B, so A is different from B; "different than" is common but [[generally clumsy|http://www.straightdope.com/columns/010316.html/]].|
|FE —Don't use "I ''feel''" (or "he feels") talk unless you have some reason to talk about gut reactions or emotions here; talk of "feeling that x is true" suggests lack of openness to reasons.|
|GM —The "''generic male''" is dying... some older authors did mean "human" by "man" (etc.), but now the male connotation is undeniable. Sometimes [[restructuring a sentence is required|http://www.cjr.org/tools/lc/heshe.asp]].|
|H — ''Homophones'' (similar-sounding words) have been confused here. [[Learn the difference|http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/homofone.htm]]! Spell-checkers can't help.|
|JB — "//Just because ... does not mean...//" is OK in informal speech, but ungrammatical in form.|
|PV — The ''passive voice'' gets in the way here: why not say directly WHO does/claims this (avoiding "by")?|
|Q —Your words indicate a ''question'' is being asked, and yet you treat the sentence like an assertion.|
|QB—The proper meaning of the phrase "[[question-begging|begging the question]]" still matters in philosophy. It does //not// mean some situation "invites us to ask a question..." Instead it means someone "fails to provide reasons on the matter, but instead simply begs for acceptance of a claim."|
|QL —If a ''quoted'' passage is ''long'', it needs its own separate double-indented, single-spaced paragraph.|
|RG — ''Argue'' [this point]: “Argue” is best used without a direct object. One argues for or against claims, but “argue a point” is unclear.|
|SD — ''Spell-check disaster'': the only explanation for this irrelevant word is that you chose a [[spell-checker’s brainless suggestion|http://www.eiu.edu/~kuoeng/spelling.html]]. Oops!|
|WP —The ''wrong pronoun'' is used.|
|YO —If possible, avoid using "''you''" to mean "anyone". (Especially avoid going back and forth among “you” and “one” and “they” in the same context.)|

The Writing Workshop, run by Ann Greene, always has writing tutors available. Some have more philosophical expertise than others.

!!!Aristotle’s represents human life as part of nature, stating or implying that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) virtue means optimally carrying out the natural functions of human beings.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes; even our rational capacities are portrayed as functions that are natural to us in virtue of being animals of the human species.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) because individuals are naturally different, what is virtuous for one may not be virtuous for another.]>
{{red{No... Aristotle acknowledges that our way of *representing* the mean may need to differ based on what our temptations (natural inclinations) are. There’s no suggestion of a subjective standard for where the mean lies.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) biological differences between people can influence their moral character.]>
{{green{Yes. Aristotle speaks of the moral tendencies of men and of women, for example -- a distinction that would not make sense to Plato or the Stoics, for whom the soul, quite distinct from the body, is not shaped by biology. (It’s true that he would not *blame* a person for their biological limitations, but certainly those limitations affect their moral profile, just as much as being biologically human rather than feline affects whether one has a moral profile at all.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) people are either virtuous or vicious because of their innate nature.]>
{{red{No... While virtue is the perfection of a natural function, we are not simply virtuous by “innate” nature, but must be educated in it and must continue to cultivate it deliberately in ourselves as well.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) virtue is mean to which we naturally gravitate because we wish to avoid two opposite vices.]>
{{red{No... Nothing about virtue involves “naturally gravitating” towards it. 1109b
}}}
===
}}}

class of knowledge-claims that are asserted and accepted only because of empirical evidence. 
(Antonym: [[a priori]])
----
Kant is anxious to discourage us from seeking basic moral principles in a posteriori sources, such as religious texts.

class of knowledge-claims whose warrant is (allegedly) //prior// to (independent of) experience: they neither require nor permit confirmation by empirical evidence.
(Antonym: //a posteriori//)
----
We know, //a priori//, that triangles have three sides. To look in the empirical world (the world of experience) for an exception to this rule -- the newly-discovered four-sided triangle found in a remote jungle, say -- is unintelligible.

Many philosophers had treated the a priori as equivalent to things that are true by definition, or analytic. Kant opposes this assumption, arguing that there are also synthetic a priori truths.

Note: The phrase //a priori// should generally appear in italics, as it is borrowed from Latin.

The categorical imperative is an ''//a priori// synthetic'' practical proposition (420).
>since discerning the possibility of propositions of this sort involves so much difficulty in theoretic knowledge, there may... be no less difficulty in practical knowledge. (420)
+++!!!![What does this mean?]
Until Kant, ''two kinds of proposition'' were recognized in philosophy:
|>|>|!Kinds of proposition (or knowledge), before and after Kant:|
|a posteriori|!+++[...]//a priori// synthetic<br>^^(added by Kant)^^<br>necessarily presupposed<br>as a //condition//<br>of understanding the world===|a priori|
|dependent on experience|~|dependent only on reason|
|''synthetic'':<br>generated by ''synthesis''—<br>bringing different concepts together|~|''analytic'': <br>generated simply by analysis—<br>dissecting conceptual definitions.|
|example: "Bats eat insects."|!+++[...]example: "Everything that happens has a cause."<br>"Anything that is colored has some dimension."<br>===|example: "Triangles have three sides."|
===

a priori      vs.    a posteriori   ...
A priori: grasped without recourse to specific experience or experimentation: matters of definition
A posteriori: grasped through specific experiences, subject to experimental evidence
		Kant offers an a priori approach to understanding the concept of moral goodness.

rationalism      vs.   empiricism: 
Is moral correctness learned through ''experience'' of pleasures and pains, as Aristotle claimed?
Or is there some moral understanding that reason applies to experience, culture, and learning?

Two thoughts on Kant as POLITICAL figure: 
(a)	 If morality can be understood apart from teaching, there’s no “liberal excuse” for vice. 
(b)	 if morality does not depend on experience, “moral authority” is no longer an obvious need.

NOTE: Some think Kant’s a priori approach means that there’s no such thing as moral growth or learning. Like Plato’s theory of forms, Kant’s theory of moral concepts does allow for education; yet the process of education is one of attunement to transcendent ideas. Education in ethics would be more like education in geometry than education in history: sharpening of perception, coming to recognize that a certain principle must be true. Further, our judgment (what counts as a lie, who is a person) can improve through reflection on experience.

[>img[Nietzsche|http://www.rschindler.com/nietzsche.jpg]]
+++!!![Nietzsche's occupation: ''philology'']
study of words/symbols, especially their historical development.
===
+++!!![Interpreting §58: ''nominalism:'']
philosophical doctrine that our concepts are //imposed// on things, don't just capture their prior nature.+++>CREATIVE nominalism: words and ideas change the world.<br>Nietzsche's famous "death of God" follows: nothing has a pre-determined essence; we are the meaning-makers.======
+++!!![Amor fati]
Yes-saying, lack of regrets<br>Consider Nietzsche's myth of eternal return, alluded to at //GS//§341===

Class discussion materials for PHIL/~ENVS212 (Introduction to Ethics), at [[Wesleyan University|http://www.wesleyan.edu]], are located here, on a single interactive webpage. Content is generated by Elise Springer at Wesleyan's [[Department of Philosophy|http://www.wesleyan.edu/phil]]. 

+++[What's under the hood?]
This site is built on a [[TiddlyWiki|https://tiddlywiki.com/]] frame, modified with many [[open-source plugins|http://www.tiddlytools.com/#NestedSlidersPlugin]], and hosted by [[TiddlySpot|http://tiddlyspot.com/?page=about]]. Many thanks to the ~TiddlyWiki community (Jeremy Ruston, Simon and Daniel Baird, Eric Shulman, and others) for their generosity in making this platform so flexible and reliable!===

+++[A quick tour]
Check out [[Perspective bias]] for use of tabs and embedded images. For self-quiz questions, using sliders to make answers visible, visit [[Epictetus' dinner-guest advice…]]. For an automatically compiled list based on tagged content, see [[definitions]] or [[philosophers]].
===

Why not think that happiness (perhaps not just one's own, but others' as well) is the goal toward which reason is directed?
Kant has a complex argument at 395:
|[In any being] suitable adapted to the purpose of life... no organ is to be found for any end unless it be the most fit and the best adapted for that end.|
|If ... happiness ... were the real end [for beings'  having reason]... then nature would have hit upon a very poor arrangement.|
|''Reason has some other end than happiness.''|

[img(100%,auto)[euthyphro_map|https://www.dropbox.com/s/s9ljfswfu5uj6ak/reading_euthyphro_bubbles.png?raw=1]]

We know Kant, unlike Aristotle, argues that only good will is "good without qualification", and that happiness is not.
Worse, it may seem that Kant thinks it is a GOOD thing if we are NOT happy when we act on duty.

+++!!!![First, what is a good will, on this account?]
>good will ''≠'' "intending //to be nice//"
>good will ''≠'' "strength in self-assertion"
>good will      =     reason properly applied to practical matters    =     principles in action    =    lawfulness (respect for duty)
===
+++!!!![Puzzle: What is Kant’s attitude towards acting out of beneficent inclinations vs. acting in spite of contrary inclination?]
>Two interpretations: 
>(a) Anti-happiness interpretation is tempting, but has disadvantages...
>(b) The epistemic interpretation: only cases of contrary inclination can serve as //examples//; otherwise inclination offers the better explanation for action. 
>Which interpretation is right?
>Hint: Kant will actually claim that promoting one's happiness is a duty!
===

(Greek term) Lack of self-control or self-restraint, sometimes translated as "incontinence." 
Greek thinkers disagreed about the possibility of akrasia; Socrates argued that genuine knowledge (based on its ideal nature) must bring motivation with it; Aristotle argued, from experience, that it is common for people to recognize that they are failing to act on their knowledge.

[img(100%,100%)[Crisp translation|https://www.dropbox.com/s/d6gxur3h81dk5af/Screenshot%202017-09-27%2009.54.58.png?dl=1]]

[<img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropbox.com/s/pdac7q7r1jvk6fr/Screenshot%202014-10-15%2012.36.31.png]]
Below, inference indicators are circled, subclaims are given their own numbers, and edits allow claims to be read independently:
[<img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropbox.com/s/00j5ec7eusk9ufc/Screenshot%202014-10-15%2012.24.54.png]]
Below, the main conclusion is double-underlined, and arrows highlight two crucial lines of inference directly supporting the final conclusion:
[<img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropbox.com/s/afcc6r07meqju8u/Screenshot%202014-10-15%2012.32.41.png]]

true by definition, or true through [[analysis]]
(Antonym: [[synthetic]])
----
>It is a merely analytic truth that a triangle has three sides.
The tradition known as [[Analytic philosophy]] begins with a methodological commitment to investigating meanings carefully.

[img(100%,100%)[osprey|http://www.montanaoutdoor.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/osprey-catching-trout-scott-linstead-450x300.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[goats|https://media.npr.org/assets/img/2017/05/31/goat-02_custom-060bac4eeff1a0b290ff201210009e650a2025d0-s700-c85.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[bees|https://ucanr.edu/blogs/bugsquad/blogfiles/17926.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[beaver|https://www-tc.pbs.org/wnet/nature/files/2014/11/mezzanine_859.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[chimps|http://www.stevebloom.com/images/b/001672-SB1.jpg]]

A stance on which reality is characterized as permeated by agency or life, where beings conventionally treated as inert things or objects are understood as active participants in the world.
----
See also: [[anthropomorphism debate]]

An objection that an reasoner forsees or imagines,  often with an advance reply.

the doctrine (usually only an doctrine imputed to someone by opponents) that denies the importance of laws. (from //anti-// against + //nomy// law)

Antinomianism occupies one extreme pole in a Christian theological debate about the relative importance, for salvation, of "works" (obedience to commandments and duties) as opposed to "faith" and "grace," both of which represent a more direct and internal relation to God. 
Both Emerson and Nietzsche have been characterized as antinomian thinkers.

rhetorically compelling brief phrase or passage, usually designed for provocation, meditation, or illustration rather than [[argument]].
----
[[Nietzsche]] is the modern philosopher who is most known for writing in an [[aphoristic]] style, though the late [[Wittgenstein]] also did so, and many ancient thinkers such as [[Epictetus]], [[Confucius]], [[Buddha]], and many others, preferred aphorism.

bewilderment or perplexity, especially following multiple failed attempts to answer a question. //See also problem//.

a set of claims designed to build support for one main point. The main point is the conclusion, while premises are the claims supposed to offer reasons to believe that conclusion.

The following passage from Aristotle's //Nicomachean Ethics// (tr. Ross) contains a network of complex inferences. Discuss and evaluate the argument using terms of argument analysis, paying particular attention to inference indicators. Then, try reconstructing the argument by...
# paraphrasing and numbering the distinct claims made
# filling in any likely suppressed claims that would bring the argument closer to deductive strength, and
# creating a diagram to illustrate the relations of support that Aristotle seems to be invoking.
> Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science; for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. [1094e-1095a]
[[See Philosophical Reasoning Skills site...|http://reasoningwell.tiddlyspot.com/#Skills]]

+++!![1. Micro-essays (30%):]
Micro-essays rotate among members of each discussion team so that one person writes in preparation for each class (assuming four members of a group, and a four-session unit). Each group can decide who writes on which occasion, in any order agreed upon by group members, as long as everyone writes at least once during each 2-week unit, for 6 total. Keep the following guidelines in mind:
!!!!!(a) Find and type a short passage that seems most importantly insightful, interestingly wrong, or centrally puzzling. (Alternately, you might type a couple short excerpts that seem to have a curious relation to each other.)
!!!!!(b) Make sure you can discuss the passage(s) with argument analysis vocabulary (see handout)
!!!!!(c) Compose a concise commentary on it (max 120 words), including argument-analysis, contextually interpretive, and evaluative elements. The idea is to use the passage as a springboard to raise a problem, then consider and evaluate possible lines of response from our author (and, perhaps, others). Seek a balance  involving both critical and charitable elements.
!!!!!(d) Edit and proofread carefully. Language errors will significantly affect credit.
!!!!!(e) Post micro-essays to moodle by midnight the night before class.
!!!!!(f) Make sure to offer a very brief and informative title, as in "Euthyphro: Where is the room for faith?" or "Utilitarianism: how does general happiness motivate anyone?"
!!!!!(g) I may illustrate points during class with excerpts from students’ commentaries, but I will be respectful of each student's level of comfort with having work shared in class. Please contact me if you prefer not to allow your writing to be considered in class discussion.
Each commentary will earn up to five points for accuracy of presentation, sustained focus on one issue, strength of challenge or problem raised, room made to anticipate an author’s response, and quality of writing. Please note although the assignment is short, it is not casual, and perfect five-point micro-essays are very rare indeed (a handful in all the years I’ve taught the course). Careful revision, as well as practice with philosophical concepts, is required to frame your key points clearly.===
+++!![2. Opening questions (no direct grade):]
Most class sessions will begin with opening questions to be discussed in small groups. The questions will take “multiple choices” format: one question with multiple potential answers, where the idea is to circle any and all correct answers, and comment. Generally, these questions will not be answerable except by having read the text carefully in advance. Group members should deliberate about the best choices. As a last resort, in cases of unresolved disagreement, any individual may add a short dissenting comment and explanation. The “secretary” role should rotate evenly through the group.
One group response form will be turned in, and signatures on this sheet will serve to mark attendance as well as to show whether the group was able to generate consensus on the answers. The group worksheet will not contribute directly to grades. However, they can bring you a bonus for studying well in advance of class because...===
+++!![3. Exams (midterm and final, 20% each):]
Approximately half of each exam will consist of exactly the same kind of objective “multiple choices” questions as were discussed in class, one for each class session (for a total of eleven or twelve such questions per exam). Exams must be completed individually and will be scored individually, but the set of exam questions will differ according to discussion group. Any questions that a group answered entirely correctly will appear on the exam for members of that group, replacing what would otherwise be a new question. In other words, to the extent your group achieves real accuracy with the questions during the usual class sessions, the exam questions will be familiar questions for which you have already helped decide on correct answers. If your group’s answer for a given week was not entirely correct, a different question (neither more nor less difficult) will appear on your exam for that material. 
Exams will each also include one essay seeking big-picture connections among ideas and texts.===
+++!![4. Essay (20%):]
There is only one major essay for the class, and plenty of time to work towards it during the semester. Each student should consider, starting early in the semester, what sort of issue might provide an engaging focus for an essay, and think about the relevance of each text for that issue. Examples might be treatment of animals, religious education, criticism and respect for difference, childhood and responsibility, moral motivation, punishment, group identity and moral perspective. A topic is a good one if you can explore a “live problem” about which reasonable people might try different approaches. One fourth of the grade will be determined by the quality of the initial abstract. Initial abstracts will be submitted and discussed several weeks before the end of the semester, and final drafts are due in the final week. Stay tuned for precise details.===
+++!![5. Participation (10%):]
Philosophy is a skill as much as a body of understanding. So, contributing to dialogue is essential. In addition to attendance,  participation scores can benefit from consistent contributions to groupwork (as assessed via anonymous peer feedback), extra moodle posts (beyond once per unit), and substantive responses to others' moodle posts. Students who expect to miss more than one or two classes, or who have other obstacles to participating in class, may want to meet with me to strategize ways to engage in compensatory forms of participation. ===

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As an empiricist, Mill believes that human behavior is basically (in theory) understandable via psychological explanation. 

The hedonist psychological theory of core motivation:
{{indent{
	Animal behavior is driven by instinctual aversions (pains) and attractions (pleasures).
	Association allows complex animals to experience pleasure and pain with non-instinctual stimuli.
}}}
Associationist school of psychology -- developed by empiricist philosophers (Hume, Mill):
{{indent{
	Learning occurs when experiences of A happen together with experiences of B.
	A and B may become linked in the mind so that an experience of A seems to *mean* B.
}}}
The result is a total theory of human action:
|“Nothing is a good to human beings but in so far as it is either itself pleasurable, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain.”
{{indent{
All choices are because of the pursuit of happiness: 
		either as a means, or as part of happiness itself (that is, desired “for its own sake”)
}}}
+++!!!![Puzzle: How does Mill make sense of “joyless choices”?]
|!Desire/Pleasure|...motivates...|!Choices of Will|...which foster...|!Habit|
|>|>|>|>|So, conditioning can lead us to choose what we do not particularly experience as pleasant.|

tranquility or peace of mind; literally, the state of being not disturbed
----
Ataraxia is the highest good for Epictetus and other Stoics, and is also highly valued by the Epicureans, who argue that freedom from anxiety or worry is a more realistic goal than achieving lasting states of pleasure.

Kant claims that we are most free when we are following universal laws of reason.
Why? (Shouldn't "freedom" mean freedom from law?)
Kantian premise: freedom = autonomy

|!heteronomy|!autonomy|
|rule by outside influences|rule according to internal guidelines|
|objects "push and pull" at one's appetites|practical reason initiates a choice|

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Consider how the stoic idea (of "accepting what is not up to us") contrasts with King's ethics:
>Modern psychology has a word that is probably used more than any other word. It is the word 'maladjusted.' Now we all should seek to live a well adjusted life in order to avoid neurotic and schizophrenic personalities. But there are some things within our social order to which I am proud to be [among the] maladjusted and to which I call upon you to be maladjusted. I never intend to adjust myself to segregation and discrimination. I never intend to to adjust myself to mob rule. I never intend to adjust myself to the tragic effects of the methods of physical violence and to tragic militarism. I call upon you to be maladjusted to such things.

|"Aristotle has often been charged with indecision and sometimes with holding conflicting views about the relative merits of a comprehensive ''practical'' life and one devoted primarily to ''contemplation''." <br>-- Amelie Rorty, "The Place of Contemplation in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics" (377)|
|"It is only in a corrupt polity that the contemplative life needs to be otherworldly, and only in a corrupt polity that the policies promoting the development and exercise of contemplative activity would come into conflict with those establishing requirements for the best practical life" (378)|

Chapter VII of the //Nicomachean Ethics// begins by distinguishing three kinds of morally bad state: vice, incontinence, and brutishness.
According to Aristotle, in some cases, human beings' bodies do things as if "nobody is home" -- that is, there is not just a failure to act on decision (as in incontinence), but a pattern of movement that takes place without room for choice at all. (Whether all "beasts" or "brutes" lack choice is another matter, but Aristotle takes deliberate choice to be distinctively human.)

As "morbid" forms of incontinence, Aristotle mentions epilepsy and acting under the influence of profound intoxication. 

A person may still be blamed for decisions //related// to the brutishness (allowing oneself to get drunk, failing to take one's medication), but not for the behaviors //within// the state. 

Can we think of other cases of what Aristotle calls "brutish" or "bestial" conditions?
+++>
* Kleptomania involves not even realizing that one is grabbing inappropriately at things.
* Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder often includes automatic coping behaviors (seeking cover, fleeing) that take place despite lack of decision.
* Addictive behaviors illustrate a spectrum between intemperateness (unwise yet fully voluntary choices), incontinent choices (regretting an action even while giving in to urges), and automatic behaviors that simply "take over".
===

!!!Utilitarianism was familiar to Mill’s readers as a view on which decision-makers should systematically weigh costs and benefits to calculate the best choice of action. Mill’s view departs from this cool and calculative approach in the following ways…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) In addition to the experience of physical pleasures and absence of pain, Mill values the exercise of complex capacities.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed; like Aristotle, he recognize a kind of pleasure that comes from being fully engaged in a skillful or complex activity, especially socially beneficial projects.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Mill denies that morality involves a great deal of calculation; most choices can be guided by familiar time-tested norms. (The main role for the utilitarian standard is to confirm and/or criticize such norms.)]>
{{green{Yes. This is Mill’s point in the penultimate paragraph of the second chapter.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Mill ranks some pleasures as more worthwhile than others, though we cannot easily quantify the difference.]>
{{green{Yes. Experience is supposed to qualify us to make those comparisons, but of course there may sometimes be controversy among experienced judges.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Mill thinks that a person’s opinion about something has no merit until they have experienced it personally.]>
{{red{No... If this were so, utilitarianism could not get off the ground; we must be able to gather evidence, through communication and reflection, about the likely effects of our actions (on other people, on our future selves, etc.). Of course, such evidence ultimately rests on actual experiences, which Mill respects as the source of all knowledge.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Mill attaches value not just to actions, but also to character traits which require cultivation and education.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

[<img(100%,100%)[moon|http://brainden.com/images/ant-helicopter.jpg]]

!!!According to Nodding, actions that best exemplify caring…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) are those that are motivated by an ethical effort; our commitment to caring as such is shown only when we push ourselves to care despite lacking the inclination.]>
{{red{No... It’s true that an *ethics* of caring requires including this kind of second-best caring (ethical effort), but Noddings clearly takes this kind of caring to be a back-up option to buttress the best examples of caring.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) do not vary according to culture; the principles of caring, unlike the rules of most masculine ethics, are universal.]>
{{red{No... For Noddings, there’s no sense in discussing the “principles of caring”; caring is based on some kind of experience which is to some degree shared by all who have been cared for at all, but there’s no implication that caring actions will look the same across cultures.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) cannot be reliably judged by others, because caring is bound up with the subjective experience of the one who cares.]>
{{green{Yes. Nodding does place emphasis //primarily// on the conscious state of the one-caring, although consequences are not irrelevant... (325)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) are ones that most effectively promote the happiness of the person being cared for.]>
{{red{No... Happiness is clearly not her target, nor is “maximal promotion” -- consequentialist rhetoric -- compatible with her emphasis on conscious and engrossed attention as the crucial moral factor.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) can never be based solely on logical reasoning.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

Beauvoir's application to writing philosophy:

|!passivity, indecision|We gain our intellectual challenge and significance by balancing precariously between these two extremes, analogous to not-being and being...|!certainty, confidence|

A central norm governing philosophical interpretation, according to which we read a text with an eye towards noticing the most consistent and reasonable view (by our own lights) it could possibly be trying to express, without ignoring clear differences between the author's views and our own.

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+++!!!![Is something like “bravery” one coherent trait?]
{{indent{
Of course, Aristotle //can// admit that someone could act (and feel) bravely in some situtations and cowardly in other situations. Such a person would not really have the //virtue// of bravery, but would merely act bravely sometimes. 

But we must then ask questions like these:
* Does acting bravely in one kind of situation help habituate a person to being brave in other situations?
* Is generosity in one kind of situation likely to correlate with generosity in other situations?
}}}
===
+++!!!![Gilbert Harman: The “fundamental attribution error” and psychology experiments...]
|It seems that ''ordinary attributions of character traits'' to people are often deeply ''misguided'' and it may even be the case that there is ''no such thing as character'',  no ordinary character ''traits'' of the sort people think there are, ''none of the usual moral virtues and vices''.|
|...Ross & Nisbett (1991, p. 95) report that the "average correlation between different behavioral measures designed to tap the same personality trait (for examples, ''impulsivity, honesty, dependency'', or the like) was typically in the range between .10 and .20, and often was even lower." These are very low correlations...|
|Our ordinary views about character traits can be explained without supposing that there are such traits. In trying to explain why someone has acted in a certain way, we concentrate on the figure and ignore the ground. We look at the agent and ignore the situation. We are naive in our understanding of the way others view a given situation. We suffer from a confirmation bias that leads us to ignore evidence against our attributions of character.|
|^^Gilbert Harman, "Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and The Fundamental Attribution Error" Proc. Arist Society 1999^^|c
===

>To illustrate this farther, we may remember that virtue is not the  only thing, originally a means, and which if it were not a means to  anything else, would be and remain indifferent, but which by  association with what it is a means to, comes to be desired for  itself, and that too with the utmost intensity. What, for example,  shall we say of the love of money? There is nothing originally more  desirable about money than about any heap of glittering pebbles. Its  worth is solely that of the things which it will buy; the desires  for other things than itself, which it is a means of gratifying. Yet  the love of money is not only one of the strongest moving forces of  human life, but money is, in many cases, desired in and for itself;  .. From being a means to happiness, it has come to be  itself a principal ingredient of the individual's conception of  happiness.<br>...The desire of  it is not a different thing from the desire of happiness, any more  than the love of music, or the desire of health. They are included  in happiness. They are some of the elements of which the desire of  happiness is made up. Happiness is not an abstract idea, but a  concrete whole; and these are some of its parts.

+++!!![Main points of overlap with Marx:]
|(1) ''Historicism'' about values: values have a history of birth and evolution|
|(2) Values serve ''interests''.|
|!Thus: (3) We ought to be suspicious of appealing to moral concepts without any awareness of the ''history and function of those values''.|
+++!!![Key difference from Marx in theoretical approach:]
|(1) Human being is understood not primarily in terms of //''praxis''// (cooperative conscious work), but in terms of individual ''will to power''.|
|(2) Therefore, the vision of liberation and full potential is ''individualist'' and ''elitist'' rather than political and egalitarian: <br>Not everyone can realize the ideal of the //Übermensch//.|
|(3) Because individuals are not simply products of the economic superstructure of society, the resulting account is not deterministic. Historical narrative need not be predictable.|
|(4) Nietzsche takes Marx's //activity// of generating ideas one step further: If all ideas emerge in historical perspective, we ought not to pretend that any idea gets entirely beyond perspective to a simple //truth// of how things "just are", independently of our interests and histories.|
======
+++!!![Nietzsche's differences from Kant are especially striking:]
|All who still judge, "everyone would have to act this way in this case" have not yet progressed five steps in self-knowledge... identical actions neither exist nor can exist... we no longer want to brood over the "moral value of our actions!" (//GS//§335)|
+++!!![But what of the similarities?]
|certainly our opinions, valuations, and tables of goods are among the most powerful gears in the clockwork of our actions, but that in every particular case the law of their mechanism is unprovable <br> We, however, want to become... those who give themselves the law... (§335)|
|The question in every thing [would be] "Do you will this once more and countless times more? (§341)|
======

a philosophical stance, in relation to debates around determinism and free will, according to which actions may be *both* causally determined *and* meaningfully described as free and responsible choices.

There are dramatic differences among the accounts of moral life that we read this semester, with authors sometimes taking starkly contrary positions on important questions. Though we can read them as giving arguments against each other, we can also see them as foregrounding different concepts and metaphors, choosing different evaluative ideas or stances around which to build an account of moral life.
[img(100%,auto)[ethics_concepts_map|https://www.dropbox.com/s/mlm6fwssr1i82j5/PHIL%20212%20concepts%20connection%20map.png?raw=1]]

the focus of attention on a problem, which may or may not yet be made explicit as a claim or objection.

a claim offered as the product of inference from supporting considerations. The supporting claims are premises, and the premises and conclusion taken together are the argument.

|Aristotle arranged his hierarchy of goods around <br>the overlapping distinction <br>between means and ends:|Kant's distinction: <br>unconditionally vs. conditionally good:|
|[<img(100%,100%)[goodsmeansends|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/wescourses/2008s/phil212/01/goodsmeansends.png]]|[>img(100%,100%)[kantiangoods|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/wescourses/2008s/phil212/01/kantiangoods.png]]|

A broad approach to moral philosophy, in which moral value is assigned according to the effects (likely or actual, general or specific) of an action, intention, or character.
----
Consquentialist approaches to ethics tend to be associated with modern empiricism, and are most starkly contrasted against rationalist-influenced deontological approaches.
Utilitiarianism is the most well-known species of consequentialism

Why does Aristotle devote attention to the distinctions between continence and temperance, incontinence and intemperance?

Consider his question:
Q: Which is worse, lack of self-restraint (incontinence) or licensciousness (intemperance)?
+++>
[<img[continence|https://dl.dropbox.com/s/d9ef9ojgfzjpok5/Continence.jpg?dl]]

A: It Depends...
     .... on which sense of "worse" you have in mind...
[<img[continence|http://d.pr/i/OMll+]]
===

The logical impossibility of a world where one's maxim is consistently followed by everyone at all times (one of two ways to fail Kant's universalizability test for the categorical imperative).
----
If a maxim fails the categorical imperative in this way, then //not// doing such things is what Kant calls a [[perfect duty]]. 
See also [[contradiction in willing]]

The logical impossibility of //willing// a world where one's maxim is consistently followed -- even if such a world is logically coherent (one of two ways to fail Kant's universalizability test for the categorical imperative).
----
If a maxim fails the categorical imperative in this way, then acting against that maxim is what Kant calls an [[imperfect duty]].
See also [[contradiction in conception]]

{{menubox{
Soc: But if the god-beloved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, and the pious were loved because it was pious, then the god-beloved would be loved because it was god-beloved, and if the god-beloved was god-beloved because it was loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was loved by the gods; but now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is of a nature to be loved because it is loved, the other is loved because it is of a nature to be loved.
}}}

;Kant expects reason to lead us to //convergence// about whether something is a moral duty.
:That is, //if// we are considering the same maxim, we should reach the same assessment...
;So, what about cultural variation and other sources of divergence in moral opinion? Doesn't Kant seem to lack appreciation for these?
:There are three kinds of Kantian response to this challenge:
# A single duty (such as showing respect) may take //multiple forms// in practice.
## Consider how "telling the truth" sounds very different in different languages.
## "What we are doing" is always relative to culture, conventions, and other situational factors
# Different cultures may indeed //emphasize// different duties.
## Suppose certain social pressures are absent in your life... — toward industriousness, charity, honesty, or respectful sexual relations — Such cultural variation doesn't show there are //not// moral duties in connection with each of these; it shows only that human communities place more attention on certain moral matters rather than others.
## Morality always requires individual conscience, not mere conformity to others' claims about morality.
###There can be human communities where those in power exemplify and promote a certain kind of hypocrisy.
## Furthermore, some demands can be made //as if// they were //moral// demands ("You must salute the leader!")... when in fact they are merely enforcing social hierarchy or some other non-moral goal. (Kant's ethics helps us to think critically about the line between morality and more parochial interests.)
##The //a priori// nature of moral reasoning, like the //a priori// nature of geometry, never can mean that every person (or culture) takes up every concept and theorem.
###A culture may never pay much attention to measuring the area of right triangles, but the Pythagorean theorem is still something that doesn't depend upon any particular cultural practices. So it is (Kant would say) with theft; even if a culture doesn't focus much on ideas of personal property, they can recognize a contradiction in the effort to make something "mine" by ignoring the very understanding that has heretofore made it "yours."
# If one person insists on judging another person's action as morally //wrong// (perhaps being especially willing to judge people with very different cultural backgrounds)... a Kantian should be skeptical...
## Morality is about the //intention// behind an action, not about how the behavior appears to us.
### We may be too quick to assume that the maxim in question is XYZ (say, subordinating women)...
### when the maxim that is actually at work //could be// PDQ (say, demarcating boundaries to facilitate respect and safety).
## Lives of good will may look very different at the surface, so long as they scrupulously avoid hypocrisy.

!!!Kohlberg seeks a way to encourage children’s moral development without resorting to indoctrination. To meet this challenge, he would suggest that we bear in mind that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The principle of moral reasoning is innate, but children do not develop the ability to act consistently on their moral reasoning until they develop emotional maturity and self-mastery.]>
{{red{No... This just ain’t in there. The first half is roughly what a Kantian says, but nobody believes the second half. (Kantians and Stoics might say that a certain kind of practical maturity is necessary in order for us to act on moral reasons, but they are skeptical that children -- or anyone -- ever becomes able to act consistently on their moral reasoning.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Different moral attitudes should not be presumed to be equally reasonable.]>
{{green{Yes. This is vital to Kohlberg’s view. We should note, however, that his development approach does require an accepting attitude toward each person’s developmental horizons. Claiming that one pattern of moral thinking is better than another is not the same as *blaming* someone for inferior thinking; nor does Kohlberg think that moral development occurs through substantive persuasion. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) If children in one culture tend, statistically, to show more advanced moral reasoning, it is not because one culture’s moral opinions are better than another, nor because of differences of intelligence, but because of the frequency of social interactions that stimulate moral reflection.]>
{{green{Yes. Critics of Kohlberg challenge the details by which “moral maturity” is evaluated in his research, charging cultural bias. Kohlberg himself insists that cultures aren’t better or worse on matters of substantive opinion. Post-conventional reasoning appears in all cultures -- just at differing ages and at differing rates.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Educators who choose the “values clarification” approach to moral education succeeds at avoiding indoctrination, but they end up stalling the moral development of their students.]>
{{red{No... Not really. First, Kohlberg claims that in practice “values clarification” educators end up implicitly or explicitly instilling certain values associated with relativism. Second, he doesn’t  claim that educators “stall” the moral development of children. They can accelerate moral development, but they can’t really hold it back.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Pre-adolescent children’s moral beliefs derive directly from their external environments; critical and creative moral thought emerges only at the post-conventional level.]>
{{red{No... It’s true that only post-conventional thinkers are able to take a generally skeptical stance toward actual social norms as such (and very few children reason post-conventionally prior to adolescence), but Kohlberg claims to recognize creative instances of moral reasoning even at the conventional stage; children may take conventional norms and apply them in novel (even insightful) ways. Furthermore, at pre-conventional stages, a child is not yet able to replicate social values, but instead treats morality as a system of rewards and punishments.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Nodding proposes an ethics centered on caring, contrasting it with the more principle-driven systems that dominate our cultural canon. If I am living according to Nodding’s ethics, then…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) My motivation is grounded in the experience of care and the value that arises from this experience, rather than in an impersonal and rational grasp of moral correctness.]>
{{green{Yes. Here is Noddings’ contrast with Kant.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) I find that there is no conflict between morality and inclination, because caring arises naturally.]>
{{red{No... Perhaps there is no *systemic* conflict, but there are certainly plenty of tensions in practice, since there are “situations in which we do not naturally care” (318) but in which we exert “an ethical effort” because of an ethical ideal I hold for myself.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) I strive to maximize the happiness and of those I care for.]>
{{red{No... The language of maximization belongs only to something that can be quantified, traded off, calculated. The caring person experiences a motivation on behalf of others, and can become “engrossed” in their concerns, but is not acting with an eye toward manipulating outcomes.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) I am accountable to the people I care for, and not to others; my moral value is determined by how well I succeed, in their eyes, at meeting their needs.]>
{{red{No... Noddings is careful not to conflate caring with actually *pleasing* the other. Also, she invokes a “reasonable, disinterested observer” to whom we imagine presenting reasons for our actions. Though this is an abstraction, it helps to clarify that Noddings is not setting up the *actual* response of any particular person as the measure of our moral success.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) I treat everyone in my life with the same consideration and affection]>
{{red{No... This should be a clear “no.” Noddings writes explicitly that she “shall reject the notion of universal caring —&nbsp;that is, caring for everyone — on the grounds that it is impossible to actualize.” (319) 
}}}
===
}}}

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an argument in which the premises support the conclusion “tightly”—so that no assumptions necessary for establishing the conclusion have been left unarticulated. 
----
>All animals have functions;
>all human beings are animals.
>So, all human beings have functions.

quick dictionary lookup:
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Also see [[Definitions overview]]

Only a short definition is offered below, but each term is a link to an entry that may offer further clarification, examples, and/or additional links.
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An approach to ethics that appeals to the nature of a choice (the quality of the will, the structure of its maxim, or the principle it invokes) as the basis for moral evaluation. 
----
Deontological ethics correlate with broadly rationalist approaches to philosophy, while consequentialist ethics (at least in the modern European context) correlate with broadly empiricist approaches.

the doctrine that events (or events within a certain domain) are all fully determined by prior causes.
----
Note: Most references to determinism take place in the context of discussing human action and debating whether it is (in principle) possible to give a causal account that would trace how it has been fully shaped by causes which themselves are not human actions. Deterministic accounts of human action may emphasize any number of causal-explanatory frameworks, ranging from physics, neurobiology and genetics to folk-psychology and social-cultural practices.

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "diag">>

//Diagram the structure of inference from premises to conclusion among the following claims in Kant://
#  ''In'' the natural constitution of ''an organized being'' ... let there be taken as a principle that in such a being ''no organ'' is to be found ''for any end unless'' it be the most fit and the ''best adapted'' for that end.  
#  Now ''if'' that being’s preservation, welfare, or in a word its ''happiness'', ''were the real end'' of nature in the case of a being having reason and will, ''then'' nature would have hit upon a ''very poor arrangement'' in having the reason of the creature carry out this purpose.  
#  For all the actions which such a creature has to perform with ''this purpose [happiness]'' in view, and the whole rule of his conduct would have been ''prescribed much more exactly by instinct''… 
# And, in fact, we find that the more cultivated reason devotes itself to the aim of enjoying life and happiness, the further does man get away from true contentment.
#  [E]xistence has another and much ''more worthy purpose, for which'', and not for happiness, ''reason is quite properly intended'', and which must, therefore, be regarded as the supreme condition to which the private purpose of men must, for the most part, defer.

+++[ANSWER]
[img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/spa/vs5pdi7981vsfr0/9uy53jbb.png]]
===

+++[KEY]
[img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/spa/vs5pdi7981vsfr0/pfrdtohg.png]]
===

Filling in the blanks on this argument analysis exercise, we get this result...
[<img[draft|http://d.pr/i/p69G+]]
Once we fill in implicit steps and implicit premises, the resulting diagram might look like this...
[<img[diagram|http://d.pr/f/gDHn+]]

The overall structure of Nussbaum's essay is a good model for micro-essays and other philosophical work:
# Highlight views that deny the cross-cultural relevance of Aristotle's ethics 
# Charitably spell out the arguments behind those views
# Consider how Aristotle —&nbsp;or someone who interprets Aristotle charitably —&nbsp;might respond.

conversation and mutual interrogation among two or more lines of thought, generally represented by two or more ''interlocutors'', or speakers. In philosophical dialogues, interlocutors may or may not be trying to persuade one another, and may or may not have fixed positions to defend.
>Plato's dialogues often portrayed Socrates in the role of ironic interrogator.
* (See also: hypothesis, elenchus, persuasion, charity, refutation, aporia and irony; [[handout available on dialogues|five tips for reading a Platonic dialogue]])

[img(100%,auto)[euthyphro_map|https://www.dropbox.com/s/32ubf85mnek0cs5/euthyphro_flowchart.png?raw=1]]

forced choice, especially between options that are each in some way unattractive

[img(100%,auto)[wartime dilemma from Sartre|https://www.dropbox.com/s/8grp7b4t0m9wvot/sartre_wartime_dilemma.png?raw=1]]

Animality versus Divinity
>Q: "Such a life would be superior to the human level. For someone will live it not insofar as he is a human being, but in so far as he has some divine element in him." - Aristotle on a life of theoretical study  CIT: Nicomachean Ethics, 1177b, p.164 
|Aristotle’s claim that a life of understanding and theoretical study is both a divine quality, and nevertheless a supreme human virtue, seems to be fundamentally discordant with his conception of humanity’s essential animality. Aristotle might say that the inherent tension between these coexisting standards for human behavior is relieved in so far as a human life completely dedicated to theoretical study is an unrealizable ideal that only attains in the divine realm. Even so, the incommensurateness of this, however exceptional, human capacity for divinity, and the base qualities of human behavior that Aristotle struggles with throughout the text, still remains. I believe it’s resolvable if, rather than positing understanding as divine, an ethic is built around this vitally human characteristic.(120 words)|@@@@|

a pattern of thought invoking an all-encompassing opposition between two categories, such as mind and body or form and substance.
----
* Note: philosophical dualisms in the Western tradition, since Plato, have generally attached a hierarchy to the dualism, such that the "higher" element is more associated with value and striving, the "lower" with a neutral, meaningless, or corrupting element. Hence some dualisms come very close to idealism, which denies that the "lower" element fully partakes in reality. 
//Contrasts against//: monism //and// pluralism. Monisms include idealism (focusing on the "upper" element as the only real one) and materialism (focusing on the "lower" element as sufficient to account for reality).

A contrast is //[[dualistic|dualism]]// when it encourages a pervasive and exclusive structural opposition. It is difficult to distance ourselves from one dualism without challenging others, since dualisms tend to align with and draw on associations with each other… 
[img(100%,auto)[so many dualisms!|https://www.dropbox.com/s/ml0ixtqqrxw7nvn/dualisms.png?raw=1]]

!!!Plumwood reflects on the origins and effects of dualistic philosophies. On this topic, she argues that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) When environmental policy-makers do not question attitudes of human invulnerability, and do not question our patterns of consumption, they are effectively treating human beings as “outside” nature.]>
{{green{Yes. Plumwood does not claim explicitly that philosophical argument is not enough, but it is implied by her concern with poetry, literature, and forms of writing that change our culture.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The debate between shallow and deep ecologists presumes a separation between self and other, which leads us away from considering our  ecological identity and relations.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 36: When we hyper-separate ourselves from nature and reduce it conceptually, we not only lose the ability to empathize (and to see the nonhuman sphere in ethical terms) but also get a false sense of our own character and location that includes an illusory sense of agency and autonomy.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Although an instrumental view of nature is generally beneficial for humans in a practical sense, it harms our ability to see ourselves as embedded within ecosystems.]>
{{red{No... Plumwood argues against the first claim, that the instrumental view of nature is in fact beneficial to us.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) By asserting that the material world is inanimate, modern reductionism amounts to affirming only one half of the older dualism between matter and spirit.]>
{{green{Yes. The hazards of imprudence are just ONE problem, but as far as it goes, this claim is true. Such attitudes ARE dangerous (as well as unjust) because they lead us to disregard long-term human interests (as well as the interests of non-humans).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) The reduction of non-human others to dead, inert matter — in contrast to idealized human agents — facilitates exploitation of the environment.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kant argues that we have duties to ourselves. About these duties, he claims or implies that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) duties to oneself are always imperfect duties.]>
{{red{No...  Just prior to 422: duties to self and others come in both imperfect and perfect forms.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) duties to oneself can also be called counsels of prudence.]>
{{red{No... Counsels of prudence are hypothetical imperatives about how to achieve an end that people do generally have -- i.e., happiness. They are not (on Kant’s account) moral imperatives as such.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) because such duties are internal, we can know whether we honor them, while it is otherwise impossible to know whether we succeed in following duties to others.]>
{{red{No... 408
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the problem with acting on suicidal despair is that one is embracing a maxim that one cannot will to be universal law.]>
{{green{Yes. 422
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) duties to oneself must be subjugated to the needs of others.]>
{{red{No... The problem with some maxims of self-love [422] is not that they fail to meet others’ needs, but simply that they are self-contradictory when examined as principles of action.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!![Does Kant's ethics yield a duty to tell the truth? (click for more)]

Duties fall into two categories:
|!Perfect duties|!Imperfect duties|
|negative|positive|
|"Do not {{{_____}}}"|"Seek to {{{_____}}}"|
|fails categorical imperative in virtue of "[[contradiction in conception]]"|fails categorical imperative in virtue of "[[contradiction in willing]]"|
|can be obeyed<br>perfectly|must be applied <br>with individual judgment|
Where would "tell the truth" fit?

+++!!!![Are we in control of whether we tell the truth?]
Maxims specify our intentions...
{{indent{and so they cannot point directly to things beyond our control.}}}
* ''"Prevent death"'': is not well-formed as a Kantian maxim
* ''"Seek to save (more clearly: extend/preserve) lives"'' is a coherent maxim
** We should notice that a world where all //seek// to save lives is different from a world in which all //succeed// at saving lives.
The most we can do is //attempt// to tell the truth -- to speak ''//sincerely//''...
{{indent{
and this is at most an ''imperfect duty''
because one cannot tell ALL truths in ALL detail ALL the time to ALL people
}}}
===

+++!!!![In place of "perfect duty to tell the truth"...]
We should talk about the ''imperfect duty'' to ''advance truth''
and the ''perfect duty not to lie''
===
===

!!!Nietzsche would respond to two of Mill’s doctrines — equal rights for all people, and sympathetic consideration for all sentient beings — by arguing that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) they portray exploitation as an evil, though exploitation is in fact an inevitable and positive force of civilization.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the majority of people embrace these doctrines blindly, failing to question what they have to gain from believing in such ideals.]>
{{red{No... The will to power No. 200-201, 204 “Any attitude of
mind is abandoned, the utility of which can not be conceived.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) these represent a mistake in humanity’s development, and truly self-aware individuals will purge such ideas from their minds.]>
{{red{No... both principles serve to advance mankind just as much as violence. (Beyond Good and Evil No. 44)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that this broad set of values, including law, respect, and generosity, had no role for the noble people who ruled the earth prior to the emergence of “slave-morality”.]>
{{red{No... noble morality includes law, respect, and generosity (as in Aristotle’s self-possessed “magnificence”) among those in power; these doctrines are different.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) these are ultimately products of the same universal drive for survival that animates noble morality.]>
{{red{No... They are equally products of the “will to power” -- but the will to power is *not* the same as a drive or instinct to survive, which Nietzsche dismisses as encouraging people to be groveling and submissive rather than assertive and creative.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!In her “ethics of ambiguity” Beauvoir embraces the following Kantian claims:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) our affirmation of freedom is fundamental to finding our lives worthwhile.]>
{{green{Yes. 265 “Freedom is the source from which all significations and all values spring.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) the only unconditioned value is freedom, and when we reflect on freedom, we recognize how to live a life of duty.]>
{{red{No... There is no such clear  recognition for Beauvoir. (It’s not even clear that Kant would say we recognize *how* to live a life of duty -- we just recognize what the notion of duty involves.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) we can take responsibility for our reasons and choices, but not for our emotions and passions, which are sensible phenomena of nature.]>
{{red{No... his passion is not inflicted upon him from without. He chooses it. It is his very being and, as such, does not imply the idea of unhappiness... (263)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) after recognizing the two realms of human life -- the sensible and the noumenal -- human beings must identify with their autonomy and transcend their inclinations.]>
{{red{No... transcendence and hierarchy -- the “winning out” of the noumenal -- are clearly Beauvoir’s targets at 262.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) human beings live simultaneously as natural bodily beings and as conscious subjects.]>
{{green{Yes. 262
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Callicott (author of “How Environmental Ethical Theory May Be Put into Practice) characterizes individual human beings as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) capable of acting on convictions and values, even when those convictions  and values are in tension with their individual interests.]>
{{green{Yes. Acting on conviction, even at considerable expense, is a phenomenon Callicott describes in several passages.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) driven by natural economic appetites that result in tragedy unless they are restrained through collective and coercive constraints.]>
{{red{No... This is Hardin’s position. It’s true that Callicott emphasizes the importance of collective and coercive constraints. Yet he does not think of our appetites as fixed forces that are constrained *only* in that way. Callicott also expects our appetites to shift along with technology and other cultural factors.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) profoundly influenced, at the level of their consciousness, by the technologies that surround them.]>
{{green{Yes. (To say we are influenced at the level of our consciousness is not to deny that such influence is largely “unconscious” -- it means that technology shapes how we think, what we notice, etc.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) able to resolve environmental problems only because we possess reason, which clearly sets us off from other animals.]>
{{red{No... Any rhetoric that “sets us off from other animals” is pernicious, on Callicott’s view.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) misguided if they approach environmental problems by seeking to minimize their individual impact.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed. At least, they are misguided if they think that sort of impact is *sufficient*.
}}}
===
}}}

/***
|Name|EditTiddlerPlugin|
|Source|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#EditTiddlerPlugin|
|Version|1.2.0|
|Author|Eric Shulman - ELS Design Studios|
|License|http://www.TiddlyTools.com/#LegalStatements <br>and [[Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.5 License|http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.5/]]|
|~CoreVersion|2.1|
|Type|plugin|
|Requires||
|Overrides||
|Description|embed an 'edit' link in tiddler content to invoke edit on any specified tiddler title|

!!!!!Usage:
<<<
{{{<<editTiddler TiddlerName linktext>>}}}
If no tiddler title is specified (or the special keyword "here" is used), the tiddler containing the rendered macro is assumed.  You can also specify optional alternative "link text" to be displayed. The default link text is "edit".
<<<
!!!!!Revision History:
<<<
2007.03.22 1.2.0 added support for 'here' keyword and optional 2nd param to specify label text
2007.03.15 1.1.1 fixed 'get tiddler ID' logic so it actually works! D'oh! 
2007.03.11 1.1.0 changed 'get tiddler ID' logic so that macro can be used outside a tiddler (i.e., in mainMenu) by specifying the ID
2006.10.04 1.0.1 invoke findContainingTiddler() as fallback when 'tiddler' param is null
2006.04.28 1.0.0 Initial release
<<<
!!!Code:
***/
//{{{
config.macros.editTiddler={
	handler: function(place,macroName,params,wikifier,paramString,tiddler) {
		var tid=params.shift(); // use specified tiddler ID (or "here")
		if (!tid || tid=="here") {
			if (tiddler)
				tid=tiddler.title; // use current tiddler, fallback to find tiddler if none provided
			else { 
				var here=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
				if (!here) return; // not in a tiddler, do nothing
				tid=here.getAttribute('tiddler'); // get ID from tiddler element
			}
		}
		var label="edit"; if (params[0]) label=params.shift();
		createTiddlyButton(place,label,'edit tiddler: '+tid,this.onclick).setAttribute('which',tid);
	},
	onclick: function(e) {
		story.displayTiddler(null,this.getAttribute('which'),DEFAULT_EDIT_TEMPLATE);
	}
}
//}}}

(in dialogue-based philosophy) the testing, or “cross-examination” of a hypothesis. [ell-'enn-kuss]

Noddings' care ethics clearly allows us to prioritize the needs and interests of those with whom we share daily interactions...

Given that some communities are ''//privileged//'' while others are ''//marginalized and desperate//'', is Noddings inviting us to ignore global disparaties and injustices?

Does Noddings' approach offer any ''//advantages//'' in helping us think about global crises? 

She may offer us an [[explanation of moral alienation]]...

the doctrine that all significant knowledge-claims derive more or less directly from experience, usually understood as sensory phenomena.
----
//compare to:// rationalism

<script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTitle") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("*");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"title")||hasClass(nodes[i],"subtitle"))
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</script>

<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("review") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
    sortBy
       'tiddler.modified'
       descending
    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items tagged with \"review\"//"'
>>

an argument which is incomplete, but which seems to give the crucial pieces of a more complete argument. This sort of argument requires the addition of suppressed premises.

the study of whether and how any claim to knowledge might be justified, or the broader study of the nature of knowledge and/or understanding.
----
usage: "I’m not denying your theory. I’m just asking an epistemological question: could we have any reason to believe it?"

!!!What to cover in your essay (applies equally to [[take-home|take-home essay process]] and in-class variation): 
Choose among the three essay options below (and label your essay theme clearly at top). Regardless of which option you choose, your task is to ''discuss at least three'' authors, and ideally four. With one or more authors, it can be helpful to discuss ''multiple possible interpretations'' (mentioning an obvious reading plus a more nuanced reading, for example)… Be sure not just to explain the ideas, but also to integrate some ''comparative and evaluative remarks'' (for example, indicating why one particular view may seem more plausible than alternatives, or where we should notice some troubling implications, etc.) 
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "midterm-essay-prompt">>

|>|!Essay question possibilities. I will give you a choice between two of the following. (The options may be slightly rephrased, but the themes should be clear from the text below.)|
|A. Human nature and ethics|Consider two or three ideas about human nature -- what is the key feature or aspect that distinguishes human beings (from non-human animals, and/or from other beings) -- and consider how that idea is interconnected with certain moral priorities. |
|B. Happiness|What different kinds of relation can we find, in our authors, between happiness and moral life? What assumptions influence that view, and what implications flow from it?|
|C. Law, authority, role models|What kinds of attitudes do our various sources take toward social, legal, and/or religious authorities and models? Are any of them essential to moral development or reasoning, and if so, how?|

# @@Save@@ your work early and often, and make @@backups@@ in multiple locations in final stages of your work.
# @@Refine your approach@@
## Make sure that you've reflected on a problem, illustrated two or three divergent lines of thought about it, and have offered a helpfully distinctive perspective on some aspect of it. 
## Check whether you've slipped into making the problem look too simple, making opposing views look unintelligent, or trying to consider //everything// about a topic.
## Review your paper to see where one more gesture of dialogue may enhance the discussion. 
# @@Revise and edit@@
## Work with a [[writing tutor|Writing tutors]] if possible. If not, make sure to share the essay with a reader who has strong critical skills -- someone who is not already familiar with your ideas.
## See my list of [[writing pointers|Writing details]]...
## Look over how you have presented your sources and citations:
### Check to see that you've included direct quotes (with citations) whenever a source says something distinctive, especially colorful, or worthy of careful analysis. 
### In the absence of reasons to quote directly, discuss ideas in your own words. Cite text locations except where your claim about a text is general and clear (as in, "Kant's main concern is with principled intentions, rather than with consequences.")
# @@Proofread@@ 
## Content: Check for paragraph and sentence coherence, clarity of discussion and reasoning.
## Form: Correct usage, syntax, grammar and spelling (including of names).
# @@Organize@@
## Check your @@[[word count|word count tool]]@@ (1200-1500 words, not counting footnotes), and @@include it@@ at the end of the essay text.
## Make sure any excerpts and data in the body of the essay are properly connected to sources. 
## Include @@works cited list@@ in complete and proper format (any standard format is fine), and include all bibliographic details even for any syllabus texts you have used.
# @@Format your document@@
## Please use a standard serif @@font@@ (Times, Palatino, or similar), 11pt.
## To save paper, please use @@single-spaced@@ paragraphs, with @@.75" margins@@. (I'll print double-sided.)
## Don't add page breaks or extra returns anywhere (title and works cited do not need their own pieces of paper). Make a simple running one-line header with name, course number, and automatic page number.
# Post on moodle by midnight on the due date.
## Cut and @@paste the body of your essay into a post@@ in the Essays discussion board. That way, other students can browse papers easily without the bother of downloading and opening. Also, if your document is corrupted, I'll still be able to read the basic text of your submission.
## Attach your document in @@.doc format@@, with a @@title like {{{lastname212.doc}}}@@.
### Please retitle any documents you submit electronically; especially avoid titles like {{{philosophy.doc}}} or {{{212paper.doc}}}. Imagine what your professors' downloads folders look like (!), and help us recognize *your* paper when we go to look for it.
### Please make sure to add the file-type extension  ({{{.doc}}}) to the title; otherwise it may not survive upload/download properly.
### If you don't use Microsoft Word and can't save into .doc format, Rich Text Format ({{{.rtf}}}) is a good alternative often available as a "Save As..." option in other programs. (Don't assume recipients can read .docx)
### Please consolidate your paper into only one document -- no separate file for Works Cited list. (Why anyone would ever make this a separate file, I'm not sure, but a few always do.)
# Log off of moodle and on again, and make sure your post and attachment appears just as you want it to.
# SUBSCRIBE to your essay's THREAD if you want to get feedback as soon as possible on your paper.

|"Observe," continued I, "This Moment! From the gateway, This Moment, there runneth a long eternal lane backwards: behind us lieth an eternity. Must not whatever can run its course of all things, have already run along that lane? Must not whatever can happen of all things have already happened, resulted, and gone by? And if everything has already existed, what thinkest thou, dwarf, of This Moment? Must not this gateway also- have already existed? And are not all things closely bound together in such wise that This Moment draweth all coming things after it? Consequently- itself also? For whatever can run its course of all things, also in this long lane outward- must it once more run!- And this slow spider which creepeth in the moonlight, and this moonlight itself, and thou and I in this gateway whispering together, whispering of eternal things- must we not all have already existed? -And must we not return and run in that other lane out before us, that long weird lane- must we not eternally return?"|
|Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra|c

This session involves materials chosen by our TAs, with discussion themes and activities organized by TAs in consultation with Elise Springer. For Fall 2017, the theme is euthanasia. Materials include the "Practical Ethics Bites" podcast (Oxford University) with Nigel Warburton, who hosts Wilkinson; and an article from the //Journal of Medical Ethics// called "Legal physician-assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: evidence concerning the impact on patients in 'vulnerable' groups"

<<forEachTiddler
    where
       'tiddler.tags.contains("euthanasia") && !tiddler.tags.contains("excludeSearch")'
    sortBy
       'tiddler.modified'
    write '" [["+tiddler.title+" ]] \"view ["+tiddler.title+"]\" [["+tiddler.title+"]] "'
        begin '"<<tabs txtMyAutoTab "'
        end '">"+">"'
        none '"//No items available//"'
>><script>
	var t=story.findContainingTiddler(place);
	if (!t || t.id=="tiddlerHideTiddlerTags") return;
	var nodes=t.getElementsByTagName("div");
	for (var i=0; i<nodes.length; i++)
		if (hasClass(nodes[i],"tagging")||hasClass(nodes[i],"tagged"))
			nodes[i].style.display="none";
</script>

[[<< back to Noddings|Noddings]] ... [[forward to Dewey>>|Dewey]]

212 exam question prompts (1A-11A are the original in-class questions; 1B-11B are the alternates):

|>|!Original prompts:|
|1A|Euthyphro's various hypotheses about piety do not withstand Socrates' elenchus because|
|2A|Socrates’ extended arguments against the escape plan claim or imply that...|
|3A|Stoics have been accused of not caring sufficiently about the people and events around them. This might be justified insofar as Epictetus encourages each of us|
|4A|King’s discussion of justice...|
|5A|According to Aristotle, a person's happiness ...|
|6A|According to Aristotle, a person who is fully virtuous…|
|7A|According to Aristotle, friendship in its true form…|
|8A|For Kant, the ability to recognize moral duty…|
|9A|Kant claims that a rational being…|
|10A|In his characterization of freedom of the will, Kant states or implies that…|
|11A|Kant differs from Korsgaard on the follow points:...|
|>|!Alternate prompts:|
|1B|The refutation of Euthyphro’s hypothesis that piety should be defined as “what all the gods love”…|
|2B|In the Crito, Socrates states or implies that “the majority” or “the many”…|
|3B|Wisdom, acccording to Epictetus, involves…|
|4B|In his “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King states or implies that white Christian moderates…|
|5B|Someone who lacks good character traits (virtues), according to Aristotle…|
|6B|In discussing specific virtues, Aristotle claims that…|
|7B|Aristotle’s claims about continence and temperance would support these conclusions:…|
|8B|In the first section of Kant’s Groundwork, Kant disagrees with Aristotle in the following ways:…|
|9B|According to Kant’s discussion, the categorical imperative…|
|10B|In discussing heteronomy, Kant claims or implies that…|
|11B|According to the modified version of Kantian ethics offered by Korsgaard...|

|!Essay question possibilities -- I'll present two, between which you may choose one:|
|A. Human nature and ethics: Consider two or three ideas about human nature -- what is the key feature or aspect that distinguishes human beings (from non-human animals, and/or from other beings) -- and consider how that idea is interconnected with certain moral priorities. |
|B. Happiness: What different kinds of relation can we find, in our authors, between happiness and moral life? What assumptions influence that view, and what implications flow from it?|
|C. Law, authority, role models: What kinds of attitudes do our various sources take toward social, legal, and/or religious authorities and models? Are any of them essential to moral development or reasoning, and if so, how?|

[[midterm]] •&nbsp;[[final exam]]

<<tag excludeLists>>

philosophical doctrine that human beings' ''existence'' is logically prior to any human ''essence'' -- this doctrine rejects various kinds of essentialism, all of which offer some account of natural or fundamental human purposes or goals.
----
|If one considers an ''article of manufacture'' -- as, for example, a book or a paper-knife -- one sees that it has been ''made by an artisan who had a conception of it''; and he has paid attention, equally, to the conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existent technique of production which is a part of that conception and is, at bottom, a formula. Thus the paper-knife is at the same time an article producible in a certain manner and one which, on the other hand, ''serves a definite purpose'', for one cannot suppose that a man would produce a paperknife without knowing what it was for. Let us say, then, of the paper-knife that ''its essence'' -- that is to say the sum of the formulae and the qualities which made its production and its definition possible -- ''precedes its existence''.|
| Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism" p. 25|c
+++!!!![Essentialism: Essence precedes existence]>
[img[essentialism|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/essentialism.png]]
===
+++!!!![Existentialism: Existence precedes essence]>
[img[existentialism|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/existentialism2.png]]
===

!!!Consider the wartime dilemma faced by the student who sought Sartre’s advice. Based on Beauvoir’s Ethics of Ambiguity, we would expect her to comment that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) The problem with this young man’s thinking lies in his determination to secure results, as if success in the external world determined the value of his choice. He should instead transcend these concerns and focus on what is within his control.]>
{{red{No... This is, of course, the stoic view; yet Beauvoir argues against the stoic project, which tries to “eliminate the ambiguity” of our condition by retreating into the pure and inner realm of “formal freedom,” denying that we are vulnerable to the world of things.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) This situation illustrates the emptiness of the moral universe. While the young man might hope to act with integrity, such moral ideals are foolish in a world that has no divinely scripted moral roles.]>
{{red{No... 267: “what characterizes the passionat man is that he sets up the object as an absolute, not, like the serious man, as a thing detached from himself, but as a thing disclosed by his subjectivity.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The search for a moral theory that would yield a prescription for action, in such a case, illustrates a kind of bad faith; ultimately, only the individual can be responsible for the affirmation of one choice rather than another.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) the only authentic way of making such a choice is to look inwards, discover what we truly feel, and follow our hearts.]>
{{red{No... This reflects the vice of “passionate” thinking: treating emotions as if they are a “given” that happens to us, beyond our responsibility.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) The defense of freedom is a perfect duty, while caring for a specific person, such as one’s mother, is an imperfect duty; hence respect for freedom requires recognizing that the universal trumps the particular.]>
{{red{No... No. Granted, lots of Beauvoir-ish rhetoric is here, but reason does NOT say HOW to exercise freedom, according to the existentialist; reason does not resolve dilemmas for us. Kant’s ethics, on her view, commits the vice of “seriousness.”
}}}
===
}}}

See [[Sartre's student]]

Why don't more people drop what they're doing to give to Oxfam, Islamic Relief, Unicef, etc., given that most people know we "should"? 

+++!!!![How have charities gotten people to feel more connected to their contributions?]>
Often, some sort of ''//sustained personal connection//'' is fostered -- by exchange of pictures, letters, or by travel. 

//Should it// matter to us whether we "know" (more or less) the people for/about whom we care?

On Noddings' view, asking this question shows that we have a very abstract conception of moral obligation.
===

!!!In his "Theories of Morals", Dewey presents human beings’ moral motivation as…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) educated mainly through a process of associating their own happiness with that of others.]>
{{red{No... This is Mill. Dewey simply never posits an initial purely individual kind of happiness that is then connected to others’ individual happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) moving through predictable educational stages toward fully mature and autonomous adulthood.]>
{{red{No... This is Kohlberg. No rhetoric of regular progression, nor of profound moral autonomy, in Dewey.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) harmed by educational institutions that shield students from the social concerns of the everyday world.]>
{{green{Yes. 359
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) drawn to Stoic and Kantian ideals only when circumstances make the world of action unpredictable and frustrating.]>
{{green{Yes. Dewey’s pragmatism is broadly (though not reductively) consequentialist, and he requires a charitable but unattractive explanation of the appeal of radically anti-consequentialist ideals.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) dependent on individuals’ ability to transcend their own interests so as to serve democracy and social coordination.]>
{{red{No... No transcendence of self or of one’s own interests. One must shape and cultivate one’s self (one’s interests, talents, etc.) so as to coordinate with others.
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[fallacy list|https://www.dropbox.com/s/fypwox7b2lfii5n/fallacies_for_phil212.png?raw=1]]

Longer essays (1200-1500 words, excluding block quotes and footnotes) are due at or around the last day of classes (see syllabus to confirm). 

This longer essay is a chance to explore a problem in ethics or moral philosophy that's especially significant from your own perspective. Please think of this essay as focused not so much on a [[thesis claim]] but rather on a philosophical problem or question. Although a [[thesis claim]] should emerge by the end of your essay-writing process, the most important part of the paper is giving the reader a detailed appreciation of the problem or difficulty you are considering; only in the context of that portrayal do you contribute some additional perspective on the problem.

!!!Topic options 
|(a) You may develop any of the [[Midterm essay question options]], making sure to broaden your net and include Mill, as well as at least ''one out-of-class source''.|
|(b) You may work on any ''practical ethics'' issue (the ethics of euthanasia, unequal intimate relations, genetic screening, consumption of animal foods, or any other difficult question arising in practice), including at least one essay from beyond the syllabus, and/or any other resources after checking in with me. Please note this is //not// a "research paper" and does not need to include a survey of available work on your theme.|
|(c) If you are particularly interested in some additional problem connected with our class readings, you may pursue it, but should be sure to check in with me to confirm that your project is philosophical in its sources, approach and emphasis.|
!!!''Essay Previews''... 
are due at moodle's essay topics forum well in advance (see syllabus for date).
For the preview, you’ll need:
|(1) A concise statement of the problem you’re considering, with one paragraph devoted to each of at least two importantly different approaches to the problem.|
|(2) A list of at least three resources, including one or two out-of-class texts|
General notes: For any topic, your project will involve philosophical evaluation in light of theories we have studied. Even if your out-of-class sources do not mention utilitarian or deontological (or virtue) approaches, you should expect to make connections and illustrate how the approaches we’ve studied bear on the issue you’ve chosen.
!!!WRITING: 
My expectations for correct and clear writing are high. The essay is an ideal opportunity to sharpen your writings skills. As always, an academic essay should include full citation details. (Any standard format is fine, so long as bibliographic information is complete and consistent.)
This would  be an ideal time to visit TA office hours, or mine, if you haven't already.

Our final exam time will be posted by the registrar. The final exam will be just like the midterm in structure, although the essay portion will involve synthesizing authors from both halves of the semester.

Thursday May 16, 9am – noon at Fisk208 (our usual classroom)

//Note: Fresh exam question prompts will be posted here by Monday May 13, and will also be available at the TA review session Sunday night (May 12)//
//Note:// this chart is provided for reference only, and all questions are subject to corrections, edits, and other reasonable modifications. (Please do let me know if you notice any errors.)

|date|!in-class question:|!fresh exam question theme:|
|3/25|Mill’s first two chapters often offer a more or less direct contrast against Kantian ideals, claiming…|John Stuart Mill warns readers against certain misunderstandings of utilitarianism, such as…|
|3/27|As an emprically-oriented thinker, Mill confronts the question how people can in practice take the general happiness seriously as a moral standard; and he claims…|In chapters 3 and 4 of Utilitarianism, Mill paints a picture of human progress according to which…|
|4/1|Mill distinguishes so-called “perfect” and “imperfect” duties, about which he claims (or implies) …|Suppose you are a doctor who is in a position to secretly save four lives (those desperately awaiting transplants) by taking the life of one terminally-ill and friendless petty criminal with several healthy organs. Mill would comment that…|
|4/3|In discussing animal welfarist views (such as Singer’s and Regan’s), Rawles points out…|Kate Rawles considers animal-welfare and conservationist stances toward non-human beings. Despite the fact that they come into tension, she points out some important similarities between them…|
|4/8|Marx’s philosophical stance has been called “materialism” —&nbsp;specifically a dialectical and historical materialism. According to this form of materialism…|In making his radical claim that morality is merely a form of ideology, Marx is laying out the groundwork for an argument that also claims that…|
|4/10|Nietzsche distinguishes two archetypes of moral attitudes: “master-morality” and “slave-morality.” His comments on these suggest…|Nietzsche’s account of morality includes some ideas that overlap with premises from various other thinkers, such as…|
|4/15|In The Ethics of Ambiguity Simone de Beauvoir offers an account of freedom according to which…|Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics is critical of many religious claims, but not all. She would argue…|
|4/17|Val Plumwood argues for a position she describes as an “enriched materialism” and as a “philosophical animism,” according to which…|Plumwood reflects on the origins and effects of dualistic philosophies. On this topic, she argues that…|
|4/22|Kohlberg (in “The Child as Moral Philosopher”) offers an account of moral education according to which…|Kohlberg sorted interviewees’ patterns of moral reasoning into three levels of moral development — pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Regarding the “post-conventional” level, Kohlberg claims…|
|4/24|Noddings develops an account of “meeting the other morally,” suggesting that morality involves cultivating an ideal of ourselves as “one-caring.” In developing this ideal, Noddings claims…|Noddings’ moral ideal differs from Kant’s in many ways. Unlike Kant, …|
|4/29|Dewey warns us against various habitual ways of drawing distinctions in moral philosophy and educational theory. For example, he is critical of how theorists tend to oppose…|Dewey, like Kohlberg, examines morality in the context of education and psychological development. Yet  some contrasts between Dewey and Kohlberg include…|
|5/1|Jeff McMahan considers widely accepted accounts of the difference between the rightness or justice of a war (jus ad bellum) and the rightness or justness of particular actions taken in a war (jus in bellum). Considering the story of Frank Hartzell, he would say:…|In response to McMahan’s argument about the ethics of killing in war, other philosophers we have read might comment as follows…|
|5/6|Robin Wall Kimmerer, informed by both indigenous Potawatomi teachings and scientific research findings, offers an account of gratitude and reciprocity in our relation to plants. In comparing her account to other theories we have studied, we might point out…|Kimmerer attributes various attitudes to plants, and to non-human animals, that would meet with skepticism in the context of Western science. About this indigenous perspective from which she writes, Kimmerer would say… |

[<img(90%+,+)[flowchart|http://d.pr/i/nuVw+]]

Here's a nudge about how to title documents you attach or email...
Think about what your recipient's downloads folder looks like! 
|[img(95%,auto)[unhappy|https://www.dropbox.com/s/ikb1hq7s71veyae/cannot_find.png?raw=1]]|[img(95%,auto)[happy|https://www.dropbox.com/s/o69sc46plbp2vzy/can_find_things.png?raw=1]]|

Thanks!

Ought implies Kan(t)?
>"The moral ought is, therefore, a necessary would insofar as he is a member of the intelligible world" (455) 
|While deliberating choices of actions, what happens when the imperative is not an option. Consider a scenario, in which a known murderer asks you via telephone to confirm your location (adding anything other than a negative is affirmative). Your answer must violate one of the two perfect duties; to give yourself up is passive suicide, whereas to lie goes against your perfect duty to others. Kant seems to sidestep the question of placing an order to duties (self vs. others). Moreover, it seems that Kant thinks we can always act morally. Of course this scenario is quite fabricated but it does not seem too difficult to imagine that there are many examples where no categorical imperative can be applied.(119 words)|@@@@|

Beauvoir describes three ways of ''failing to be authentic''.
Consider some typically valued projects and activities:
||Parenting|Music|
|!Serious|"Parenting is part of our nature"<br>"Parenting is part of the life God wants for us."|"Music is the culmination of human culture"<br>"I was brought up to be a musician."|
|!Nihilistic|"There's nothing inherently valuable about parenting -- it's just making another batch of human beings, who have no purpose in the first place."|"Music might make people feel good, but it's just frequency vibrations and it doesn't really matter; people are deluded if they think it does."|
|!Passionate|"I could never imagine myself not parenting; every time I see a baby I just want another one!"|"The music just comes through me, and I just do what my inspiration tells me to do."|

EK asks The Euthyphro question: Do I find it worthwhile because it has some inherent value apart from me? Or, do I find it worthwhile simply because of the value I project into it?

|It is desire which creates the desirable, and te project which sets up the end. (264)|

[<img[http://d.pr/i/ZwPq+]]

the capacity to choose action in ways that cannot be fully determined by ordinary causal influences
----
Note: whether freedom of the will is possible, or even intelligible, is highly contested. For the most extended discussion of freedom of the will, including a transcendental argument for accepting its existence, see Kant. For an argument that we can never make sense of any kind of freedom other than political freedom (freedom from being specifically coerced by other agents), see Hume.

Aristotle is one of the only philosophers who emphasizes the centrality of friendship.
Translation of “philia”: loving relationship (connection of living-together and sharing activity)
+++!!!![Kinds of friendship:]
Note Aristotle's way of distinguishing something “without qualification” vs. something that is so only //in some way//, or //under some condition//. (e.g. “the good” vs. “the good for us”)
There’s friendship without qualification, and friendship which is limited in some way.
+++[pleasure] 1156a32: "The cause of friendship between young people seems to be pleasure... But as they grow [what they find] pleasant changes too. Hence they are quick to become friends, and quick to stop."
===
+++[usefulness] 1156a20: "What is useful does not remain the same, but is different at different times... when the cause of their being friends is removed, the friendship is dissolved too."
===
+++[true friendship]1155b30: “Friendship demands that we wish a friend good things for his sake”… ''Only the good can be friends'' without qualification. Notice this is an important attraction within the process of becoming virtuous – only a virtuous person can experience a true friendship, which is essential to eudaimonia.
===
===

1155a27: “no need for justice when there is friendship…” some communitarians claim a great emphasis on justice suggests lack of concern for particular human relationships.

From the initial observation of tension between “birds of a feather…” and “opposites attract”, we are motivated to ask after what underlies friendship.

It requires trust – hence time. If there’s not yet “so much salt tasted together” it is mere wish for friendship

Puzzles:
One cannot have true friendships without virtue. What are Aristotle’s reasons (immunity to slander 1157a20), and are they convincing?
1159a5: Aristotle raises a puzzle: do you wish for your friend NOT to have the best, since such achievement might dissolve the friendship? What a challenging observation! Many apparent friendships cannot sustain themselves past the great successes of one person. Is this true of the best friendships? Does Aristotle resolve that puzzle?
1159a20: puzzle: Is it suspicious that we honor our friends? Are we hoping for honor in return?

In Book IX, Aristotle claims that the good person is related to his friend //as to himself// (for his friend is //another self//).

/%
What is the ultimate answer to the suggestion that “opposites attract”? 1159b20: contrary does not seek contrary as such, but only incidentally; rather the desire is for the intermediate.
1162b: render what is proportionate, in unequal friendships (this refers back to the justice sections, which we’ve left out…)
1164b25: should one prioritize the friend, or the good person: puzzle about the role of PARTIALITY in ethics…
1165b1: what to do about changes in your friend’s character? Should one pretend to love on the basis of character?
1169a10: the good person should be a self-lover. How does Aristotle square this with common denigration of selfishness?

!!!According to Aristotle, friendship in its highest form…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) should be distinguished from friendship between unequals, which can only revolve around pleasure and usefulness.]>
{{red{No... 1162a: “There are three types of friendship, as we said.... and within each type some friendships rest on equality, while others correspond to superiority.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) is what any two people who are fully virtuous feel for each other.]>
{{red{No... Friendship is not just a feeling, and it requires “living together” or “tasting much salt together” to grow.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) is desired by everyone, though a life of virtue and happiness may be achieved without it.]>
{{red{No... Virtue cannot be realized in the absence of friendship -- think especially about its role in education and young adulthood. Happiness, also, is hard to achieve without friends -- although the contemplative philosopher may eventually become self-sufficient.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) requires a person to desire, for her friend, exactly what that friend desires for himself or herself.]>
{{red{No... Two problems: the highest form of friendship may involve some mutual guidance or correction. Also, friends may be anxious about great gains in the status of the other.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) is especially rare within very bad political regimes.]>
{{green{Yes. 1161a: “Friendship appears in each of the political systems, to the extent that justice appears also. ... there are friendships and justice to only a slight degree in tyrannies also, but to a much larger degree in democracies.
}}}
===
}}}

a theoretical approach to problems of combined action, where multiple agents' choices combine to affect outcomes, and those outcomes have different relative values for different individuals.

!!!Kant distinguishes the categorical imperative structure of moral duty from the hypothetical imperative structure (associated with prudence and skill). About this distinction he claims or implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Moral motivation, which is categorical, can be traced to incentives that people universally share.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Hypothetical imperatives are duties to ourselves, while categorical imperatives are duties to others.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) A person of good will does not act on hypothetical imperatives.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) There are multiple hypothetical imperatives, but only one categorical imperative.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) We conform to hypothetical imperatives because of instinct, not reason.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

Utilitarianism and Torture
>Q: "This firm foundation is...the desire to be in unity with our fellow creatures" (Ch. 3, pg. 32). 
|Mill argues that people are inherently social, and so only utilitarianism can be a beneficial code of morality. However, Mill does not discuss the fact that people feel more of a unity with their group than with all humanity. Take the situation at Guantánamo Bay. Assuming that our sense of security was increased knowing that possible terrorists were being imprisoned, could the utilitarian say that the proceedings were immoral? Mill would respond that the ultimate end of utilitarianism is to use education and social institutions to create a feeling of unity with all people, not just with one’s group. Further, a group that advocates torture would not feel bound to any moral system, and so utilitarianism cannot be blamed here.  (120 words)|@@@@|

Brandon Pearson
Juliana Castro
Justin Bergerson
Ben Garfield
Will Halm

Will Dempsey
Katie Cahn
Ryan Rehl
Jasmyn Choi

Sam Pratt
Hannah Sonnenberg
Foster Conklin
Ashna Joshi
Joshua Markowitz

Rhys Evans
Zach Farnsworth
Isabella Whiting
Kaitlyn Leahy

Sam Kirk
Michael Feiburger
Sophie Linett
Julian DeMann
Emma Smith

Jared Huennekens
Emily Aoki
Roby Mann
Cameron Cook
Theo Li

Liam Caplan
Hongjia Zhang
Eli Roche

Is our society healthy and functioning?
> "Not only does all strengthening of social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others, it also leads him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even greater degree of practical consideration for it." [Mill, Chapter 3, p32]  
|Mill states that a healthy, functioning society is one whose members work towards the collective utility and happiness of all. However, society today has more violent crime and more slavery than before, and American society is still highly individualistic in that people tend to put themselves first. Could it be that despite all the legislation meant to create a more just society, we have regressed to a more savage state? Or have we not progressed morally, but have simply developed better technologies with which to oppress one another? I feel that Mill would agree with the latter, and add that the implementation of governmental policies is useless without early training of individuals to work towards the collective utility of society. (120 words)|@@@@|

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/1gi2ttrgaxsdtwm/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.19.58.png?raw=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/jfjt4eosv48751d/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.46.45.png?dl=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/tqv0s0wx8lzfi2a/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.42.48.png?dl=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/o7ibvv68undkktb/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.43.57.png?dl=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/qcfi48ynbu7xxyl/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.44.40.png?dl=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/dragjm7bl6b0n95/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.45.21.png?dl=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/e2c2p8hr6ppvkxq/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.47.45.png?dl=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[Hume passage|https://www.dropbox.com/s/y0xs22ansgyfrg1/Screenshot%202017-09-26%2006.52.19.png?dl=1]]

+++!!!![Unit A handouts]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "ho-sp19a">>===
+++!!!![Unit B handouts]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "ho-sp19b">>===
+++!!!![Unit C handouts]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "ho-sp19c">>===
+++!!!![Unit D handouts]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "ho-sp19d">>===
+++!!!![Unit E handouts]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "ho-sp19e">>===
+++!!!![Unit F handouts]
<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "ho-sp19f">>===

Well-being, contentedness, satisfaction, or thriving of a person, organism, or community.
----
The term 'happiness' in English translates various ideas across languages and traditions, and conflations between these distinct ideas may lead to serious misunderstandings and confusions. In particular, many translators choose 'happiness' to translate eudaimonia, the Greek word that refers more holistically to a successful and well-lived life, as measured against the functional standard for the corresponding (usually human) species. This concept is quite different from the subjectively-assessed notion of happiness central to utilitarian ethics.

[img[happiness|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/happiness.jpg]]

being governed by forces or influences beyond one's self
----
//contrast against//: autonomy

For Kant, all incentives and motivations insofar as psychology could describe them remained fundamentally heteronomous, because they involved empirical patterns of causality. Automony, on the other hand, required a kind of freedom that could neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed by science.

|Highlight only the skeleton of the clear claims you need.|[<img(100%,100%)[highlight only main parts|https://www.dropbox.com/s/o7kvpyr5oyzmt1m/arist_chapter_two_highlighting.jpg?raw=1]]|

!!!Marx’s materialism implies that human life is one form of animal life. In connection with this view, Marx claims or implies…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) human consciousness is always an outgrowth of distinctively human ways of meeting our needs.]>
{{green{Yes. “distinctively human ways of meeting our needs” is roughly the meaning of “praxis” or self-activity...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) human nature has been corrupted by capitalism, and needs to be returned to a more organic pre-industrial economy.]>
{{red{No... Marx is explicit about the impossibility -- and even undesirability -- of “undoing” the movements of history. The answer to modern forms of alienation is never just “going back” to something older, purer, and better.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) if a human society is not involved in organized manufacture and economic trade, it cannot have a distinctly human form of consciousness.]>
{{red{No... Economic activity, for Marx, is not necessarily industrial, agricultural, or mercantile; a society has an economic pattern as long as it has ways of cooperatively and creatively transforming the environment so as to meet human needs.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) humans are distinguished from other animals by a capacity to transcend the world of material needs.]>
{{red{No... This is, at least in one respect, Kant’s view; we are simultaneously animal beings (with inclinations) and noumenal beings (with transcendent principles).
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) while other animals can satisfy their needs directly by instinct, human beings communicate and work together to meet our needs and develop our ways of life.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the core of Marx’s normative account of the human predicament — both our challenge and the creative difference that makes us historical and social-cultural beings without a simple biological essence.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!![Violations of duty have the structure of HYPOCRISY, for Kant:]
>If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find that ''we actually do not will that our maxim should become a universal law'' — because this is impossible for us — but ''rather'' that ''the opposite of this maxim'' should remain a law universally.(424)
{{indent{
I depend upon others' doing X, ''but'' I //don't// intend to do X.
(or: I depend upon others' //not// doing X, ''but'' I intend to do X anyway.)
}}}
===

a plausible claim ready to be tested by cross-examination, experiment, or future experience.

A moral obligation characterized by a positive imperative to make efforts of a certain kind. Generally, perfect duties require considerable judgment as to when and how to fulfil their demands. Kant discusses giving to charity and developing one's talents as examples of imperfect duties.
----
See also [[imperfect duty]]

!!!Beauvoir’s emphasis on freedom would lead her to assert…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) we should not think that our freedom is enhanced by the ability to dominate others; on the contrary, our freedom is meaningless without theirs.]>
{{green{Yes. Beauvoir is in this way refusing Nietzsche’s vision of freedom as embodying an indifferent or exploitative will to power.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that nihilism is irresponsible because it involves denying the freedom to create meaning in the world.]>
{{green{Yes. Nihilists start from noticing that values “aren’t out there” and conclude too quickly that values cannot be realized.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that religion necessarily denies freedom by setting up an authority for our conscience that overrides our own responsibility.]>
{{red{No... Religion may be interpreted in ways that remain compatible with responsibility and freedom: see her positive endorsement of the anti-fascist’s priest’s view of the Christian myth of creation. (269)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that authentic people need not conform to social norms; instead, they are moved by values that may not speak to others.]>
{{red{No... this is a mildly disguised articulation of the passionate ideal: “moved by inspiration” rather than taking responsibility for choice.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that because freedom transcends experience, it is universal and can be developed, using reason, into a code of moral values.]>
{{red{No... this is a Kantian take on freedom: a space into which reason can take up the project of autonomous self-governance.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Book VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics discusses “incontinence” (akrasia, or lack of self-restraint), which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) … shows that a person does not really know what virtue requires.]>
{{red{No... Not really; this is a good statement of Socrates’ position, against which Aristotle argues. (Aristotle does, however, admit that there may be a certain kind of ignorance involved in incontinence.)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) … makes a person&nbsp;morally equivalent to an animal who cannot be guided by reason.]>
{{red{No... Brutishness/bestiality is different — that’s not “being home” as a deliberate chooser, at all — neither making a decision nor being regretful of one’s action at the moment of action.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) … is a vice of deficiency; there is another vice corresponding to too much self-restraint.]>
{{red{No... Incontinence is not a vice. Also, one cannot have too much continence or self-restraint in Arsitotle’s sense, as it means simply being able to control one’s impulses, and there’s no such thing as too much of that, on Aristotle’s account. The virtuous person isn’t called on to exercise much self-restraint, 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) … is especially painful, because incontinent people experience inner conflict.]>
{{green{Yes. Indeed. Vice is more blameworthy, but akrasia is more painful. (See his discussion of the paradox about which is worse, near beginning of Book VII)
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) … is not actually blameworthy; the incontinent person has already tried self-blame, and being subject to blame clearly does not work to change them.]>
{{red{No... The second half has some truth (made vivid in the “puzzle” passage about what to drink when water causes choking). Still, Aristotle clearly does find incontinence to be blameworthy, albeit less so than intemperance and other vices.
}}}
===
}}}

an argument in which evidence for a general claim is built up based on various examples or particular observations. 
----
>Einstein was not perfect; 
>Gandhi was not perfect;
>therefore, we can expect all human beings, even the most admirable, to have some imperfections.

the movement of thought from an argument’s premises toward its conclusion.

[img(100%,100%)[https://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/spa/vs5pdi7981vsfr0/pfrdtohg.png]]

words and phrases such as for, since, because; thus, so, therefore that serve as cues that an argument is being presented, and which may help us locate premises and conclusions.

One debate among Aristotle scholars:
How much do the virtues "hang together"? Or, how much to believe in the ''unity of the virtues''?
+++!!!![Justice (in the general sense) and magnanimity (sometimes translated as "greatness of soul") supposedly require having all the virtues together...]
{{indent{But that would seem simply to make justice and magnanimity more difficult than virtues that seem more specific, such as courage...}}}
===
+++!!!![Can I be //perfectly// brave while being not at all generous?<br> Can I be perfectly generous without being at all witty?]
{{indent{
In theory, it seems these things are possible...
A soldier who would cover a grenade to save friends, but who wouldn't share a sandwich?
Someone who contributes to others (in the right way, with the right feelings), but who doesn't laugh?
}}}
===

words or gestures that mean one thing at face value, while some insiders (or reflective readers and hearers) are expected to recognize a contrary or more complex implication. 
----
In philosophical contexts, irony is...
* not simply "saying the opposite of what one means," but is rather a way of inspiring ambivalence and further reflection. 
* //distinguished from// sarcasm, which is a cutting tone intended to wound or deter
* //distinguished from// coincidence, confusion, and paradox, which are not forms of communication (We don't say a //fact// "is ironic).
>In the Euthyphro, Socrates openly asks Euthyphro for advice and edification, but Plato's readers recognize that Socrates suspects that Euthyphro has nothing to teach; hence, Socrates' comments to Euthyphro are highly ironic.

Empiricists are committed to studying the world as it is:

*What patterns do we find?
*How does one part of reality (what we observe) help inform us about parts that we don't observe?

Moral theorists are committed to talking about what //should// be true. 

Kant would say this involves potentially radical critique of what is //in fact// true. "Is" and "Ought" are entirely different attitudes.

Puzzle:

1. according to Mill's moral principle (Greatest Happiness Principle):
whether something is MORALLY GOOD is basically determined by the extent to which it promotes the general happiness...

2. Yet according to Mill's associationist psychology (the kind of empiricism Mill develops):
whether people act in any specific way is determined by psychological principles...

then...

How can we expect these two to come together as more than coincidence? 

In cases where the moral choice is not backed by desire, how can we expect people to embrace morality? Does Mill //expect// people (from a moral point of view) to do what he //cannot expect// them to do (from an empirical point of view)?

Mill’s moral theory is HISTORICAL: Sympathy + social institutions facilitate the right associations

Varieties of 'justice' -- "homonymy is close"
revealed by "number of ways [we speak of] an unjust person" (1129a32)
|>|background-color:#686;!Complete / general virtue|background-color:#a66;! Vice, in general|
|>|"whatever produces and maintains happiness and its parts for a political community"(1129 b19)|"The worst person... exercises his vice toward himself ... as well [as toward others] (1130a7)|
|>|background-color:#262;!The specific virtue (fairness)|background-color:#822;!Specific vice (unfairness)|
|first species:<br>"the distribution of honors or wealth... that can be divided among members of a community" (1130 b32)|second species:<br>"rectification in transactions" (1131a)|"bad action that "we can refer... to no other vice except injustice" (1130 a32)|

|borderless|k
|background-color:green;width:180px;A|background-color:green;width:80px; C|background-color:brown;width:50px;C |background-color:brown;width:90px; D|background-color:red;width:150px;D|background-color:red;width:250px;  B|
"The judge restores equality, as though a line [ab] had been cut into unequal parts... (1132a25)

!!!Kant defends the need for a purely formal a priori grasp of moral principles, arguing along the way that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) a knowledge of human nature, and of anthropological differences, may help us apply moral principles, but it cannot help us define them.]>
{{green{Yes. 412: In this way all morals, which require anthropology in order to be applied to humans,must be entirely expounded at first independently of anthropology as pure philosophy...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) genuinely worthy action is actually discouraged by patterns of moral education that point to incentives, such as eternal reward, for acting well.]>
{{green{Yes. Correct; perfect duties are absolute prohibitions, while imperfect duties are positive responsibilities to be exercised with good judgment. They cannot conflict so long as the perfect duties are prohibitions on what can be //willed//.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) the desire to imitate an exemplary person does not represent genuinely moral motivation.]>
{{green{Yes. 409: Imitation has no place at all in moral matters.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) morality depends upon the possibility of recognizing an imperative that is not hypothetical — that is, neither a matter of skill nor of prudence.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. The non-hypothetical imperative is the categorical imperative; imperatives of skill and of prudence are the two kinds of hypothetical imperatives.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) when our behavior towards someone is intended to help us achieve our own individual goals, we are not acting in accord with duty.]>
{{red{No... In this situation we may well be acting //in accord with// duty, just not //from// duty.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Kohlberg’s ideas about the role of experience in moral development include the following:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) that higher stages of moral reasoning do not exist solely in democratic countries, so intelligent individuals will be able to reach moral maturity, no matter what their surrounding social and cultural conditions are.]>
{{red{No... p 514: it’s not about intelligence, but about certain kinds of stimulation;  the rate of one’s moral development is never independent of conditions. He does think that the possibility of post-conventional reasoning within any culture confirms that the process of moral reasoning moves toward the post-conventional in virtue of its own developmental logic.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) that “values clarification” exercises may be useful in stimulating moral development, but they are counterproductive insofar as relativistic premises are introduced.]>
{{green{Yes. “Values clarification is NOT SUFFICIENT”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) that a wide array of culture-bound moral attitudes are found by anthropologists working in isolated cultures, because most members of such cultures tend not to reach post-conventional stages of reasoning.]>
{{green{Yes. While *most* members don’t reach post-conventional stages, Kohlberg does not attribute this to the *content* of their moral norms, but rather to the general influence of cultural isolation (lack of critical stimulation) itself.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) that the relatively rapid moral development among middle-class children can be traced to their ongoing exposure to middle-class values.]>
{{red{No... It’s not intelligence that makes the difference, and the rate of one’s moral development is never independent of conditions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that children can generate and maintain moral ideals of their own creation, even in the face of adults trying to socialize them to prevailing values.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the point of his discussion of his child’s spontaneous recognition of animal suffering as a moral concern.
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,100%)[fishing|https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b9/Stilts_fishermen_Sri_Lanka_02.jpg/1200px-Stilts_fishermen_Sri_Lanka_02.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[gathering|https://whyfiles.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/peru_woman.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[weaving|http://kalingafornia-laga.com/uploads/3/5/2/2/35225043/7942549_orig.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[rooftop farming|http://media.npr.org/assets/img/2013/09/24/chicago-rooftop-farm_wide-7cbe7ae709a8afc2f75650d26929ff43f82d1c3e-s900-c85.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[water-carrying|http://www.waterencyclopedia.com/images/wsci_01_img0139.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[brickwork|http://i.imgur.com/fgb34Gd.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[construction|http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/13/136441066_14999309697271n.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[assembly line|http://samomatic.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/factory1.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[garbage-sifting|https://s.yimg.com/ny/api/res/1.2/OB7xBxrrr2W6JW7r22Rx2g--/YXBwaWQ9aGlnaGxhbmRlcjtzbT0xO3c9ODAwO2g9NjAwO2lsPXBsYW5l/http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/afp.com/Part-HKG-Hkg10232204-1-1-0.jpg]]
[img(100%,100%)[white-collar work|https://spectatorblogs.imgix.net/files/2012/07/17446.jpg]]

the doctrine that material phenomena account for aspects of reality that are usually //not// understood as material.
----
//Historical materialism// names Marx's program of accounting for mental and abstract concepts (ideology) as dependent on and determined by material (economic) relations and interests.
//philosophical materialism// (or "physicalism," a rough synonym) may also name any stance that rejects mind-body (or spirit-nature or divine-mortal) dualism, in favor of a view on which there is no such division, and all beings partake of material or physical nature.
//Reductionist materialism// maintains, in addition, that nothing has any of the attributes (mind, creativity, intelligence) typically associated with supposedly non-physical (or mental or divine) kinds of being.

“policy” or guideline (conscious or not) serving as a principle behind action. [as in Kant] 
----
Note: According to Kant, the maxims that account for our actions may be unconscious, and we may be deceived about which maxim really motivates us.

Can objects become feelings through habituation?
>Q: "They are desired and desirable in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end."  CIT: Mill, 37 
|Mill claims that happiness is nothing more than the feeling of pleasure relative to pain that occurs within an individual's mind. He goes on to say that things which contribute to happiness can eventually become an end instead of a means, or an inherent part of happiness for that individual. However, if happiness is what Mill claims it to be, then things like virtue, money, or power can never become an end, which is just a feeling of pleasure. The enablers are still objects or externals. Mill might counter by saying that when something leads to happiness enough times, the feeling induced by it becomes so habitual that the objects themselves lead directly to that feeling, becoming bound up and inseparable. (121 words)|@@@@|

!!!Mill acknowledges that people do not always think of their actions as a means to happiness, but he argues that that happiness is still, in a sense, the underlying goal of human action. To make sense of these points, he claims…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Pleasure (and absence of pain) are the only legitimate goals for human action, but people can mistakenly confuse happiness with other things — such as money, fame, or power —&nbsp;that become associated with it.]>
{{red{No... Mill’s claim is not that things are “mistakenly confused” with happiness, but that happiness itself expands so as to incorporate new “parts” such as money, power, etc. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) If something is inherently pleasant, such as music, then it cannot really be desired for its own sake; it must always be chosen for the sake of happiness.]>
{{red{No... Mill simply does not claim this. Some things become desired in their own right, and pleasant things are eligible for this conversion as much as tedious or neutral things.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) If some activity results frequently in happiness, it can come to seem intrinsically desirable over time. In doing so, it becomes a part of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the core of the argument in Chapter IV
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Some things, like virtue, should be desired for their own sake, but people in fact always desire it only because of personal incentives.]>
{{red{No... Neither half here is quite right. Mill never claims something *should* be desired for its own sake; as an empiricist he is offering and account of what people *do* desire. Yet what people do desire, on his account, may easily include virtue, so long as virtue comes to be associated with happiness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) If a person’s actions ultimately lead to her own suffering, then even suffering turns out to be a form of happiness, because it has been chosen.]>
{{red{No... Some clever critics of human action claim something like this. Mill does not. It’s possible for a person to act based on habit, even if those actions no longer promise happiness. The suffering that results is not called happiness by Mill.
}}}
===
}}}

philosophical inquiry concerned with questions //around// or //about-yet-beyond// ethics.
----
Metaethics is often focused on how to interpret the meaning of moral terms and claims, and/or on the possibility of their objective truth.

suggestive use of language in which a point is conveyed by drawing attention to some characteristic of a familiar concrete domain (the metaphor's "ground") in order to illustrate something about a target domain, which is framed as analogous. 
----
Philosophical criticism of metaphor can proceed either by denying the relevant similarity of domains, or by showing that even the metaphor's grounding domain should be understood differently.

Commentaries rotate among members of each discussion team so that one person produces a passage commentary each class. Each group can decide who writes on which occasion, in any order agreed upon by group members, as long as everyone writes at least once during each 2-week unit, for 6 total. Keep the following guidelines in mind:
## Find and type a short passage that seems most importantly insightful, interestingly wrong, or centrally puzzling. (Alternately, you might type a couple short excerpts that seem to have a curious relation to each other.)
##  Make sure you can discuss the passage(s) with argument analysis vocabulary (see handout)
##  Compose a concise commentary on it (max 120 words), including argument-analysis, contextually interpretive, and evaluative elements. The idea is to use the passage as a springboard to raise a problem and consider possible lines of response. Seek a balance involving both critical and charitable elements.
##  Edit and proofread carefully. Language errors will significantly affect credit.
##  Post passage-commentary combination to the unit’s BlackBoard Discussion Board area by midnight the night before class.  (Note: details for submitting commentaries are subject to change.)
##  Make sure to offer a very brief and informative title, as in "Phaedo: Why does knowledge differ?" or "Utilitarianism: how does general happiness motivate anyone?"
##  I may illustrate points during class with excerpts from students’ commentaries, but I will be respectful of each student's experience in having work shared in class. Please contact me if you prefer not to have your writing considered in class discussion.

Each commentary will earn up to five points for accuracy, clear writing, relevance, conciseness, and strength of evaluative position. Please note although the assignment is short, it requires much more time than a chatty and informal contribution. Careful revision is required to frame your key points clearly.

[>img[diagram|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/dialoguediagram.jpg]]In this course, we will frequently employ the concepts and skills of philosophical reasoning, and these will need to be handled confidently on exam and essay work. In particular, we will emphasize a [[dialogical|dialogue]] approach to discussion of ideas. For practice in these skills, participants will write one "micro-essay" per unit. 

The basic task of a micro-essay involves: 
(1) recognize one or more inferences behind the author's conclusion(s), 
(2) to develop a critical concern in response to the author's [[reasoning|philosophical reasoning]], 
(3) articulate a potential objection to the resulting argument (which need not be "your opinion"), and 
(4) anticipate likely replies (taking the author's perspective or a slightly amended version).  
(5) if possible, follow up on your concern, revising or redirecting it in response to the imagined reply.

The midterm for PHIL/ENVS 212 is one of two exams, and covers the first three units (Unit A, Unit B, Unit C).
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Our midterm exam comes after [[Unit C|Unit C overview]] (Kant & Korsgaard), and covers the first three units. A [[Midterm Review Session]] is scheduled by the TAs.
;The exam includes:
; 12 MULTI–CHOICES QUESTIONS (formatted like the opening questions for small group discussion, one question per session).
* If you participated in a small-group discussion that earned a BULLSEYE or an "OK," you'll see the same FAMILIAR question again on the midterm. (If your score was "OK" then there's at least one response that was not ideal. Make sure to review why.)
* If your group score was "Almost" (or any other similar remark), or if you were ABSENT, you'll see the ALTERNATE question concerning that day's reading and discussion material.
** If you explicitly dissented on your group's answer sheet, your individual question status is adjusted accordingly.
** I may adjust wording to avoid potential confusion; I may also shuffle the order of answers. <br>So make sure to go beyond memorizing answers; understand WHY! 
** These will be scored incrementally; each choice (circling or not-circling) is separately graded. 
** You may clarify your answer on up to THREE response-options TOTAL. (Remember, I'm looking at about 1500 little circled-or-uncircled letters in order to grade these! So don't explain //too much//, but if you really think there's ambiguity in the wording of an option -- and can't get satisfactory clarification from me or a TA during exam -- jot a note as to what kind of interpretation led you to circle/not circle.)
; ONE ESSAY, which will involve a choice between possible themes. 
* A good midterm essay should discuss at least three perspectives on the theme, and an excellent essay will make room to draw in a fourth perspective and/or show an easily overlooked or especially nuanced reading of one or more major authors. Your response should synthesize beyond the text, offering comparative and evaluative commentary along the way. Please write clearly and avoid fluff.
; EXTRA CREDIT diagramming option
* Similar to diagram challenges we did in class for Aristotle (why the young should not be students of political science) and for Kant (on the purpose of reason being something other than happiness).

!!!Opponents often worry that utilitarianism collapses matters of justice into matters of usefulness, happiness-promotion, or expediency. Mill attempts to distinguish justice from “mere” expediency as follows:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) While popular conceptions of justice are essentially subject to conflicting intuitions, claims of expediency are more open to evidence, and may help resolve disputes about justice.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 55: “All these opinions [about punishment] are extremely plausible; and so long as the question is argued as one of justice simply, without going down to the principles which lies under justice and are the source of its authority, I am  unable to see how any of these reasoners can be refuted.... No one of them can carry out his own notion of justice without trampling upon another equally binding...” p. 58 top “Justice has in this case [of fair remuneration] two sides to it... Each, from his own point of view, is unanswerable; and any choice between them, on grounds of justice, must be perfectly arbitrary. Social utility alone can decide the preference.”
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) The demands of justice essentially involve rights, and these are the most basic preconditions for people’s pursuit of happiness.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 59: Justice is a name for certain classes of moral rules which concern the essentials of human well-being ... It is their observance which alone preserves peace among human beings... a person may possibly not need the benefits of others, but he always needs that they should not do him hurt
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Justice depends not only on our sympathetic concern for the general happiness, but also on the sentiments associated with punishment.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 51-52: two essential ingredients in the sentiment of justice... the desire to punish ... and the knowledge or belief that there is some definite individual or individuals to whom harm has been done.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Justice concerns matters of expedience that need to be regulated by law; whatever is unjust ought to be illegal.]>
{{red{No... p. 48 Mill speaks of “private injustice”; all injustices could be made illegal only if “tribunals” were perfect, only if “magistrates could be trusted so much”. Alas, sometimes there are heavy costs involved in getting government involved in regulating conduct.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Acting justly is a perfect duty, while promoting utility in general is an imperfect duty.]>
{{green{Yes. p. 49-50: [With] duties of perfect obligation ... a correlative //right// resides in some person... this distinction exactly coincides with that... between justice and other other obligations of morality.
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!!!*[125: I seek God... We have killed him!]
>Haven’t you heard of that madman who lit a lantern in the bright morning, ran to the marketplace , and shouted unceasingly, “I seek God! I seek God!”? ... The madman sprang into their midst and transfixed them with his gaze. “Where has God gone?” he cried, “I’ll tell you where! We’ve killed  him—you and I! ... Is there still an above and a below? Aren’t we wandering as if through an endless nothing? ... Don’t we yet hear the noise of the gravediggers who are burying God? Don’t we yet smell the divine rot? — For gods rot too! God is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him!...
===
+++!!!!*[270: Become who you are]
>What does your conscience say? — “You shall become who you are”
===
+++!!!!*[276: amor fati]
>I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things — In this way I will be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati [love of fate]: let that be my love from now on! I do not want to wage any war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Let looking away be my only negation! And all in all, to sum it up: some day I want to be only a Yes-sayer!
===
+++!!!!*[341: eternal  return]
>What if one day or one night a demon slinked after you into your loneliest loneliness and said to you: “This life, as you live it now and as you have lived it, you will have to live once more and countless times more. And there will be nothing new about it, but every pain and every pleasure, and every thought and sigh, and everything unspeakably small and great in your life  must come back to you, and all in the same series and sequence —and likewise this spider and this moonlight... The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again—and you with it, you mote of dust!”<br>... The question in each and every thing, “Do you will this once more and countless times more?” would lie as the heaviest weight upon your acts! Or how benevolent would you have to become toward  yourself and toward life in order to long for nothing more ardently than for this ultimate eternal  sanction and  seal?
===
+++!!!!*[349: Will to power]
>Wanting to preserve oneself expresses a situation of emergency, a constriction of the real, fundamental drive of life, which aims at extending its power, and in this willing, often enough puts self-preservation into question and sacrifices it. <br>... Darwinism, with its unbelievably one-sided doctrine of the “struggle for existence”... a result of the ancestry of most natural scientists... poor and humble folks... But... in nature what rules is not emergency situations, but overflow, superfluity, even to the point of absurdity. The struggle for existence is only an exception, a temporary restriction of the will to live; everywhere the struggle, both great and small revolves around supremacy, around growth and expansion, around power, in accordance with the will to power, which is precisely the will of life.
===
+++!!!!*[370: Backward inference.. to the need... behind it]
>Thus I gradually learned... My sight grew ever sharper for that most difficult and dangerous form of backward inference in which the most mistakes are made: the backward inference from the work to the author, from the deed to the doer, from the ideal to the one who finds it necessary, from every way of thinking and valuing to the need that is in command behind it.<br>With regard to all aesthetic values, I now make use of this main distinction: I as in every individual case: “Is it hunger or overflow that has become creative here?”
===
+++!!!!*[374: necessarily perspectival character of human existence]
>How far the perspectival character of existence reaches, or even whether existence has any other character; whether an existence without interpretation, without “sense,” becomes precisely “nonsense”; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially an interpreting existence—this cannot be figured out, and rightfully so... the human intellect cannot help seeing itself under its own perspectival forms, and only in  them. We cannot see around our own corner...<br>But I think that today we are at least far from the laughable presumption of decreeing from our corner that one is allowed to have perspectives only from this corner.
===
+++!!!!*[244: etymology of “good”]
>what is the true etymological significance of the various symbols for the idea “good” which have been coined in the various languages? ... they all led back to the same evolution of the same idea — that everywhere “aristocrat,” “noble” (in the social sense), is the root idea, out of which have necessarily developed “good” in the sense of “with aristocratic soul,” “noble,” in the sense of “with a soul of high calibre,” “with a privileged soul”—a development which invariably runs  parallel with that other evolution by which “vulgar,” “plebeian,” “low,” are made to change finally into “bad.” ...
===
+++!!!!*[244: resentment and slave morality]
>The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving  birth to values — a resentment experienced by creatures who, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge. While every aristocratic morality springs from a triumphant affirmation of its own demands, the slave morality says “no” from the very outset to what is “outside itself,” “different from itself,” and “not itself”: and this “no” is its creative deed. . . .
===
+++!!!!*[246: self-consolation for lack of power: finding someone responsible]
>The interpretation by means of which the Christian sinner tries to understand himself, is an attempt at justifying his lack of power and of self-confidence: he prefers to feel himself a sinner rather than feel bad for nothing: it is in itself a symptom of decay when interpretations of  this sort are used at all. ... when... the Socialist, the Anarchist, and the Nihilist are conscious that their existence is something for which someone must be guilty, they are very closely related to the Christian, who also believes that he can more easily endure this ill ease and his wretched constitution when he has found someone whom he can hold responsible for it.
===
+++!!!!*[251: man does not desire ‘happiness’.]
>Rudimentary psychology... which sought a will behind every action... could only answer “happiness” to the question: “What does man desire?” (it was impossible to answer “Power,” because that would have been immoral); —...<br>As a matter of fact, man does not desire “happiness.” Pleasure is a sensation of power: if the passions are excluded, those states of  the mind are also excluded which afford the greatest sensation of power and therefore of pleasure. The highest rationalism is a state of cool clearness, which is very far  from being able to bring about that feeling of power which every kind of exaltation involves...
===
+++!!!!*[248: Exploitation as essential to life]
>On no point, however, is the ordinary consciousness of Europeans more unwilling to be corrected than on this mater; people now rave everywhere, even under the guise of science, about coming conditions of society in which ”the exploiting character”is to be absent: — that sounds to my ears as if they promised to invent a mode of life which should refrain from all organic functions. “Exploitation” does not belong to a depraved, or imperfect and primitive society: it belongs to the nature of the living being as a primary organic function; it is a consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the Will to Life.
===
+++!!!!*[247: Altruism as egoism]
>The instinct of revenge and resentment as a  means of enduring life, as a self-preservative measure... At bottom... the discharge of resentment  which takes place in the act of judging, rejecting, and punishing egoism (one’s own or that of others) is still a self-preservative measure on the part of the bungled and the botched. In short: the cult of altruism is merely a particular form of egoism...
===
+++!!!!*[256: transvaluation of values]
>Transvalue values— what does this mean? ... we ought o have the courage to become conscious, and to affirm all that which has been attained... A transvaluation of values can only be accomplished when there is a tension of new needs, and a new set of needy people who fell all old values as painful — although they are not conscious of what is wrong. 
===
+++!!!!*[45: no doer behind the deed]
>For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there wer ea neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such substratum; there is no “being” behind doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer” is merely a fiction added to the deed — the deed is everything.
===

+++!!!![What modern moral theories have in common, compared to ancient:]
[>img[happiness|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/happiness.jpg]]
We tend now to think of happiness as something more personal and subjective, less like Aristotle's wholistic flourishing. 
{{indent{It's possible to be happy but not morally good, or morally good but not happy. }}}
Also, it's more common for modern theories to give something like recipes or recommendations for moral judgment. 
{{indent{Aristotle was systematic, but didn't think it was possible to discern virtue without great training.}}}
===
+++!!!![Two broad kinds of moral theory in modern (post-1650) moral philosophy:]
||!Deontological|!Consequentalist|
|emphasis:|origins of action: principle, integrity, conceptions of right|effects of action: harms, benefits, results|
|example:|Kant's categorical imperative|Mill's utilitarianism|
So, this course is examining one major example of each kind.
Note that each broad category has other variants.

[<img(100%,100%)[moon|http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2015/08/01/11/2B032AAA00000578-3179917-image-a-61_1438426481891.jpg]]

Consider these two concepts:
* ''moral agents'' (those enact morally meaningful choices and/or who can be held to moral expectations) 
** //Note: this term does not imply "morally good" beings, just those to whom we apply moral demands or expectations.//
* ''moral patients'' (those who much be taken into account as deserving moral concern, respect, or attention).  
An idea about how these two categories overlap can be expressed through a Venn diagram:
|[<img(80%,auto)[agents|https://www.dropbox.com/s/bpitidvyfrg07w6/kant_and_moral_patient_diagram.png?raw=1]]|On Kant's view, being able to act on moral reasons is the very thing that makes a being worthy of respect, and hence of moral treatment. In other words, belonging to the set of moral agents is the same as belonging to the set of moral patients... (Kantians will add that we rightly treat a toddler (for example) as belonging to this domain of morality, recognizing the potential moral agent who emerges only with time).|
|[<img(80%,auto)[patients|https://www.dropbox.com/s/z42mo83qjjg61m6/moral_patients_not_agents.png?raw=1]]|The utilitarian criterion for moral consideration is broader; some beings are moral patients without being moral agents... Peter Singer calls for us to "expand the circle" of moral concern.|

+++!!!![Intelligence in many forms:]
>To measure animal intelligence, scientists observe creatures in the wild — watching a dolphin stick a sponge on its beak to avoid getting cuts from sharp rocks and coral, for example. Or they bring animals into the lab and offer them puzzles to solve, such as rewarding crows when they learn to rip paper into strips of just the right size.
>Only a few species stand out in these studies, and by comparing them, scientists have identified some shared factors. The animals have big brains relative to their body size, they live for a long time, and they can form long-lasting social bonds.
>Another feature that cephalopods share with other smart animals is a relatively big brain. But that’s where the similarities appear to end. Most of the neurons that do the computing, for example, are in the octopus’s arms.
>Most strikingly, cephalopods die young. Some may live as long as two years, while others only last a few months. Nor do cephalopods form social bonds.
===

Consider Kohlberg's Kantian approach to moral maturity, and compare to Aristotle's way of describing moral maturity...

!!!Kohlberg (in “The Child as Moral Philosopher”) offers an account of moral education according to which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) “socialization,” in the form of being trained to accept the norms of one’s culture and social milieu, gives children the basic moral values which may then be refined as they mature.]>
{{red{No... Kohlberg explicitly distances himself from the language of “socialization,” and the *content* of mature values can challenge, not just “refine,” the conventions one learned as a child.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) intelligent individuals will be able to reach moral maturity regardless of surrounding social conditions, since morality is essentially self-taught.]>
{{red{No... p 514: it’s not about intelligence, but about certain kinds of stimulation;  the rate of one’s moral development is never independent of conditions. He does think that the possibility of post-conventional reasoning within any culture confirms that the process of moral reasoning moves toward the post-conventional in virtue of its own developmental logic.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) moral development includes a “conventional” phase in which people tend to follow local norms; yet development beyond the conventional phase is possible for those who have good reflective role-models.]>
{{brown{Maybe. The first half is mostly correct (more accurate would be: at the conventional stage, people //justify// moral claims by reference to local norms, whether or not they actually follow them.) The second half is muddy too. While most people don’t reach post-conventional stages, and having reflective role models *may* help stimulate development somewhat, Kohlberg does not suggest that having a "good reflective role-model" is //pivotal// to making this development possible (which this sentence might be read to imply). On the other hand, "development beyond the conventional stage is possible"  — //whether or not// people have good reflective role models — and in this sense the second half is acceptable. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) it is possible for children to spontaneously generate and develop moral ideals that are at odds with the prevailing values around them.]>
{{green{Yes. This is the point of his discussion of his child’s spontaneous recognition of animal suffering as a moral concern.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) “values clarification” exercises may be useful in stimulating moral development, but not if students are reassured that all reasoning is equally valuable and well-developed.]>
{{green{Yes. “Values clarification is NOT SUFFICIENT”. Kohlberg acknowledges a potentially positive role when educators help people reflect on and articulate values, but that positive role is *outweighed* if the educator also insists that moral ideas all have equal status, or that the task of moral discussion is for each person to become satisfied with their own values.
}}}
===
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[stages in Kohlberg's moral-developmental model|https://www.dropbox.com/s/a7ufjyajraxstna/kohlberg6stages_landscape2.png?raw=1]]

[img[singer|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/expandingcircle.jpg]][img[status|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/moralstatus.jpg]]

!!!In making his radical claim that morality is merely a form of ideology, Marx is laying out the groundwork for an argument that also claims that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) philosophy — understood as a timeless description of reality — is one form of false consciousness that may be embraced by the ruling class.]>
{{green{Yes. Marx need not claim that *only* the ruling class are attracted to philosophical views that portray themselves as inert in this way, but philosophy (unlike religion) is generally associated with a certain kind of leisure, and philosophy that pretends to reflect timeless ideals helps to buttress the status quo.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) those who own the means of production have access to objective truth while those who are alienated from their production exhibit a false consciousness.]>
{{red{No... Those who own the means of production may also have false consciousness. Economic power does not necessarily bring about objectivity of perspective.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) individuals in the proletariat should be held responsible for their own self-deception when they embrace status quo moral ideas.]>
{{red{No... The language of “responsibility” here is misleading, to say the least: Marx thinks that people’s ideas are determined by the surrounding material-economic circumstances. On the other hand, if all you were thinking was “the workers engage in self-deception” (without focusing on responsibility) then there’s some plausibility here...
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) systems of ethics are no more objective than are systems of religion.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) the proletarian revolution would put an end to class struggle, which until then is propelled forward by the interaction of material-economic productive forces.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

Mill distinguishes, on p. 17-18:
|!intention|!motive|
|!//what it is// that one sets out to do|!what feeling or interest inspires an act|
|to save a drowning person|wanting to earn admiration|
|to torture someone|in hopes of preventing terrorism|
Note divergence from Kant, for whom intention is always inseparable from motive.
Note suitability of utilitarianism for ''policy-making'': 
{{indent{the question is not how to inspire people to have Kantian integrity, but how to orchestrate social conditions so that people often will be inspired to do things that in fact benefit others (a la Smith's "invisible hand").}}}

[<img(100%, 100%)[elephants|http://blog.sevenponds.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/elephants-with-the-bones-of-the-dead.gif]]

!!!Noddings distinguishes “natural caring” and “ethical caring”, noting that…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) even the ethical mode of caring cannot reasonably imply attending equally and impartially to everyone.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) natural caring is sufficient for those with whom we live, while ethical caring becomes necessary only when we interact with strangers.]>
{{red{No... No; ethical caring may be necessary with familiars, too!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) this distinction is analogous to the Kantian distinction between acting in accord with duty and acting from duty.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) people become secure and capable of competent caring only by having been the focus of natural caring when they were dependent children.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) natural caring, which is spontaneous, is the only thing of intrinsic moral value.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
}}}

A commitment to respond to provocation in constructive ways that solve problems and build mutual regard without inflicting further harms or encouraging misunderstandings. Non-violence is developed into a philosophical and ethical ideal by a number of thinkers: King, Ghandi, Thoreau, Ikeda. Carol Gilligan argues that this ideal epitomizes a trajectory of moral development focused on care rather than rules; Nel Noddings gives a philosophical articulation of this "care perspective," but resists treating non-violence as a straightforward rule.

a claim which involves attribution of positive or negative value, as contrasted (though not always sharply) with most “matter of fact” claims. 
----
//usage: // {{{"Their normative recommendations about public education clash because they interpret the testing data differently."}}}

Find here some notes from prior in-class discussions. See also Study Questions and discussion questions.

a complaint about an argument, usually focused either on the truth of its premise(s), or on its structural validity, and occasionally using the diagnostic language of fallacies.

!!!Kate Rawles considers two frequently-opposed positions concerning our obligations to the non-human world, and raises some objections to each side. These objections include:…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Conservationists have unwisely portrayed emotional responses to individual animals as irrational and out of place in addressing our ecological responsibilities.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Conservationists have often failed to consider the significance of the distinctly human soul.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Accounts of the moral value of non-human beings often rest on a troubling assumption that theorists can separate ourselves from nature enough to judge the intrinsic moral status of other beings.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Many conservationists treat human individuals as morally significant, while non-human species are considered only at the species level; yet this difference has not yet been well justified.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Many animal-welfare advocates rely on a tradition of moral theorizing that is fundamentally individualist and non-ecological in its concerns.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

Does Aristotle neglect to consider important virtues?
What are the spheres of life he considers and prioritizes?
Are there other important spheres of human action that ought to be central to our moral evaluation?

>If the opinion which  I have now stated is psychologically true — if human nature is so  constituted as to desire nothing which is not ''either a part of  happiness or a means of happiness'' — we can have no other proof, and we require no other, that ''these are the only things desirable''. If  so, happiness is the sole end of human action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge of all human conduct; from whence it  necessarily follows that it must be the criterion of morality, since a  part is included in the whole.

>Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct... But... ''to [prove happiness is the sole criterion of morality]'' it would seem, by the same rule, ''necessary to show'', not only that people desire happiness, but that ''they never desire anything else''. Now it is palpable that they do desire things which, in common language, are decidedly distinguished from happiness.  They desire, for example, virtue, and the absence of vice, no less really than pleasure and the absence of pain. The desire of virtue is not as universal, but it is as authentic a fact, as the desire of happiness. And hence the ''opponents of the utilitarian standard'' deem that they have a right to ''infer that there are other ends of human action'' besides happiness, and that happiness is not the standard of  approbation and disapprobation.

!!!Discuss the following broad claims about this class, and circle any claims that, upon reflection and deliberation, your group is ready to endorse.…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Ethics (as studied here) concerns the variety of ways in which people have understood the conflict between morality and self-interest.]>
{{red{No... “The conflict between morality and self-interest” is not a shared concern among different ethical texts and traditions.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Work will be evaluated based not on the content of students’ opinions, but on how well those opinions are defended with persuasive arguments.]>
{{red{No... Neither opinion nor their defense are central. The skills of critique are central, and such thinking is independent of taking sides on any given question.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Philosophical subject-matter can be divided into three broad themes: metaphysics, epistemology, and values; this course (ethics) will involve discussion of all three themes, despite focusing on the third.]>
{{green{Yes. Hence, this class should be a fine introduction to philosophy as such.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Dialogue is an essential philosophical practice, so participation requires speaking up in class and/or contributing discussions at moodle and/or visiting TA office hours.]>
{{green{Yes. Exactly.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) A micro-essay, due once per unit, is only 120 words long, and serves as a quick way to summarize your reaction to a reading.]>
{{red{No... The 120-word  limit does not make the micro-essay “quick” -- you’ll need time to prepare, formulate, consolidate, and revise.
}}}
===
}}}

Opening questions for small discussion groups, at the beginning of class sessions, have three main objectives:
# To encourage ''each'' student to engage in discussion about the reading,
# To prompt reflection on ''themes'' that we'll want to probe more deeply in the class session
# To ''incentivize'' attentive reading, including anticipation of good questions, but without creating the anxieties associated with individually graded pop-quizzes.
There are three possible results for the discussion question sheets:
|BULLSEYE drawing:|Wow, your group completely nailed this question! You'll see this very question (perhaps edited a bit) in the place for this session on the exam.|
|OK!|Although another answer would have been optimal, I'm persuaded that your group had good reasons for its answers and studied well. You'll see this very question (perhaps edited a bit) in the place for this session on the exam.|
|Almost... (or some other comment)|There was at least one facet of this question that your group didn't answer well. There will be a different (but not more difficult) question about this session on the exam. Please discuss with me if your group members are still unsure how to understand my feedback, or if you'd like to persuade me to mark your sheet differently.|

''Additional clarifications:''
*Exams are generated based on //individual// results. So, group members who are absent when their group scores a "bullseye" or "OK" do not get the bonus result of the familiar exam question.
* If your group has fewer than four people, feel free to seek out another small group with whom to check your responses and/or deliberate further (You'll still turn in separate sheets).
* If discussion does not bring your group to agreement, turn in one sheet marked with the answers that two or more participants support, with a clear note about who dissents from which responses.
* Groups will be re-arranged at midterm and/or when enrollments change. But if your group experience is not positive, please send me an email and/or meet with me in office hours.

{{menubox{
Soc:  Consider this: Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious ''because'' it is loved by the gods?
//Euth: I don’t know what you mean...//
...
Soc: ...that which is being carried is being carried ''because'' someone carries it...?
//Euth: That is the reason.//
Soc: ... So it is in the same case as the things just mentioned; it is not loved by those who love it because it is being loved, but it is being loved because they love it?
...
Soc: What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Surely that it is loved by all the gods, according to what you say?
//Euth: Yes.//
Soc: Is it loved ''because'' it is pious, or for some other reason?
//Euth: For no other reason.// (10 a-d)
}}}

[img(100%,auto)[stages in Kohlberg's moral-developmental model|https://www.dropbox.com/s/bcu316e0yc261sw/mill_firstreading_outline.png?raw=1]]

Here's a few of the "slices" of information here that cut across the whole semester:
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Find and concisely paraphrase a pair of phenomena (as described by Ahmed) that stand in tension with each other. See if you can edit this pair of descriptions to highlight their contradiction (logical incompatibility).

Then, for another passage in the text, do this again. (Paraphrase how there’s a double-phenomenon with a tension/contradiction embedded in it.)…

One challenge in reading Beauvoir's work is digesting phrases that seem intentionally self-contradictory. Why might Beauvoir have chosen to write this way?
|Sartre, in //Being and Nothingness//... defined man [as] ''that being whose being is not to be''... (263)|
|... by taking the world away from me, others also give it to me, since a ''thing is given'' to me only ''by the movement which snatches'' it from me. (269)|
|... if it is true that every project emanates from subjectivity, it is also true that this ''subjective movement establishes'' by itself a ''surpassing of subjectivity''. (269)|
|"To will oneself free is to will others free" (270)|

//Note:// this chart is provided for reference only, and all questions are subject to corrections, edits, and other reasonable modifications. (Please do let me know if you notice any errors.)

|date|!in-class question:|!fresh exam question theme:|
|1/28|In light of his discussion with Crito (taken as a whole), we can conclude that Socrates endorses the following ideas about acting rightly…	|Socrates claims, in his dialogue with Crito, that he has entered into a fair agreement with the city of Athens. According to Socrates, this agreement, or “contract”…	|
|1/30|The character Euthyphro is portrayed (by Plato) as making various kinds of mistakes about how to offer a definition (or account of the concept) of piety. These mistakes include… |Plato's //Euthyphro// provides hints about how Socrates himself might understand piety. These clues suggest that.…	|
|2/4|Wisdom, according to Epictetus, involves…	|Epictetus encourages student to aim for ataraxia, a state of being undisturbed. Ataraxia involves…	|
|2/6|King’s discussion of justice…	|King’s stance in “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” echoes a few Socratic and stoic themes. For example…	|
|2/11|English translations of Aristotle often use “happiness” to render the Greek word εὐδαιμονία or “eudaimonia”. The ‘eu’ prefix means ‘good’ or ‘well,’ and ‘daimon’ (which survives as the English word “demon”) means ‘life-spirit’ or ‘soul’; so the word “eudaimonia” means something like “having one’s life go well.” After reading the first sections of Aristotle’s text, we can say the following about Aristotle’s idea of eudaimonia (“happiness”):…|Deliberate voluntary choices, on Aristotle’s account…|
|2/13|Aristotle de-emphasizes values that are central to the Judeo-Christian tradition, such as humility and equality. For example, Aristotle claims or implies:…	|For Aristotle, virtue requires not just acting well, but having the right kinds of desires. On his account of desire …	|
|2/18|Aristotle discusses ideal friendships and various kinds of non-ideal friendships. About the non-ideal friendships, Aristotle would say:…	|Aristotle distinguish three different ways that a character can fall short of virtue. Specifically,…	|
|2/20|In the first section of Kant’s Groundwork, Kant disagrees with Aristotle by claiming…	|Kant claims many other values are easily confused with true moral worth. For example…	|
|2/25|On the subject of moral duties, Kant would claim…	|Kant distinguishes the categorical imperative structure of moral duty from the hypothetical imperative structure (associated with prudence and skill). About this distinction he claims or implies…	|
|2/27|Kant describes his moral principle as “the principle of the autonomy of the will” (Ak 433). In elaborating the distinction between autonomy (being governed by oneself) and heteronomy (being governed by something different from the self), Kant asserts or implies the following claims:…	|Human beings (unlike angels, Kant imagines) must see themselves as belonging not only to the intelligible order, but also to the temporal world of the senses. This implies…	|
|3/4|According to Korsgaard, Kant’s rigorism is tied to his narrow view of moral responsibility (on which we are each responsible for acting in a morally ideal way, and *not* responsible for evils and harms brought about through others’ action). Korsgaard takes a somewhat different view of moral responsibility, arguing…	|According to Korsgaard's modified Kantian view, certain conditions would make it acceptable to tell a lie. Korsgaard specifies…|

+++!!!!*[262: ambiguity]
>Man.. is still a part of this world of which he is a consciousness. He asserts himself as a pure internality against which no external power can take hold, and he also experiences himself as a thing crushed by the dark weight of other things. ... Between the past which no longer is and the future which is not yet, this moment when he exists is nothing. This privilege, which he alone possesses, of being a sovereign and unique subject amidst a universe of objects, is what he shares with all his fellow-men. <br>As long as there have been men and they have lived, they have all felt this tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as long as there have been philosophers and they have thought, most of them have tried to mask it.
===
+++!!!!*[262: Ethics of ambiguity]
>They have denied death, either by integrating it with life or by promising to man immortality. Or, again they have denied life, considering it as a veil of illusion beneath which is hidden the truth of Nirvana.<br>And the ethics which they have proposed to their disciples has always pursued the same goal. It has been a matter of eliminating the ambiguity by making oneself a pure inwardness or pure externality, by escaping from the sensible world or by being engulfed in it, by yielding to eternity or enclosing oneself in the pure moment.
===
+++!!!!*[263: defined man... Being is not to be]
>it is by ambiguity that... Sartre...  fundamentally defined man, that being whose being is not to be, that subjectivity which realizes itself only as a presence in the world.... a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being.
===
+++!!!!*[264: God as impossible synthesis]
>When a man projects into an ideal heaven that impossible synthesis... that is called God, it is because he wishes the regard of this existing Being to change is existence into being; but if he agrees not to be in order to exist genuinely, he will abandon the dream of an inhuman objectivity. ... it is not a matter of  being right in the eyes of a God, but of being right in his own eyes. 
===
+++!!!!*[265: everything permited?]
>Dostoievsky asserted, “If God does not exist, everything is permitted.” Today’s believers use this formula for their own advantage. To reestablish man at the heart of his destiny is, they claim, to repudiate all ethics. However, far from God’s absence authorizing all license, the contrary is the case, because man is abandoned on the earth, because his acts are definitive, absolute engagements. He  bears the responsibility for a world which is not the work of a strange power, but of himself, where his defeats are inscribed, and his victories as well.
===
+++!!!!*[266: The serious]
>The serious  man gets rid of his freedom by claiming to subordinate it to values which would be unconditioned...  must mask the movement by which he gives [values] to himself.
===
+++!!!!*[267: Nihilism is disappointed seriousness which has turned back upon]
>Nihilism is disappointed seriousness which has turned back upon itself.... right in thinking that the world possesses  no justification and that he himself is nothing. But he forgets that it is up to him to justify the world and to make himself exist validly. 
===
+++!!!!*[268: the passionate man... sets up the object as an]
>the passionate man... sets up the object as an absolute, not, like the serious man, as a thing detached from himself, but as a thing disclosed by his subjectivity.
===

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A moral obligation characterized by a clear line between conformity and violation. Generally, perfect duties involve injunctions //not// to engage in various forbidden forms of action, such as dishonesty and coercion, where some specific person's legitimate expectations (or rights) would be violated thereby.
----
See also [[imperfect duty]]

The view that reality cannot be conceived or understood except as something inextricable from perspective.

|How far the ''perspectival'' character of existence reaches, or even whether existence has any other character; whether an existence without ''interpretation'', without “sense,” becomes precisely “nonsense”; whether, on the other hand, all existence is not essentially an interpreting existence—this cannot be figured out, and rightfully so... ''the human intellect cannot help seeing itself under its own perspectival forms'', and only in  them. We cannot see around our own corner...<br>But I think that today we are at least far from the laughable presumption of decreeing from our corner that one is allowed to have perspectives only from this corner. |
|—Nietzsche §374|c

Phenomenology is the study of phenomena, often with special attention to how things are experienced, prior to or without invoking the idea of a reality represented (correctly or not) in those experiences.

study of the origin, history, and evolution of languages and meanings
----
Though philology enjoyed a prominent place in the academy during the 19th Century, its role has largely given way to related areas of linguistics, classics, literature, and philosophy.

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Inquiry into questions and problems that lie beyond other academic disciplines' research methods (including questions about virtually any discipline's deepest concepts), and with the arguments by which people acquire and change their attitudes, beliefs, and practices. 
The Greek word for '' 'philosophy' '' emerges out of two concepts:
* ''//philo//-'': love (for or of)
* ''//sophia//'': wisdom 
See also: philosophers

!!!Reflect on the following idea, which roughly paraphrases one moment in Plato’s Euthyphro: 
“Piety can’t mean ‘what the gods love,’ because the gods love different things.”…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) This summarizes the most important moment of elenchus in the Euthyphro.]>
{{green{Yes. It summarizes a moment of elenchus, but it’s really a minor and quick elenchus, compared to the one that comes next. This elenchus hinges on Euthyphro’s kind of polytheism, but the central part of the dialogue applies equally well to any inquiry into how divine values are related to ideas about value.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) In light of subtle cues in Plato’s text, we should imagine that there is some irony in Socrates’ line of reasoning here.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes, though this may be too subtle to notice without exposure to other texts. Socrates “has a hard time accepting” stories about violence and strife among the gods. He is likely skeptical about their being in constant disagreement, then, as well. But since Euthyphro has invoked the violent disagreement of the gods from the beginning of this dialogue, Socrates cross-examines his views with that assumption left in place.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) This argument is an enthymeme.]>
{{green{Yes... Straightforwardly so. This argument only “ticks” once you add some further premises: that impiety can be understood as the mirror image of piety and that it’s unacceptably absurd to count something as both pious and impious.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) After hearing this idea, Euthyphro concedes that his first proposed definition leads to an absurd consequence, and promptly offers a revised hypothesis.]>
{{green{Yes. Yes. The revision is simple: from “what the gods love” to “what //all// the gods love”.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) This claim is not necessarily endorsed by Plato, but he thinks it is a valid hypothesis that cannot be refuted.]>
{{red{No... It’s hard to tell which claims Plato endorses. But everything after that point is rubbish. “Valid” (in the context of arguments” is a trait of arguments, not hypotheses, and there’s no sign that Plato thinks of anything here as impossible to refute.
}}}
===
}}}

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A philosophical approach to mental and abstract concepts that treats them as preparations for and orientations to organic activity.
----
See, for example: John Dewey

a claim (expressible in a complete sentence) offered to (help) support another claim, a conclusion.

+++!!!![Aristotle emphasizes that some virtues depend on having certain social advantages...]
{{indent{
Magnificence, most notably, depends upon having large sums of money.
Magnanimity, also, is enhanced by being "wellborn and powerful"
}}}
===
+++!!!![This suggestion is surprising]
{{indent{
vs. Christian, and democratic assumptions that social status is irrelevant to moral worth.
vs. Socrates' and Stoics' confidence that poverty might actually help us achieve virtue.
}}}
===
+++!!!![On the other hand...]
{{indent{
Aristotle's reasons here could easily be marshalled for progressive purposes, too:
* We cannot expect people to be ''virtuosos on the flute'' unless... they've ''practiced'' with a real flute.
* We cannot expect people to have excellence in confronting danger unless... they've learned through such confrontations.
* We cannot expect people to be wise with money unless... they're experienced in handling money.
So, //if// we (democratic folks) want to have high expectations of everyone, then...
{{indent{
we've got to distribute resources better.
We shouldn't //blame// people for lacking the "virtues of privilege"; 
but perhaps we should empower them instead.
Meanwhile, it's easy to interpret Aristotle charitably (or amend his view) so that these virtues are all assessed relative to one's situation.
For example, as Aristotle already notes, it is possible for a poor person to be generous, simply by being willing to give in the right proportion to her resources.
... But is there any way one could be //magnificent// as a poor person?
}}}
}}}
===

in philosophy: a challenge revolving around uncertainty about how to approach or understand an issue.
* //related to// a dilemma, which is more narrowly focused on a choice between specific alternative claims or choices (where neither option is ideal)
* //related to// an objection, which is someone's explicit complaint against some aspect of an argument.
* //related to// concern, which is the appreciation of or perception of a problem.

the core human faculty of making good choices based on how things appear to us, according to Stoic philosophy
----
Prohairesis is, acording to Epictetus, the part of us to which all other parts are subordinate; it is also the only part that is fully under our control.

Aristotle's //phronimos// is a person who judges and decides wisely in practical matters. Irwin's decision to translate this quality as "prudence" may be misleading (see glossary entry in Irwin) if we assume "prudence" involves narrow self-preservation.

[img(100%,auto)[Kant's four examples|https://www.dropbox.com/s/c3wk4b322n4zw01/Kant%20purpose%20of%20reason.png?raw=1]]

+++!!!![Aristotle's text is not a dialogue... but it illustrates internalized dialogue, especially in considering puzzles:]
* the importance of fortunes after death: Solon's puzzle (1100a10)
* whether we act voluntarily when we are under threat (1110a5)
* we become virtuous by acting virtuously — how is that? (1105a, ref. back to 1103b)
===
+++!!!![Other puzzles may strike us while reading:]
* bootstrapping: to study what is "fine and right" we must already have been brought up right. (1095) 
* our education seems "not up to us", and yet our character is supposed to be voluntary. (III.5, 1113b5)
===

+++!!![Objective vs. Subjective happiness]
{{indent{
Utilitarianism, like Aristotelianism, emphasizes ''experience'' and ''psychology''.
It differs in its ''subjective'' conception of happiness. 
Mill’s happiness is not “eudaimonia”
Nor is it the (supposedly) objective measurable stuff of Bentham's calculus. 
}}}
===
+++!!![QUALITY: Are there more and less valuable kinds of pleasure?]
Bentham: All pleasures are *commensurable* (like all money)
{{indent{Note: We must try to understand this claim in light of the successful scientific quantification of many other “intangibles”. 
Consider measuring warmth (!) in terms of CALORIES, or measuring a color (!) by analyzing wavelengths.
Bentham anticipates that we can estimate HEDONS (and DOLORS), the smallest units of pleasure and pain.
}}}
Mill disagrees: Pleasures differ in quality as well as quantity.

Note: There is controversy over Mill’s arguments about how to tell better pleasures from worse... 

"It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied". 
{{indent{
What evidence can support such a claim? 
Can we make general comparative claims that hold for all or most people?
}}}
===
+++!!![Whose pleasures count?]
[>img[expandingcircle|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/expandingcircle.jpg]]
Utilitarians differ in the extension of  their moral concern: 
* human beings? 
* sentient beings?
Note, however, that Mill's claim is not that we must be always *thinking* about every being, but that impact of our (kind of) behavior on the aggregate of beings is what affects its moral value. Usually, we need only think about a small circle of beings directly affected by what we do.
===

See prior discussion questions at left here.

the doctrine that some important kinds of understanding are available as a priori knowledge -- dependent only upon reason, and not upon sensory experience.
----
//compare to:// empiricism

an objection to a claim, hypothesis, or argument, which draws attention to an extreme application of a position,  attempting to show the absurdity of a view by “reducing it” to some absurd implications.

Kant is often ridiculed by those who think his Universalizability test (checking whether one can will one's maxim to be universal law) yields bizarre results:
* "Have lunch at noon"
** ...  //seems// to fail ({{red{...What if everyone did that??}}})
* "Lie only 1% of the time, and unpredictably" 
** ... //seems// to pass ({{green{...people would continue to trust, right?}}})
Such examples are used in arguments that take a //reductio ad absurdum// form.
Either Kant's moral theory does //not// yield these results, or the theory has a serious defect.

+++!!!![How would Kant respond to such "absurd" results?]
# Psychological realism: your maxim (principle of action) revolves around what's //doing the work// in your choice. It doesn't depend on particulars <br>any more than laws of science mention //particular// diamonds or planets.
# No free lunch: coming up with a consistent maxim to rationalize your action doesn't guarantee that this is the maxim actually at work in your action. 
# Skepticism: It's always possible to come up with a description that makes someone's action look bad or irrational. Whether the bad maxim was operative is another matter.
===

a family of loosely related doctrines (or imputed doctrines), all of which insist that some claim or concept can only be understood or evaluated once a further variable is specified.

Clear doctrines of relativism specify what further variable helps determine our grasp of the concept in question. For example: "Cold weather" is a relative concept; in different climate zones, different weather counts as cold." or "Speed is relative; we need to specify a location (on the earth, on the moon, on a moving cruise ship) which is to count as the steady reference point for evaluation of speed." Unclear doctrines (especially when relativism is imputed rather than claimed) tend not to specify: "But if morality is relative, then anything goes." (Relative to what? is a good critical question.)

an answer to an objection, a defense or slight qualification of an argument intended to satisfy concerns raised by an objection. (Further objections might be called rejoinders, replies to replies, etc.)

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!!!Though existentialism is often associated with “despair”, Beauvoir warns us against the attitude of “seriousness”, which…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) involves insisting on taking responsibility for all of our choices, including our choice of values.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) characterizes most religion.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) can be an honest attitude only for someone whose life is completely controlled by others.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) involves not recognizing oneself as free.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) may prompt nihilism as an overreaction.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
}}}

+++!!![Philosophical Reasoning: argument]
The Greek practice of //dialectic// involves testing someone's asserted views for consistency (Socrates as "midwife"). 
Hypotheses are subjected to cross-examination (elenchus) -- different from disagreement-oriented debate.
===
+++!!![Mapping the Euthyphro]
See handout. 
Main Hypotheses in attempt to define piety (not counting "what I am doing now" as a definition):
# what the gods love (7a)
## what //all// the gods love  (9e)
# a part of justice...
## ... concerning ''care of'' the gods (12e)
## ... concerned with ''service to'' the gods (13d)
# knowledge of sacrifice and prayer...
## ... which //pleases// the gods, though they don't need anything from us.
===
+++!!![The Euthyphro Problem: Divine Command vs. Reasoned Religion]
See handout, examine [[order of explanation (10a-d)]] and [[core argument (11a)]]
===
+++!!![Reading for Thursday: Crito]
# Scan [[argument vocabulary|Definitions list]]; attend especially to:
## hypothesis
## elenchus
## premise
## conclusion
# Write a passage commentary if it's your turn. Post it //by midnight//
# Take a look at other students' commentaries, if it's not your turn.
===

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[<img(100%,100%)[glasses|https://i.pinimg.com/564x/8b/85/0f/8b850f3fad91d4e3d2985cc8e9cfbac4.jpg]]

a property had by an argument when the premises are true and when it is also valid.

See [[Spring 2019 opening questions set]]

!!!Emerson’s reflections in "Self-Reliance" suggest...
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Truth, and therefore virtue, is a matter of subjective perception; however, we must act as if our truth were everybody’s truth.]>
{{green{Yes. Important here is that Emerson focuses on perception (as opposed to accepted opinion), and his claim is not simply that whatever strikes us as true //is// true for others, but rather that it is “genius” to expect your convictions to become evident to others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) For society to progress, we must stop worshiping the past and relpace conformity with creativity.]>
{{red{No... Social progress is one of the preoccupations Emerson discourages.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) One cannot learn from others’ ideas, as all insight comes from intuition.]>
{{red{No... Emerson is ambivalent about learning from others insofar as we may idolize the teacher or genius of another; but there is no refusal to learn from others.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Acts done of out of self-reliance manifest divinity.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) We should avoid affirming principles and creeds, since preoccupation with consistency only hinders our ability to live fully in the present.]>
{{red{No... Emerson recommends against worrying about consistency over time (with a past self), but not about affirming principles and creeds in the moment.
}}}
===
}}}

Following Kant, a number of philosophers have articulated a dualism //not// of ontology, but of stance or approach.
PF Strawson: 
|"participant attitudes"|"objective attitudes"|
|love, gratitude, resentment, play|manipulation, prediction, control|

Dan Dennett: 
|"intentional stance"|"physical stance"|
|intends, wants, plans|affected by physical laws|

[img(100%,100%)[https://www.dropbox.com/s/iypxyy8w6my5j4x/step%20a.png?raw=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[step b|https://www.dropbox.com/s/p9exytrhhvpwsfj/step%20b.png?raw=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[step c|https://www.dropbox.com/s/zwt8x5cfb0zjck5/step%20c.png?raw=1]]

[img(100%,100%)[step d|https://www.dropbox.com/s/81ydb4fav2ff3g2/step%20d.png?raw=1]]

A Greco-Roman school of philosophy that emerged in the third century BCE, on which most suffering and distress resulted from lack of perspective and associated errors of judgment.
----
[from Wikipedia:]

!History

Beginning at around 301 BC, Zeno taught philosophy at the Stoa Poikile (i.e., "the painted porch"), from which his philosophy got its name.[12] Unlike the other schools of philosophy, such as the Epicureans, Zeno chose to teach his philosophy in a public space, which was a colonnade overlooking the central gathering place of Athens, the Agora.

Zeno's ideas developed from those of the Cynics, whose founding father, Antisthenes, had been a disciple of Socrates. Zeno's most influential follower was Chrysippus, who was responsible for the molding of what is now called Stoicism. Later Roman Stoics focused on promoting a life in harmony within the universe, over which one has no direct control.

Scholars usually divide the history of Stoicism into three phases:

* Early Stoa, from the founding of the school by Zeno to Antipater.
* Middle Stoa, including Panaetius and Posidonius.
* Late Stoa, including Musonius Rufus, Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius.

As A. A. Long states, no complete work by any Stoic philosopher survives from the first two phases of Stoicism. Only Roman texts from the Late Stoa survive.[13]
...
Later Stoics, such as Seneca and Epictetus, emphasized that because "virtue is sufficient for happiness", a sage was immune to misfortune. This belief is similar to the meaning of the phrase "stoic calm", though the phrase does not include the "radical ethical" Stoic views that only a sage can be considered truly free, and that all moral corruptions are equally vicious.[1]

From its founding, Stoic doctrine was popular with a following throughout Greece and the Roman Empire, including the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, until the closing of all philosophy schools in AD 529 by order of the Emperor Justinian I, who perceived their pagan character as being at odds with the Christian faith.

[<img[tankman|http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/d/d8/Tianasquare.jpg]]
!!!Does stoic philosophy (such as Epictetus' view) encourage or discourage political action?
+++!!!!![On one hand...]
It's reasonable to associate stoicism with quietism:
Embracing the world //as it is// is a central tenet; Stoics claim it is unwise to aim for "externals," including political change.
===
+++!!!!![On the other hand...]
Political action may be understood not as the desire to //change// the world, but as the commitment to //exemplify// justice, or to //demonstrate// a conviction.
In that case, stoicism then promises an exceptional kind of motivational strength:
The stoic political demonstrator cannot be deterred by threats, punishments, or even by the unlikelihood of success.
[img[self-immolating_monk|http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-zzhuBQCGwqw/UIn2ssZ89bI/AAAAAAAAHy0/aFCqtPqRKdc/s1600/Untitled-1.jpg]]
===

* Unit A
** [[Euthyphro|Euthyphro]]
** [[Crito|Crito]]
** [[Epictetus]]
** [[King|M.L. King's Letter]]
* Unit B
** [[Aristotle1]]
** [[Aristotle2]]
** [[Aristotle3]]
** [[Nussbaum]]
* Unit C
** [[Kant1]]
** [[Kant2]]
** [[Kant3]]
** [[Korsgaard]]
* Unit D
** [[Mill Ch 1-2]]
** [[Mill Ch 3-4]]
** [[Mill Ch 5]]
** [[Rawles]]
* Unit E
** [[Marx]]
** [[Nietzsche]]
** [[Beauvoir]]
** [[Plumwood]]
* Unit F
** [[Kohlberg]]
** [[Noddings]]
** [[Dewey]]
<<dropMenu>>

an assumption left unstated by the person giving an argument. 
----
//example: // 
{{{Experience is necessary to do this job. Therefore, young people cannot do this job.}}} 
This argument is enthymematic, because it suppresses the premise: young people lack experience.

[img(50%,auto)[huggingchimps|http://first100chimps.wesleyan.edu/images/Pan/pan&wendybabyPS.jpg]]

true or intelligible by means of conceptual synthesis, or putting distinct concepts together
(Antonym: analytic)
----
Many philosophers had treated [[synthetic]] [[knowledge]] as equivalent to things that are true [[a posteriori]] (only through experience of the world). Kant opposes this assumption, arguing that there are also [[synthetic]] [[a priori]] truths.

{{floatright{
|background-color:black;color:white;!domain|! <——|!//virtue//|!——> |
|!fear & confidence|cowardice| ''bravery'' | rashness|
|!pleasures & pains|intemperance| ''temperance'' | [insensibility]|
|!giving & taking money|ungenerosity| ''generosity'' | wastefulness|
|!handling large sums|stinginess| ''magnificence'' | ostentation|
|!honor & dishonor (great)|vanity| ''magnanimity'' | pusillanimity|
|!honor & dishonor (small)||||
|!anger|irascible| ''mildness'' | inirascibility|
|!daily pleasures|quarrelsome| ''friendly'' | ingratiating/flattery|
|!truth-telling|boastfulness| ''truthfulness'' | self-deprecating<br>pretense|
|!pleasure in amusements|boorishness| ''wit'' | buffoonery|
|!pleasure/pain re<br>others' fortunes|envy| ''proper''<br>''indignation'' | spite|
|!distributions|| ''justice'' ||
}}}"Virtue, then, is ''a state that decides'', consisting in ''a mean'', the mean relative to us, which is ''defined by reference to reason'', that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the [[prudent|prudence]] person would define it. It is a mean ''between two vices'', one of excess and one of deficiency." (1107a)

Doing the midterm essay as a take-home challenge is optional.
If you do: please use a word-processor to type your essay, and then print and bring to our midterm session. Time available to complete the non-essay portion will be reduced to 40 minutes if you choose this option.
# Set aside up to __''50 minutes''__. Note your ''start'' time and ''end'' time.
# __''Sequester yourself.''__ Ensure that texts, notes, conversation and online resources (etc.) are not available to you while you write. Your writing should be entirely based on what you have learned through study, and should be comparable to what someone might write out by hand in a classroom exam session. (You may use spell-check functions and cut/paste editing features, but no further electronic functions such as dictionary or thesaurus.) 
# Stick to a __[[''word limit'' of 500 words|word count tool]]__, trimming your essay, if needed, //before// the end of your 50-minute time interval.
# __''Print''__ your document, including your start-time and end-time, date of work completed, and WesID at the top, but {{red{__NOT your name__}}}. (I grade these anonymously.) ''Bring'' your printed essay to the midterm session.
# On a separate Honor Pledge sheet, I'll ask you to sign ("No Aid, No Violation") with your name and ~WesID. (I'll have index cards at the exam for this purpose, so you won't need to worry about bringing this.)

An assertion that functions as the main conclusion of the argument within an essay or academic project. 
---- 
Contrast against: problem-driven writing

Thesis-driven writing is common in academia, and much academic writing-advice assumes that your work should revolve around a thesis claim. 

(Problem-driven writing generally also includes a thesis-claim, but the purpose of the paper is first to engage the reader in appreciating a problem, and only second to present some contribution or progress toward a better perspective on the problem. Often a thesis-claim, in the context of a problem-driven essay, emerges only in the process of writing and revising.)

"Thick" norms and ideals are detailed specifications of value. Different cultural environments diverge greatly in the thick norms and ideals they tend to encourage.
"Thin"norms and ideals leave plenty of room for discussion; their point is to fix a reference for discussion in ways that leave open how such ideals can be realized.

!!!Which of the following claims might Dewey make about the experiences of students in an ethics class?…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) A well-rounded moral education must orient students to their potential role, as unique individuals, in solving social problems.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Students should come to see how different ethical ideas address the challenges and assumptions of different circumstances.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) The central task of an ethics class should be to give students knowledge of the major traditions and claims of moral philosophers.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) A good ethics class should provide students with a feeling of duty to act in ways that transcend selfish concerns.]>
{{red{No... 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) Prioritizing discussion and dialogue rather than indoctrination is not intrinsically important, but it is important at an institution like Wesleyan because of our role in a democracy.]>
{{red{No... This is difficult, however; Dewey certainly suggests that reflective education carries a special burden in democracy.
}}}
===
}}}

!!!Suppose you are a doctor who is in a position to secretly save four lives (those desperately awaiting transplants) by taking the life of one terminally-ill patient who is depressed, disoriented, and friendless, yet who has several healthy organs. Mill would say…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) Society benefits more from preventing such calculated sacrifice of some individuals for the sake of others than from the possibility of saving lives in such situations.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) We can never know with certainty the consequences of our actions, so we should not risk treating any person merely as a means.]>
{{red{No... This is Kant, of course -- not Mill!
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) Although killing one person to save others must count as an unjust action, it is not morally wrong from a utilitarian point of view.]>
{{red{No... All unjust actions are morally wrong, on Mill’s view. Injustice is a subset of moral wrongness.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) There is a great deal of disagreement about the nature of justice, so we must engage in a detailed cost-benefit analysis in difficult cases such as this one.]>
{{red{No... Justice is to be understood based on general considerations of utility; where justice is at stake, we generally should not decide on a case-by-case basis.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) If nobody has sympathy for the person whose life is taken, then the sentiments associated with justice will be irrelevant to this case.]>
{{red{No... p. 51: the desire to punish grows out of sympathy + retaliation instinct. However, though justice grows out of these sentiments, Mill does not endorse limiting rights to those for whom we happen to feel sympathy.
}}}
===
}}}

[img[rainbow|http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Rainbow_02.jpg]]

the doctrine that each person must place stock in certain ideas or claims even in the absence of direct evidence or logical proof. 

As a movement, transcendentalism emerged in early 19th century New England, especially Emerson and Thoreau.
Transcendental argument had been introduced and defended by Kant, and Plato's doctrine of Forms (especially his narrative of "recollection" of ideals) may be understood as a precursor to transcendental patterns of argument.

[[Radio show here:|https://www.wnyc.org/widgets/ondemand_player/wnycstudios/#file=/audio/json/799466/&share=1"]]

>Most of us would sacrifice one person to save five. It’s a pretty straightforward bit of moral math. But if we have to actually kill that person ourselves, the math gets fuzzy.
>
>That’s the lesson of the classic Trolley Problem, a moral puzzle that fried our brains in an episode we did about 11 years ago. Luckily, the Trolley Problem has always been little more than a thought experiment, mostly confined to conversations at a certain kind of cocktail party. That is until now. New technologies are forcing that moral quandry out of our philosophy departments and onto our streets. So today we revisit the Trolley Problem and wonder how a two-ton hunk of speeding metal will make moral calculations about life and death that we can’t even figure out ourselves.

This story was reported and produced by Amanda Aronczyk and Bethel Habte.

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "Aristotle3">>

[img(100%,100%)[2 ways|https://www.lucidchart.com/publicSegments/view/2076f8be-446a-4961-9594-aca936e6d369/image.png]]

!!!Nietzsche distinguishes two archetypes of moral attitudes: “master-morality” and “slave-morality.” His comments on these suggest…
{{indent{
+++!!!![(a) A wise person would call for the return to the old aristocratic values exemplified in the “master-morality.”.]>
{{red{No... 1007-1109, 1014
}}}
===
+++!!!![(b) Moralists who dwell on fairness, equality, and the general good should be seen as embracing variants on slave-morality.]>
{{green{Yes. 
}}}
===
+++!!!![(c) “Master-morality” is admirable insofar as it prioritizes the will to power over the mere will to self-preservation.]>
{{green{Yes. Gay Science 349
}}}
===
+++!!!![(d) Those who embrace master-morality will express contempt for any action that benefits others or places burdens on themselves.]>
{{red{No... The “master morality” does not involve a general obligation toward altruism or humility.... yet in various ways the “noble” mentality may involve honor, self-sacrifice, magnanimity (as in Aristotle’s noble soul), and the giving of favors (204)... the Aristocratic attitude (”master morality”) does involve “respect among equals” — but only among equals within a social order, nothing like a universal grounds for respect across all humanity.
}}}
===
+++!!!![(e) that the emergence of “slave-morality” results from a lack of creativity among inferior people.]>
{{red{No... In fact, there’s an ironic respect Nietzsche shows for the creativity of those who “invented” such a distinctive approach to values.
}}}
===
}}}

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A consequentialist approach to ethics that refers ultimately to the general good, or happiness, as the proper standard for moral philosophy.

structural integrity in the logic of an argument. 
----
//Note: // To say an argument is valid is to say this: //assuming // that the premises are (or were) true, then the conclusion must also be (would have to be) true. Sometimes an argument is valid even though it has false premises. On the other hand, an argument may be full of true claims, including a true conclusion, and yet fail to be logically valid.

>But does the utilitarian doctrine deny that people desire virtue, or  maintain that virtue is not a thing to be desired? The very reverse.  It maintains not only that virtue is to be desired, but that it is  to be desired disinterestedly, for itself. Whatever may be the opinion  of utilitarian moralists as to the original conditions by which virtue  is made virtue; however they may believe (as they do) that actions and  dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than  virtue; yet this being granted, and it having been decided, from  considerations of this description, what is virtuous, they not only  place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to  the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact  the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself,  without looking to any end beyond it; and hold, that the mind is not  in a right state, not in a state conformable to Utility, not in the  state most conducive to the general happiness, unless it does love  virtue in this manner- as a thing desirable in itself, even although,  in the individual instance, it should not produce those other  desirable consequences which it tends to produce, and on account of  which it is held to be virtue.

<<tiddler ShowTabsForTags with: "welcome">>

+++!!!![Many appeals to relativism mix up potentially very different claims...]
Popular fuzzy relativism: “He was doing what was right for him”
|!Interpretation #1:|!Interpretation #2:|!Interpretation #3:|
|He was doing was was right ''//from his perspective //'' (what he believed to be morally right).|He was doing what was in fact (on my understanding) the right thing ''//for his situation//'' (in his particular case).|He was doing what was ''//good for himself//'' (appropriate to his own concerns).|
|(Perhaps //you// don’t believe it’s right)<br>This claim calls simply for empirical attention to divergent beliefs|(Perhaps someone in a slightly different case should have done something else) <br>==>contextualism: attention to varying circumstances that affect moral justification|(Perhaps it really turned out badly for someone else)|
		Attention to multiple demands of morality: one can satisfy one demand while neglecting.
Philosophical advice: avoid such fuzzy language. It fosters fuzzy thinking!

https://wordcounter.net/

|We do not call something "wrong" unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it -- if not by law, then by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience. This is the turning point of the distinction between ''morality'' and mere ''expediency''. (48-49, 2nd ed.)|

Paraphrase: ''If something is wrong, then it ought to be punished.''

Two formal patterns of argument:
|modus ponens|modus tollens|
|P —> Q<br>P<br>So, Q|P —> Q<br>NOT Q<br>So, NOT P|

[img[Milldiagram|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/MillCh5.jpg]]

[<img(100%,auto)[http://d.pr/i/p69G+]]

{{outdent{
¶1 Some ascribe everything to self-love, regretting that human nature is too weak to follow something more noble.}}}{{outdent{
¶2 No matter how we flatter ourselves about our moral value, some secret impulse of self-love may explain our actions.}}}{{outdent{
¶3 Even if it is never actualized, we must emphasize that it's clear what reason commands (just as we may lament not finding true friends, but know what they must be like).}}}{{outdent{
¶4 Moral law holds for all rational beings, so it cannot be derived from experiences unique to human nature.}}}{{outdent{
¶5 Every supposed example of morality held up for imitation must first be examined by the light of reason's ideals.}}}{{outdent{
¶6 It should be obviously worthwhile to set out the pure a priori principles (though popular morality seems more attractive to many).}}}{{outdent{
¶7 Returning to popular-level discussion is good -- but only after getting principles clear (otherwise one gets a mish-mash)}}}{{outdent{
¶8 Popular accounts of morality mix human nature, perfection, happines, feeling, fear of God, etc.; but we must attempt pure practical philosophy (metaphysic of morals).}}}{{outdent{
¶9 Reflection on such a pure morality can have positive influence more powerful than other incentives (while mixed moral philosophy causes wavering).}}}{{outdent{
¶10 Tho' morals require anthropology to be applied, they must first be understood as pure philosophy.}}}{{outdent{
¶11 Here we switch from popular moral philosophy (which gropes about) to metaphysics; we must start with the practical faculty of reason, finding where duty emerges.}}}{{outdent{

¶1. The Will is a kind of causality… Freedom is independence from alien causes.
Natural necessity is property of the rest of nature; each thing is liable to outside causes.
¶2. The foregoing explanation of freedom is negative…
Freedom is certainly not lawlessness. (causality requires lawlikeness, otherwise it’s not cause, but randomness)
Freedom, then, is autonomy. (The will is a law to itself.) [Or, freedom=rational necessity, we’ll see]
¶3. Therefore if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality… follows…
The principle of morality is still synthetic, though. (cannot be proved by mere analysis)
Here’s the principle: The maxim of a good will… can have itself as content when extended universally.
To make it follow, we need to add the assumption of freedom.
¶4.Freedom must be Presupposed as a Property of the Will of All Rational Beings
Trying to get an empirical proof that humans are free is impossible, and not enough anyway.
(If humans are moral for some other reason than being rational, then there could be multiple “species” of rational beings, some of which could get out of it…)
PREMISE: We must necessarily attribute freedom to any will (any application of reason to practice)
The idea of applying reasoning to practice implies that the will is able to do something by its own power, rather than just being manipulated from outside. “Reason MUST regard itself as the author of its principles…”
[Note: Kant can’t prove that any of us are free, but that’s because he can’t prove we think of ourselves as causing our own actions. But he appeals to your intuitions here: don’t you determine your actions? Or, don’t you find that’s impossible for you to think of yourself as doing anything other than deciding and choosing?]
¶5. Concerning the Interest Attached to the Ideas of Morality [this paragraph is mostly summary]
¶6. But why should I subject myself to this principle…?
The “ought” of the categorical imperative is properly a would… what we would do insofar as we are (or were?) rational. But there are other forces acting on us, other inclinations.
¶7. Freedom, moral law, autonomy then seem to come to the same thing.
But why suppose that these concepts actually apply?
How do we come to believe that our worth lies in acting this way?
¶8. Indeed, we are capable of being motivated by worthiness (rather than just happiness). [450]
We do divorce ourselves from empirical interest, but don’t yet discern how that’s possible.
¶9. One must frankly admit… a sort of circle… among concepts of freedom, self-legislation, and autonomy.
¶10. However, one recourse still remains open…
Notice the difference between seeing self as a priori efficient cause
and coming to think of self as the cause in virtue of what we perceive through our senses.
¶11. No subtle reflection is required… to see that what we grasp in experience are always appearances,
that the REALITY of a think is something that remains unknown, but that we must assume exists.
There is a distinction between a world of sense and a world of understanding:
We have sensations and perceptions about ourselves (including “inner perceptions,”
yet we must also posit a substantial self “in there,” the “me (mind/cause)” behind all the perceptions.
¶12. Sometimes understanding tends to want to think of this deeper reality as also perceivable, but no.
¶13. While all understanding does is to organize our sense-perceptions by means of rules,
What REASON does, beyond that, is also to grasp the very difference between understanding & sense.
¶14. Reason recognizes itself as belonging to world of understanding, despite perceiving 2 kinds of causality.
¶15. If reason insists on its own causality, that will be DIFFERENT from the natural causes other things obey.
¶16. The appearance of circular reasoning has been removed; to see self as free is to see it as able to transcend physical causality, insofar as we understand ourselves as intelligible at all, we see ourselves as autonomous.

Kant denies ''moral dilemmas'':
No situation could //force us to violate duty// by pitting duties against each other, because...
+++!!!![1. Perfect duties cannot conflict...]since they are all basically negative: do not lie, cheat, steal (or otherwise treat another being in a fundamentally disrespectful way).
===
+++!!!![2. Perfect duties always trump imperfect duties...] the obligation to develop one's talents, or to give to charity, doesn't compete against the duty not to lie, etc.
===
+++!!!![3. Imperfect duties may indeed be in tension, but...] -- We might feel torn whether to spend this afternoon cultivating our talents or giving to charity. <br>''However'', imperfect duties are not //violated// simply by not being pursued in the present situation. They are violated only by a pattern of neglect.
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!!For the third Kant session:
!!!!please review the end of the second section (on autonomy and heteronomy)
!!!!...  then read the third section.